

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION

Francisco
Suárez

A COMMENTARY ON
ARISTOTLE'S
METAPHYSICS

(Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis)

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN
WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

by

JOHN P. DOYLE

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Francisco Suárez

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OR
"A MOST AMPLE INDEX
TO THE METAPHYSICS
OF ARISTOTLE"

(INDEX LOCUPLETISSIMUS

IN METAPHYSICAM ARISTOTELIS)

Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation

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Francisco Suárez

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To Mary Gale

My dear wife for the last forty-one years,
to our seven children, to their spouses,
and to our grandchildren, with love and
gratitude for all that you are and for all
that you have given me

INTRODUCTION

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), Scholasticism’s “Outstanding Doctor” (*Doctor eximius*),¹ was arguably the greatest Jesuit philosopher-theologian of all time. A case for this could be made from the viewpoint of his thought and also of what a German might call its *Wirkungsgeschichte*, its influence on later thinkers.² As regards his thought and its place in Scholasticism, my late friend and colleague at *St. Louis University*, Vernon Bourke, put things well when he very astutely wrote:

If we think of Thomism, Scotism, and Ockhamism as the three points of a triangle, then we may picture Suarezianism as a type of thought which falls within this triangle, on some questions moving closer to one point, on others approaching a different point. To some readers it looks like eclecticism but Suarezianism is a well informed and highly personal philosophy which shares some of the features of all the major schools of earlier Scholasticism with systematic consistency and coherence.³

From my personal four-decades-long study of Suárez and Suarezianism, I can and will, with conviction, second Professor Bourke’s judgment. While I would not call myself a Suarezian, in the sense of a simple follower of Suárez, I will confess to anyone that I have learned a tremendous amount from the *Doctor eximius*. I would also tell anyone who wants to learn the history of medieval philosophy, and especially the history of the Aristotelian tradition through the Middle Ages, that Suárez will be his best teacher. Here I agree, for the most part, with the greatest twentieth-century historian of medieval philosophy, my own teacher at the *University of Toronto*, Etienne Gilson, when he writes:

In the Preface to his *Metaphysical Debates* Suarez modestly introduces himself as a theologian who, to facilitate his own work, has felt it advisable to lay down, once and for all, the philosophical principles of which he makes use in his theological teaching. In fact, Suarez enjoys such a knowledge of medieval philosophy as to put to shame any modern historian of medieval thought. On each and every question he seems to know everybody and everything, and to read his book is like attending the Last Judgment of four centuries of Christian speculation by a dispassionate judge, always willing to give everyone a chance, supremely apt at summing up a case and, unfortunately, so anxious not to hurt

equity that a moderate verdict is most likely to be considered a true verdict. Rather than judge, Suarez arbitrates, with the consequence that he never wanders very far from the truth and frequently hits upon it, but, out of pure moderation of mind, sometimes contents himself with a 'near miss'.⁴

Forty years ago I would have accepted everything in Gilson's paragraph. But today I cannot accept its final appraisal of Suárez's passion for "equity," with its implication of a lawyer's eclectic mentality. Instead, I credit Bourke's estimate of "a well informed and highly personal philosophy" which displays a "systematic consistency and coherence." Yet, at the same time, I do totally embrace Gilson's estimate of Suárez as an historian, with which estimate Bourke would also have agreed.

While Gilson was immediately basing his remarks on the 1597 "Metaphysical Disputations" (*Disputationes Metaphysicae*), the same remarks easily apply to every work through Suárez's entire *Opera omnia*, which comprises 26 double-columned quarto Latin volumes in its last complete edition.⁵ Nonetheless, of all these works, undoubtedly it is the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* which is central and most important. It is fair to say that everything which Suárez ever published had a basis in the metaphysics that he systematically presented in the *Disputationes*.

As Bourke said, Suárez's philosophy was highly personal and also well-informed. It was deeply rooted in his scholarship and especially, going back beyond the four centuries mentioned by Gilson, in his knowledge of and sympathy for Aristotle. This is particularly manifest in the two volumes of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, where he has cited Aristotle, always with respect if not always with complete agreement,⁶ a total of 1735 times.⁷ In addition, he prefaced the whole work with the present "Most Ample Index to the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle."

Balancing the system in the *Disputationes*, the Index amounts to a late medieval commentary, "by way of question," on the first 12 books of the *Metaphysics*. Shorter in length than, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas' (1225–1274) commentary on the same 12 books,⁸ Suárez's Ample Index more than makes up for that by cross-referencing the *Disputationes* itself hundreds of times. In fact, the Index and the *Disputationes* are exactly as Suárez intended them to be, complementary of one another and mutually supportive.

More to explain, let me say that medieval commentaries on Aristotle were basically of three kinds.⁹ There were summaries or 'paraphrases' (*paraphrases*) of the text; 'expositions by way of comment' (*expositiones*

per modum commentii); and 'expositions by way of question' (*expositiones per modum quaestionis*). The first kind was illustrated by the work of Avicenna (980–1037)¹⁰ and among Christians, by St. Albert the Great (ca. 1200–1280).¹¹ The second was the method favored by Averroes (1126–1198), in his long commentaries on Aristotle,¹² and later by St. Thomas. The third method may be found in the *Quaestiones subtilissimae* ('Most Subtle Questions on the Books of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle') of Duns Scotus (1266–1308),¹³ as well as here in the Ample Index.

In this third method, customary questions which were occasioned by the text were raised and answered. Suárez's fellow Jesuit, Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599),¹⁴ used the third method. But alongside this he made a critical edition of the Greek *Metaphysics*, translated it into Latin, and gave explanations which were literal commentaries on Aristotle's text.¹⁵ In his Ample Index, Suárez was heavily dependent upon Fonseca's much longer and more elaborate work,¹⁶ but he limited his own effort to a commentary *by questions*, which would be coupled with the 2000 page systematic doctrine of the *Disputationes*.

To my mind, the first question about the Index which anyone should ask is: did Suárez read Greek? More specifically, was he reading a Greek text of the *Metaphysics*? I think the answer to both questions is decidedly affirmative. The education in humanities which Suárez received as a young man certainly required his learning Greek. During his student days at the University of Salamanca, studies in the language of Homer, Plato, and Aristotle were emphasized to the degree that in 1561, the year Suárez enrolled at the University,¹⁷ there were at Salamanca four concurrent Chairs of Greek.¹⁸ At the same time and through the decades after, the Jesuits were training their scholars in Greek.¹⁹ While second to Latin, this training in Greek was prescribed in the preliminary (1586) *Ratio Studiorum* ("Plan of Studies") of the Jesuit Order, for which *Ratio* Suárez was a member of a Jesuit evaluation team at Rome.²⁰ Greek continued to be prescribed for Jesuit schools in the definitive *Ratio Studiorum*, which appeared in 1599,²¹ just two years after the first publication of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. While Suárez may not have known Greek as well as Fonseca did, had he not been able to read it with some facility he would have been out of place as a leading Jesuit philosopher and theologian.

That Suárez was comfortable with Greek is supported, if not decisively proven, by numerous passages in the *Disputationes* and other works where he has commented on Greek words.²² It is true that in the *Disputationes* and in the Ample Index, he also shows that he had access to at least four Latin translations of the *Metaphysics*. In their chronological order, these were

authored by William of Moerbeke (ca. 1215–1286), John Argyropoulos (ca. 1415–1487), Cardinal Bessarion (ca. 1403–1472), and Pedro da Fonseca. Suárez usually shows a preference for Fonseca;²³ but he does not slavishly follow him. Thus on occasion he rejects Fonseca's translation or interpretation²⁴ and prefers the text of Argyropoulos or Bessarion,²⁵ and sometimes he is clearly making his own new version.²⁶

In the English translation for this volume, wherever Suárez is directly quoting Aristotle or Plato I have footnoted it with their Greek. As regards the Latin, in the corresponding places where Suárez is translating from the *Metaphysics*, I have footnoted the four Latin versions just mentioned. Accordingly, any reader who so desires can check Suárez's Latin against Aristotle's Greek (as well as my translation) and also against the Latin translations which Suarez had in hand. If he does that, I am confident that such a reader will conclude with me that Suárez was at least a fair Greek scholar. He could read Aristotle in the original. But he did rely on earlier translations, of which he could at times be critical. On the further matter of Suárez's citations: while they are usually accurate, at times he does make mistakes. Some of these might be only apparent in that they have resulted from his use of different texts from those which I was able to find. Or perhaps he was citing from a wonderful but still human and fallible memory. Often a mistake seems to be what he himself in at least one place has called a "typographer's error."²⁷ But while he may be one or two digits out of the way, the substantive point being made is usually valid.

There was one surprise I got came from Suárez's citations. After working with him in many other areas, I had come to expect that in a work as broad as the Index he would cite just about everyone before him. But he does not. In at least one of the Books of the Index²⁸ he has cited no one except Aristotle. And among those mentioned in the *Disputationes* but not in the Index are St. Augustine (354–430), St. Anselm (1033–1109), St. Bonaventure (ca. 1217–1274), Henry of Ghent (1217?–1293), Walter Burley (1275–1344?), Petrus Aureoli (1280?–1322), Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (d. 1334), Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), William of Ockham (ca. 1290–1349), Francis Lychetus (d. 1520), Domingo Soto (1494–1560), and Domingo Bañez (1528–1604).

Most times, I found his cross-references to the Index itself and to the *Disputationes* to be accurate. There were some discrepancies and, for whatever reason, there seemed to be more in the cross-references he gave in Book 12. Perhaps he was at that point less careful—possibly tired or rushing himself for a publication deadline. The thought also occurred that it might be his editors who made the mistakes. Either way, as one who over years has

included many cross-references in his writings, some of which in the end did not match, I can have sympathy. *In fine*, overall I was most impressed at how precise both his citations and cross-references were.

As the reader will see, the following volume is divided into translations and the corresponding Latin texts. The translations are in order:

(1) *Suárez's Plan for his Metaphysical Disputations*. This is his preface to the 1597 edition. It is an address to his reader in which he lays out his intention as a Christian theologian to pursue a Christian philosophy, specifically a metaphysics which will be at the service of his theology. This metaphysics will be in two main parts. The first of these will be what will shortly after be called an "ontology"²⁹ or a general science of being, in which after establishing "real being insofar as it is being" as the object of metaphysics, he will proceed to study its properties, its principles, and its causes. The second part will then descend from the general concept of being to study those beings, God and creatures, substances and accidents, which are contained under that concept. Finally, it should be noted that in this preface he speaks of the present Index and gives his reader some idea of its purpose.

(2) *The Proemium to the Second Metaphysical Disputation*. This short piece is important. After again indicating the systematic plan of the *Disputationes*, it contrasts that with the disorganized text of Aristotle and commentaries on it. But then he says that, in order to satisfy "students of Aristotle," he has added the present Index which follows the order of the *Metaphysics* and which gives cross-references to the Disputations. It will also, he tells us, comment at times directly on the text of Aristotle and will explore matters which for whatever reasons have not been covered well enough in the Disputations.

(3) Next comes the *Most Ample Index* itself. In this Suárez, as he promised, follows the order of the *Metaphysics*, essentially commenting on it as I have said, "by way of question." To appreciate this Index, a modern reader should have some familiarity with Aristotle's text and the main problems interpreters have encountered with it. To facilitate that, I have at the start of most Books added a summary of the remarks of Jules Tricot, the important French translator of the *Metaphysics*. I chose Tricot's remarks for a number of reasons. First, they were succinct. Second, they were the thoughts of an authentic scholar. Third, while Tricot's scholarship may be a few decades old, it is still valuable for understanding the main nineteenth and twentieth-century debates about the composition and the meaning of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, debates which often bear on problems which Suárez and the medievals encountered. Finally, there is something which will not

be evident from the summaries I gave, but which was in the background of my choosing Tricot. This is that he, unlike many contemporary writers, extends his interest out beyond the text of Aristotle to the traditions of his Greek and Latin commentators. In short, Tricot pursues understanding of Aristotle in a way which I am certain Suárez would endorse.

(4) *An Index of Disputations*: This amounts to a Table of Contents for the fifty-four Disputations which comprise the main portion of Suárez's work. To make it easier for readers to find these Disputations I have added volume and page numbers to Suárez's list. A further benefit of this may be that a reader will be able to see at a glance the relative importance which Suárez attached to each Disputation from the number of pages he allotted to it. In passing I did notice minor variations between some of the Section headings in the main text of the *Disputationes* and the Index of Disputations. Generally, in my notes I ignored such variations and mentioned them only on rare occasions.

Following the translations, the next portion of the current volume is devoted to the Latin texts. Thus I have transcribed in their original language the Preface to the whole work, the Prologue to the Second Disputation, the Most Ample Index itself, and the Index of the Disputations. The most important notes that I added contain the Latin translations mentioned above, i.e., those of Moerbeke, Argypoulos, Bessarion, and Fonseca. On this score, let me say that I deliberately separated the Greek of Aristotle from the Latin of Suárez and these others. My purpose in this was to allow interested persons to compare the Latin translations without the immediate distraction of the Greek. At the same time, the Greek will be available and matched directly to my English translation of Suárez's Latin. My hope is that this is clear and that it makes some sense to interested readers.

The volume includes a *Dramatis Personae*, that is, a list of and a few facts about persons whom Suárez mentions in the Ample Index. Again, I have added a bibliography of sources in various languages to which readers may go for more in depth understanding of the issues raised in the translated texts.

Ante-penultimately here, let me say something about my translation. It is as literal as I could make it in what I hope is still readable English. To achieve that, at times, I did break Suárez's long sentences into shorter ones; I also on occasion changed a passive to an active voice; and I changed an impersonal Latin construction to a more colloquial English personal one. With a goal of aiding comprehension, I frequently included the original Latin word or phrase after a translation, especially if that translation was a bit free. With the same goal, I have supplied words [in square brackets]

which are not actually in Suárez's text, but which seem clearly enough to be called for from the context.

Penultimately: a word about the source of my translation as well as about two previous modern translations of the Most Ample Index into languages other than English. For my Latin source, I used Charles Berton's edition of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* from the above-mentioned *Opera omnia*. On a few occasions, I corrected it for an obviously better reading. The two other translations were in Spanish³⁰ and in French.³¹ Both were sometimes useful, especially for detecting nuances in what Suárez had written. However, neither was very helpful for locating his citations or cross-references. The Spanish text translated them directly without any identifying or verifying footnotes. The French text does have footnotes but I found them to be vague and inexact.

Ultimately, I would like to share with interested readers a table of Chapter divisions from various relevant editions and translations of the *Metaphysics*. I apologize that I do not have the divisions, with their folios identified, of Argyropoulos and Bessarion in the work from which I cited them. I had that work for a limited time through Interlibrary Loan and I sent it back before it occurred to me to check the Chapter divisions in it. But that said, let me end this Introduction with the following table:

Various Chapter Divisions in Books 1–12 of the Metaphysics

As given by W.D. Ross

In: *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2 vols., Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1953.

Book I. Ten Chapters: (980a21–993a27).

Book II. Three Chapters: (993a30–995a20).

Book III. Six Chapters: (995a24–1003a17).

Book IV. Eight Chapters: (1003a21–1012b31).

Book V. Thirty Chapters: (1012b34–1025a34).

Book VI. Four Chapters: (1025b3–1028a6).

Book VII. Seventeen Chapters: (1028a10–1041b33).

Book VIII. Six Chapters: (1042a3–1045b24).

Book IX. Ten Chapters: (1045b27–1052a11).

Book X. Ten Chapters: (1052a15–1059a14).

Book XI. Twelve Chapters: (1059a18–1069a14).

Book XII. Ten Chapters: (1069a18–1076a4).

As given by Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)

In: *The Most Ample Index* (i.e.: *Index locupletissimus*).

- Book I. Seven Chapters (pp. I–IV).
- Book II. Three Chapters (pp. IV–IX).
- Book III. Six Chapters (pp. IX–XIV).
- Book IV. Eight Chapters (pp. XIV–XVII).
- Book V. Thirty Chapters (XVII–XXVI).
- Book VI. Two Chapters (pp. XXVI–XXIX).
- Book VII. Seventeen Chapters (pp. XXIX–XLII).
- Book VIII. Six Chapters (pp. XLII–XLVI).
- Book IX. Twelve Chapters (pp. XLVI–LIV).
- Book X. Thirteen Chapters (pp. LIV–LX).
- Book XI. Eleven Chapters mentioned (pp. LX–LXI).
- Book XII. Ten Chapters (pp. LXI–LXVI).

As given by William of Moerbeke (ca: 1215–1286)

In: *Metaphysica Lib. I–XIV*. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka. Edidit Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, ed. G. Verbeke, vol. XXV, 3.2 (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995).

- Book I, Nine Chapters (pp. 11–42).
- Book II, Three Chapters (pp. 43–47).
- Book III, Six Chapters (pp. 48–66)
- Book IV, Eight Chapters (pp. 67–91).
- Book V, Thirty Chapters (pp. 92–124).
- Book VI, Four Chapters (pp. 125–131).
- Book VII, Seventeen Chapters (pp. 132–167).
- Book VIII, Six Chapters (pp. 168–178)
- Book IX, Ten Chapters (pp. 179–194).
- Book X, Ten Chapters (pp. 195–217).
- Book XI, Twelve Chapters (pp. 218–245).
- Book XII, Ten Chapters (pp. 246–269).

**As given by John Argyropoulos (ca. 1415–1487)
and Cardinal Bessarion (ca. 1403–1472)**

In: *Aristotelis castigatissime recognitum opus metaphysicum...* [Parisiis]: Apud Henricum Stephanum, 1515.

- Book I. Seven Chapters (fols. 2r-15r).
- Book II. Three Chapters (fols. 15r-17r).
- Book III. Six Chapters (fols. 17r-25v).
- Book IV. Eight Chapters (fols. 25v-36r).
- Book V. Thirty Chapters (fols. 36r-50v).
- Book VI. Two Chapters (fols. 50v-53v).
- Book VII. Seventeen Chapters (fols. 53v-68v).
- Book VIII. Six Chapters (fols. 68v-73r).
- Book IX. Twelve Chapters (fols. 73r-80r).
- Book X. Thirteen Chapters (fols. 80r-88v).
- Book XI. Eleven Chapters (fols. 89r-100r).
- Book XII. Ten Chapters (fols. 100r-109v).

As given from Cardinal Bessarion

In: *Averrois Commentaria et Introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione latina*, Tom. VIII, Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562; 1573–1574.

(with Averroes' Comments interspersed)

- Book I. Five plus Four Chapters—i.e. Nine in all (fols. 1ra–27vb).
- Book II. Three Chapters (fols. 28rb–35vb).
- Book III. Eight Chapters (fols. 35rb–63rb).
- Book IV. Six Chapters (fols. 63vb–99rb).
- Book V. Thirty Chapters (fols. 100ra–143ra).
- Book VI. Two Chapters (fols. 143va–152ra).
- Book VII. Twenty Chapters (fols. 152vb–208rb).
- Book VIII. Eight Chapters (fols. 209rb–224vb).
- Book IX. Seven Chapters (fols. 225va–248rb).
- Book X. Four plus Nine Chapters—Thirteen in all (fols. 249rb–276rb).
- Book XI. Five Chapters + Two Chapters + Four Chapters—Eleven in all (fols. 277rb–285vb).
- Book XII. Four Chapters + Five Chapters—Eight in all (fols. 290va–339vb).

As given by Cardinal Bessarion

In: *Aristotelis Opera*, vol. III, *Aristotelis Latine interpretibus variis*, edidit Academia Regia Borussica (Berolini: Apud Georgium Reimerum, 1831), pp. 481–536.

Book I. Nine Chapters (pp. 481–487).

Book II (i.e., I Minor [α] in Bessarion's [or Bonitz's] listing) Three Chapters. (p. 487).

Book III (i.e. II) Six Chapters (pp. 487–491).

Book IV (i.e. III) Eight Chapters (pp. 491–496).

Book V (i.e. IV) Thirty Chapters (pp. 496–502).

Book VI (i.e. V) Three Chapters (pp. 502–503).

Book VII (i.e. VI) Seventeen Chapters (pp. 503–510).

Book VIII (i.e. VII) Six Chapters (pp. 510–512).

Book IX (i.e. VIII) Ten Chapters (pp. 512–515).

Book X (i.e. IX) Ten Chapters (pp. 515–519).

Book XI (i.e. X) Thirteen Chapters (pp. 519–524).

Book XII (i.e. XI) Ten Chapters (pp. 524–527).

As given by Pedro da Fonseca (1548–1599)

In: *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*. Tomi quatuor, Coloniae: 1615–29; rep. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964

Book I. Seven Chapters (Tome I, cols. 37–8—373–4).

Book II. Three Chapters (Tome I, cols. 375–6—549–50).

Book III. Six Chapters (Tome I, cols. 549–50—633–34).

Book IV. Eight Chapters (Tome I, cols. 633–34—929–30).

Book V. Thirty Chapters (Tome II, cols. 3–4—1141–42 [Note that all of Tome II is devoted to the 5th Book of the *Metaphysics*.])

Book VI. Two Chapters (Tome III, pp. 1–193).

Book VII. Seventeen Chapters (Tome III, pp. 194–437).

Book VIII. Six Chapters (Tome III, pp. 438–508).

Book IX. Twelve Chapters (Tome III, 509–670).

Book X. Thirteen Chapters (Tome IV, pp. 2–46).

Book XI. Eleven Chapters (Tome IV, pp. 48–76).

Book XII. Ten Chapters (Tome IV, pp. 78–131).

[In the 1570 edition of the *Opera omnia* of St. Thomas Aquinas there are two translations of the *Metaphysics*: (1) the *Versio Antiqua*, which is the text of Moerbeke, as given later in Cathala and Spiazzi, and (2) the version of Bessarion. Neither version is divided into Chapters. Instead, their divisions are into “*Lectiones*,” which are reproduced in Cathala and Spiazzi.³² In this arrangement, Book VI contains 4 *lectiones*; Book IX has 11; Book X has 12; Book XI contains 13; and Book XII has 12.]

Notes

- ¹ An honorific title, which came from a letter of commendation to Suárez by Pope Paul V. On this, see Raoul de Scorraille, S.J., *François Suarez de la Compagnie de Jésus* (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1912–13), vol. 2, pp. 126–7.
- ² For a recent brief presentation of Suárez, the man, his work, and his influence, see John P. Doyle, “Suárez, Francisco,” *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York, 1998), vol. 8, pp. 189–96. But still the main source for Suárez’s life is the just cited work: R. de Scorraille, *François Suarez ...*. In English, Joseph Fichter’s biography (*Man of Spain, Francis Suarez*, New York: Macmillan, 1940) is readable. For a shorter but still accurate presentation, cf. P. Monnot, “Suarez, François. I. Vie et oeuvres,” *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, XIV, 2^o partie (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1941) cols. 2638–2649.
- ³ Vernon J. Bourke, *Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964), p. 177.
- ⁴ Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2nd edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), p. 99.
- ⁵ Cf. Suárez, Franciscus, S.J., *Opera omnia*, 26 vols., Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–1866; plus two volumes of indices, 1878
- ⁶ It may be noted that Jesuit professors were obliged by the *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus* to follow Aristotle in philosophy wherever possible. For this, see: Sancti Ignatii de Loyola, *Constitutiones Societatis Jesu*, P. IV, c. 14, n. 3, in *Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu*, vol. 65 (Romae: Borgo S. Spirito, 1938), p. 151. For just one of a number of places where Suárez will not follow Aristotle for the reason that his view is incompatible with Christian Faith, cf. *Index locupletissimus*, IX, c. 9, q. 5, vol. 25, p. lii.
- ⁷ For this, see J. Iturrioz, S.J., “Fuentes de la metafísica de Suárez,” *Pensamiento*, numero extraordinario (Madrid, 1948), p. 40.
- ⁸ Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M.R. Cathala, O.P., Taurini: Marietti, 1950.
- ⁹ On the methods of medieval commentary, see esp. Martin Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristotelesstudiums im Mittelalter*, (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1939), pp. 17–54; and D.A. Callus, *Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford* [from *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 29 (1943)], London: H. Milford, 1944.
- ¹⁰ Cf., *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I–IV, édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale, par S. Van Riet, Louvain: E. Peeters and Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977.
- ¹¹ See, e.g. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I–II, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 16, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Münster im Westfalia: Aschendorff, 1960–64. Also see, Georg Wieland, *Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Neue Folge, Band 7 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1992), p. 11.

- ¹² Cf. Averrois Cordubensis, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros*, recensuit F. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.
- ¹³ See Joannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristolis*, in *Opera omnia*, (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), vol. 4, pp. 497–848.
- ¹⁴ On Fonseca, see John P. Doyle, “Fonseca, Pedro da (1528–99),” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge: 1998), vol. 3, pp. 688–90.
- ¹⁵ Fonseca’s *Commentary on the Books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics* (the first volume of which appeared in 1577) contained a Greek text which he had himself established from the best available manuscripts and printed editions. Through the first volumes, in a right hand column matching the Greek to the left, he gave a Latin translation. An explanation of the text followed each chapter and then commentary, by way of question, on most of the chapters throughout the first nine Books of the *Metaphysics*. A last volume, published after Fonseca’s death, gave the Greek and Latin, plus the explanation, for Books ten, eleven, and twelve, with just the text in the two languages for Books thirteen and fourteen.
- ¹⁶ For Fonseca’s influence on Suárez, cf. Eleuterio Elorduy, “Influjo de Fonseca en Suárez,” *Revista portuguesa de filosofia*, 11 (1955), pp. 507–519.
- ¹⁷ Cf. De Scorraile, vol. 1, p. 30; Fichter, p. 29.
- ¹⁸ Cf. article “Salamanca,” in *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana*, tomo LIII (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1926), p. 118b.
- ¹⁹ In the only place of which I am aware in which he mentions the study of Greek, Suárez cites the *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus* (Part II, Chapter 12, Paragraph 2), where St. Ignatius Loyola has prescribed the learning of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, plus other languages such as Chaldean, Arabic, and Hindi, where they may be needed. Cf. Suárez, *Tractatus de religione Societatis Jesu*, V, c. 3, n. 5, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 16(bis), p. 813.
- ²⁰ For this, see Allan P. Farrell, S.J., *The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education: Development and Scope of the Ratio Studiorum* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1938), p. 233.
- ²¹ For the Greek program of 1599, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 350–52. For the actual text of the *Ratio* as it pertains to Greek, cf. *Ratio atque institutio studiorum Societatis Iesu*, introduzione e traduzione di Angelo Bianchi, testo latino a fronte (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2002), pp. 246, 274, 286, 294, and 302.
- ²² See, for examples: *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (hereafter *DM*), 13, 11, n. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 25, p. 207; *ibid.*, 15, 1, n. 5, p. 499; *ibid.* 34, 1, n. 14, vol. 26, p. 352; *ibid.*, 42, 3, n. 7, p. 612; *ibid.*, 44, 13, n. 20, p. 728, and n. 28, p. 730.
- ²³ For Suárez on the worth of Fonseca’s translation, see esp. *Index*, I, c. 7, q. 1, vol. 25, p. iv.
- ²⁴ Cf. e.g. *DM* 22, 1, n. 24, vol. 25, p. 807.
- ²⁵ On these two, note that the humanist scholar, Jacobus Faber Stapulensis, in a dedication to Robertus Fortunatus with which he prefaced the work entitled, *Aristotelis castigatissime recognitum opus metaphysicum* a Clarissimo principe Bessarione Cardinale Niceno latinitate foeliciter donatum/ xiiii libris distinctum: cum adiecto in xii primos libros Argyropyli Byzantii interpretamento/ rarum proculdubio et hactenus desideratum opus. Deus optimus qui sub nomine ipsius entis in hoc opere celebratur: (Parisii: Apud Henricum Stephanum, 1515), has stated that Argyropoulos liked to paraphrase and that Bessarion was a more literal translator. Cf. “Sed revertamur ad Bessarionis interpretationem. Hanc charissime Fortunatus sic cum graeco contuli, et ad intelligentiam sicubi in devium flectebatur iter revocavi: ut hos libros nunc vel facile absque commentariis legi posse haud dubitem. Cui adieci Argyropolum qui magis sapit paraphrasten: Bessario vero potius partes interpretis agit, intelligent haec: qui latina graecis contulerint.”
- ²⁶ For a good example of Suárez using previous translators and commentators to get to the sense of Aristotle’s Greek text, cf. *Index*, VII, c. 3, q. 4, vol. 25, p. xxxi.
- ²⁷ *DM*, 47, s. 3, n. 3, vol. 26, p. 795.

²⁸ That is, Book 4.

²⁹ First to use this term was the Protestant Scholastic, Rudolph Goclenius (1547—1628) who in his *Lexicon philosophicum* (Francofurti, 1613), p. 16, coined the word in Greek.

³⁰ For this, see: Francisco Suárez, *Disputaciones metafísicas*, 7 vols., edición y traducción de Sergio Rábade Romeo, Salvador Caballero Sánchez y Antonio Puicerver Zanón, Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1960–1966. The translation of the *Index locupletissimus* is in volume 1, pp. 20–178.

³¹ Cf. *Suárez et la refondation de la métaphysique comme ontologie. Étude et traduction de l'Index détaillé de la Métaphysique d'Aristote de F. Suárez*, par Jean-Paul Coujou, Louvain/Paris: Éditions Peeters, 1999.

³² Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M.-R. Cathala, O.P. et R.M. Spiazzi, O.P., Taurini: Marietti, 1950.

SUÁREZ ON METAPHYSICS

The Plan and the Progression of the Whole Work To the Reader

Inasmuch as no one can become a finished theologian unless he first lays the firm foundations of metaphysics, so I have always understood that it would be worthwhile, before I would write theological commentaries (which I have in part already published, and in other part am working on now with the intention, God willing, that they be completed soon) that I would put forward this carefully elaborated work, which I am now offering you, Christian reader. But for good reasons, I was not able to defer studies (*lucubrationes*) on the Third Part [of the *Summa Theologiae*] of St. Thomas and it was necessary to commit them first of all to the press.¹ In time, however, I saw in a clearer light how that divine and supernatural theology wants and needs this human and natural [theology] so much so that I did not hesitate to interrupt for a little while the work I had begun in order to give, or better to restore, to this metaphysical doctrine its place and basic position. And although in working out that task I have been delayed longer than I first planned, and although there have been solicitations from many, who desire to see the completion of those commentaries on the Third Part or (if it can be hoped for) on the whole *Summa* of St. Thomas, nevertheless, I was never able to turn back from the work begun, and I hope that the reader will approve of my decision, especially as [he may be] led by the same experience.

But in this subject matter, I am acting as a philosopher, however in such a way that I am always aware that our philosophy should be Christian and it should be the servant of divine theology. I have prefixed this goal for myself, not only in treating questions, but much more in selecting views or opinions, leaning toward those which would seem to me more to serve piety and revealed doctrine. For that reason, halting in the philosophical progression, I do turn sometimes to certain theological matters, not so much to spend time examining or more accurately explaining them (which would be outside the task upon which I am now embarked) as to in a sense point a finger for the reader at the way in which principles of metaphysics are to be accommodated for and related to the confirmation of theological truths. I confess that in the study of the Divine perfections,

which are called attributes, I have delayed longer than perhaps the present enterprise would seem to someone to have required. But, first of all, the dignity and the excellence of those things compelled me and then, there is the fact that I have never seemed to myself to go outside the boundaries of natural reason, and neither therefore of metaphysics.

And since I have always considered that a great power to understand and to penetrate things is based upon inquiring and judging them by a fitting method, which [method] I could scarcely, or not even scarcely, observe, if in the manner of commentators (*expositores*), I were to treat all questions as they by the way and by chance occur in relation to the text of the Philosopher, I therefore reckoned it would be more expeditious and more useful, following the order of teaching, to ask about and to propose for the eyes of the reader all those things which could be investigated and desired about the object of this wisdom. To be sure, the first Disputation of this work explains what that object is and at the same time in that Disputation we initially speak of the dignity, the utility, and the other things which writers customarily put forward in the prefaces to works of science. Following this, in the first tome, the most full and most universal character of that same object, as well as its properties and causes, are carefully examined. And in the contemplation of causes we have spent more time than is ordinarily spent, because we have thought both that this was very difficult and also most useful for all philosophy and theology. Then in the second tome we have pursued the concepts which are ranged under that object, taking our beginning from the division of being into created and Creator, inasmuch as that division is prior and nearer to the nature (*quidditas*) of being and is more fitted for the development of this doctrine—which development, thus, proceeds through the things contained under these members to all the genera and degrees of being, which are contained within the boundaries and limits of this science.

However, because there will be very many who will desire that this whole doctrine be collated with the books of Aristotle, not only in order to better perceive on what principles of the so great Philosopher it is based, but also in order that it be more easily and usefully employed for understanding Aristotle himself, I have also sought to provide the reader in this matter with an elaborate index, in which, if it is attentively read, most easily (if I am not mistaken) all those things which Aristotle treated in the books of *Metaphysics* can be comprehended and retained in memory. And again, [with that index] all questions can be at hand which are customarily raised among the expositors of these books.

Finally, we have thought to advise the benevolent reader that this, indeed, is one work and that its Disputations would not have been separated from one volume unless some reason compelled us to do so. For first of all, we have separated it into two volumes lest it would have been burdensome because of its bulk. But, second, in order to fulfill, as far as possible, our obligation to those who are keenly interested in our work, we have launched this first volume as soon as it came from the printer, while the second volume has proceeded already to the point that I think this first part will not have been completely read, before it will appear. Our prayer is that both volumes and other things we are working on will redound to the great glory of God, the Best and the Greatest, and of the Catholic Church. Fare you well.

Note

¹ By the time Suárez is now (1597) publishing his *Disputationes metaphysicae*, his commentary on the Third Part of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas has appeared in three successive volumes; cf. *Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem Divi Thomae, tomus primus, autore P. Francisco Suarez, S.J.*... Compluti: In collegio Societatis Iesu, ex officina Typographia, Petri Madrigalis, 1590; *Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem... , tomus secundus*, Compluti: Ex officina Ioannis Gratiani, 1592; and *Commentariorum ac disputationum in tertiam partem... , tomus tertius*, Salamanticae: Excudebat Ioannes Ferdinandus, 1595. Of these volumes, the first comprised 785 pages in folio, plus 9 pages of front matter and 18 pages of indices; the second contained 1204 folio pages, plus 6 pages of front matter and 23 pages of indices; the third contained 3 pages of front matter plus 1326 folio pages. Still to come were two more volumes: tome 4 at Coimbra in 1602, comprising 1224 folio pages, plus front matter and indices; and tome 5 at Coimbra in 1603, which contained 1235 folio pages, plus front matter and indices. For all of this, see P. Francisco de P. Sola, S.J., *Suárez y las ediciones de sus obras: monografía bibliográfica, con ocasión del IV Centenario de su nacimiento, 1548-1948* (Barcelona: Editorial Atlantida, S.A., 1948), pp. 21-35.

THE PREFACE TO THE SECOND DISPUTATION

The Order and Nature of the Doctrine to be Followed in this Work.—Supposing those things which we have treated in regard to the object or subject of this science,¹ it is necessary first of all to explain its proper and adequate concept (*ratio*) and then its properties and causes.² And this will comprise the first principal part of this work.³ In the second part,⁴ we will propose the chief division of this subject and in this way we will investigate and explain insofar as they can be attained by natural reason all things which are contained under being and which include the character of being in such way that they fall under the objective consideration (*ratio*) of this science and abstract in their being from matter. For in order to use more concision and brevity and to treat all things with a suitable method, we have thought it necessary to abstain from a wordy explanation of the Aristotelean text and to contemplate the things themselves with which this science is concerned in that order of teaching and way of speaking which is most fitting to them. For, as regards the text of the Philosopher in his books of the *Metaphysics*, some of their parts have little utility, either because they propose various questions and difficulties and leave them unresolved, as for example in the whole of the Third Book [of the *Metaphysics*], or because we may waste time relating and refuting the opinions of ancient thinkers, as can be easily made evident from almost all the First Book and from a great part of the others, or finally because he either repeats or summarizes the same things which were said in previous books, as is clear from Book Eleven and other books. Indeed, those things which are useful and worthy and necessary to know, various Greek, Arab, and Latin interpreters have labored to explain enough as they are contained in the text of Aristotle. From these interpreters we are making use especially of explanations by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, and most of all, St. Thomas. But in the following Disputations we will examine these things and at the same time we will take care to accurately explain the mind and the meaning of Aristotle, and the individual texts on which almost all questions are usually based. But so that we might in every way satisfy those who are students of Aristotle, at the end of this work⁵ we have given an Index of all the questions which are customarily treated according to Aristotle's text and following its order, or which occur to us, and we have

designated the places in which we discuss them. But if perhaps some opinions of Aristotle, the knowledge of which is useful for other sciences, occur in these books, which may not be treated in our disputations, keeping to the order of doctrine which we establish, in the same index we give brief commentaries on the text of Aristotle, in which we explain whatever was not touched on in the disputations and has some difficulty or utility. Therefore, in the present Disputation⁶ we must answer the question, what is being insofar as it is being. For, that being is, is so self-evident that it needs no explanation. However, after the question, *whether it is*, the question of *what a thing is* is the first of all questions which it is necessary to presuppose or to declare in the beginning of any science about its subject. But this science, since it is the first and the highest of all natural sciences, cannot take from another science as proved or explained the concept and nature of its subject, and therefore it is necessary to treat and explain it immediately in the beginning.

Notes

- ¹ See the First Disputation: "About the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics," in: R.P. Francisci Suarez, S.J., *Opera omnia*, editio nova (Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1856–66). vol. 25, pp. 1–64. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Suárez will be from this edition.
- ² This will take Suárez from the present Disputation to the end of Disputation 27.
- ³ It will also comprise the first tome of the work.
- ⁴ Which begins with Disputation 28.
- ⁵ Note the place assigned here to the "Most Ample Index." As may be seen in other notes, Suárez will put his Index before the main text of the "Metaphysical Disputations."
- ⁶ That is, Disputation 2: "About the Essential Nature or the Concept of Being," in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 64–102.

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

A MOST AMPLE INDEX TO THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE¹

In which the order and character of its books are laid out, a brief summary of all is proposed, and all questions, which can be or ordinarily are raised, are indicated, together with the passages in which they are discussed in the following work. But if lesser things which pertain to the understanding of the text have been omitted in the work itself, in this index they are briefly brought out.

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS²

This whole book is introductory and is divided into two parts. The first of these properly contains an introduction, in which the [subject] matter and dignity of this doctrine is broached—more generally in the first chapter and then more in detail in the second.³ In the second part, through seven more chapters,⁴ opinions of ancient philosophers about the principles of things are related and refuted by Aristotle.

The First Introductory Chapter

Question 1. What is the true meaning of Aristotle's axiom, "Every man naturally desires to know?"⁵ [See:] *Disputation 1, Section 6.*⁶

Question 2. Whether sight is more useful for science than the other senses, and for what reason is it preferred to the other senses? *ibid.*⁷

Question 3. Which brute animals have only sensation, which have memory, and what kinds also have experience and prudence, and in what way? *ibid.*⁸

Question 4. In what way does a man acquire experience through memory, but art and science through experience, and what is the difference between these? *ibid.*⁹ The opinion of Polus, which Aristotle brings in here,¹⁰ namely, "expertise (*peritia*) has begotten art and inexperience

fortune,” is found in the *Gorgias* of Plato as follows: “Many arts in men are found to come by skilled experience. For expertise (*peritia*) brings it about that our way proceed by art, but inexperience that it randomly wander about by fortune.”¹¹ From both the signification and the meaning of the words, this opinion seems rather different; however, the words of Aristotle explain that the terms “expertise” and “inexperience” are not to be taken as broadly in Plato as they present themselves in their absolute signification. For expertise (*peritia*) not only is said of experience (*experientia*) but also of art. Therefore it cannot properly be said that expertise generates art, except by reason of experience. But the second part of this opinion seems better explained in Plato; for inexperience not so much generates fortune as exposes a man to fortune and to chance.

Question 5. Whether experience is absolutely necessary in order to know the principles of sciences? *ibid.*¹²

About subsistence—Question 6. In what sense has it been said by Aristotle that all actions relate to singular things?¹³ [See:] *Disputation 34, Section 9* [sic].¹⁴

Here, however, as regards the text of Aristotle, it should be observed that he asserts that the physician directly (*per se*) cures Socrates,¹⁵ that is to say an individual man, but incidentally (*per accidens*) he cures man. He suggests the reason, which is that it happens by accident that Socrates is a man. But both things entail difficulty. For Peter is a man, not by accident but essentially (*per se*). But if “to be by accident” does not there signify to belong from an accident, but to absolutely inhere (as St. Thomas explains¹⁶) Aristotle has not rightly inferred that man is cured by accident.

Neither does another explanation seem satisfactory, an explanation advanced by St. Thomas¹⁷ and Alexander of Hales,¹⁸ namely, that although absolutely it is not accidental to Peter to be a man, nevertheless, it is accidental to Peter that he be cured. For that does not seem true, because /p. II/ in order that Peter can be cured, it is necessary that he be a man. Therefore, the medical doctor’s curing is not exercised by accident with respect to man, since of its proper nature it cannot be exercised with respect to another nature, just as vision is not exercised by accident with respect to color, even though always and necessarily it must be exercised in a singular case with respect to a particular color. For just as color is the object of sight, so in its own way is the human body the object of medicine.

The answer is that Aristotle is not speaking of curing in an absolute and abstract way, in which way curing is rather conceived than exercised. But he is speaking about this action of curing insofar as it is actually exercised in reality. And he is saying that this is by accident related to man, not

because this is completely accidental to him, but because it is not directly and immediately (*per se primo*), and as it were adequately, concerned with man as such, but as restricted to this individual man on whose proper complexion and disposition the curing most of all depends. Hence, “by accident” (*per accidens*) here seems to be the same as “by another” (*per aliud*) which is at least conceptually (*ratione*) distinct. Or it is the same as “through a part” (*per partem*), in the way in which a singular thing is a subjective part of a specific whole.¹⁹ For in this way a whole is in a certain manner said to be moved “by accident” by reason of [the motion of] a part. And with this, the explanation of the other proposition fits very well, namely, it is accidental to Socrates that he be a man, that is, it belongs to him as to a subjective part contained under [the species] man. Or indeed it can be said to be accidental in the way in which an inferior difference is accidental to a genus, that is, outside its concept (*ratio*). For in this way the proper dispositions of an individual are outside the concept of its species—which is enough in order that man be said to be cured by accident (*per accidens*), that is, through another (*per aliud*). However, in this sense it should rather be said that Socrates is accidental to man instead of the converse. Nevertheless, in reality the same thing is signified and everything tends to the same end, namely, that it be understood that the action for the most part depends upon the dispositions of the individual, which dispositions fall more under experience than under art. And therefore, it is understood that art without experience is exposed to error and to chance (*fortuna*), as was said above.

Question 7. Is it only speculative knowledge or is it also practical knowledge which is desired for a knowledge of truth? [Cf.] *Disputation 1, Section 6.*²⁰

Question 8. Whether the science of metaphysics is for its own sake most of all desirable by a man? *Disputation 1, Section 6, through the whole Section.*²¹

Chapter Two of the Introduction

Question 1. What is wisdom and in how many ways is the term taken? *Disputation 1, Section 5.*²²

Question 2. How does wisdom contemplate all things as well as their causes and principles? *Disputation 1, Section 2, through the whole Section;*²³ and *Disputation 1, Section 5.*²⁴

Question 3. Are things most universal most difficult for us to know? *Disputation 1, Section 5.*²⁵

Question 4. Does metaphysics surpass the other sciences, especially mathematics, in certitude? *Ibid.*²⁶

Question 5. Is metaphysics, or wisdom, more certain than the habit of principles? *Ibid.*²⁷

Question 6. Does metaphysics properly demonstrate through all the causes? *Ibid.*²⁸

Question 7. Is metaphysics better suited than other disciplines for teaching? *Ibid.*²⁹

Question 8. Is metaphysics the speculative science by which the cause of knowing truth is sought? *Disputation 1, Section 4, at the beginning;*³⁰ *and Section 5, at the beginning.*³¹

Question 9. Whether and how wisdom or metaphysics commands the other sciences? *Ibid.*³²

Question 10. Are all sciences subordinated to metaphysics? *Disputation 1, Section 5.*³³

Question 11. Is metaphysics at once both science and wisdom? *Ibid., through the whole Section.*³⁴

Question 12. How is metaphysics useful for other sciences? [*Disputation 1*], *Section 4.*³⁵

Question 13. Whether and in what way metaphysics demonstrates the objects of the other sciences? *Ibid.*³⁶

Question 14. How metaphysics is compared to other sciences in the order of teaching. *Ibid.*³⁷

Question 15. How metaphysics demonstrates first principles. *Disputation 1, Section 4.*³⁸

Question 16. What is the habit of principles? *Ibid.*³⁹

Question 17. Does metaphysics or dialectics treat the instruments of scientific knowing (*sciendi*), or what in this task is proper to each? *Disputation 1, Section 4.*⁴⁰

Question 18. Whether wonder arises from ignorance? Indeed, this axiom is ordinarily taken from this Chapter. For Aristotle says: men began to philosophize because of wonder,⁴¹ in order, namely, that by the acquisition of knowledge they would dispell ignorance. However, it should be noted that Aristotle said only: He who doubts and wonders, clearly thinks that he does not know.⁴² Therefore, he joined two things, namely, doubting and wonder. Thus, it does not seem necessary that everyone who wonders is ignorant, but only one who while he wonders is also doubting. This is noted by the way because of Christ's wonder, which although it was true wonder,

did not however come from ignorance, as I have extensively explained in Tome 1, in commentary on [the *Summa Theologiae*] of St. Thomas, Part III, question 15, article 7 [sic],⁴³ from which place the true explanation, or rather the limitation, of this axiom must be sought./p. III/

Question 19. Is it beneficial for a man to spend time on the study of wisdom? About this question, which is most clear, it will be enough to consult Aristotle and to carefully note what he says in this place in praise and commendation of wisdom. For he has some sentences which are worthy of consideration. The first is: “The Divine science, or the contemplation of God, which is called wisdom, is most of all free, and therefore in human nature, which is in many ways servile, it cannot be perfect; but only God may claim it for himself as his own.”⁴⁴

But it is necessary to notice that Aristotle has taken this last dictum from a certain Simonides⁴⁵ and he means, as St. Thomas,⁴⁶ Boethius,⁴⁷ and others interpret, that he [i.e. Simonides] has thought that a man should not seek Divine wisdom because this is not fitting for his nature but [for the nature] of God alone. And therefore, says Aristotle, if, as the poets say, with respect to God there can be envy especially that would be in the case of those men who are seeking Divine wisdom.⁴⁸ To which the saying of Socrates applies: “What things there are above us, don’t matter to us.”⁴⁹ And the wise man also will counsel: “Search not things higher than yourself.”⁵⁰

But rightly the Philosopher rejects that dictum in that sense, or rather as [Alexander of] Aphrodisias explains,⁵¹ he understands and moderates that opinion in such way that God alone is believed to exactly and perfectly possess this wisdom.

From this it does not follow that a man should not spend time on the study of wisdom. But rather it follows that he should maximally and with all his powers seek this wisdom, in order to be like God inasmuch as possible. And this is what Aristotle says below under a disjunction: “That, namely wisdom, is either God himself or He most of all has it.”⁵² Therefore, he denies that a man seeking this science is envied by God, both because Divinity cannot be envious and also because otherwise a man who would seek this knowledge would be unhappy. For what greater unhappiness would there be than to have God as an adversary who would begrudge his proper advantages? Moreover, it is absurd to say that wisemen, by the very fact that they are wise, are unhappy, since rather it is in wisdom that the happiness and the eminence of a man consists.

In the same vein, the Philosopher himself, in the *Ethics*, Book 10, Chapter 7, reprehends those who say that it is necessary for us, inasmuch

as we are men, to enjoy human things, and inasmuch as we are mortal, mortal things. In contrast, he says that we, insofar as possible, should free ourselves from (*vendicare a*) our mortality and do all things “so as to live in harmony with that part of us which is best, that is, our mind.”⁵³ And in Chapter 8,⁵⁴ he adds that he who so lives and cultivates wisdom is most beloved by God, and most of all honored and rewarded by God. But this must be understood as regarding those who seriously and on their own initiative seek Divine wisdom. For those who wish by their own reason and judgment to comprehend and to measure the Divinity are without doubt envious of God. It is these men that the [biblical] Wiseman counsels not to seek things higher than themselves. For as he has said in another place: “a searcher of Majesty will be overwhelmed by [His] glory.”⁵⁵ This is not because God is envious of him, but because he is punishing his rashness and pride. But if these things are true, which Aristotle said about natural wisdom, as indeed they are, for a much higher reason they are fitting with respect to supernatural and Divine contemplation, which makes men almost divine and in a certain way free and immune from the slavery of the body. But there will be more about this elsewhere.

Question 20. Does this science speak about God as its object or only about him as the principle and cause of all things? [See:] *Disputation 1, Section 1.*⁵⁶ But how according to natural reason is it true that God is the principle and the cause of all things, and that he possesses whatever is perfect and excellent, and that he envies no one, but does good to all, and how He alone perfectly knows and enjoys Himself (for Aristotle indicates all of these things about God), are treated in *Disputations 30*⁵⁷ and *31* [sic]⁵⁸ which deal with natural knowledge of God.

Chapter Three

About Various Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers Regarding the Principles of Things

Question 1. How many causes are there of natural things? This is extensively treated around Book 5; from *Disputation 12*,⁵⁹ through several [after].⁶⁰

Question 2. What were the opinions of the ancients with regard to the principles of things? *ibid.* *Disputation 13, Sections 2 and 3.*⁶¹

Question 3. Whether the same thing can move itself? This is broadly [treated in] *Disputation 18, through the whole of Section 4.*⁶² But in this place, the words of Aristotle are: “that which is subjected [to motion] does

not effect its own mutation.”⁶³ This will be explained at the end of the mentioned Section.

Question 4. Whether it is evident that the order of this universe is not by chance, but rather that it is established by the intention⁶⁴ of some agent? This is extensively treated in *Disputation 30, Section 2*,⁶⁵ and there are some things also in *Disputation 23, Section 1*.⁶⁶ But the words of Aristotle in this place [Book 1, Chapter 3] should be very much noted: “It is not right,” he says, “that so great a thing,” namely, the order of the universe, “be assigned to chance and fortune. Therefore, he [Anaxagoras] who said that mind, just as in animals, so also in nature is a cause both of the world and of all the order in it seemed to be, in comparison those who were before speaking rashly, like a sober man.”⁶⁷ So also in Plato’s *Phaedo* Socrates very much praises Anaxagoras for this that he said “mind arranges all things /p. IV/ and is the cause of all things.”⁶⁸

But the comparison with animals can be understood in two ways: first, that by “animals,” through a kind of antonomasia,⁶⁹ there is understood “men,” so that an argument is being made from the microcosm to the macrocosm. Second, it can generally be taken for all animals in which the composition and the ordering of all their members is, as more wise philosophers have discovered, so contrived that it cannot come to be except by a maker endowed with mind. From this an argument is taken to prove with greater reason that this must be thought about the whole universe, in which all things are so composed and ordered that on that basis it has been said even by many philosophers to be like a single animal, as Albert [the Great] has noted in the beginning of [his Commentary on] the *Metaphysics*, Treatise 3, Chapter 3.⁷⁰

Chapter Four About the Same Opinions

In this chapter no new question occurs. It may be noted only that in this place Aristotle confirms what in the fourth opinion in the preceding chapter he said about mind and the maker of the world. And, giving a most beautiful example, he at once praises and blames the ancient philosophers who had known that truth. “They act,” he says, “just as untrained men do in a fight. For when they rush in all directions, they very often cause remarkable wounds, but they do not act from art. Nor do these [philosophers] seem to hold by science those things which they say.”⁷¹

Chapters Five and Six About the Same Thing

Question 1. A special question can be treated in connection with these chapters about the opinion of Plato, since that is most famous—namely, whether he posited Ideas in the way that Aristotle attributed to him? Again, [understood] in that sense, is he rightly opposed by Aristotle, especially since in this place, Chapter 6,⁷² Aristotle concludes that he [Plato] removed efficacy from the Ideas, by positing them as immobile? But about this matter we have spoken when treating of universals in *Disputation 5*,⁷³ and about exemplar causes in *Disputation 25*,⁷⁴ and about the efficacy of Intelligences in *Disputation 35, the last Section*.⁷⁵

There can be a *second question* here near the end of Chapter 6: whether besides the four kinds of causes there should be posited an exemplar cause, or some other cause? This is treated in *Disputation 25*,⁷⁶ and it is mentioned in *Disputation 12, the last Section*.⁷⁷

Chapter Seven The Opinions of the Ancients Are Opposed

Question 1. With respect to this chapter, two or three questions can most especially be asked. First, are Aristotle's arguments against the ancient philosophers efficacious, particularly those against the Platonists? Second, are those things true which Aristotle says in Chapter 7⁷⁸ about numbers and magnitudes? Third, is *form* the whole essence (*quidditas*)⁷⁹ of material things, as Aristotle suggests here in Chapter 7, Text 5.⁸⁰ However, I think that the first question should be omitted, (1) because those opinions of the ancient philosophers as they are treated by Aristotle are now antiquated and completely rejected by philosophy, and (2) because in his arguments Aristotle (*Philosophus*) has mentioned nothing which can bring any benefit for knowing other things. Accordingly, I think it useless to spend time in either explaining or defending those arguments. But they may be read in the commentators (*expositores*), especially [Pedro da] Fonseca whose translation is so elegant and lucid that it can be read by almost anyone without a commentator.⁸¹

The *second question* embraces many things which we treat in the *Disputations on Quantity*, that is, 40⁸² and 41.⁸³ The *third question* is treated in *Disputation 36, Section 1*.⁸⁴

Notes

- ¹ It may be noted that Suárez knew of fourteen books in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. But, perhaps following the lead of St. Thomas before, he will comment here on only twelve. He does mention Books 13 and 14 one time in this *Index* (cf. Book 3, Chapter 1, Question 18). I cannot now recall any references in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* itself to Books 13 and 14, although I am certain that I have seen a few. In connection with the availability of all fourteen books prior to Suárez, we can say the following: (1) Alexander of Aphrodisias or Pseudo-Alexander (i.e. Michael of Ephesus), *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck, in *CAG*, Berlin: Reimer, 1891, has commented on 13 (M) and 14 (N); (2) Syrianus, *In Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. W. Kroll. Berlin: Reimer, 1902, has commented on M and N; (3) St. Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer, Munster in Westphalia, 1960 and 1964, has commented on 13 books, including 13 and 14, but he lacked Book 11, which had not yet been translated by Moerbeke. Bernhard Geyer (*Ad Metaphysicam Alberti Magni Prolegomena*, in *Opera omnia*, tomus XVI, pars 1, p. vii) tells us that Albert probably composed his commentary not long after 1262–3; (4) About that time, William of Moerbeke, O.P., edited and translated all 14 books; cf. *Aristoteles Latinus*, ed. G. Verbeke, vol. 25, 3.2, contains *Metaphysica* lib. I–XIV. *Recensio et translatio* Guillelmi de Moerbeke, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem, Leiden: Brill, 1995; (5) St. Thomas Aquinas (*In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, ed. Cathala [Taurini: Marietti, 1950]) commented on books I–XII. A check on authorities cited in the *Summa Theologiae* and *Summa Contra Gentiles* shows what I counted as 458 citations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, all of them from Books I–XII; cf. Leonine edition of the *Opera omnia*, vol. XVI, pp. 185–7; (6) Pseudo-Alexander of Hales (Alexander Bonini), *In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio* (Venetiis, 1572), has commented on books I–XII; (7) Both Duns Scotus (*Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*) and Pseudo-Scotus [i.e. Antonio Andreas] (*In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*)—in the Wadding edition of Scotus's *Opera omnia* (Lugduni, 1639), tome IV—have only Books 1–12; (8) In the 15th century, John Argyropoulos (see in: *Aristotelis castigatissime recognitum opus metaphysicum* [Parisiis: Apud Henricum Stephanum, 1515]) has translated Books 1–12; (9) The 1562 edition of Aristotle with Averroes' commentary (*Averrois Commentaria et Introductiones in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum versione latina*. Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562; 1573–1574) contains Books 13 and 14 (in Cardinal Bessarion's 1450 translation)—but there is no commentary on them; and (10) Pedro Fonseca, S.J., *Commentarii in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*. 4 vols., Cologne, 1615–29. [reprint, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1964], has the text of all fourteen books, but no commentary on Books 13 and 14.
- ² Note that the text of this First Book which Suárez possessed was divided into 7 Chapters, rather than into the 10 as found in modern Post-Bekker editions.
- ³ That is, *Metaphysics* 1.1–2.980a20–983a23.
- ⁴ *Metaphysics* 1.3–9.983a24–993a27.
- ⁵ “Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.” *Metaphysics* 1.1.980a21.
- ⁶ Cf. *Disputationes metaphysicae* (hereafter *DM*), disp. 1, sect. 6, num. 3, in Francisco Suárez, *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–1866) vol. 25, pp. 53–4.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, nn. 11–12, pp. 55–7.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, nn. 16–22, pp. 58–9.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, nn. 23–30, pp. 59–63.
- ¹⁰ *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a4.
- ¹¹ Cf. “...πολλὰ τέχνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ἐμπείρωσ ἡρημένα· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην.” Plato, *Gorgias* 448C. For an example of Suárez critically approaching the text of Plato, cf. *DM* 2, s. 2, n. 3 (vol. 25, p. 207).

- ¹² *DM* 1, s. 6, nn. 29–30, pp. 62–3.
- ¹³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16.
- ¹⁴ *DM* 34 contains only 8 Sections. I have not found a passage which will fit Suárez's reference here. But, cf. *DM* 29, 1, n. 35, vol. 26, p. 32, where he explicitly says that actions relate to singular things.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a19.
- ¹⁶ Cf. S. Thomas Aquinatis, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* I, c. 1, lect. 1, ed. M.-R. Cathala, O.P. et R.M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), p. 9, nn. 21–22.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 21.
- ¹⁸ Cf. Alexandri de Ales, O.M. [actually, Alessandro Bonini, aka Alexander of Alexandria (ca. 1270–1314)], *In duodecim Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros dilucidissima expositio*, I, t. 5 (Venetiis: Apud Simonem Galignanum de Karera, 1572), fol. 5rv. For Bonini's influence on Suárez, cf. Ramón Ceñal, S.J., "Alejandro de Alejandria: su influjo en el Doctor Eximio y la dificultad criticista," *Pensamiento*, 4, numero extraordinario (1948), 91–122.
- ¹⁹ Subjective parts divide a universal whole. For examples: at the level of a genus, the universal whole, *animal*, is divided into subjective parts such as *man* or *dog*, or, at the level of a species (as in the present text), the universal whole, *man*, is divided into subjective parts such as *Peter* and *Paul*.
- ²⁰ Cf. *DM* 1, 6, n. 15, vol. 25, p. 57.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–64.
- ²² *DM* 1, 5, vol. 25, pp. 37–53.
- ²³ *DM* 1, 2, vol. 25, pp. 12–22.
- ²⁴ *DM* 1, 5, vol. 25, pp. 37–53.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.* nn. 16–23, pp. 41–3.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 26, p. 44.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 30, pp. 45–6.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, nn. 39–42, pp. 48–9.
- ²⁹ Cf. nn. 34–7, pp. 47–8.
- ³⁰ *DM* 1, 4, nn. 1–3, vol. 25, p. 26.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 5, nn. 1–2, p. 37.
- ³² *DM* 1, 5, nn. 3–4, pp. 37–8.
- ³³ Cf. nn. 44–52, pp. 50–53.
- ³⁴ Cf. *DM* 1, 5, pp. 37–53, in which Suárez asks the question: "Whether metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science, and whether it is true wisdom?"
- ³⁵ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 6–12, vol. 25, pp. 27–8.
- ³⁶ Cf. nn. 9–12, p. 28.
- ³⁷ n. 13, p. 29. The "order of teaching" (*ordo doctrinae*) is something which Suárez mentions frequently throughout his works. This paragraph 13 is particularly instructive for its understanding. Briefly, he distinguishes between an order of doctrine for things in themselves, in which metaphysics will be first, and an order of doctrine for us, in which the teaching of metaphysics will come last. Also in this paragraph, he registers a complaint which he has also made in other places: that metaphysics has a particular connection with logic (*dialectica*) because of which a large number of his contemporary logicians (*moderni dialectici*) confuse the two disciplines. This last thought might have continued application in our own time.
- ³⁸ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 15–27, vol. 25, pp. 29–34.
- ³⁹ Cf. nn. 14–19, pp. 29–31.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. nn. 28–33, pp. 34–6.
- ⁴¹ Cf. "διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι...ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν..." *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b11–13. For the same thought, cf. Plato, *Theatetus* 155D.

- ⁴² Cf. “ὁ δ’ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἶεται ἀγνοεῖν...” *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b17–18.
- ⁴³ Cf. Suárez, *Commentaria ac disputationes in tertiam partem D. Thomae, scilicet, opus de Incarnatione*, III, q. 15, a. 8, in *Opera*, vol. 18, pp. 213–214.
- ⁴⁴ Here Suárez is not directly quoting but rather paraphrasing *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b21–32.
- ⁴⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b30.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.* I, c. 2, lect. 3, Cathala nos. 61–3.
- ⁴⁷ On this supposed, but really non-existent, translation by Boethius, cf. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, *Praefatio Wilhelm von Moerbekes Übersetzung der Aristotelischen Metaphysik*, in *Metaphysica, Lib. I–XIV: Recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, in *Aristoteles Latinus*, XXV 3.1 (Leiden/New York/Köln, 1995), pp. 2–3. In one place [*De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, c. I, n. 33], St. Thomas has referred to Boethius’s translation of the *Metaphysics*, XII [Book XI for Thomas], 3, 1070a 21–27. But there is no known translation here by Boethius. The earliest Latin versions of the *Metaphysics* do not go beyond Book IV. L. Minio-Paluello has made an analysis of this text of St. Thomas; cf. “Note sull’Aristotele Latino Medievale II: La ‘Metaphysica vetustissima’ comprehendava tutta la *Metaphysica*?” *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica*, 43 (1950), 222–226, as cited by Abelardo Lobato, *Tommaso d’Aquino: Lente e l’essenza. L’unità dell’intelletto* (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 1989), p. 103, n. 72.
- ⁴⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.2.982b32–983a2.
- ⁴⁹ For this, see Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 13, 1 (ed. B. Kytzler [Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1982] p. 10) who in the place cites Socrates. Also see Tertullian, *Ad nationes libri duo* II, 4, 15 (ed. J.G.P. Borleffs [Leiden: E.J. Brill] p. 44; cf. J.-P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, Tomus I [Parisiis, 1844], col. 591C), who attributes this expression to Epicurus.
- ⁵⁰ *Ecclesiasticus* 3, v. 22.
- ⁵¹ Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, I, 2, ed. M. Hayduck, in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, I (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1891), p. 17, l. 14–p. 18, l. 13.
- ⁵² Cf. “καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ’ ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός.” *Metaphysics* 1.2.983a9–10.
- ⁵³ Cf. “...καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ...” *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7.1177b33–34.
- ⁵⁴ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.9.1179a23–34.
- ⁵⁵ *Proverbs* 25, v. 27.
- ⁵⁶ Cf. *DM* 1, 1, vol. 25, pp. 2–12. Suárez’s answer here (cf. esp. *ibid.*, n. 26, p. 11) will be that being insofar as it is real being is the adequate object of this science of metaphysics. In this, he will include God as part of the subject matter of metaphysics and he will follow the path of Avicenna and Duns Scotus in preference to that of Averroes (even though this last is mentioned in paragraph 26 as teaching this same doctrine). On Suárez’s choice in this, cf. my articles: (1) “Heidegger and Scholastic Metaphysics,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 49 (1972): pp. 201–220; and (2) “The Suarezian Proof for God’s Existence,” in *History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday*, ed. Linus J. Thro, Washington: University Press of America, 1982, pp. 105–17. On the earlier question here, see Albert Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, Leiden-Köln: E.J. Brill, 1965.
- ⁵⁷ *Disputation* 30 (vol. 26, pp. 60–224), which is the longest of all the Metaphysical Disputations, comprises seventeen Sections dealing with the essence and attributes of God inasmuch as they can be known by human reason.
- ⁵⁸ *Disputation* 31 (vol. 26, pp. 224–312) treats of essence and existence in creatures. It contains the famous Suarezian denial of a “real distinction” between the essence and the

existence of a creature. For an English translation, see: Francis Suarez, *On the Essence of Finite Being as such, On the Existence of that Essence and their Distinction*, translated from the Latin with an Introduction, by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983.

- ⁵⁹ *Disputation* 12 (vol. 25, pp. 372–395) deals in general with causes.
- ⁶⁰ In *Disputations* 13 through 25 (vol. 25, pp. 395–916) Suárez deals with material, formal, efficient, final, and exemplar causes. In *Disputation* 26 (vol. 25, pp. 916–949) he treats the relations of causes to their effects. And *Disputation* 27 (vol. 25, pp. 949–961) considers the relations which exist among causes themselves.
- ⁶¹ Cf. vol. 25, pp. 399–409. In these sections Suárez deals mainly with the pre-Socratics, whom he divides into those who posited several material principle and those who said there was only one such principle; cf. *DM* 13, 2, 1, p. 399. His sources include Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius, Plato, Plotinus, Theophrastus, Plutarch, Sts. Augustine, Irenaeus, Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, Ambrose, plus Epiphanius and Eusebius; *ibid*.
- ⁶² Cf. *DM* 18, 4, vol. 25, pp. 624–27.
- ⁶³ Cf. “οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γ’ ὑποκείμενον αὐτο ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτό.” *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a21–22.
- ⁶⁴ Here I am following Rábade et al., who say that other Latin editions have “intentio” in place of the Vivès edition’s “actio.” “Intention” better fits Suárez’s sense.
- ⁶⁵ Possibly: *DM* 30, 2, nn. 15–17, vol. 26, pp. 69–70; but much more probably: *DM* 29, s. 2, pp. 34–47, where it is asked: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this [uncreated] being by itself?”
- ⁶⁶ Cf. esp. *DM* 23, 1, n. 5, vol. 25, p. 844. This Section has special interest inasmuch as it presents Suárez’s doctrine of the metaphorical nature of final causality; on this cf. Vernon J. Bourke, *Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), p. 178.
- ⁶⁷ Cf. “οὐδ’ αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πράγμα καλῶς εἶχεν. οὖν δὴ τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἶον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ’ εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον.” *Metaphysics* 1.3.984b14–18.
- ⁶⁸ Cf. *Phaedo* 97B.
- ⁶⁹ A figure of speech in which a name appropriate to different things is applied to one of them for which it is especially suited.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. Alberti Magni, O.P., *Metaphysica*, I, Tr. 3, c. 3, ed. B. Geyer, in *Opera omnia*, tomus XVI, pars 1 (Monasterium Westfalorum: Typis Aschendorff, 1960), pp. 32–3.
- ⁷¹ Cf. “ἀλλ’ οἶον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι περιφερόμενοι τύπτουσι πολλάκις καλὰς πληγὰς, ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης οὔτε οὗτοι εὐόκασιν εἰδέναι ὃ τι λέγουσιν.” *Metaphysics* 1.4.985a14
- ⁷² Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.9.991a11–12.
- ⁷³ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 140–148.
- ⁷⁴ Cf. *DM* 25, s.1, vol. 25, pp. 899–910.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 468–77, where it is asked: “What can be known by natural reason about the power to act and the efficacy of the Intelligences.” The Intelligences here would be either Aristotelian Separate Substances or, for later theologians, Angels.
- ⁷⁶ See *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 899–916. Here, especially see Section 2 (pp. 910–916), which asks the question: “Whether an exemplar has the proper nature of a cause or is it to be reduced to one of the other causes?”
- ⁷⁷ Cf. *DM* 12, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 388–95, where Suárez asks: “How many kinds of cause are there?”
- ⁷⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.8.989b29–990a32.

⁷⁹ Literally: the “whatness” of something.

⁸⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.7:983b4–5.

⁸¹ This must be noted. Suárez has a very high regard for the work of his fellow Jesuit.

⁸² *DM* 40, vol. 26, pp. 529–587: “About Continuous Quantity.”

⁸³ *DM* 41, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity.”

⁸⁴ Cf. *DM* 36, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 477–82, where Suárez asks: “What is the essential nature of material substance and whether it is entirely the same as the nature of corporeal substance?”; but even more, see s. 2, pp. 482–6, where the question is: “Whether the essence of material substance consists in substantial form alone or also in matter?”

THE SECOND BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS

About this book, the commentators have various opinions, because it does not seem to be consistent with the other books.¹ But omitting these [opinions], it seems to me to be a part of the introduction or some addition to that. And I take this from Aristotle himself, in Book 3, Text 2, where making reference to what he had said in this book, he says: “In those things which were said in the place of the introduction.”² For because in the introduction Aristotle said that this science most especially contemplates truth and afterwards he showed how much previous philosophers had erred in the investigation of that, he wished in this place once again to open up the difficulty which is inherent in the investigation of truth, and [show] what way should be followed in that, and what principle or foundation we should use, so that we not labor in vain.

Chapter One It Is Difficult to Find the Truth That This Science Seeks

Question 1. Whether in proportion to its excellence, it is not only difficult but also impossible for man to attain truth? This question is more theological than metaphysical, and it is usually treated /p. V/ by theologians in the beginning of their teaching on the Grace of God. But Aristotle proposes it here in the beginning of this chapter and answers it in a way which is sufficiently in harmony with Catholic doctrine. For in an absolute sense he denies that any man can attain truth, in proportion to its excellence.³

But what he means when he says “in proportion to its excellence” (*pro dignitate*⁴), can be understood from what he adds after—that the knowledge of truth is in part easy, because according to the old proverb, “Will anyone miss the door?”⁵ That is to say—as St. Thomas⁶ and Averroes⁷ explain it—who will not easily reach the principles, which are to be found like the door or the gate to truth? Or, as Alexander [of Aphrodisias] explains it,⁸ who will not reach at least those things which are easy? For just as a javelin thrower (*jaculator*),⁹ if the whole door is proposed as his target, does not miss, because of how easy it is to reach it, so we can reach some

truths which are easy, but not all truth. Hence Aristotle adds: “But whole and part,” that is, principles and conclusions, “we cannot have,”¹⁰ that is, completely and without error. That, he says, is its difficulty.¹¹

In this also we can understand by “whole and part” what the theologians say are individual truths or the collection of all truths. Therefore, to reach the truth in proportion to its excellence is to know both whole and part, that is, to know not just one or another truth, but to know all truths without error. Perhaps, however, Aristotle himself did not entirely reach this sense. But, because led by natural light he would have guessed at human weakness as regards the contemplation of truth, he declared that in words which would comprehend the matter itself and would be consonant with Catholic doctrine.

There is another indication of this when he says: “For individual truth seekers contribute little, but from all together gathered into one a certain great content exists.”¹² In this it is worth noting that he did not say that one perfect and exact knowledge of truth is produced by all, but only “a certain greatness” (*quaedam magnitudo*¹³). For indeed what each one by his own efforts can find is either nothing or very little, but what all together, or each one aided by the labor and effort of others, can know is something more—but it is still not perfect and not free from all errors. Therefore, it is simply impossible for man with human powers to contemplate truth in proportion to its excellence. But what can be done in this area through Divine Grace is a subject for a higher contemplation.¹⁴ Therefore, this is enough about this question in this place.

Question 2. What is the source of the difficulty which a man experiences in knowing truth? This is treated extensively in *Disputation 9, Section 2* [sic].¹⁵

Question 3. Are first principles known naturally? This question is only implicitly touched on by Aristotle; therefore it does not merit discussion here. However, we have mentioned it as this [metaphysical] doctrine gave opportunity, in *Disputation 1, Section 6*,¹⁶ and *Disputation 3, Section 3, at the beginning*.¹⁷

Question 4. Can we in this life quidditatively know things which are actually and in the highest degree intelligible, that is, Separate Substances?¹⁸ [This is treated] extensively in *Disputation 35, Section 2*.¹⁹

Question 5. Do speculative science and practical science differ in their goals, in that the former stops at contemplation of truth, while the latter relates to operation—and, therefore, the former directly inquires after the cause of truth, since there simply is no science of truth without the cause, but the latter investigates the cause only insofar as it is useful for

operation? About this matter, some things have been said in *Disputation 1*,²⁰ and more things in *Disputation 44*, which is about habits.²¹

Question 6. What is the true meaning of this assertion: “What is a cause for other things to be such is itself most of all such?”²² From this place there is usually deduced in another way this axiom: “What is most of all such, is the cause for other things being such.”²³ This is the way in which St. Thomas gives this principle, in [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 2, Article 3, argument 4,²⁴ and Question 44, Article 1,²⁵ and *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 13,²⁶ in which places Cajetan²⁷ and Ferrara²⁸ defend it in this sense, as well as Capreolus in [his *Defensiones*] Book 2, Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 1, at the end,²⁹ and extensively in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 1.³⁰

But it was said by Aristotle just in the way we have proposed it. And in rigor, one does not follow from the other, because a universal affirmative proposition is not simply [as such] convertible. But that this is the mind of Aristotle is clear, both from the words and also from the context and intention of the Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle]. For he intends to conclude that this science is about things which are most of all true, because it discusses first causes and the principles of truth in other things. But what is the cause of truth in other things is itself most of all true, because each thing is most of all such which is the cause that other things be such.

And in this way the explained axiom coincides with that proposed in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1, Chapter 2: “That on account of which each thing is such is itself more [such]” (*Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*).³¹ But here it is said more explicitly that the cause must be such that it agree in name and concept with its effect. This Scotus explains as univocal agreement,³² but it is enough if it is understood with a unity of formal character or of the same objective concept,³³ as we will extensively treat below when we explain the analogy of being, in *Disputation 28, Section 3*.³⁴ And this is the way that almost all commentators (*expositores*)³⁵ explain the /p. VI/ assertion in this place; cf. Alexander [of Aphrodisias],³⁶ the Commentator [i.e. Averroes],³⁷ and St. Thomas,³⁸ about which more will be said below, in *Disputation 29, Section 2*.³⁹

Chapter Two

There Is No Process to Infinity in Species or Number of Causes

The Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] has inserted this treatise in this place: (1) in order to show that the cognition of truth, which depends upon a knowledge of causes, even though it is difficult, is not impossible; and (2) also in order to show that there are first causes of beings, about which he said this science is concerned. But because the subject matter belongs to the discussion of causes, all questions which could be here asked we have put into the Disputations about causes.

Question 1. Whether there is a definite number of genera and species of causes? Cf. *Disputation 12, Section 3, throughout.*⁴⁰

Question 2. Whether there may be in material causes a progression to infinity, or whether we must reach a stand in some first matter? Cf. *Disputation 15, Section 6 [sic].*⁴¹

Question 3. Whether in physical formal causes there may be a progression to infinity? Cf. *Disputation 15, Section 6 [sic].*⁴²

Question 4. Whether in metaphysical formal causes, or in essential predicates, there may be a progression to infinity. Cf. *Disputation 25, Section 7 [sic].*⁴³

Question 5. Whether essential predicates of the same thing differ really (*ex natura rei*) or only rationally? *Disputation 5, Section 2,*⁴⁴ and *Disputation 6, Section 1,*⁴⁵ and more at length in *Section 5.*⁴⁶

Question 6. Whether there can be a progression to infinity in efficient causes, as subordinated both directly (*per se*) and accidentally (*per accidens*)? Cf. *Disputation 29, Section 1.*⁴⁷

Question 7. Whether in final causes there can be a progression to infinity? *Disputation 24, Section 1.*⁴⁸

Question 8. Whether the infinite may fall under science in such way that it can be exactly known? This question is usually treated in this place at the occasion of Aristotle's words: "This knowledge is also destroyed, for things which are infinite in this way, how can they be understood?"⁴⁹ And in Text 13: "That, however, which by addition is infinite, cannot be crossed in a finite time."⁵⁰ According to the latter words the former must be explained and limited, and in this way the question poses no problem. For it can be a question either of infinite being absolutely and in the whole range of being, or about a created being which is infinite to a certain extent. Again the discussion can be either about an Uncreated Intellect, or about

any created intellect, or especially about the human intellect concerning which alone Aristotle spoke. And finally, the question can be about any knowledge whatever, even a confused and imperfect knowledge, or about a perfect distinct knowledge, which again is what Aristotle was speaking about.

Therefore, about an infinite being, such as God alone is, we treat broadly in *Disputation 30, Section 11 and following*, where we explain how God, although He comprehends himself, is invisible⁵¹ and incomprehensible to every creature.⁵² But about created being, inasmuch as we think it impossible that there be given a created being which is actually infinite in any way, that is, in intension, in magnitude, or in multitude, it is consequently clear that an infinite being of this kind cannot be thought with a true and distinct knowledge. For that which is not included within the range of being (*sub latitudine entis*), is not of itself true or intelligible.⁵³ But this infinite being, since it is impossible, is not included within the range of being.⁵⁴ Therefore, it is not properly knowable [of itself], since this [knowability] is a property which follows upon the character of being. But it can be conceived or fashioned as impossible only through a finite being, with a joined negation of a limitation or boundary. But positing the opposite hypothesis, that is, that this infinite thing is possible, it would have to be said that it could most easily be known or comprehended by the Divine intellect, since this is of infinite power which is by far more eminent. But with respect to a created intellect, there cannot be a universal judgment, since so great a power of understanding does not necessarily belong to every created intellect and also it is not repugnant to every such intellect. Thus, the human intellect [as such], since it is the most imperfect of all intellects, does not possess so great a power; but an angelic intellect, I think, can have that power, because its power is of a higher order and it understands in a more abstract and more subtle way.

Therefore, granted that there cannot exist among things a created being which is actually infinite, nevertheless, [a created being] can be increased to infinity either in intension,⁵⁵ in magnitude, or in multitude. And that total increase can be known simultaneously in a single insight, which is most certain with respect to the Divine intellect, as we show in the mentioned *Disputation 30, Section 12*.⁵⁶ With respect to a created intellect which clearly sees the Divine essence, and in that sees creatures, theologians frequently and correctly also admit this, as I have treated it [commenting on the *Summa Theologiae*] in *Tome 1, of the Third Part, Disputation 26, Sections 2 and 3*.⁵⁷ But apart from that vision, some deny this with regard to the knowledge of an infinite thing in itself, which knowledge theologians call

“in its own /p. VII/ genus.” I, however, think it is not repugnant, not only through an elevated and supernatural knowledge, as I have treated in the just mentioned place in the Third Part with regard to the knowledge which was infused into the soul of Christ, but also by the proper and natural power of any created intellect.

Especially, this is so if we are talking not about the whole infinite collection of possible creatures, but if it is in some definite nature. For, as I said, although it is not necessary that every created intellect have so great a power, and therefore neither the human intellect nor perhaps lower order angels have it, nevertheless, it does not exceed the whole order of created intellects. This is because for this knowledge there is required neither an absolutely infinite power nor infinite perfection in being. But a finite power of a higher species and character is enough.⁵⁸

Nor is it a problem that a finite power by the very fact that it is employed with respect to many things is diminished in each of them, in such way that it seems not to be able to perfectly know each of them if they are infinite. For that axiom⁵⁹ must be understood when those many things are such that each of them is adequate to the power of the potency and then their multitude exceeds that power. But when they all are comprehended under one adequate character and power of that potency, it is not necessary that in this way knowledge and apprehension be diminished in such manner that each of them cannot be exactly known as well as all together simultaneously. For in that case they are reckoned to be known as if they were one thing. And in this way the theologians say, and we will touch on it later, that higher order angels simultaneously through one intelligible species know many genera and species of things, while exactly and sufficiently knowing each individual. And for equal reason an angel of the highest species can be so perfect that by a single insight it may know some infinite multitude of things (as they say) “syncategorematically”⁶⁰ as they are contained under some particular genus or species. For this does not require in the knower infinity without qualification, but only to a certain extent. Or rather [it requires in the knower] an eminence of a higher character.

However, I have constantly said “by a single insight” because it is impossible that an infinite of this kind be known successively in such way that it be exhausted. For it is impossible that an infinite be exhausted by counting successively. Otherwise, a whole which is innumerable would be enumerated successively, and we would arrive at the endpoint of that which is without end—which involves an open contradiction of the character of the infinite itself, as is clear from *Physics*, Book 3, Chapter 7.⁶¹ And for this reason, because men know the causes of things not simultaneously

but gradually, Aristotle thought, first, simply to infer that knowledge of a thing through infinite causes is impossible for a man and, second, that it is impossible to know infinite causes. This is especially because that succession endures in each man for only a finite time. However, this holds true not only in a human intellect, but also in one which is Divine. For this repugnance does not arise from a defect of intellective power, but rather from the very nature of the infinite, which consists in this that it cannot be successively crossed through.

This is especially inasmuch as a succession must always be in actuality finite on the side of one extreme, namely the last or the ending terminus—which all admit and which is self-evident because the succession is always ended in that. But on the side of the other prior or beginning extreme many think differently. But I think that also is true, because I think there cannot be a real succession, whether it be continuous or discrete, which lacks a beginning and is eternal, as I will remark below in *Disputation 29, Section 1*,⁶² and *Disputation 30, Section 3* [sic].⁶³

For this reason, therefore, universally and without restriction it is true that what is infinite cannot be successively known, which is what Aristotle principally intends in this passage. And against this there is no difficulty of any importance.

Chapter Three About the Manner and Order to Be Observed in Seeking Truth

Since the Philosopher said that the knowledge of truth is difficult but not impossible, here he is explaining what manner should be observed in seeking it and what impediments should be avoided. His thought is quite clear and about it few things can be asked.

Question 1. Should the way of learning be adapted to custom? This question is sufficiently treated in the text, where first he [Aristotle] declares⁶⁴ that the force of custom is so great that often because of it fabulous things are preferred to what is true, and things which are not customary are immediately judged as foreign. Hence, it happens that because of various customs men desire different ways of learning. For some are pleased with conjectures, others with examples, others with texts, and yet others with fine arguments. From this, Aristotle seems tacitly to conclude that an incontrovertible rule for learning cannot be taken from custom, but a

learner must be instructed so that he inquires after and accepts each thing following the demand of the matter itself.

In this it is necessary to note two things. One is that the same judgment should not be passed on every custom. For sometimes a custom is bad and /p. VIII/ unreasonable, such as the custom of those who have grown used to asking for an equal demonstration of all things. Or, conversely, the custom of those who think that only those things should be believed which they find in authors who are familiar to them and who immediately reject all the rest as novel and unusual. These should attentively read and weigh the words of the Philosopher in *Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 6: "It will seem better," he says, "and perhaps necessary, especially for philosophers, to refute even their own opinions for the sake of truth, for while both are beloved it is right to prefer truth to reputation (*honor*)."⁶⁵ Therefore, when a custom is of this kind, the method of teaching should not be accommodated to it, but rather it should be overturned or moderated by the very efficacy of that method. But sometimes a custom is very good and it is fitted to sound teaching, and then the best advice is that the method of learning be accommodated to that custom. For, as Aristotle says here, what is customary is always more known. But the method of learning should be taken as far as possible from what is more known. Also, custom is regarded as a "second nature."⁶⁶ But things which are more consonant with nature are more easily learned. Accordingly, Aristotle, in *Ethics*, Book 2, Chapter 1, says: "It is not a little but much, indeed rather it tells all, that men be accustomed so or not so from youth."⁶⁷ This is true not only in morals but also in learning science.

Second it must be noted that not only from custom but also from the natural talent and the particular make-up of each man it comes to pass that different ones desire to learn or to teach in different ways, as Fonseca rightly remarks here.⁶⁸ And when from this it occurs that a discipline is treated other than it should be treated, it is very difficult to correct or change nature, as is self-evident.

Question 2. In what sense was it said by Aristotle: "It is absurd to seek at once both science and the method of science"?⁶⁹ Almost all interpreters (*interpretes*) understand by the "method of science" (*modus sciendi*) dialectics [i.e. logic]. Hence, some take the occasion in this place to treat of the nature of dialectics, whether, that is, it is a science, and whether it is necessary for the other sciences? For Aristotle in the cited words seems to distinguish it from science and to teach that it should be placed before science. However, I think these questions should be left to dialectics itself, and it should be supposed that the doctrine itself of dialectics, which they

call “teaching dialectics” (*dialectica docens*), is a true science. For it proceeds from evident principles to the demonstration of its conclusions, sometimes a posteriori, or “from the impossible,”⁷⁰ and sometimes also through a proper cause, as is clear enough from the development (*discursus*) of that doctrine. However, because that whole doctrine tends to this that it teaches the method of science, even though it teaches it demonstratively, from its goal it is called by Aristotle “the method of science” and is said to be distinct from the other sciences which are nothing but sciences and do not demonstrate the method of science but only receive it from dialectics.

You will say: therefore at least in dialectics itself it will not be absurd to simultaneously seek science and the method of science. I will respond by conceding the consequence. For in that science the method of science, taken broadly and in general, is sought as a goal or as an object to be known, while the science itself is sought as the form and the perfection to be attained by such study. But in the other sciences, since the method of science is not sought as an object or as a goal, it must be presupposed as an instrument serving for the acquisition of the science. And, therefore, in those sciences it would be absurd and difficult to simultaneously seek science and the method of science. And it is about those [sciences], as I have said, that Aristotle spoke.

But the fact that in dialectics it is not impossible to simultaneously seek both the method of science as well as science itself is true for the following reason. For the intellect reflects upon itself and in this way while in its own acts it is searching for the method by which they may be aptly disposed to acquire science, it investigates the very form and disposition of those acts through their proper causes. And in demonstrating these it holds to (*tenet*) that same disposition or mode of reasoning. Thus in the search for and the demonstration of the method of science it observes the method of science and in this way it simultaneously acquires science. In this it is aided by a natural logic which is in a human being the principle of every science with regard to its form and method of reasoning. Finally then in dialectics this is in a special way clear (*non absurdum*). For it must be so, and we cannot suppose prior to dialectics any other acquired⁷¹ method of knowing. Nor can we proceed to infinity. But we must stop at a form [of acquired discipline] which is at once “that which” (*quod*) and “that by which” (*quo*), namely, both a science and a method of science.

Lastly it can be added that besides dialectics, which is common to all sciences, there is in each science a particular and proper way of proceeding, which can also be called a method of knowing. In this sense, as Alexander of Hales has noted here,⁷² Averroes distinguished a common logic and a

logic proper to each science.⁷³ For he called that proper method of knowing “proper logic,” inasmuch as it is a certain application of dialectics or of some part of that. And this method of knowing in individual sciences should be put first, lest there be confusion in our procedure, as Aristotle also has indicated in *On the Parts* /p. IX/ of *Animals*, Book 4, Chapter 1⁷⁴ as well as in *Ethics*, Book 1, Chapter 3,⁷⁵ and as he himself observes in physics and almost all other sciences. And this is observed by almost all authors who treat dialectics, in such way that in the beginning, perfunctorily and without an exact demonstration, they prepare the way for their science, and then afterwards by means of dialectics itself they demonstratively perfect the method of knowing.

Question 3. Whether there is equal certitude or evidence in all sciences? This question is raised on the occasion of Aristotle’s words in Text 16⁷⁶ [of *Metaphysics*, Book 2]: “The mathematicians’ exact method of teaching should not be demanded in everything.”⁷⁷ This he almost repeats below in Book 6, Chapter 1,⁷⁸ and he has similar things to say in *Ethics*, Book 1, Chapters 3⁷⁹ and 7.⁸⁰ And in general, how certitude can be unequal is treated in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1,⁸¹ although theologians have said it more precisely in connection with the subject of *faith*. But in the present context, we discuss below, in *Disputation 1, Section 5*,⁸² the degree of certitude which is in metaphysics as compared with mathematics and physics.

Question 4. Do all natural things have matter? This is asked because of the word “perhaps” which Aristotle uses in Text 16, saying: “Perhaps every nature has matter,”⁸³ in which by the word “nature” he understands things which are natural and which are subject to physical motion, which is in line with his way of speaking, as is clear from Book 12, Chapter 7⁸⁴ and other places. Some, therefore, think that Aristotle used the word, “perhaps,” because he did not think that the heavens had matter. But it can be more simply said that he used it because he did think they had matter but not with as much certainty as he thought that about other natural things. Or indeed he used it because the matter of the heavens is of a different kind. However, I think it more true to say that there is no mystery in that word, but it is Aristotle’s custom to speak this way out of modesty when he is not explicitly discussing something. Therefore, this question is of little importance in this place. But it is treated below in *Disputation 13, Sections 10*⁸⁵ and 11.⁸⁶

Question 5. Whether of all things there is one or several sciences? The Philosopher mentions this in the last words of this Chapter,⁸⁷ and in

connection with this science [of metaphysics] we discuss it in *Disputation 1, Sections 2⁸⁸ and 3.⁸⁹*

Question 6. Should metaphysics be learned before or after the other sciences? This is mentioned by Aristotle in the same place [i.e. at the end of this Chapter],⁹⁰ and it is taken up briefly in *Disputation 1, Section 4.⁹¹*

Notes

- ¹ The problem of the authenticity of Book 2 (α) has persisted up to modern time. The book itself seems incomplete and appears to be an interpolation. It also appears to break the continuity between Books 1 and 3. From antiquity its attribution to Aristotle himself has been questioned. Thus, it has been attributed by some to Pasicles of Rhodes, a nephew of Eudemus of Rhodes, and himself a pupil of Aristotle. Werner Jaeger (cf. *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, tr. R. Robinson, 2nd edition [Oxford: The University Press, 1948], p. 169) thought it was put together from notes taken by Pasicles from Aristotle's lectures. However, it is a fact that the Greek commentators on the *Metaphysics* have not denied that it is a work of Aristotle. Yet, Alexander of Aphrodisias and Asclepius thought it was out of place in the received arrangement of the Books. In the 19th century, Hermann Bonitz doubted, but in the end did not deny, its authenticity. More recently, Jules Tricot thought it probable that the Book belongs to Aristotle. For this, cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote: La Métaphysique* (Paris: Vrin, 1991), tome I, pp. xx–xxi.
- ² Cf. "...περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφρομισασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν..." *Metaphysics* 3.1.995b5–6.
- ³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a31–b1.
- ⁴ Aristotle: "ἀξίως"; *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a31.
- ⁵ Cf. "τίς ἂν θύρας ἀμάρτοι;" *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b5.
- ⁶ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* II, c. 1, lect. 1, Cathala no. 277.
- ⁷ Cf. *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri xiii, cum Averrois Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et Epitome...*, II, t. 1 (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), v. VIII, f. 29raA.
- ⁸ Cf. *In Arist. Metaphys.*, II, c. 1, ed. Hayduck, p. 140, ll. 14–19.
- ⁹ Here Suárez is changing slightly the example of an archer (τοξότης) given by Alexander; p. 140, l. 15.
- ¹⁰ Cf. Aristotle: "...τὸ δ' ὅλον τι ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι..." *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b6.
- ¹¹ Cf. "δηλοῖ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτῆς." *ibid.* 6–7.
- ¹² Cf. "καὶ καθ' ἕνα μὲν ἢ μῆδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροισομένων γίγνεσθαι τι μέγεθος." *ibid.* 993b2–4.
- ¹³ Aristotle: "τι μέγεθος"; 993b4.
- ¹⁴ That is to say a contemplation aided by or based upon Christian Faith.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *DM* 9, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 324–28, where Suárez inquires: "From where does the difficulty of attaining truth come?"
- ¹⁶ Cf. *DM* 1, 6, nn. 27–29, vol. 25, pp. 60–62.
- ¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 3, 3, nn. 1–5, vol. 25, pp. 111–112.
- ¹⁸ That is substances separate from matter, such as the Aristotelian Separate Substances responsible for the movements of the heavens, or the angels in later theology.
- ¹⁹ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 2, pp. 436–9, where Suárez asks: "What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?"
- ²⁰ See *DM* 1, 5, nn. 3–5, vol. 25, pp. 37–8.

- ²¹ Cf. *DM* 44, vol. 26, pp. 663–737: “About Habits.”
- ²² Cf. “ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων, καθ’ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει τὸ συνώνυμον,…” *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b24–5.
- ²³ Cf. *ibid.*
- ²⁴ That is the fourth argument of the famous “5 ways” to prove the existence of God. For this, cf. *Summa theologiae* I, 2, 3, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Omnia opera*, tomus quartus (Romae: S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1888), p. 32a.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 44, a. 1, tom. IV, p. 455b.
- ²⁶ Cf. *Opera omnia*, tomus decimus tertius (Romae: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918), pp. 33b–34a.
- ²⁷ Cf. *In Summam Theologiam* I, 2, 3, n. VII, in: S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Omnia opera*, tom. IV, p. 33b; *ibid.*, 44, 1, n. VIII, pp. 456b–57a.
- ²⁸ Cf. *In Summam contra Gentiles*, I, c. 13, XXII–XXIII, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, tom. xiii, p. 39ab.
- ²⁹ Cf. Johannis Capreoli, O.P., *Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, II, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, ed. C. Paban et T. Pègues (Turonibus: Sumptibus A. Cattier, 1903), vol. 4, p. 43.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, I, d. 3, q. 1, vol. 1, pp. 166–7.
- ³¹ Cf. “αἰεὶ γὰρ δι’ ὃ ὑπάρχει ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνω μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει,…” *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29–30.
- ³² For this, cf. Pseudo-Scotus [aka Antonio Andreas, O.M.], in: R.P.F. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, cum summariis, notis, et scholiis R.P.F. Hugonis Cavelli Hiberni. Item eiusdem Doctoris *In Metaphysicam quaestiones subtilissimae*, cum annotationibus R.P.F. Mauritiū de Portu Hiberni; *Expositio*, Lib. II, Caput 2, in R.P.F. Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Opera omnia*, quae hucusque reperiri potuerunt, collecta, recognita, notis, scholiis, et commentariis illustrata, a PP. Hibernis, Collegii Romani S. Isidori Professoribus (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), Tomus IV, p. 65b. On Antonio Andreas as author of the *Expositio* here, cf. E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952), p.674.
- ³³ Suárez has explained the difference between formal and objective concepts as follows: “First, we must presuppose the common distinction between a formal and an objective concept. The formal concept is said to be the act itself or (what is the same) the ‘word’ by which the intellect conceives some thing or common character. It is called a ‘concept’ because it is like a child of the mind. It is called ‘formal’ either because it is the ultimate form of the mind, or because it formally represents to the mind the thing which is known, or because it is the intrinsic and formal termination of the mind’s conception, in which it differs from the objective concept. The objective concept is said to be that thing, or character (ratio), which is properly and immediately known or represented. For example, when we conceive man, that act which we produce in the mind in order to conceive man is called the formal concept. But the man known and represented by that act is called the objective concept.” *DM* 2, 1, n. 1, vol. 25, pp. 64–5. “*Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et objectivi. Conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu communem rationem concipit: qui dicitur conceptus, quia est veluti proles mentis; formalis autem appellatur, vel quia est ultima forma mentis, vel quia formaliter repraesentat menti rem cognitam, vel quia revera est intrinsecus et formalis terminus conceptionis mentalis, in quo differt a conceptu objectivo, ut ita dicam. Conceptus objectivus dicitur res illa, vel ratio, quae proprie et immediate per conceptum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur; ut, verbi gratia, cum hominem concipimus, ille actus, quem in mente efficitur ad concipiendum hominem, vocatur conceptus formalis; homo autem cognitus et repraesentatus illo actu dicitur conceptus objectivus,...*”

- ³⁴ Cf. *DM* 28, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 13–21, which asks: “Whether [the division of being] is analogous, in such way that being is not said univocally but rather analogically of God and creatures?” For an extended treatment of Suárez’s doctrine of analogy, cf. my article: “Suarez on the Analogy of Being,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 46 (1969): pp. 219–249; 323–341.
- ³⁵ Strictly, Suárez seems to reserve the word “Commentator” to refer, as we will immediately see, to Averroes. In addition to *expositores* (which would “expounders” or “explainers”) he also speaks of *interpretes* (“interpreters” or “translators”) and *scriptores* (“writers” or “copyists”) of metaphysical questions; cf. *DM* 47, 10, n. 12, vol. 26, p. 824.
- ³⁶ Cf. *In Arist. Metaphys.*, II, c. 1, M. Hayduck, p. 147, ll. 15–27.
- ³⁷ *In lib. Metaphys.*, II, t. 4, fol. 30ra.
- ³⁸ *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* II, c. 1, l. 2, Cathala nos. 292–3.
- ³⁹ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, where the question is: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this [uncreated] being by itself?” In this context, Suárez is reasoning from the world as effect to God as its cause.
- ⁴⁰ *DM* 12, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 388–393, where Suárez asks how many kinds of cause there are.
- ⁴¹ Cf. *DM* 13, 1, n. 4, vol. 25, p. 396. The main question in Section 4 here is: “Whether by natural reason it is evident that among beings there is a material cause of substances, which we call ‘prime matter?’”
- ⁴² Cf. *DM* 15, 11, nn. 19–28, vol. 25, pp. 563–66.
- ⁴³ Instead, see *DM* 15, 11, nn. 19–28, vol. 25, pp. 563–66.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *DM* 5, 2, vol. 25, pp. 148–61. While in this Section Suárez focuses on the individual and asks: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”, he is *pari passu* concerned with the question of common essential predicates.
- ⁴⁵ See *DM* 6, 1, vol. 25, pp. 201–206, in which Suárez asks: “Whether there is in things some formal unity which is distinct from and less than numerical?”
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–28, where the main question is: “Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect? And [supposing an affirmative answer] how should we answer objections against that?” The way Suárez asks his question now in the *Index* seems to anticipate later questions among seventeenth-century Jesuits about abstraction or precision. That is, whether it is “objective,” which would presuppose real facets in things themselves, or “formal,” which would make it a matter of aspects that would depend upon the knower. On this, cf. Friedrich Staudenhecht, S.J., *Tractatus philosophico-theologicus bipartitus de praecisione et distinctione objectiva tam in creatis quam in divinis*. Herbipoli: Hertz, 1665.
- ⁴⁷ See *DM* 29, 1, nn. 25–40, vol. 26, pp. 28–33.
- ⁴⁸ Cf. *DM* 24, 1, vol. 25, pp. 890–94, where it is asked: “Whether it can be well enough proven by natural reason that there is some ultimate end and that there is no process to infinity in final causes?”
- ⁴⁹ Cf. “ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιρούσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες... τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν;” *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b20–23.
- ⁵⁰ “τὸ δ’ ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πεπερασμένῳ διεξελθεῖν.” *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b30–31.
- ⁵¹ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 11, vol. 26, pp. 141–58, where Suárez asks: “Whether God is invisible, and what can be investigated about this by natural reason?”
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, s. 12, pp. 159–62, which asks: “Whether it may be demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended nor quidditatively known?”
- ⁵³ Understanding the “range of being” to be the “range of real being”, which would include that which is or can be and would exclude “beings of reason” and “accidental beings,” the principle here does not jibe with everything in Suárez’s metaphysical and episte-

mological doctrine. On this, see my article: “Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth”, *Vivarium*, 25, 1 (1987): pp. 47–75; 26, 1 (1988): pp. 51–72.

⁵⁴ Again, the point is that real being will include the actual or the possible, but not the impossible. On this cf. my articles: “Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth”, as cited in the immediately preceding note, and “Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 44 (1967): pp. 29–40.

⁵⁵ On qualitative intension, cf. *DM* 46, vol. 26, pp. 753–81.

⁵⁶ Cf. *DM* 30, 12, n. 1, vol. 26, p. 159.

⁵⁷ Cf. Suárez, *De Incarnatione*, Qu. X, a. 4, Disp. XXVI, ss. 2–3, in *Opera*, vol. 18, pp. 18–33. In Section 2, the question is “Whether it is a matter of Faith that the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Divine Essence?” (*Utrum secundum fidem anima Christi non comprehendat divinam essentiam.*) Section 3 asks “Whether the soul of Christ sees in the Word all possible things which are eminently contained in God? (*Utrum anima Christi videat in Verbo omnia possibilis quae in Deo eminenter continentur.*) To the first question, Suárez replies: (1) It is a matter of Faith that God is incomprehensible in any created knowledge (“...dico primo: de fide est Deum esse incomprehensibile quacunque creata cognitione” s. 2, n. 2, p. 19.), and (2) The soul of Christ does not comprehend the Divine Essence (“Dico secundo: ...animam Christi non comprehendere divinam essentiam” *ibid.*, n. 5, p. 21). In answer to the second question, Suárez says: (1) The soul of Christ, the Lord, does not actually see in the Word all things which are absolutely contained in the omnipotence of God (“Dico primo: anima Christi Domini non videt actu in Verbo omnia quae absolute in omnipotentia Dei continentur.” s. 3, n. 10, p. 24); (2) The soul of Christ does not in first act or in habit see all possible things in God (“Dico secundo: anima Christi neque in actu primo seu habitu videt omnia possibilis in Deo.” *ibid.*, n. 28, p. 31.); and (3) The soul of Christ sees in the Word some possible things which will never eventuate (“Dico tertio: anima Christi videt in Verbo aliqua ex rebus possibilibus quae nunquam erunt.” *ibid.*, n. 31, p. 32).

⁵⁸ Note that Suárez has left us a *Treatise on the Angels* (*Tractatus de Angelis*), which in volume 2 of the Vives edition of his *Opera omnia* comprises 1130 pages! For the angels’ knowledge of all possible creatures, cf. *ibid.*, II, c. 13, pp. 170–76.

⁵⁹ That is: “This knowledge is also destroyed, for things which are infinite in this way, how can they be understood?” *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b20–23.

⁶⁰ Cf. *DM* 20, 2, n. 4, vol. 25, p. 754, and *DM* 29, 1, n. 31, vol. 26, p. 31. Something is said to be syncategorematically infinite which is such in potency. For example, a mathematical quantity which is yet without completion is called syncategorematically infinite inasmuch as it is not actually but only potentially infinite. In contrast, something is said to be categorically infinite which is actually so. For example, God is called categorically infinite.

⁶¹ Cf. *Physics* 3.7.207ba3–208a4.

⁶² Cf. *DM* 29, 1, nn. 25–40, vol. 26, pp. 28–33.

⁶³ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 113–115, which asks: “Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable and eternal?”

⁶⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 2.3.994b32–995a6.

⁶⁵ Cf. “δόξετε δ’ ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ φίλοιον ὅσον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.” *Nichomachean Ethics* 1.4.1096a14.

⁶⁶ Cf. *Nichomachean Ethics* 2.5.1106b14; also, *On the Parts of Animals* 1.1.639b19–20.

⁶⁷ Cf. “οὐ μικρὸν οὐδ’ διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθύς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πᾶμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.” *Nichomachean Ethics* 2.1.1103b24–25.

⁶⁸ *Comment. in libros Metaphys.*, II, c. 3, tom. 1, cols. 477–480. Note again Suárez’s approval of Fonseca.

- ⁶⁹ Cf. "...ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης..." *Metaphysics* 2.3.995a13–14.
- ⁷⁰ For this, see *DM* 1, 4, nn. 25–6, vol. 25, pp. 33–4.
- ⁷¹ As opposed to "natural" or "infused" by God.
- ⁷² Cf. Alexander [i.e. Bonini], *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros*, II, t. 15, 47vb.
- ⁷³ Cf. *In lib. Metaphys.*, II, t. 15, f. 35raF.
- ⁷⁴ Cf. *On the Parts of Animals* 1.1.639a1–642b4.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.1095a30–b13.
- ⁷⁶ The Vivès text reads "6".
- ⁷⁷ Cf. "τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ..." *Metaphysics* 2.3.995a15–16.
- ⁷⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a7–22, where Aristotle distinguishes three theoretical sciences, including mathematics, which each have a different subject matter.
- ⁷⁹ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1.1094b12–27.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.7.1098a26–29.
- ⁸¹ Cf. Chapter 27, 87a31–37.
- ⁸² Cf. *DM* 1, 5, nn. 10, 22–30, vol. 25, pp. 39, 43–46; esp. n. 26, p. 44, where Suárez directly compares metaphysics and mathematics from the viewpoint of their certainty.
- ⁸³ Cf. "...ἅπαντα γὰρ ἴσως ἢ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην." *Metaphysics* 2.3.995a18.
- ⁸⁴ Possibly *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b35 or 12.7.1072b14.
- ⁸⁵ See *DM* 13, s. 10, vol. 25, pp. 434–8, where a question concerning celestial matter is framed thus: "Whether a substantial material cause is found in incorruptible bodies?"
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 438–452, where the question is: "Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect?"
- ⁸⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 2.3.995a19–20.
- ⁸⁸ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 12–22, which asks: "Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?"
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–25, where Suárez asks: "Whether metaphysics is one single science?"
- ⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.* 18–19.
- ⁹¹ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, n. 13, vol. 25, p. 29. Suárez again is raising the question of the "order of teaching" (*ordo doctrinae*).

THE THIRD BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

Summarily Containing All Difficulties That Occur in This Science

The Commentators (*expositores*) usually ask why Aristotle in this place has taken up a whole book proposing questions without resolving them. I think he did that in order to highlight the difficulty and the utility of this discipline and, perhaps, to excite a desire in the reader to investigate a science in which so many doubts are [going to be] resolved, as well as for other reasons which he himself has mentioned in Chapter 1 and which are in that Chapter sufficiently clear.² Thus Aristotle proposes various questions in Chapter 1, while in the other Chapters he brings out reasons for doubting on both sides, but resolves nothing. Moreover, in proposing these questions he observes almost no method (*methodum*)³ nor any certain order, but he seems to have just poured them out as they came to his mind. Therefore, I am noting this, lest anyone think we are obliged either to give a reason for his order or to follow it when we debate these questions.⁴ Hence, for both reasons we will propose all the questions together with the places where we have treated and answered them. But if some have been omitted as useless or of little importance, we will also indicate that.⁵

Chapter One

Question 1. Is it the task of one or of several sciences to contemplate all causes? This is raised by Aristotle immediately in the beginning of Chapter 1.⁶ The truth is that inasmuch as this can be the task of one science, it is especially that of metaphysics. See *Disputation 1, Sections 17 and 5*.⁸

Question 2. Does this science consider only simple principles of substance or does it also consider complex principles? This is discussed on both sides here by Aristotle in Chapter 2, Text 4.⁹ But the affirmative side is taken in Book 4, Chapter 3,¹⁰ and by us in *Disputation 1, Section 4*,¹¹ and *Disputation 3, Section 3*.¹²

Question 3. Does this science discuss all substances? Both sides are presented here by the Philosopher in Chapter 2, Text 5,¹³ and the question is decided in Book 4, Chapter 2¹⁴ and Book 6, Chapter 1,¹⁵ and by us in *Disputation 1, Section 2*.¹⁶

Question 4. Whether apart from sensible substances there are other separate substances? This is treated here by Aristotle only with regard to Ideas¹⁷ and mathematical things, about which see above in Book 1, Chapters 6 and 7 [sic],¹⁸ and below in Book 7, Chapter 12 [sic],¹⁹ and following. But in this sense I think it is an idle question, and it is treated, therefore, briefly in *Disputation 4, Sections 1²⁰ and 2,²¹* and throughout *Disputation 5,²²* and we add some items in *Disputation 25,²³* with respect to exemplar causes.²⁴ But the proper question is about angelic substances, which is treated by the Philosopher in Book 12, Chapter 8,²⁵ and by us in *Disputation 35.²⁶*

Question 5. Is it the same science which treats of substances /p. X/ and of those things which as such are accidental to substances? This is discussed in the following Chapter, Text 6,²⁷ and the affirmative side is taken in Book 4, Chapters 1 and 2.²⁸ To be sure, the matter is clear, and more dialectical than metaphysical, but it is explained by us in relation to this science in *Disputation 1, Sections 1²⁹ and 2.³⁰*

Question 6. Are the common properties of being, such as the *same*, the *different*, and the *like*, considered in this science? *Ibid.*

Question 7. Whether genera and differences should be regarded as principles of things, or rather as physical parts, like matter and form? Aristotle treats both sides of this in Chapter 3 of this Book.³¹ It does not seem to us that it needs special discussion. For we think that both can be called principles, the former metaphysical and the latter physical principles. But because metaphysical composition is effected only by the reason, whereas physical composition is real, we think that physical principles are proper to material things, and we discuss them through the whole of *Disputations 13,³² 14,³³ 15,³⁴ and 16.³⁵* But metaphysical principles are principles only according to our way of conceiving, or according to reason,³⁶ and we speak of them when we treat of universals in *Disputation 5, Sections 1³⁷ and 2,³⁸* and in *Disputation 6, throughout.³⁹*

Question 8. Whether among genera those which are more universal are more principles? Aristotle treats this most fully through almost the whole of Chapter 3.⁴⁰ But there is no advantage [in doing so]. For remote genera can be said to be more principles extensively, but nearer genera [can be called such] intensively. Or the former [can be called such] more in the nature of potency and matter, while the latter [can so be called] in the nature of form and perfection. But these things pertain only to one's way of speaking.

Question 9. Whether apart from matter there is some essential cause, and whether that is separable or not, and whether it is one or many? Aristotle

asks this in almost the same words toward the end of this Chapter.⁴¹ But its meaning is ambiguous. For if the words themselves are taken as they sound, what seems to be asked is whether beyond material causes there is a formal, or other kind of, cause. And in this sense this question is treated below in Book 4, Chapter 2,⁴² and by us at some length in what follows in *Disputation 12*,⁴³ about causes in general. But it does not seem that this is what Aristotle means. For immediately in Chapter 4,⁴⁴ he discusses in a very different sense this question with others following from it. Therefore, another sense of the question will be: whether apart from matter, that is, *outside singular things*, there is some essential cause? For Aristotle is in the practice of using the word, “apart from” (*praeter*)⁴⁵ in a Platonic sense. For he often raises this question with Plato, and he treats it in this sense in Chapter 4, Text 12,⁴⁶ and it is answered by us in *Disputations 5*⁴⁷ and 6,⁴⁸ when we treat of universals. There remains only the difficulty that then the following question seems to coincide with this one.

Question 10. There is, therefore, a tenth question: whether there is something apart from the whole material individual itself? Aristotle proposes this question in Text 2, in these obscure words: “Is there something besides the whole together?”⁴⁹ But he explains what he means by “the whole together” (*simul totum*)⁵⁰ saying: “I call it the whole together, when something is predicated of matter,”⁵¹ that is, as I interpret, the species said of a material individual. He seems therefore to ask whether in material things the species is something apart from individuals, and in this sense his question is for Plato. But it appears to be the same as the preceding question as we have explained it—except we say that in that place he is asking from the aspect of causality while here he is asking from the aspect of essence (*quidditas*). Thus it is materially the same question, but formally diverse. Or in that place he is indeed asking about a real separation but here he is asking about one which is formal or from the nature of a thing, as we discuss in *Disputation 5, Section 2*.⁵² But others understand that generally here he is asking whether “what something is” (*quod quid est*)⁵³ in material things is the same as that of which it is.⁵⁴

Question 11. Whether principles are determined not only in species but also in number? That is, are they proper to each thing and diverse in distinct things? This is treated below in Chapter 4, Text 13,⁵⁵ and in Book 12.⁵⁶ But we should not delay with it. For it is certain that intrinsic principles are multiplied with the numerical multiplication of individuals and not more than that. And this is true in different ways in forms and in matter. For forms are multiplied according to their entities in different

individuals; but matter is not always multiplied, since a numerically one entity of matter exists successively under different forms. But it is varied according to its dispositions and in this way proximate matter is always diverse, either specifically or numerically, by reason of forms. But extrinsic principles are not multiplied in this way because one can be the principle of different things. However, sometimes they are multiplied, but they are always of a finite number, because in no multiplication of causes is there given a procession to infinity, as was noted above in Book 2.⁵⁷

Question 12. Whether the principles of corruptible things and of incorruptible things are the same? This is treated by Aristotle below in Chapter 1, Text 15,⁵⁸ and Book 12, Chapter 4.⁵⁹ We treat of intrinsic principles in *Disputation 13, Section 11*,⁶⁰ and of extrinsic principles in *Disputation 29, Section 2*.⁶¹

Question 13. Whether all principles, even those of corruptible /p. XI/ things, are without corruption? This is treated by Aristotle in the same places, but in particular we discuss matter in its own *Disputation*.⁶² About form there is controversy only with regard to the rational soul, which does not pertain to this science.⁶³ However, in the case of extrinsic causes there is almost no place for this question. For a proximate and univocal cause of corruptible things must be corruptible, but a superior cause can be incorruptible and eternal. It is also necessary that all incorruptible species derive their origin from some eternal and incorruptible thing, as we demonstrate in *Disputation 29, Section 1*.⁶⁴

Question 14. Whether unity (*unum*)⁶⁵ and being are the very substance of things or whether something else is their subject? These matters are discussed by Aristotle in Chapter 4, Text 16.⁶⁶ The discussion, however, is Platonic and pointless. For if it is about transcendental being and unity, clearly enough these are not something apart from the substance or the undivided essence of each thing—about which we will deliberate sufficiently in *Disputations 4*⁶⁷ and *5*.⁶⁸ But if it is taken by antonomasia for a first being which is essentially one, in this way it is clearly something separate from other beings. However, it is not their substance or subject but their first cause—about which we deliberate much at length in *Disputation 29, Sections 1*⁶⁹ and *2*.⁷⁰ If, however, being and unity are taken with other hidden and metaphorical meanings, those may be explained and the reply will be easy.

Question 15. Are the principles of things universal or singular things themselves? This question is treated below in Chapter 5, Text 20,⁷¹ and Book 7, from Chapter 13,⁷² and it can be understood as aimed at Plato—whether, namely, Ideas are principles of things?—and in this way it is treated now

in the mentioned place and often elsewhere. It can also coincide with that question in which it is asked whether actions pertain to singular things?—which is mentioned in Book 1,⁷³ and treated in *Disputation 34, Section 9* [sic].⁷⁴ Or, as St. Thomas has explained it,⁷⁵ whether principles are such because of a universal or a singular character, and in this way it is mentioned in *Disputation 5, Sections 3, 4, and 6*.⁷⁶

Question 16. Whether principles of things cause in another way than by motion? This question seems properly to be asked only about an efficient cause, as in *Disputation 22, Section 1*.⁷⁷ However, Aristotle never discussed it explicitly in this sense, but he seems to propose it because of the Ideas of Plato, which he said induce forms in another way. And he appears to discuss it below in Chapter 6, Text 18.⁷⁸ In this sense, it is also treated by us in *Disputations 15*⁷⁹ and *18*,⁸⁰ where we discuss the eduction of substantial form and its effective principle.

Question 17. Whether the principles of things are in act or in potency? This question is discussed with regard to individual principles in their proper places, namely, with respect to matter, form, etc. But it seems to be proposed here⁸¹ by Aristotle because of the elements which are the principles of mixtures. And about these the question is: whether they exist actually or potentially in the mixture? Aristotle treats this question in Chapter 6, Text 19,⁸² and we treat it in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.⁸³

Question 18. Whether numbers, figures, lengths, and points are a kind of substance or not? The question is treated by Aristotle below in Chapter 5,⁸⁴ and most extensively in Books 13 and 14.⁸⁵ But in connection with it, nothing need be said except for what we will say below about quantity in *Disputations 40*⁸⁶ and *41*.⁸⁷

Chapter Two Reasons for Doubting in the First Five Questions

I think it is superfluous to note individual reasons, since they can be read and easily understood both in the text and in other commentators (*expositores*).⁸⁸ But even though Aristotle, while proposing these reasons, did say some things which merit being known and being discussed, nevertheless, because he always proceeds by arguing from this and from that direction, we cannot hold anything definite about his opinion, as Averroes also noted at the beginning of his comments on this Book.⁸⁹ Therefore, if we are to proceed correctly: Aristotle gives no basis in this whole Book

for treating questions which he calls occasional or textual.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, as regards this Chapter the following are usually treated.

Question 1. Do the mathematical sciences demonstrate through efficient and final causes? Aristotle, arguing in Text 3, takes the negative side to be true.⁹¹ However, since by that argument Aristotle apparently tries to confirm something false, namely, that there is no science which considers all the causes, it is evident that from this text nothing can be affirmed about his opinion. However, I have thought that question should be put aside in this work both because it pertains rather to the explanation of the nature and character of the mathematical sciences, and also because it is most easy [to answer]. For it is clear that the things which mathematics discusses have in themselves efficient and final causes. For quantity, line, and points are made by someone on account of something. However, insofar as they are considered by the speculative mathematical sciences, they are abstracted from these causes, because they are abstracted from motion and from every operation. And so Aristotle did not say that mathematical things do not have an efficient and a final cause, /p. XII/ but that mathematics does not demonstrate through those causes.

And the *a priori* reason seems to be that mathematics does not consider the proper essence and nature of quantity, but only certain proportions which follow on these, not by real causality but only by an inferential consequence.⁹² From this it can be understood that mathematics also does not demonstrate through material causality (which Aristotle seems to have omitted as well known) because mathematics abstracts from matter. Hence, mathematics cannot demonstrate through a proper physical form, because form and matter are quasi-correlative.

Finally from this some infer that mathematics does not demonstrate through any cause and that, therefore, it is not properly a deductive (*prop-ter quid*) science and that it only demonstrates that its conclusions are true sometimes from what is impossible (*ab impossibili*)⁹³ and sometimes from a sign⁹⁴ and, as it were, [by an appeal] to sensation. However, even though this is true of many demonstrations in mathematics, nevertheless it must not be denied that sometimes in mathematics there is deductive demonstration, which is through a cause.

But we must distinguish with respect to causes. For one kind is real with a proper influence (*influxus*) with respect to being, and about this it is true that it has nothing to do with mathematical demonstrations, as Averroes suggested in [his commentary on] *Physics*, Book 1, in the beginning.⁹⁵ The other kind is a cause in respect to cognition. This is rather called a *reason*, which suffices for an *a priori* demonstration. This is seen, for

example, when we demonstrate one Divine attribute from another. And in this way a mathematician demonstrates through a cause, for example, when through the definition of a triangle he shows something about this or that triangle.

Question 2. Secondly here, on the occasion of Aristotle's words, it is usual to ask whether mathematical beings are good—which we have treated sufficiently in *Disputation 10, Section 2* [sic].⁹⁶

Question 3. Whether all actions are accompanied by motion? For Aristotle also affirms this in the course of that argument where he also says many things which pertain to the matter of causes. For example, [he says] that immobile things have neither an efficient nor a final cause—which is false with respect to created Intelligences.⁹⁷ But, as I have said, none of those things which are assumed here by Aristotle are necessarily affirmed as his own opinion. Still, we extensively discuss the first proposition⁹⁸ when we treat of creation in *Disputation 12, Section 1* [sic],⁹⁹ in which we prove the negative side. But what Aristotle says here can be explained with respect to physical action, for he is supposing that mathematical things do not have some other superior action. The second proposition¹⁰⁰ is discussed in the same place and in *Disputation 29, Sections 1*¹⁰¹ and *2*,¹⁰² and *Disputation 35, Section 1*.¹⁰³ But in this place, by “immobile things” there is understood only mathematical objects, and these, not only in reality but also with regard to their abstraction and consideration, are said not to have an [efficient or final] cause, as has been explained.

Chapter Three

A Question Is Raised about Principles: Whether They Are Themselves Genera, or Elements, or Physical Principles?

About this question, which Aristotle explicitly discusses,¹⁰⁴ there occurs nothing new besides those things which have been noted in Chapter 1, Question 7. But some questions do occur about what Aristotle has incidentally mentioned, especially with respect to Text 10.

Question 1. Whether a genus is directly (*per se*) predicated of the differences by which it is contracted? Or as it is usually asked in another way: is it essential to a genus that it have differences outside its concept (*ratio*), that is, [differences] in whose intrinsic and essential concept the genus itself is not included? For the Philosopher evidently supposes this in the argument which he fashions in Text 10.¹⁰⁵ And lest someone say that he

is not proceeding in this text in a definitive way (*definiendo*) but only for the sake of argument (*argumentando*), the same Philosopher proves this [point in question] explicitly in the *Topics*, Book 6, Chapter 3.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, this question is in one sense metaphysical and in another dialectical. For it is metaphysical insofar as it highlights the question between genus and difference and the precision of one from the other as well as the mode of composition of a species from these [i.e. genus and difference], and in this sense it is indicated by the last words cited above, and it is sufficiently treated by us in *Disputation 6, Sections 5*¹⁰⁷ and *6*.¹⁰⁸ And what is treated in *Disputation 2, Section 6*,¹⁰⁹ and *Disputation 39, Section 2*,¹¹⁰ comes to the same thing.

However, this question is dialectical insofar as it asks about the quality of a predication, namely, whether the predication of a genus with respect to its differences, or vice versa, is essential, for example [the predications] “rational is animal¹¹¹” (*rationale est animal*), or, “animal is rational¹¹²” (*animal est rationale*). And in this sense, [John of] Jandun treats the question extensively in Question 12¹¹³ and he affirms that it is essential. Antonio Andreas, in Question 2,¹¹⁴ and [Chrysostomos] Javellus, in Question 2,¹¹⁵ also treat it and they deny that it is essential. Again [Agostino] Nifo treats it in his *Disputation 2*¹¹⁶ and uses various distinctions.

But the matter is both extrinsic [to the present discipline] and also clear. For those propositions are not in the first or second mode of essential predication which Aristotle distinguished in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1¹¹⁷—because in them the predicate is not of the essence of the subject nor is the subject essential to the predicate. And the reason is taken *a priori* from the explanation of the first [i.e. metaphysical] sense. For since genus and difference are so related /p. XIII/ that one is outside the concept and the essential nature of the other, and a difference is not otherwise a property flowing from the nature of the genus, as is self-evident, it results that one cannot be predicated of the other either in the first or second mode of essential predication.

But if someone wishes [to explain it] in another way according to other essential (*per se*) modes posited by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* Book 5, Chapter 18,¹¹⁸ or by still other modes which can be fashioned, as for example, when “essential” (*per se*) is distinguished against “through something else” (*per aliud*), or as it excludes an accidental (*per accidens*) composition—for instance, when a difference is joined essentially (*sicut per se*) to a genus, that is, immediately and not through something else (*per aliud*), or when a genus and a difference essentially (*per se*) and not accidentally (*per accidens*) compose one thing—in these ways it can be said that one is predicated

essentially (*per se*) of the other. But these ways of essential predication are not as usual (*usitati*) as the first ways—besides the fact that these predications are in a certain respect not natural but in some manner improper and in this also they fall short of essential propositions. For even though a divisive difference is related to a genus in the manner of a form, still it is less universal than the genus. But, on the other hand, even though the genus is more universal, it is however related to a difference as potency and not as act, and therefore it is not so properly and directly predicated. Absolutely, therefore, these propositions should be excluded from the number of essential (*per se*) propositions.

Question 2. Whether to have differences outside its own concept, in which differences it is not included nor of which it is essentially predicated, is not only natural to a proper genus but also natural to every univocal predicate, or to every predicate having one objective concept¹¹⁹ common to all things contained under it? We have addressed this question in *Disputation 2, Sections 5*¹²⁰ and *6*,¹²¹ where we have shown that it is not necessary that such a property belong to every predicate which is common according to the same objective concept. And in *Disputation 39, Section 2* [sic],¹²² we have shown that it does not belong to every essential or quidditative predicate. Moreover, Aristotle in this place has spoken only about a proper genus—whatever some commentators contend. And we have addressed the same matter in *Disputations 32*¹²³ and *30*.¹²⁴

Question 3. Whether a species is essentially predicated of a difference which is constitutive of it, as for example, [in this proposition] “rational is man”¹²⁵ (*rationale est homo*)? The authors cited above treat this question in this place—and some answer in the affirmative, others in the negative, and still others use distinctions. But we have put it aside: first, because it is a question for logic, and, second, because (as Fonseca well indicated in his commentaries¹²⁶) Aristotle thought that the negative position was so evident that he left it without proof and explanation.¹²⁷

Nor is there any problem resulting from what others object, namely, that in that proposition the subject is of the essence of the predicate and it is therefore in the second mode of essential predication, for this is the definition of that second mode. Likewise, because this proposition, “Man is rational” (*homo est rationalis*) is in the first mode of essential predication, therefore, the proposition which converts with it will also be essential at least in the second mode.

These (I say) and similar things are not a problem. For that proposition [“rational is man”] is not natural, but indirect, most improper and apart from nature;¹²⁸ and, therefore, it is outside the whole range of essential

propositions. For those definitions of essential modes must be understood with regard to predicates and subjects which are proper and *connatural*—not about those which are composed and converted by us in an inverse and *contranatural* order. Hence, it also can be said that the genus when proposed in those definitions constitutes a proper and natural proposition. And for the same reason it is not necessary that one essential proposition be converted into another, when by that conversion there is effected an indirect and improper proposition. Add also that this proposition is essential in the first mode: “Man is animal” (*Homo est animal*), but this proposition, “Animal is man” (*Animal est homo*) is essential in no mode.

I see this controversy to be about the way of speaking; and I see that many think that this proposition, “Risible is man” (*Risibile est homo*), is in the first mode of essential predication even though it is indirect. But, nevertheless, the first mode is more formal and more proper. Otherwise, this proposition also, “Rational is man” (*Rationale est homo*) would be in the first mode of essential predication. For if “man” is put in the definition of “risible” why not in the definition of “rational”? In this way the same proposition, “Rational is man” (*Rationale est homo*), would be in both the first and the second mode [of essential predication]: which is absurd. Therefore, these indirect propositions are outside the order of essential propositions. On this, see Cajetan [commenting on] the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1, Chapters 4¹²⁹ and 18.¹³⁰

Chapter Four

In this place Aristotle is debating both sides of several questions which were proposed in the first Chapter, that is, from Question 9 up to 14. However, he defines nothing and does not bring forward anything new, or anything which needs our discussion or notation.

Chapter Five

In this Chapter he is discussing Question 18, about mathematical things or about quantity: that is, whether this is a substance or not? And he says nothing worthy of note or needing a new discussion. Those things are enough which we will treat about quantity in *Disputation 40, Sections 1*¹³¹ and 2.¹³² However, this passage should be kept in mind (*observandus*) for those things which are there treated. /p. XIV/

Chapter Six

In this Chapter he is discussing other questions put forward above. And he almost always comes back to an unprofitable (*inutilis*) debate with Plato about Ideas. Therefore, also in this place nothing new is ordinarily disputed [by Scholastic commentators].

Notes

- ¹ In this Book, Aristotle is asking questions and raising objections (*aporiai*), which he will answer in later books.
- ² Tricot (*Aristote...*, tome I, pp. xxi–xxii) tells us that the ancients saw in this book the true beginning of the *Metaphysics* itself—with the preceding books serving only as an introduction. Tricot agrees with Werner Jaeger (cf. *Aristotle: Fundamentals...*, pp. 169–76) that (with some possible exception) Book 3 belongs to Aristotle’s early period. For in this book Aristotle is using the 1st person plural to designate the Platonists and is obviously with this considering himself to be one of them. Since, in this book, Aristotle is asking questions and raising objections, which he will answer in the books to follow, Tricot sees it as very important for understanding the overall unity of the *Metaphysics*.
- ³ Although I have been using the English word “method” up to now in order usually to translate Suárez’s Latin “*modus*”, this is the first time that he himself uses the Latin “*methodus*.”
- ⁴ With this compare Suárez’s remarks in the prologue to *Disputation 2*.
- ⁵ This bears some reflection in order to understand Suárez’s purpose and method in the *Index*.
- ⁶ For this, see *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a18–20. Suárez’s reference here to Chapter 1 probably stems from his use of the Junctas edition of Aristotle with Averroes’s commentary, in which the passage in question is found in “The Second Summation” (*Summa Secunda*), Chapter 1 (Cap. I); cf. vol. 8, fol. 40rE.
- ⁷ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 2–12, which asks: “What is the object of metaphysics?”
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 5, pp. 37–53: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ⁹ See *Metaphysics* 3.2.996b26–997a15.
- ¹⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.3.1005a21–22.
- ¹¹ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 19–20, vol. 25, pp. 31–2.
- ¹² Cf. *DM* 3, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 111–115, which asks: “By what principles can properties be demonstrated of being? And whether among these, this is the first: ‘It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.’”?
- ¹³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.2.997a15–25.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.* 4.2.1004a32–b1.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.* 6.1.1026a29–32. In this place Aristotle remarks that his First Philosophy is concerned with whatever substances exist beyond the natural order and from this it has concern for all being insofar as it is being, i.e. for all substances.
- ¹⁶ *DM* 1, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 12–22, which concerns the sphere of the object of metaphysics and which asks: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ¹⁷ That is, Platonic Ideas.
- ¹⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.6.987a29–988a17.

- ¹⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.13.1038b1–1039a23.
- ²⁰ Cf. *DM* 4, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 115–122, where the main question is: “Whether transcendental unity adds some positive character to being, or only one that is privative?”
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 122–5, where the question is: “Whether ‘one’ as such expresses only a negation which it adds to being? Or [does it express] something else?”
- ²² *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201
- ²³ See in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 899–916.
- ²⁴ For later philosophers and theologians such as Suárez this is what the Platonic Ideas have become: exemplars, according to which God fashions the things He creates.
- ²⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a14–1074b14, where Aristotle is concerned with the Separate Intelligences which move the spheres of heaven.
- ²⁶ Cf. *DM* 35, vol. 26, pp. 424–477: “About Immaterial Created Substance.” For Suárez, Angelic substances are equivalent to the Intelligences or the Separate Substances of Aristotle.
- ²⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.2.997a15–33.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.1.1003a21–22; 4.2.1003b19.
- ²⁹ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 2–12: “What is the object of metaphysics?”
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 12–22: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ³¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.2.998a28–999a24.
- ³² *DM* 13, vol. 25, pp. 395–461: “About the Material Cause of Substance”.
- ³³ *DM* 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–97: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
- ³⁴ *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
- ³⁵ *DM* 16, vol. 25, pp. 566–580: “About an Accidental Formal Cause.”
- ³⁶ This evidently entails a conception of metaphysics which is close to logic.
- ³⁷ *DM* 5, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 145–48, which asks: “Whether all things which exist or can exist are singular and individual?”
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148–61, where the question is: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”
- ³⁹ Note here the conceptual rather than existential character of metaphysics.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.3.998b14–999a24.
- ⁴¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.3.999a17–21.
- ⁴² Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b16–19.
- ⁴³ Cf. *DM* 12, 3, nn. 3, 9–22, vol. 25, pp. 388, 390–95. The question in this whole Section 3 is: “How many kinds of cause are there?”
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.999a26–b17.
- ⁴⁵ Cf. Aristotle: “παρά”; e.g., 999a19.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.999a26–b17.
- ⁴⁷ *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: “About Individual Unity and its Source.”
- ⁴⁸ *DM* 6, vol. 25, pp. 201–250: “About Formal and Universal Unity.”
- ⁴⁹ Cf. “καὶ πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον...” *Metaphysics* 3.1.995b34–5.
- ⁵⁰ Aristotle’s “σύνολον.”
- ⁵¹ Cf. “λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῆ τι τῆς ὕλης.” *ibid.* 35.
- ⁵² *DM* 5, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 148–61, where Suárez asks: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”
- ⁵³ Aristotle’s “τὸ τί ἐστι”. That is, “the what it is” or the essence of a thing.
- ⁵⁴ That is, the material individual; Aristotle’s “τὸδε τι”, “this something”.
- ⁵⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.999b24–1000a4.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 12.5.1071a21–b2.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a–b31.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.1.996a2–3.
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 12.4.107031–33.

- ⁶⁰ *DM* 13, s. 11, vol. 25, pp. 438–52, in which Suárez asks: “Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect?”
- ⁶¹ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, in which Suárez asks: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this [uncreated] being by itself?” and in the course of which he shows that God alone is the cause of the sublunar world, the heavenly bodies, and any Intelligences beyond those bodies.
- ⁶² Cf. *DM* 13, vol. 25, pp. 395–461: “About the Material Cause of Substance.” Also see *DM* 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–497: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
- ⁶³ For Suárez, treatment of the soul belongs to physics rather than to metaphysics; cf. *DM* 1, 2, n. 20, vol. 25, p. 19; *DM* 8, *Ordo disputationis*, p. 275; and *DM* 29, 1, n. 18, vol. 26, p. 26. On later 17th and 18th century thinkers who, influenced by Suárez, also treated the soul in physics, cf. Martin Grabmann, “Die ‘Disputationes Metaphysicae’ des Franz Suarez in ihrer methodische Eigenart und Fortwirkung,” in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, vol. 1 (München: Hueber, 1926), p. 545.
- ⁶⁴ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 22–34, where it is asked: “Can it be evidently demonstrated that there exists some being which is by itself and uncreated?” On this, see: John P. Doyle, *The Metaphysical Nature of the Proof for God’s Existence according to Francis Suarez, S.J.*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1966; and my essay: “The Suarezian Proof for God’s Existence,” in *History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday*, ed. Linus J. Thro, Washington: University Press of America, 1982, pp. 105–17.
- ⁶⁵ Here I am accepting the reading of Sergio Rábade Romeo, et al. (vol. 1, p. 44), instead of the Vives reading of “verum.”
- ⁶⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.1001a4–b6.
- ⁶⁷ *DM* 4, vol. 25, pp. 115–145: “About Transcendental Unity in General.”
- ⁶⁸ *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: “About Individual Unity and its Source.”
- ⁶⁹ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 22–34, which asks: “Can it be evidently demonstrated that there exists some being which is by itself and uncreated?”
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, where Suárez asks: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this [uncreated] being by itself?”
- ⁷¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.6.1003a7–17.
- ⁷² Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.13.1038b–1039a2.
- ⁷³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16
- ⁷⁴ Possibly, *DM* 29, 1, n. 35, vol. 26, p. 32.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* III, c. 1, l. 3, Cathala nos. 355–6.
- ⁷⁶ Cf. *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: “About Individual Unity and its Source”; Section 3 (pp. 161–175) asks: “Whether ‘designated matter’ (*materia signata*) is the principle of individuation in material substances?”; Section 4 (pp. 175–7) asks: “Whether substantial form is the principle of individuation for material substances?”; Section 6 (pp. 180–88) asks: “What, finally, is the principle of individuation in all created substances?”
- ⁷⁷ Cf. *DM* 22, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 802–809, where Suárez is asking: “Whether by natural reason it can be sufficiently proven that God directly and immediately operates in the actions of all creatures?” At the end of this Section (cf. nn. 24–30, pp. 807–809), Suárez emphasizes the unique role of God’s efficient causality concurring with creatures.
- ⁷⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.5.1002a8–b11. The key to Suárez’s interpretation here is in his next sentence, where there is question of the education of substantial forms. While the form of Hermes which is educed from a stone (cf. 1002a23) is not substantial it will serve as an analogue of a form which is substantial and is educed from matter.
- ⁷⁹ *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
- ⁸⁰ *DM* 18, vol. 25, pp. 592–687: “About a Proximate Efficient Cause and its Causality, and about Everything which it Requires for Causing.”
- ⁸¹ *Metaphysics* 3.1.996a11.

- ⁸² *Metaphysics* 3.6.1002b–1003a6.
- ⁸³ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 10, vol. 25, pp. 536–557, which asks: “Whether of one substance there is only one formal cause?” In this Section Suárez discusses the famous medieval question regarding a plurality of forms in a composite substance.
- ⁸⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.6.1001b26–1002b11.
- ⁸⁵ Note here a rare reference to Books 13 and 14 of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.
- ⁸⁶ Cf. *DM* 40, vol. 26, pp. 529–87: “About Continuous Quantity.”
- ⁸⁷ *DM* 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity.”
- ⁸⁸ Note this “other”. In this Suárez indicates his own assessment of what is currently doing. He is a commentator, or better, an “explainer” (*expositor*) of the text of Aristotle. In this, he is taking a place alongside Averroes, St. Albert, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and others.
- ⁸⁹ Cf. *In lib. Metaphys*, III, t. 1, fol. 36vb–37ra.
- ⁹⁰ Possibly, cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.1001a1–3.
- ⁹¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.2.996a29–30.
- ⁹² That is, by logical entailment.
- ⁹³ For this see Aristotle’s “ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις” (cf. e.g. *Anal. Post.* 1.11.77a22) and his “ἀποδείξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς” (*Metaph.* 4.4.1006a11–12).
- ⁹⁴ On demonstrations from signs, which are from effect to cause, cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 2.27.70a6–8 and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* 167b8.
- ⁹⁵ Cf. *Aristotelis de Physico auditu, libri octo, cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eisdem commentariis*, I, c. 1, t. 1 (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 4, fol. 6rBC.
- ⁹⁶ Instead, see: *DM* 10, 3, nn. 19–23, vol. 25, pp. 352–3.
- ⁹⁷ That is to say, from Suárez’s Christian perspective, Angels or the Separate Substances of Aristotle would be caused by God.
- ⁹⁸ That is, that all actions are accompanied by motion.
- ⁹⁹ Cf. *DM* 20 (*De Creatione*), s. 4, nn. 24–28, vol. 25, pp. 776–8.
- ¹⁰⁰ That is, that immobile things have neither an efficient nor a final cause.
- ¹⁰¹ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 22–34, which asks: “Can it be evidently demonstrated that there exists some being which is by itself and uncreated?”
- ¹⁰² Cf. *ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 34–47, where the question is: “Can it be demonstrated a posteriori that God alone is an uncreated being?”
- ¹⁰³ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 424–36, which asks: “Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?”
- ¹⁰⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.3.998a20–999a23.
- ¹⁰⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 3.3.998b25–28.
- ¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Topics* 6.3.140a27–32; and 6.144a36–b3. Note, however, that in this last place Aristotle is asking rather than answering the question of predicating a genus of a difference.
- ¹⁰⁷ Cf. *DM* 6, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 222–3, where Suárez asks: “Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect? And how should we answer the objections which have been stated against that?”
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 223–8, where the question is: “By what operation of intellect are universal things produced?”
- ¹⁰⁹ Cf. *DM* 2, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 98–102, where it is asked: “How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?”
- ¹¹⁰ Cf. *DM* 39, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 510–23, where the issue is: “Whether the division of accidents into nine kinds is enough?” Also, cf. *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 523–9, which asks: “Whether the mentioned division is univocal or analogous?” In this last Section, see esp. nn. 7–8, pp. 534–5.
- ¹¹¹ Or, “what is rational is an animal.”
- ¹¹² Or, “what is an animal is rational.”

- ¹¹³ Cf. John of Jandun: *Quaestiones perspicacissimi Peripatetici, Ioannis de Ianduno, in duodecim libros Metaphysicae*, iuxta Aristotelis, et magni Commentatoris intentionem ab eodem exactissime disputatae, III, q. 12 (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1554), fols. 41rH–43rF.
- ¹¹⁴ Cf. *Quaestiones Antonii andree super duodecim libros metaphysice*, III, q. 2 (Venetiis: Iohannes et Gregorius de Gregoriis, 1495), fol. 15rb–va. Antonio's Question 2 here is: "Whether a genus is predicated essentially of a difference" (*Utrum genus praedicetur de differentia per se*). His answer is negative: "I answer that a genus is not predicated essentially of a difference." (*Respondeo quod genus non praedicatur per se de differentia*); *ibid.*, 15rb.
- ¹¹⁵ Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, *In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita testualia metaphysicali modo determinata: in quibus clarissime resolvuntur dubia Aristotelis et Commentatoris, eaque ut plurimum decisa habentur iuxta Thomisticum dogma...*, III, q. 2 (Venetiis: Apud Haeredes Ioannis Mariae Bonelli, 1576), fols. 42v–45r. Javellus was, I believe, the source here for Suárez's understanding of both Antonio Andreas and John of Jandun. For this, consider Javellus' opening paragraph in Question 2 (42v): "With respect to this question, three things must be done. First, the opinion of Blessed Thomas will be examined carefully, with which [opinion] Antonio Andreas is in agreement. Second, the opinion of Jandun, who holds the opposite [view], will be examined carefully. Third, some doubts are resolved." (*Circa hanc quaestionem tria agenda sunt. Primo, pertractabitur opinio B. Th. cui concordat Ant. And. Secundo pertractabitur opinio Ianduni, qui tenet oppositum. Tertio, solventur quaedam dubia.*)
- ¹¹⁶ See: Augustini Niphi, *Dilucidarium metaphysicarum disputationum, in Aristotelis Decem et quatuor libros Metaphysicorum*, III, disp. 2 (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559), pp. 93–97.
- ¹¹⁷ Cf. c. 4.73a34–b5.
- ¹¹⁸ Cf. Bekker no. 1022a25–36.
- ¹¹⁹ Cf. Book 2, note 33, above.
- ¹²⁰ Cf. *DM2*, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 92–8, which asks: "Whether the character of being transcends all the characters and differences of inferior beings, in such a way that it is intimately and essentially included in them?"
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*, n. 6, vol. 25, pp. 98–102, where Suárez asks: "How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?"
- ¹²² Cf. *DM39*, 3, n. 8, vol. 26, p. 525.
- ¹²³ Cf. *DM32*, vol. 26, pp. 312–29: "About the Division of Created Being into Substance and Accidents."
- ¹²⁴ See *DM30*, 4, nn. 28–34, vol. 26, pp. 83–5, where Suárez is excluding a composition of genus and difference from the Divine essence.
- ¹²⁵ Or in better English: "a rational thing is a man." The problem for a translator comes from the need to be explicit about the difference, "rational."
- ¹²⁶ Again, note Suárez's praise of Fonseca.
- ¹²⁷ Cf. Fonseca, *Comment. in lib. Metaphys. Aristotelis*, III, c. 3, tom. I, cols. 587–8 m.
- ¹²⁸ Obviously, it does not sound that good to a Latin speaker like Suárez.
- ¹²⁹ Cf. Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), *Commentaria in Posteriora Analytica Aristotelis*, I, c. 4, n. 6, textus ex editione Lugdenensi (1579) excerptus et a E. Babin et W. Baumgaertner exaratus et emendatus (Québec: Les Editions de l'Université Laval, 1950), vol. 1/1, pp. 83–7.
- ¹³⁰ *Ibid.* c. 18, Expositio, vol. 1/2, esp. pp. 118–119. Both here and in Chapter 4, Cajetan regards such propositions as accidental (*per accidens*) rather than essential (*per se*).
- ¹³¹ Cf. *DM40*, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 529–33, which asks: "What is quantity, especially continuous quantity?"

¹³² *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 533–38, where Suárez’s question is: “Whether the quantity of a mass is something distinct from a material substance and its qualities?”

THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

About the Subject of This Doctrine, As Well As Its Parts, Properties, and Principles

Question 1. Whether being insofar as it is being is the subject of metaphysics?—[which is] what Aristotle affirms in this place.² See *Disputation 1, Section 1, throughout*.³

Question 2. What kinds of being or what features of beings does metaphysics address in its contemplation? See *Disputation 1, through the whole of Section 2*.⁴

Question 3. Whether being as such (*secundum se*) has properties which essentially inhere in it and which are demonstrated in this science? See *Disputation 1, Section 4*.⁵

Question 4. How many such properties are there and what order do they have among themselves? See *Disputation 3, Section 2*.⁶

Question 5. Whether this science is concerned with first principles and what it does with regard to them? See *Disputation 1, Section 4*.⁷

Question 6. Whether by reason of their object or their principles other sciences are subordinated to metaphysics? See *Disputation 1, Section 5*.⁸

Question 7. Whether this science has some first principles from which it demonstrates? See *Disputation 3, Section 2[sic]*.⁹

Question 8. Whether this science considers the first causes and principles of things, and in what way? See *Disputation 1, Section 4*,¹⁰ and *Disputation 12, at the beginning*.¹¹

Question 9. Whether being insofar as it is being has real causes? [This is treated] in the places just cited.

Question 10. Whether being insofar as it is being has some one objective concept?¹² This question is placed here because of Aristotle’s words: “Since we are seeking the principles and supreme causes, it is clear that it is necessary that being be essentially (*per se*) of some nature.”¹³ And at the end of the chapter he concludes: “Therefore, we must assume first causes of being insofar as it is being.”¹⁴ From these sentences compared between themselves it seems clear that in Aristotle’s opinion being insofar as it is

being entails some nature, or some concept which is common in the way of one nature, whose essential properties, principles, and causes can be investigated in this science. However, we treat the mentioned question in *Disputation 2, Section 2*¹⁵—to which question the following [questions] are joined:

Question 11. Whether we have one formal concept of being¹⁶ which is common to all beings? Cf. *Disputation 2*, through the whole of *Section 1*.¹⁷

Question 12. Whether being insofar as it is being is something really prescinded from its inferiors? *Ibid.*, *Section 3*.¹⁸

Question 13. Whether it can be prescinded at least according to reason? See *Disputation 4, Section 2*.¹⁹

Question 14. Whether being insofar as it is being actually or potentially includes its inferiors? Cf. *Disputation 2, Section 2*.²⁰

Question 15. Whether being insofar as it is being signifies all supreme genera immediately or only mediately? *Ibid.*²¹

Question 16. In what is the common and prescinded concept of being located? *Ibid.*, *Section 4*.²²

Question 17. Whether being is said essentially or accidentally about particular beings, especially created ones? *Ibid.*²³

Question 18. Whether the character of being transcends all things in such way that it is included in all their modes and differences? *Ibid.*, *Section 5*.²⁴

Question 19. How being is contracted to its inferiors. Cf. *Disputation 2, Section 6*.²⁵

Question 20. In this place [the question] can also be treated: Is the existence of a creature distinguished from its essence?—about which the ample *Disputation 31*²⁶ is concerned, which *Disputation* contains many questions which can be seen both there and also in the *Index of Disputations*, at *Disputation 31*.

Chapter Two About the Analogy of Being and about Some of Its Properties

Question 1. Whether being is univocal or analogous both with respect to created and uncreated being and with respect to substance and accident? The first question is treated in *Disputation 28, Section 3*,²⁷ and the second in *Disputation 32, the last Section*.²⁸

Question 2. Did Aristotle correctly compare the analogy of *being* with the analogy of *healthy*?²⁹ The reason for the question is that it seems to be of a very different character, as is clear from the aforementioned disputations.

The question can be answered in two ways: first, he compared these in analogy simply (*absolute*) but not in the [same particular] mode of analogy since they are not similar in mode. For “healthy” is analogous in such a way that the form which it signifies is intrinsically present in only one significate, while it is in the others by an extrinsic denomination. But “being” signifies a form or a character which is intrinsically inhering in all the significates. From this it results that “healthy” does not signify one concept which is common to all, such as “being” signifies. /p. XVI/

From this it further results that when Aristotle equates *being* and *healthy* in this that just as one science treats of healthy with regard to all of its significates, inasmuch as they are all derived from one health, so one science treats of being, when (I say) he compares these, it must also be understood according to likeness and not according to equality. For *healthy*, according to its whole analogy, is not the adequate object of one science which directly under itself comprehends its significates as proper subjective parts of such an object,³⁰ directly, or as they say “straightway” (*in recto*), belonging to the object of such a science. For only the principal significate of healthy is the adequate and direct object of the science of medicine. But the rest of the things which are analogically called healthy belong indirectly (*in obliquo*) to that science, as signs of health, or the instrument of health, or something of this kind. But being is an adequate object which directly comprehends its own, as it were, subjective parts, as has been sufficiently shown in the Disputations cited in the previous chapter. Hence, it results that being according to its adequate signification can be an extreme [term] of a demonstration in which properties adequate to it are demonstrated of it.³¹ But healthy cannot in any way [be that] except by reason of the primary significate.

Secondly, we can answer that we can speak about being in two ways: in one way, as it comprehends only true real beings³²—and it transcends and contains under itself all of these. In another way, as it is extended to many things which are not beings truly and intrinsically and which are called beings only by a certain extrinsic attribution, for example, privations, or beings which are entirely by accident, or beings of reason.³³

Aristotle seems in the chapter above to have spoken [of being] in the first way, and in that way it is a properly adequate and direct object of one science so that it is analogous,³⁴ with a unity of concept and objec-

tive character found intrinsically in all its significates, including those which are secondary, as we show in the mentioned places. And taken in this way it is comparable with *healthy* not in a way that is equal,³⁵ but only in that way which we have just explained.

In this chapter Aristotle seems to speak about being in the second way. And in this way it includes an analogy of several concepts with respect to many significates and [is said] according to an extrinsic denomination with respect to some. And in respect to these it is compared with healthy, even in its way of analogy and in the way in which it falls under one science, as is simply clear from what has been said.

And it should not seem strange that Aristotle takes the word “being” in different significations in these two chapters, since in them he is speaking in different ways. For in the first, inasmuch as he is defining the adequate object of metaphysics, he is treating being according to its proper objective concept. But in this chapter he is treating of the whole expanse of the signification of the word “being.” Hence, he enumerates explicitly enough several things which are not true beings, such as privations³⁶ and the like, which he himself excludes from the direct and adequate object of metaphysics at the end of Book 6.³⁷

Question 3. Whether it pertains to metaphysics to treat of the proper nature of substance and its proper principles? See *Disputation 1, Section 2*.³⁸

Question 4. Whether metaphysics treats the species of being according to their proper natures? And whether in general the science of a genus is also concerned with its species? This is treated in *Disputation 1, Section 2*.³⁹ And the answer is plainly negative. However, the words of Aristotle in Text 2 on which this question is based, namely: “Of one genus there is one science—wherefore, also about being, however many are its species, it is the task of a generically one science to contemplate and [also to contemplate] the species of its species,”⁴⁰ these words (I say) are ambiguous and they are extensively explained in that place [Text 2]. In this place it should only be noted that the discussion is formal[ly] about the species of being in the genus of “being scientifically knowable” (*scibilis*).⁴¹ And in this way it can be said that the genus of “being scientifically knowable as such” (*scibilis ut sic*) pertains to the genus of science, but the various species of things scientifically knowable pertain to various species of sciences. Or also all beings insofar as they agree in one character of “scientifically knowable” fall under one science, which although it is one in species is called general on account of its universal treatment of all beings under this other character. Nevertheless, the species of beings under their proper

characters (of being objects in some way scientifically knowable) pertain to sciences which are specifically diverse.

Question 5. Whether being and one are the same and one in nature? *Disputation 4, Sections 1*⁴² *and 2.*⁴³

Question 6. Whether being and one are converted, or (as Aristotle says) mutually follow one another? See *Disputation 4, Section 1* [sic].⁴⁴

Question 7. Whether in this mutual relation (*reciprocatio*) Aristotle rightly compared being and one to a principle and a cause? Cf. *Disputation 13* [sic], *Section 1, in the solution of the arguments.*⁴⁵

Question 8. Whether those things are one which are generated by the same generation and corrupted by the same corruption? Cf. *Disputation 7, Section 2.*⁴⁶

Question 9. Whether *one* is privatively opposed to multitude, as Aristotle indicates here? Cf. *Disputation 4, Section 6.*⁴⁷

Question 10. Whether dialectics and sophistic are concerned with every being, and in that agree somehow with metaphysics? For Aristotle seems to affirm that in the text. However, it pertains /p. XVI/ more to dialecticians than to us. Therefore, briefly we should observe that this must not be understood about genuine dialectical doctrine and sophistic art but about their use. For the doctrine of dialectics or topics (for here it is taken in the same meaning) is only concerned with teaching the way of concluding or arguing with probability, especially by reason of subject matter. But sophistic is concerned with the way of concluding apparently. Hence, understood in this way it is not employed about being, or about all beings, but about such operations⁴⁸ of the intellect. But the use of the arts of dialectics and sophistic is extended to all things, because in every thing or subject matter there can be probable or apparent reasons. In this, these parts of logic go beyond demonstrative doctrine. For the use of that doctrine is not extended to all things, but it is employed only in the case of true and necessary things. Metaphysical doctrine, therefore, is not equated with the doctrine of dialectics, but with the use [of that doctrine]. And the comparison is proportional and not completely similar, and in this way the matter is clear.

However, even though Aristotle in this Chapter is not so much discussing unity as saying that it should be discussed, customarily all questions pertaining to unity, and indeed to all other properties of being, are treated in this place. About these properties we have treated at length from *Disputation 4 to 11*,⁴⁹ as may be seen in the Index above,⁵⁰ in order not to give a useless repetition here. Some [authors] in this place also discuss the being of existence (*esse existentiae*)⁵¹ and how it is compared

with being or essence. About this matter we have extensively spoken in *Disputation 31*.⁵²

Chapter Three First Principles Pertain to This Science and Especially That Which Is the First of All

A Single Question. Is this the first of all principles: “It is impossible that the same thing both be and not be at the same time”?⁵³ See *Disputation 3, Section 2*[sic].⁵⁴

Other things which are said with respect to principles are treated in that place and also in *Disputation 1, Section 4*,⁵⁵ and they have been noted above.

Chapters Four To Eight These First Principles Are Defended: “It Is Impossible That the Same Thing Both Be and Not Be at the Same Time” and “Everything Necessarily either Is or Is Not”

Aristotle takes up these five chapters refuting certain philosophers who either deny or imagine themselves to deny these principles—unless perhaps he himself is imagining that for the sake of debate. However that may be, almost nothing occurs in these chapters which brings any special benefit or gives an occasion for any question, apart from one or two passages.

A first question can be raised in Chapter 4, with regard to Texts 13 and 14:⁵⁶ whether one accident can be the subject of another? We have treated this question in *Disputation 14, Section 4*.⁵⁷ And [in that place] the present passage is explained.

Question 2. could be raised with respect to Text 15: whether what is not can effect something? This is occasioned by the words of Aristotle: “But those things which are not, how will they speak or how will they walk?”⁵⁸ However, a question of this sort is far enough away from the present concern of Aristotle and it has been indicated in order only to note what Aristotle said. But we treat it at length in *Disputations 18*⁵⁹ and *31*.⁶⁰

Question 3. A question can be raised about Chapter 8 [sic]: whether and what kind of definite judgment of good is required to move the will? For in regard to this question the passage here should be carefully noted—as we observe in *Disputation 23, Section 8*,⁶¹ where we treat the question.

Question 4. There can be a fourth question around the end of Chapter 4: whether truth and falsity can be greater or lesser, that is, is one [truth or falsity] greater than another? For Aristotle thought the affirmative answer was so certain that he used that principle to demonstrate the first principle: “It is impossible that the same thing simultaneously both be and not be.”⁶² However, as he himself says in the beginning of this Chapter, in these reasonings the argument is not from things more known, but rather the adversaries are refuted from what they have conceded. Hence, it is probable that the affirmative side had been conceded by an adversary.

However, in an absolute sense, that opinion can seem to be false. For since truth consists in something indivisible, and in an adequation in every way of the intellect to the thing, it does not seem that it can be more or less. And for the same reason, neither can falsity [be more or less]; for if it takes away truth, it takes it away entirely, and in this way no falsity can be greater.

But it must be said, there can be more or less in falsity, not formally by an admixture of truth and falsity, as the argument made rightly proves, but “radically” by a greater or lesser distance from truth. And this clearly is what the Philosopher intends. For this is enough for him: that he conclude that something is determinately true; but there is not said to be more or less in truth by access or removal from falsity. For falsity is opposed to truth by way of privation, and therefore it is measured from that [truth] but not vice versa. Therefore, only by reason of a foundation, or of a greater firmness or necessity of that thing in which a truth is founded, can /p. XVII/ one truth be called greater than another. However, this whole matter can become more fully evident from what we say about truth and falsity in *Disputations 8*⁶³ and *9*.⁶⁴

Question 5. Whether contraries with respect to the same subject are opposed as much as contradictories with respect to anything at all? For Aristotle seems to affirm that in this place. From this some infer that even in relation to the absolute power [of God] it is repugnant that two perfect contraries be in the same subject. We speak about this matter in *Disputation 45*, in connection with the category of Quality.⁶⁵ It is evident that Aristotle now is speaking only insofar as one contrary implies the privation or the negation of another. But if this is impeded, it is clear that there cannot be equal repugnance. But whether it can be impeded, Aristotle did not know, and indeed he would deny [that it can]. However, there is no reason for us to deny it, except where there would be a special reason—about which we speak in the cited place.

Question 6. Whether two contraries can naturally be simultaneous in imperfect being (*in esse remisso*) in the same thing, as Aristotle thinks here—this is disputed in the same place.

Question 7. Further, it can be asked: whether all things are always moved, or all things are always at rest, and whether something is utterly immobile, which is the first mover. But these things are treated in physics, and they are proper to that science, even though we treat in *Disputations 20*⁶⁶ and *29*⁶⁷ of the Prime Mover, not under the character of first mover, but of first cause, or first being.

Question 8. About all these chapters it is usually asked: whether truth exists pure and without falsity in affirmations and negations and can it be grasped by us? Concerning this matter, we have said what seems worthy of discussion in the *Disputations about truth and falsity*.⁶⁸

Notes

¹ Tricot (*Aristote ...*, pp. xxii–xxiii) speaks of this Book as follows. In its eight chapters, Aristotle treated being in so far as it is being, some axioms related to being, and the principle of non–contradiction, with dependence in places upon Books 1 and 3. The fourth Book resolves several of the problems from Book 3. The unity, therefore, of Books 1, 3, and 4 is manifest. There are two parts which can readily be distinguished within this Book: (1) Chapters 1 and 2, which deal with the object of metaphysics, and (2) Chapters 3 to 8, which give an indirect demonstration of first principles, most notably the principle of non–contradiction, whose value is affirmed in encounters with Heraclitus and the Sophists. The two parts are linked inasmuch as the first principles are related to being insofar as it is being and are, like it, of universal application. With regard to the object of metaphysics, there is a progression in this Book beyond Book 1: here the First Philosophy is designated as the science of being insofar as it is being, and no longer only as the science of the absolutely first causes of beings.

² Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.1.1003a21.

³ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 2–12, which answers the question: “What is the object of metaphysics?” Let me note again that in this place (n. 26, p. 11) Suárez adds to Aristotle’s “being insofar as it is being” (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν; cf. *Metaphysics* 4.1.1003a21) the qualification “real.” The phrase then becomes “being insofar as it is real being” which, in a way that Aristotle would not disapprove, decidedly excludes “beings of reason” and “accidental beings” from the subject matter of metaphysics. The further import of this will be seen in seventeenth–century Scholasticism which will emphasize intentional or objective being, which will often be equated with “being of reason” and with Aristotle’s “being as true” (τὸ ὄν ὡς ἀληθές; cf. *Metaphysics* 6.2. 1026a34–5). For some of what will be involved here, see my articles: “Extrinsic Cognoscibility: A Seventeenth Century Super–transcendental Notion,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 68 (1990), pp. 57–80; “Another God, Chimerae, Goat–Stags, and Man–Lions: A Seventeenth–Century Debate about Impossible Objects,” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 48 (1995), pp. 771–808; “Silvester Mauro, S.J. (1619–1687) on Four Degrees of Abstraction,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 36 (1996), pp. 461–474; “Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 50 (1997): 783–815; “Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre,” *Medioevo*, 24 (1998), pp. 1–30; and “On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 79 (2001), pp. 57–78.

- ⁴ *DM* 1, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 12–22, where the question is: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ⁵ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 26–37, where the question is: “What are the tasks of this science? What is its goal? Or what is its utility?” A closer match here might be *DM* 3, s. 1, pp. 103–107, which asks: “Whether being insofar as it is being has some properties and of what kind they are?”
- ⁶ *DM* 3, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 107–111, which raises the question: “How many properties are there and what order do they have among themselves?”
- ⁷ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 15–27, vol. 25, pp. 29–34, where metaphysics is assigned the tasks of confirming and defending first principles.
- ⁸ Cf. *DM* 1, 5, nn. 44–52, vol. 25, pp. 50–53.
- ⁹ Cf. *DM* 3, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 111–115, which asks: “By what principles can properties be demonstrated of being? And whether among these, this is the first: ‘*It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.*’”
- ¹⁰ Cf. *DM* 1, 3, nn. 19–24, vol. 25, pp. 31–32.
- ¹¹ Cf. *DM* 12, [prooemium], vol. 25, pp. 372–3.
- ¹² Cf. Book 2, note 33, above.
- ¹³ Cf. “ἐπει δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ’ αὐτήν.” *Metaphysics* 4.1.1003a26–28.
- ¹⁴ Cf. “διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.” *Metaphysics* 4.1.1003a31.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *DM* 2, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 70–81, where the question is: “Whether being has one concept or [one] formal objective character?”
- ¹⁶ Suárez literally writes: “Whether being has in us one formal concept.”
- ¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 2, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 64–70, where the question is: “Whether being insofar as it is being has in our mind one formal concept which is common to all beings?” As indicated above in a note (Book 2, Chapter 1, Question 6), in this Section (n. 1, pp. 64–5) we find Suárez’s description of the important distinction between formal and objective concepts.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 82–87, where the question is: “Whether the character or the concept of being is, in reality and prior to being understood, in some way prescinded from its inferiors?”
- ¹⁹ *DM* 4, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 122–5, where Suárez asks: “Whether ‘one’ as such expresses only a negation which it adds to being? Or [does it express] something else?”
- ²⁰ Cf. esp. *DM* 2, 2, n. 21, vol. 25, p. 77.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, nn. 22–24, pp. 77–8. Something to remark here is that when Suárez uses the verb “signifies” he is focusing on the term *being* rather than its concept; cf. n. 23, p. 78.
- ²² Cf. *DM* 2, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 87–92, in which the question is: “In what does the character of being insofar as it is being consist? And how does it belong to inferior beings?” In this Section we find Suárez’s account of the distinction between “being as a noun” and “being as a participle” (n. 3, pp. 88–9) as well as his discussion of what a “real essence” is (nn. 6–7, pp. 89–90).
- ²³ *Ibid.*, nn. 13–14, pp. 91–2.
- ²⁴ *DM* 2, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 92–98, where it is asked: “Whether the character of being transcends all the characters and differences of inferior beings, in such a way that it is intimately and essentially included in them?” This Section contains Suárez’s understanding of and opposition to the Scotistic doctrine of intrinsic modes; cf. 8, p. 95.
- ²⁵ *DM* 2, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 98–102, which asks the question: “How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?”
- ²⁶ Cf. in *Opera*, vol. 26, pp. 224–312.

- ²⁷ *DM* 28, s. 3, vol.26, pp. 13–21, which asks: “Whether [the division of being] is analogous, in such way that being is not said univocally but rather analogically of God and creatures?”
- ²⁸ Cf. *DM* 32, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 319–29: where the question is: “Whether being is analogically divided into substance and accident?”
- ²⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003a33–b4.
- ³⁰ That is to say, as parts which would divide a universal whole.
- ³¹ This is a most important notion for the whole progression of the Suarezian metaphysics. Being has enough unity to be the middle term in demonstrations. This is especially presupposed by the basic plan of the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, which in the first 27 Disputations deals with being in general and then in Disputations 28 to 53 descends in a quasi–deductive way to the subjective parts (God and creatures, substance and accidents) contained under being in general. In this way, it is the unity of the common concept which in different places mediates the passage to and through the beings contained under that concept.
- ³² That is, what is or can be; cf. above, my note 3, this Book.
- ³³ About this latter meaning of being, which is what Aristotle (cf. *Metaphysics* 6.2.1026a33) has called “being as said in an unqualified way” (τὸ ὄν τὸ ἀπλῶς λεγόμενον) and which comes to be treated in post–Suarezian seventeenth–century philosophy as “supertranscendental being.” I have written extensively elsewhere; cf. e.g. John P. Doyle: “Supertranscendental Being: On the Verge of Modern Philosophy,” in *Meeting of the Minds: The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, ed. Stephen F. Brown (Brepols, 1998/9), pp. 297–315 and “Supertranscendent,” in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. 10 (1999), cols. 643–649.
- ³⁴ Suárez exactly says: “it has an analogy”.
- ³⁵ Suárez exactly says: “not according to equality.”
- ³⁶ For Suárez, beings of reason, which are not real beings and which are excluded from the subject matter of metaphysics, comprise negations, privations, and relations of reason; for this cf. *DM* 54, vol. 26, pp. 1014–1041; in English: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis) Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, translated from the Latin, with an Introduction and Notes, by John P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.
- ³⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b33–34.
- ³⁸ Cf. esp. *DM* 1, 2, nn. 5 and 14, vol. 25, pp. 13 and 17.
- ³⁹ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 12–22, which asks: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ⁴⁰ Cf. “ἅπαντος δὲ γένους...μία...ἐπιστήμη, ...διὸ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος...ἢ ὄν ὅσα εἶδη θεωρῆσαι μίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει, τὰ δὲ εἶδη τῶν εὐδεν.” *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b19–22.
- ⁴¹ Over and above knowability (*cognoscibilitas*), scientific knowability (*scibilitas*) involves the possibility of a complex inferential passage from causal premisses to conclusions. On this, cf. *DM* 44, 11, n. 63, vol. 26, p. 713.
- ⁴² Cf. *DM* 4, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 115–22, where Suárez asks: “Whether transcendental unity adds some positive character to being, or only a something privative?”
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 122–5, where the question is: “Whether ‘one’ as such expresses only a negation which it adds to being? Or [does it express] something else?”
- ⁴⁴ Rather cf. *DM* 4, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 131–3, where the question is: “Whether unity is an adequate property of being? And about the division of being into the one and the many.”
- ⁴⁵ Rather, see *DM* 12, 1, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 382.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *DM* 7, 2, nn. 15–18, vol. 25, pp. 266–9.

- ⁴⁷ Cf. *DM* 4, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 135–6, in which the question is: “How are the one and the many opposed?”
- ⁴⁸ That is, concluding and arguing.
- ⁴⁹ See *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 115–372.
- ⁵⁰ The Spanish translators have changed this to “the following index.” This makes more sense for the present volume as well.
- ⁵¹ The terms “*esse essentialiae*” and “*esse existentiae*,” go back at least to the doctrine of Henry of Ghent; cf. e.g., *Quodl.* I, 9 (ed. Paris, 1518), fol. 72v. On Suárez’s use of this terminology, cf. J. Owens, “The Number of Terms in the Suarezian Discussion of Essence and Being,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 34 (1957), esp. pp. 151–2.
- ⁵² Cf. *DM* 31, vol. 26, pp. 224–312: “About the Essence and Existence of Finite Beings as such, and their Distinction.” For English, see: Francis Suarez, *On the Essence of Finite Being as such, On the Existence of that Essence and their Distinction*, translated from the Latin with an Introduction, by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983.
- ⁵³ Cf. “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον...” *Metaphysics* 4.3.1005b19–20.
- ⁵⁴ Rather, cf. *DM* 3, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 111–115, which asks: “By what principles can properties be demonstrated of being? And whether among these, this is the first: ‘It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.’”
- ⁵⁵ Cf. *DM* 1, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 26–37, where his questions are: “What are the tasks of this science? What is its goal? Or what is its utility?” For discussion of first principles, see esp. nn. 19–27, pp. 31–4.
- ⁵⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.4.1007a34–b17.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. *DM* 14, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 493–7, which asks: “Whether one accident can be the immediate material cause of another?”
- ⁵⁸ Cf. “τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγγαίτο ἢ βαδίσειεν;” *Metaphysics* 4.4.1008a22–23.
- ⁵⁹ *DM* 18, vol. 25, pp. pp. 592–687: “About a Proximate Efficient Cause and its Causality, and about Everything it Requires in order to Cause.” For English, see: Francisco Suárez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- ⁶⁰ Cf. *DM* 31, vol. 26, pp. 224–312: “About the Essence and Existence of Finite Being as such, and their Distinction.”
- ⁶¹ For this, cf. *DM* 23, 8, n. 5, vol. 25, p. 880, where Suárez records St. Thomas (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 82, a. 3) citing Aristotle from *Metaphysics* VI, Text 8 (cf. *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25–7) and also: *DM* 23, 8, nn. 9–11, pp. 880–881, where he discusses the judgment involved in apprehending the good which is required to move the will.
- ⁶² See note 9, this chapter.
- ⁶³ *DM* 8, vol. 25, pp. 274–312: “About Truth or the True which is a Property of Being.”
- ⁶⁴ *DM* 9, vol. 25, pp. 312–328: “About Falsity or the False.”
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *DM* 45, 4, nn. 15–16, vol. 26, pp. 752–3.
- ⁶⁶ *DM* 20, vol. 25, pp. 745–785: “The First Efficient Cause and its Action, which is Creation.” For English, cf.: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002.
- ⁶⁷ *DM* 29, vol. 26, pp. 21–60: “Whether there is a First and Uncreated Being.” English translation: Francisco Suárez, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God (Disputationes Metaphysicae 28 and 29)*, Translated from the Latin by John P. Doyle, South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004.
- ⁶⁸ That is, *Disputations* 8 and 9 (vol. 25, pp. 274–328).

THE FIFTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

On the Signification and Distinction of Common and Analogous Terms

Aristotle is not yet approaching the subject which is the proper treatment of the object of this science. But first in this Book he distinguishes the meanings of certain terms. For, because being, which in the last Book he set up as the object of this science, is most common, its properties, causes, principles, and parts are usually signified by many terms which are most common. For this reason, to Aristotle it seemed necessary to explain the analogy of these terms before treating things [comprised under this science].² And this is the aim of the present Book, as the Commentator [i.e. Averroes] has noted.³ For, even though this doctrine principally deals not with words but with things, nevertheless, because things can be explained only by words, to Aristotle (*Philosophus*) it seemed necessary to give an exact understanding of those words. The result is that this Book also, if we look at the intention of Aristotle, must be reckoned among the preambles for treating the true science of metaphysics.⁴ But if we consider the custom of the commentators (*interpretes*), they usually treat in it those things themselves which belong to the object of metaphysics, especially all the categories and causes of being insofar as it is being—in the knowledge of which things a great part of this doctrine consists.

Chapter One

About the Common Meaning and True Signification of the word “Principle”

This chapter is explicitly treated in *Disputation 12*,
Section 1,⁵ where the following questions are briefly explained.

Question 1. In how many ways is “principle” said? And how can its significations be reduced to some certain concept? See *Disputation 12*,
Section 1.⁶

Question 2. Whether *to be prior* is common to every principle? *Ibid.*⁷

Question 3. What is the general definition of a principle? *Ibid.*⁸ The definition given by Aristotle⁹ is explained, and also the division [of principles] added in the same place.

Question 4. Whether “principle” is analogous, and of what kind is its analogy? *Ibid.*¹⁰

Question 5. Whether principle and cause are convertible? *Ibid.*¹¹ There also: various things said by Aristotle about this matter, both in this Chapter and in others, are explained.

Chapter Two About Causes

In this place Aristotle gives the same doctrine with regard to causes which he taught in Book 2 of the *Physics*,¹² and in almost the same words, although the dignity and the breadth of metaphysics seems to demand a more accurate and a more universal discussion. But why he should have done that, the commentators explain with various reasons. I, however, think that Aristotle had nothing to add beyond what he says in Books 7 and 8, about the principles of substance, and in Book 12, about God and the Intelligences. But in explanation of this Chapter we have spent a large part of the following work, from *Disputation 12 up to 27* [inclusive],¹³ in which we have first given a general division of causes and then one by one we have copiously discussed each specifically, as well as their members or subdivisions; /p. XVIII/ and finally we have compared them among themselves and with their effects—to which three points the doctrine of this Chapter is reduced. But it would be superfluous in this place to transcribe the titles of all these sections or questions, since they are contained in an orderly fashion in the following Index of Disputations¹⁴ and they can easily be sought in that.

Chapter Three About an Element

In this Chapter *the first question* can be: whether an element has been correctly defined by Aristotle? But this is of little importance. For the description given by Aristotle is only a certain explanation of the signification of this word in line with its common usage. And thus we briefly explain it in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.¹⁵ Moreover, the same must be

thought about all questions which depend upon that word; for they are more about a word than a reality.

Question 2. Whether matter is an element?—about which see *Disputation 15, Section 10*.¹⁶

Question 3. Whether form is an element?—in the same place.¹⁷

Question 4. Whether a genus and a difference are elements? About which it seems nothing should be said, because it is only a question about a word. But those things can be read which I noted above, in Book 3, Chapter 1, Question 7, about a similar question under the word, “principle.”

Question 5. Here it can also be asked: whether it is of the nature of an element that formally and by itself it composes that of which it is an element? This almost coincides with the famous question: whether elements formally remain in a mixture—about which we have spoken in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.¹⁸

Chapter Four About Nature

Question 1. Insofar as it belongs to metaphysical consideration, we have explained this Chapter in *Disputation 15, Section 11*, where we have briefly answered the common question of the proper signification of this word [i.e. “nature”] and whether it has been correctly treated by Aristotle.¹⁹ And here there is no problem of any importance, either in the text of Aristotle or in the matter itself. For here we are treating only the meaning of the word.

Question 2. Moreover, the question of the definition of nature which was given in Book 2 of the *Physics*²⁰ is not the concern of this place even though some discuss it here.

Question 3. A question which is ordinarily treated here in an incidental way, namely, whether parts of matter which have diverse forms can be continuous, has been expounded in *Disputation 40*, within the necessary explanation of continuous quantity.²¹

Chapter Five About Necessity and Its Modes

The necessary modes [i.e. the modes of necessity], which Aristotle treats, are clear enough. For necessity from an end can be twofold, that is, either

simply or for being better—plus a third [necessity] from an agent, which he calls violent.²²

Question 1. With regard to this last mode the question could be asked: whether everything which is necessary from an efficient cause is violent? But because the matter is not difficult, it may be noted briefly that something can be necessary from an efficient cause in two ways—in one way from that cause alone, and in another way not from that cause alone but at the same time [from something] on the side of what undergoes or receives the causality. What is necessary in this latter way is not violent, even if it happens to be caused by an extrinsic agent, as is clear [for example] from the downward motion of a stone. Therefore, only the first way of necessity, which results from an extrinsic thing alone, is violent. But again in that there is need for distinction. For sometimes what receives the causality is not opposed to the effect or the motion, even though it may not desire it, and in this case that necessity also is not violent, as is clear from the motion of the heavens, or (to be sure) the motion of fire in its proper sphere.²³

Therefore, only that necessity is violent which comes about when the thing receiving (*passum*) the causality is opposed [to it], which Aristotle has sufficiently stated here in these words: “Apart from tendency and choice ...” (*Praeter propensionem electionemque*)²⁴—where he incidentally suggested that the violent is generically superior to the forced.²⁵ For the forced taken properly is contrary to choice (by which you should understand all elicited appetition), but the violent is either contrary to this or contrary to a natural tendency or propensity which is founded in a natural, whether active or passive, potency. For Aristotle in no way distinguished between these. Hence, he tacitly explained this also in *Ethics*, Book 3, Chapter 1, and said that the violent is “what is from outside, with the recipient not contributing any impetus,”²⁶ where “not contributing” must be understood positively, that is, as “opposing,” or, if I may say it, not passively suffering [the causality].

You will object: therefore, another mode of necessity can be added, namely, one which is from an efficient cause without either violence or connaturality.²⁷ The answer is that either there is nothing which is necessary in this way or [this mode] is reduced to the fourth mode [of necessity] which Aristotle has immediately posited—that is, what cannot be otherwise than it is,²⁸ which he has said is what is necessary without qualification and through participation in which all other [modes] are called necessary.

This I explain as follows: for either that effect is from a cause which is acting by a necessity of nature, and in this way such /p. XIX/ necessity belongs to the simply necessary, because it cannot be otherwise than it is,

and it does not have a special kind of necessity. Or that effect is from a free cause, and it is called necessary only by supposition, because when that cause is acting the recipient of the causing cannot resist. And this mode of necessity, with respect to the agent, is reduced to that by which a thing when it exists necessarily exists, which mode seems to be omitted here as indeed most improper and as not inducing more than a conditioned necessity. But with respect to the recipient it belongs to the fourth mode [of necessity], because that recipient cannot be related otherwise to an extrinsic agent which is so acting. Hence, Aristotle immediately seems to add a certain division of that fourth mode of necessity. For one thing has a cause of such necessity, but another thing does not have a cause, but is such by itself.

Question 2. But with regard to this division the question is: whether according to Aristotle and according to truth there are any beings which are necessary by themselves and have no cause of their necessity? For Aristotle here seems to affirm it so, and many think that he did feel it to be so. But this passage does not compel the imputation of this to Aristotle. For, first of all, this division can be understood not about beings with respect to their existence, but only with respect to their being of essence (*esse essentiae*),²⁹ or with respect to the truth of judgments which abstract from time—which judgments are called necessary, because they have eternal truth. And among these certain ones have a cause of their necessity, as for example: mediated propositions which are demonstrated through prior principles. There are others which do not have a cause, such as, self-evident principles (*principia per se nota*).³⁰ Or if Aristotle is speaking about existing beings, even though he gives the division in plural, it is not required that both members be verified in plural. Hence, in the end he concludes only conditionally—if there are some beings of this kind, then they are eternal. But what he thought in other places, we will see in what follows. And we discuss the whole matter in various places in the following work. For through the whole of *Disputation 20*³¹ we treat of the emanation of all beings from One by creation. Moreover, in *Disputation 29, Section 1*,³² we treat of the necessity of the First Being, and in *Section 2*,³³ about how this is proper to that Being. And in *Disputation 30, Section 16*,³⁴ [we treat the question]: whether the First Being acts from a necessity of nature—as well as what Aristotle thought about this.³⁵

Question 3. On the other hand, in this place we can also ask: whether there are some beings which can be called necessary, even though they have a cause? This is treated in *Disputation 28, Section 1*,³⁶ and in *Disputation 35, Section 3, near the end*.³⁷

Question 4. Finally, it can be asked: whether complex truths which are called necessary have a cause of their necessity, and of what kind their necessity is? We have touched on this in *Disputation 1, Section 4*,³⁸ and *Disputation 8*, which is about truth, *Sections 1*³⁹ and *2*,⁴⁰ and [have treated it] extensively in *Disputation 31, Section 2*,⁴¹ and *Section 12, toward the end*.⁴²

Chapter Six About Unity and Its Various Modes

Those things which can be discussed with regard to this Chapter, and which are particularly relevant to the matter at hand, are treated in *Disputations 4*,⁴³ *5*,⁴⁴ *6*,⁴⁵ and *7*,⁴⁶ through several questions which can be seen in the following Index.⁴⁷ But with respect to the text some things can be debated about quantitative unity and continuity—for example, whether the continuum is correctly defined through motion, i.e.: as that continuous being which is moved by itself with one motion. *Second*, whether heterogeneous bodies are truly continuous? *Third*, whether parts or substances which have several different forms can be truly continuous? *Fourth*, whether unity (*unum*) is the principle of number? and what kind of principle it is? *Fifth*, whether this belongs equally to every unity, or in a special way is the ultimate unity called the form of number? *Sixth*, does the character of measure belong in a special way to unity? However, all these questions are in themselves not difficult, and therefore they are briefly raised and answered in the context of what needs to be discussed about continuous and discrete quantity in *Disputations 40*⁴⁸ and *41*.⁴⁹

Question 7. Seventh, it can be asked how Aristotle said that to be one or the same is more truly predicated about things which are diverse in species with the application of a remote genus than with the application of a proximate genus, for example, that man and horse are more truly said to be the same as living than the same as animal. The reason for the question is that there is a greater unity in a proximate genus rather than in one which is remote.

The answer is that Aristotle was not treating about a reality but about a figure of speech. For, with respect to a reality, it is certain that there is greater unity in a proximate genus. However, in the mode of predication, a predication becomes more true and less equivocal under that form which Aristotle posited. And the reason is, as St. Thomas noted,⁵⁰ because with respect to a remote genus species agree not only in that genus, but also in

the difference which contracts that genus. Therefore, when man and horse are called the same as they are living, it is signified not only that they agree in the genus of living thing, but also in a difference which contracts that genus—which is true. But when they are said to be the same inasmuch as [they are each] animal, similarly there is signified not only that each is an animal, but also that they are the same in some determinate character of animal. For they are determinate /p. XX/ animals which differ by differences of [the genus] animal. When, therefore, they are said to be one or the same as animal, they are indicated to agree in some difference which contracts animal. For the same reason proportionately, Peter and Paul are not said to be one man, absolutely speaking; but they are more easily said to be the same as animal. However, because these matters pertain only to our way of speaking, common usage should be observed and all equivocation should be avoided.

There are also many things which are usually asked about the division which Aristotle gave in Text 12: “Some things are one in number, others are one in species, others in genus, and others by analogy.”⁵¹ For example, in what way does this division differ from the first division of unity into: “one by continuity, one by reason of form, one in genus, in definition, or species, and one by indivision in every way,”⁵² which last is individual, or indivisible, as others wish to say. However, I say briefly that the divisions are partly the same and partly different, because some members are formally contained in the first which are omitted in the second and vice versa. But virtually they amount to the same thing. For the unity of continuity and of indivision, which are distinguished in the first⁵³ division, are comprehended under numerical unity. Likewise, unity of definition and of form belong to specific unity, just as [does] also the unity of difference, which Aristotle does not explicitly mention in either division, but which pertains to the unity of species. To this also, according to some, is reduced the unity of property and of accident. However, these rather are accidental unities.

But the unity of analogy, because it is imperfect, was entirely omitted in the first division. Moreover, in the second division the unity of analogy of attribution seems omitted. For Aristotle noted only [the analogy] of proportionality.⁵⁴ But the words of Aristotle can easily be accommodated to both [kinds of analogy], or one can easily be reduced to another, especially that analogy of proportion which is merely extrinsic. For that [analogy] which is by an intrinsic and proper agreement, in some way can be reduced to the unity of a genus. And in this way both the diversity and agreement between these divisions and also their sufficiency is clear.

Question 9. But [people] ask further: are these divisions conceptual or real? And are they logical or metaphysical? The question, however, has little importance, if we suppose (what in the mentioned place [sic]⁵⁵ was extensively discussed) that all universal unity is conceptual, but formal unity is in some way real. For from this it is easily evident that the several members of those divisions can be explained either according to reality or according to concept, and therefore both logically and metaphysically. However, by Aristotle they are most of all treated as real, even though he often explains common unities through logical terms, inasmuch as they are more apt to explain the foundation in reality which these unities have. But numerical unity, because it is more real, he simply explains through real terms. Therefore, both divisions can be thought partly real and partly conceptual.

Question 10. Again with regard to Aristotle's definition, "They are one in number, whose matter is one,"⁵⁶ here there usually is extensive treatment of the principle of individuation—about which we have written almost the whole of *Disputation 5*.⁵⁷ As regards the meaning of Aristotle's proposition, even though the Scotists maintain that he is not speaking of the matter which is a part of the composite [of form and matter] but about the material difference, which they call "thisness" (*haecceitas*),⁵⁸ simply, however, the more true sense is that the Philosopher is speaking about genuine matter. For this is for Aristotle the total significate of this word, and not something else. And he uses it in the same sense, treating about the same thing in [*Metaphysics*] Book 7, Text 28,⁵⁹ and Book 12, Text 49,⁶⁰ as I have shown at length in the mentioned *Disputation*.⁶¹ Therefore, it is difficult to adapt those words in order that they contain an adequate definition of numerical unity. For both in the Angels and in accidents there is numerical unity without matter. Therefore, the Commentator says, in that place⁶² it is not transcendental one⁶³ but rather quantitative one⁶⁴ which is adequately defined.⁶⁵ And St. Thomas⁶⁶ is thinking almost the same when he says that the individual is not defined in [terms that are] common but rather is revealed (*explicari*) in material things. Indeed, we should add that it is revealed only in existing material substances or that it should be understood with respect to matter not in an absolute way but rather as marked with accidents.⁶⁷ Actually, however, Aristotle has not in this place sufficiently explained the principle of individuation, but instead he has in some way indicated for us what an individual is.

Question 11. By generic unity⁶⁸ Aristotle evidently here understands categorial unity.⁶⁹ Hence it is also customary to ask here: whether the categories differ in the character (*figura*) of category? But because this

question has particular difficulty in connection with the division of the nine categories of accidents, we therefore treat it when we are explaining that division in *Disputation 39, Section 2*.⁷⁰

Question 12. The final question is: in what way is it true, as Aristotle says, that “posterior unities follow those that are prior”⁷¹?—that is, that those things which are one in number are also one in species, genus, and analogy. For Peter, who is one in number, is not /p. XXI/ analogically one. And Peter and Paul who are one in species, are not analogically one. The answer is that the sense [of Aristotle’s dictum] is that all the superior unities are in an individual and singular thing. And in this way things which are one with an inferior unity are necessarily one with a superior unity, even if that is a [unity of] analogy. However, it is not necessary that with respect to those things there be an analogous unity, but it suffices that there be an analogous predicate common to them. In this sense, the rule here is equivalent to that which logicians give: that of whatever an inferior predicate is said, there is said also a superior predicate in whatever way it is one. For if Peter is this man, he will also be man, and substance, and being. And thus if Peter and this man are one in number, they are also one in species, genus, and analogy—that is, they are one in formal characters which are specific, generic, and analogous.

Chapter Seven About Being and the Various Ways in Which It Is or Is Signified

Question 1. The first question here can be about the division [of being] into *per se* and *per accidens*, which we have extensively explained in *Disputation 4, section 4* [sic].⁷²

Question 2. The second question is about the division of being into being in act and being in potency. Some things about this have been touched upon in *Disputation 2, Section 4*.⁷³ But it is treated *ex professo* through the first three sections of *Disputation 31*.⁷⁴

Question 3. A question can be added at this point: on account of what Aristotle has inserted here about the being which is in the truth of a proposition⁷⁵—what is it for something to be true or false? This is partly treated in *Disputations 8 and 9*, which concern truth⁷⁶ and falsity,⁷⁷ and partly in the last *Disputation* [i.e. 54], which concerns beings of reason.⁷⁸ For this “being true,” which Aristotle has here distinguished, is only objective being in a true or false composition of the mind, which is only a

being of reason or [something which exists] by extrinsic denomination⁷⁹ from the operation of reason. It should be noted that he has here spoken about this being, in order to indicate that, while this “being true” is said in some way about negations, it does not belong among real (*propria*) and essential beings, nor to the categories, except by a certain reduction.

Question 4. Finally, there is here broached the division of being into the categories, which we treat in *Disputations 32*⁸⁰ and *39*.⁸¹ But now I note simply that Aristotle in this place has enumerated only seven categories of accident, leaving out *position* and *habit*.⁸² While this perhaps was done by chance, we are happy to note, from Averroes,⁸³ that these two categories are of little importance and [worthy] of almost no consideration, and therefore we discuss them [only] most briefly in *Disputations 52*⁸⁴ and *53*⁸⁵ of this work.

Chapter Eight About Substance

In this Chapter there is nothing which is worth noting. But about substance we debate at length from *Disputation 31* up to *Disputation 36* [inclusively],⁸⁶ through many questions, whose titles and places can be seen in the following Index.⁸⁷

Chapter Nine About Same, Diverse, and Similar

The divisions which Aristotle has given of one by accident and one *per se*, and of the various modes of one, he gives here also with respect to the same, and consequently with respect to the diverse, which can be said in as many ways as its opposite—and therefore, there is nothing here which needs to be discussed. For what is said about the distinction between the diverse and the different only pertains to the use of terms, just as also what is said about similar and dissimilar things. But with regard to the same and the diverse, we do add a short question about unity, in *Disputation 7, Section 3*.⁸⁸

Chapter Ten

About Opposites and Things Specifically Different

A Single Question. Here it is usual to ask whether two accidents which differ only in number can be simultaneously in the same subject. This is occasioned by the words of Aristotle at the end the Chapter where he puts among those things which differ in species “all those which are different even though they exist in the same substance.”⁸⁹ But we treat this extensively in *Disputation 5, Section 8*,⁹⁰ where we have concluded that Aristotle should not be understood in a universal way, but [as speaking] about accidents which are completely similar in an individual nature (*ratio*), as we have there explained at length.⁹¹ The other things which Aristotle says here about opposites and contraries are amply discussed in logic. However, we have mentioned some things in *Disputation 43*,⁹² where we discussed the contrariety of qualities.

But it is not necessary to ask why, after an enumeration of opposites and contraries, Aristotle returned to explaining specific diversity. For neither in the order of these chapters, nor in their individual members, nor in the enumeration of the meanings of these words, do I see that any certain reason or method was observed by Aristotle. For why has he first treated of unity, then about being and substance, and only then about the same and the diverse? Certainly he did that for no reason, but only because he thought it mattered little /p. XXII/ to put this or that first, especially in these smaller matters.

Chapter Eleven

About the Modes of Prior and Posterior

Question 1. First of all we can ask here: what is the nature of prior and posterior, and whether they consist in some real or rational relation? Moreover, we can ask either about what Aristotle means or about the thing itself. For, in the beginning of the Chapter, Aristotle says things prior are “those which are nearer to some principle”⁹³ (or “to a first”⁹⁴.) In this description he seems to put the nature of the prior [to the posterior] in a relationship to some third thing and not between themselves. From this it seems to follow that what is first is not prior to the others, which is absurd. Because of this it is not acceptable to some that this be the general description of the prior as such, but [rather they think it is] an indication of a certain mode of things prior. For something can be understood to

be prior to something else in two ways: either by a relation to some third thing or by a relation which they have between themselves. In the aforesaid description, Aristotle has alluded to the first member and he has also tacitly suggested the division when he says: "certain"⁹⁵ prior things are such. Then after an explanation and subdivision of this member he concludes as follows: "And indeed these are in this way called prior."⁹⁶ And immediately he seems to add the other member when he says: "But in another way,"⁹⁷ etc. However, the Philosopher does not explain this second member with any general description, but only through a bi-membral division—which is, that certain things are so related between themselves that one is prior either in concept to the other or prior by nature, or order of subsistence (*subsistendi consequentia*),⁹⁸ to the other.

This interpretation is indeed probable, but that first description can be correctly fitted to all prior things. For when we say that this, which is nearer to a first, is prior to another, it is clearly supposed and tacitly said that that first is much more prior than the rest. For (if it may be said) it is much nearer to its own self—or something more than near. So, for example, if that body which is nearer to the first heaven is first in place in the universe, much more that first heaven itself is prior to the rest.⁹⁹ Therefore, generally, priority consists in a certain disposition or relation among those things which are denominated prior and posterior. But sometimes this relation is measured by some third thing, and is as it were founded in another disposition or nearness and distance from that. But sometimes [it is founded] only in some condition of extremes which are related among themselves as prior and posterior—inasmuch as one has existence when the other does not have it, or because one is a cause and the other an effect, or because one is more noble than the other. And indeed priority taken essentially (*per se*) and intrinsically consists in this relation of the extremes among themselves. But it is remotely and fundamentally in an order to a third thing, or (so to speak) "measurately" (*mensurative*).¹⁰⁰

But this relation, since it is of a certain order, as the word "prior" indicates, can be either in an order of place or an order of time, or of motion or generation, or of causality, or of cognition, or of nature, or of an order of subsistence.¹⁰¹ And in this way the various modes of prior are enumerated which are evident in Aristotle both here and in the *Postpredicaments*.¹⁰² From this it results that this relation of prior, strictly speaking, is not real, because it is often attributed to things which are not distinguished in reality.¹⁰³ For example, man is said to be prior to Peter in the order of subsisting.¹⁰⁴ Sometimes it is attributed with respect to something which is not existing; for example, I am said to be prior in time to the Antichrist.

But sometimes the character of prior is completed by a kind of negation. For something is said to be prior in time to something else, because it has or had existence when the other is or was not existing. But sometimes it consists in a certain comparison of relations; for example, when that is called prior which is nearer to a first. Finally, sometimes this priority has a foundation in nature but at other times [it has a foundation] only in human evaluation or classification, as Aristotle also has noted here. For priority, therefore, a real relation is not essentially required. But insofar as such a relation sometimes coincides with some other relation which is real, it can also be real. For example, when a cause is said to be prior by nature to its effect, that relation of prior in fact is not different in reality apart from the relation of cause, which on account of a certain agreement or proportion is called a priority. Therefore, in that case the relation of prior will also be real and perhaps it will never be found as real in another way.

Finally, from what has been said it is easily understood that this listing of ways of being prior is not some univocal division, but rather one that is analogous, imperfect, and proportional. For here there is not an attribution to some first significate, but there is a certain proportion. Indeed it seems that the character in question, of prior and posterior, belongs first to motion or to time and from these it is transferred to other things through a certain proportional likeness.

Question 2. Last, it can be asked here why Aristotle /p. XXIII/ has in this place put aside that priority of nature which exists in causality? The answer is that either he omitted that priority because it is improper unless it includes some other priority in the sequence for subsisting,¹⁰⁵ or he certainly comprehended it under priority of nature, or under those things which are called prior by potency. What was said about this can be seen in *Disputation 26, about Causes, Section 1*.¹⁰⁶ [St. John] Damascene in his *Dialectics*, Chapter 7, certainly does not acknowledge another priority of nature apart from that which is in the sequence for subsisting.¹⁰⁷

Chapter Twelve About Potency

Question 1. It is usual to ask about the definition of active potency, namely: "It is a principle of...changing something other, or insofar as it is other."¹⁰⁸ For this contains several difficulties. First, because it does not include the power to create; about which see *Disputation 20, Section 1*.¹⁰⁹ Briefly it may be said that Aristotle used better known words, but they

can be accommodated or extended, if we use the word, “change,”¹¹⁰ not rigorously but loosely for any kind of eduction from non-being to being. And then by “other”¹¹¹ we may understand not only the subject but also the terminus of causation.

The second difficulty is that it does not include potencies [i.e. faculties] which are active by immanent action. And the third difficulty is that it does not include heaviness and lightness (*gravitas et levitas*), which are principles of moving not something other but that very thing in which they exist. About these see *Disputation 18, Section 3* [sic],¹¹² and *Disputation 43, Section 2*.¹¹³ Briefly, I say that they are included by reason of the phrase, “insofar as it is other,”¹¹⁴ because they do not act upon their proper subject except insofar as it lacks such an act or motion. Neither is it necessary that such a potency, when it exists in that which it moves, exist there in an accidental way (*per accidens*) as certain interpreters explain. For, even though it happens in such a way in the example which Aristotle gives, about a medical doctor curing himself, nevertheless, Aristotle has not said that it is necessary that it always happen this way.

Others reject these faculties, heaviness, and other things, because they are only instruments of motion. But this does not satisfy me, because in fact they are most proper active potencies, even though with respect to the generator they are improperly and rather broadly called instruments, as I have explained in *Disputation 17, Section 2*.¹¹⁵

On the other hand, there is a fourth difficulty because under this definition there is included not only potencies but also habits such as art, which Aristotle gives as an example. The answer (because the matter is easy) is that potency is not taken here strictly for the second species of quality,¹¹⁶ but broadly for any principle at all of acting. And in this way substantial form also is included insofar as it can do something. So also passive potency, about which Aristotle immediately treats, as it is receptive includes matter and quantity. And similarly in another understanding of potency, which he immediately stipulates, namely, that he is said to be able who can do something well, it includes habits and dispositions, which confer that facility by reason of which someone is said to be able to act well.

Question 2. Again we can ask: what is the potency to resist, which Aristotle here seems also to number among potencies? And likewise [we can ask] whether impotence is a privation of potency, or also a passive potency? The first question is treated in *Disputation 43, Section 1*,¹¹⁷ and the second in *Disputation 40* [sic], *Section 3*.¹¹⁸

Question 3. Whether objective potency¹¹⁹ is a real potency? And, consequently, whether a thing is called possible when it does not yet actually exist? About this matter I have spoken partly in *Disputation 31, Section 3*,¹²⁰ and partly in *Disputation 43, at the beginning*.¹²¹ The rest of what is here said about passive potency and about other meanings of potency does not have any difficulty, supposing what has been noted about active potency. For by proportion to that the rest should be understood. For, as Aristotle has said, at the end of the Chapter,¹²² this is the first potency and every other use of the word “potency” is taken through some relation to it. But about this subject, namely, potency and act, we have treated at length in *Disputation 43*.¹²³

Chapter Thirteen About a Quantum or about Quantity

With regard to this Chapter serious questions occur, which we take up in *Disputations 40*¹²⁴ and *41*¹²⁵ and, therefore, it is not necessary to review them in this place. But, with respect to the text of Aristotle, no special problem occurs which is not treated there, especially since the text is clear and any difficulty is in the things themselves.

Chapter Fourteen About “Quale” [Such] and Quality [Suchness]

We have *ex professo* explained this Chapter from *Disputation 42 to 46* [inclusive],¹²⁶ and there is nothing to add here.

Chapter Fifteen¹²⁷

We treat this Chapter at great length in *Disputation 47*,¹²⁸ and therefore there is no need to note anything now.¹²⁹

Chapter Sixteen About the Perfect

In this Chapter there is no question which /p. XXIV/ we need to discuss. For Aristotle gives the common description or signification of the perfect,

saying that the perfect is that which lacks nothing—that is, nothing of those things which are required for its completion. He explains this description in various classes of things by proposing diverse ways in which some things are called perfect, namely, in size, in integrity and fullness of parts, in power, and in pursuit of a goal—all of which are evident in the text. And in *Disputation 10* treating of the good we address those things which seem necessary with respect to the perfect.¹³⁰ For the good and the perfect are either the same thing or they seem to be very much connected with one another, as we note there.

Chapter Seventeen About a Term

There is nothing in this place to be noted or discussed. For here there is a question only about the meanings of this word “term”¹³¹ which are clear enough in the text and which are usually treated first of all at the beginning of Dialectic. But about this matter there is no question, first, because of its great analogy and most full meaning. For “term” is said of the meaningful word itself,¹³² in which way it is treated in Dialectic; and it is said in a particular way about a definition, as Aristotle remarks here.¹³³ It is also said about a real term, either of quantity, which is treated in the category of quantity, or of time, of motion, of disposition or relation, of inquiry, of potentiality—about which there is discussion in various places. Second, and most of all, [there is no question] because the common appellation of “term” insofar as it is considered metaphysically either consists in a kind of negation, insofar as a thing does not extend beyond its term, or in an extrinsic denomination¹³⁴ inasmuch as it is that to which something else tends, or in which it rests, as we have mentioned in *Disputation 45, Section 10* [sic], when we explain the term of a relation.¹³⁵

Chapter Eighteen About “According to Which, According to Itself, and through Itself”

From a summary of this Chapter it is clear that it is not treating of things but about the meanings of these words. For these are syncategorematic words which do not signify any things but rather dispositions of things.¹³⁶ And in this way Aristotle says that the expression “according to which”¹³⁷

often signifies a disposition of a formal cause, for example, if we say that a man is zealous “according to virtue.”¹³⁸ But sometimes it means a disposition of a proximately material cause, for example, when a wall is called white “according to its surface”. It is often extended also to other kinds of cause. And finally it sometimes signifies a relation of position, for example, when it is said that Peter is sitting “behind the king” (*secundum regem*). This last meaning should be noted. For it is little used in the Schools, but in fact it is true Latin and it strictly signifies being proximately after another. Hence it is extended not only to an order of position but also to signify an order of perfection. For example, if you say that faith is the most perfect virtue “following charity” (*secundum caritatem*), that means: immediately after charity.

Then Aristotle shifts the discussion¹³⁹ to the meaning of these words, “according to itself” (*secundum se*)¹⁴⁰ and “through itself” (*per se*),¹⁴¹ which he regards as synonyms,¹⁴² indicating that the word “according to” (*secundum*) often signifies the same as “through” (*per*)—as can also be concluded from the earlier meanings of “according to which” (*secundum quod*) itself. For the word “through” (*per*) best of all signifies a relationship of causality (*habitudinem causarum*). But the significations of the phrase “according to itself” (*secundum se*) or “through itself” (*per se*) are clear in the text.

Notice, however, that in this place he has omitted some of the modes of “through itself” (*per se*) which he listed in Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁴³ For the mode of “through itself secondly” (*per se secundo*), that is, when a property is predicated of its subject, is not listed here, unless it is reduced to the third mode listed here, which is more universal and is said of all that which first inheres in or belongs to something—which can be attributed to a property with respect to its subject. Also the fourth mode of saying “through itself,” [that is] by reason of causality, is here left aside. In addition, there can be noted other meanings of these words which are not mentioned here, for example, that the expression “according to which” (*secundum quod*) sometimes diminishes signification, as when we say “a white man according to teeth” (*albus secundum dentes*) and the expression “through itself” (*per se*) sometimes excludes an accidental union, as we have noted above with respect to the third chapter of Book 3. Therefore, it is enough that Aristotle remarked the principal meanings to which the others can be reduced or from which the others can be understood. And here there is no question worthy of debate.

Chapter Nineteen About Disposition

We have *ex professo* explained this Chapter in *Disputation 42, Section 2* [sic], where we have explained the first species of [the category of] quality.¹⁴⁴

Chapter Twenty About Habit

The first part of this Chapter belongs to the special category of habitus, and therefore we have explained it in *Disputation 52* [sic], which is about that category.¹⁴⁵ The second /p. XXV/ part, however, regards that signification by which he [Aristotle] has established a particular species of [the category of] quality itself and it is transferred to signifying other qualities as well. And we have treated this part in the mentioned *Disputation 42*,¹⁴⁶ and more extensively in *Disputation 44* which is properly about habits.¹⁴⁷

Chapter Twenty–One About Passion

The significations of this word have been treated by Aristotle, and we have treated much more what it signifies, in *Disputation 42, Section 2* [sic],¹⁴⁸ when we explained the third species of [the category of] quality, that is, passion and passible quality, and in *Disputation 49*, which is about the category of passion.¹⁴⁹

Chapter Twenty–Two About Privation

As regards the various kinds of privations which Aristotle gives in it, this Chapter is clear and banal in Dialectic or to those who are moderately trained (*mediocriter exercitatis*). But some questions can be raised in it which pertain to the being of a privation or to privative opposition. For example, is a privation something real or is it a being of reason, and how? In privative opposition, is there is some medium, either absolutely or with respect to a certain subject? Again, can a privation become more or less?

About these issues we debate partly in *Disputation 45*, which concerns oppositions,¹⁵⁰ and partly in the *last Disputation* of this whole work [i.e. *Disputation 54*], which is about beings of reason.¹⁵¹

Chapter Twenty–Three About Having and Being in Something

Apart from what has been said about “having” (*habitus*), there is nothing to note with regard to this Chapter. Therefore, the things we said in connection with Chapter 20 may be looked at. And about the modes of “being in” (*essendi in*) the Philosopher himself can be consulted in *Physics*, Book 4, Chapter 3,¹⁵² and we have made some points in *Disputation 37*, which concerns the essence of an accident.¹⁵³

Chapter Twenty–Four In How Many Ways Is ‘Being from Something’ Said?

This Chapter also does not contain any new thing or property of being, but only the meanings of this word, “from,” and the various relations which it can indicate—which are sufficiently clear in the text.

Chapter Twenty–Five About Part

In this place Aristotle divides “part” into integral, or quantitative, “aliquot”¹⁵⁴ or “non–aliquot”, subjective or potestative, essential or metaphysical, all of which are immediately and directly evident.

Chapter Twenty–Six About Whole

Aristotle indicates that “whole” can be said in two ways, namely, either with respect to parts, inasmuch as it is made up of these, or as it is opposed to “truncated,” that is, when whole is said of that which does not lack any part. And this last meaning will be clear from the following Chapter which is concerned with the truncated. Here he is treating the first meaning. And first he lists its different interpretations (*significata*) which can be clear from what has been said about “part”—for in as many ways as one

opposite is said in so many ways is the other opposite said. Again, since whole here is by composition one, what was said above about one can be applied to whole. For there are almost as many kinds of one as there are of whole, if one is taken with composition. Therefore, it is not necessary to add anything on this score.

Then the Philosopher explains the use of these terms, “all” (*omne*)¹⁵⁵ and “whole” (*totum*)¹⁵⁶—but this involves only the propriety and custom which should be observed in speaking. For it does not matter at all whether you say “the whole water” or “all the water,” or “the whole house” or “all the house”—although the first is said with more propriety and less ambiguity or equivocation.¹⁵⁷

Chapter Twenty–Seven About the Truncated¹⁵⁸

Also in this Chapter there is nothing of any importance. For Aristotle is only explaining what conditions are required, either from the side of a thing which is truncated or from the side what is cut off or not present, in order that something be called “truncated” [or “mutilated”]. And from the first Chapter he says it is required that what is truncated evidently be some whole made up of parts. Then [it is required] that it be continuous, for numbers are not truncated. This is because they cease to be by subtraction of any unity. Hence, third, it is necessary that it be a heterogenous whole. For a homogeneous whole cannot properly be truncated, since the nature of the whole will remain in every part and that whole does not require a certain /p. XXVI/ composition of parts. It is also necessary that the thing which remains as truncated be greater than the [part] which is cut off. Otherwise, it will not be a truncated thing but another thing. From this it is also necessary that the part which is gone not be one of the principal parts. For without one of these, such as for example a head or a heart, the thing cannot remain. However, it is necessary that the part which is gone be one of the prominent parts and one which is dissimilar [from the rest]. For not just any cut–off part makes a thing to be truncated, as is clear from the way we speak. Finally, Aristotle says that such must be a part which cannot be again generated. For a thing is not said to be truncated if its hair is shaved off; since it can grow again. But all these things, as is clear from themselves, only pertain to the way we speak. For a thing could be called truncated for that time in which it lacked a part, even if that part could be restored by nutrition. But we do not speak in this way.¹⁵⁹

Chapter Twenty–Eight About Genus

Here also there is no question; but one need only list the significations of this word, “genus,” which are common enough and are given also by Porphyry in his book *On the Predicables*.¹⁶⁰ But on this occasion Aristotle teaches that something can differ generically in two ways, that is, either for a physicist,¹⁶¹ which is to say by its subject or matter, or for a metaphysician or a logician, that is, by category. About this distinction we will remark some things below in Book 10, with respect to Chapter 5, and several things in *Disputation 13, Section 2*,¹⁶² as well as in *Disputation 35, Section 1* [sic].¹⁶³ But because one signification of genus is that it signifies the first predicable,¹⁶⁴ some writers accordingly here construct a most extensive disputation about the predicables. But what metaphysics requires as regards treatment of universals, we give in *Disputations 5*,¹⁶⁵ *6*,¹⁶⁶ and *7*.¹⁶⁷ The rest, which is proper to the dialecticians, we leave to them.

Chapter Twenty–Nine About the False

In this Chapter the Philosopher explains how falsity, and the denomination of “false,” is ascribed to things, to speech, and to men. All of these, as regards the signification of the words, are clear enough in the text. But about the thing [itself] there is debate here about whether falsity exists and what it is, and whether it is to be listed among the properties of being, and where it exists formally and where, indeed, it exists only by extrinsic denomination. About this we have written a special disputation, which is *Disputation 9*.¹⁶⁸

Chapter Thirty About Accident

“Accident” is said in two ways: either as an effect, or as a being which is outside the essence of something and [still] inheres in it in some way, even if this is in the second or the fourth way of the *Posterior Analytics*¹⁶⁹—that is, inheres either by way of an intrinsic emanation from the essence or from some certain and essential cause. In this place, Aristotle therefore appears to treat these two significations of “accident” and in their regard serious

questions can be asked. For with regard to the first there is a serious debate about contingent causes and effects, and about fortune and chance, about which we dispute at length in *Disputation 19*.¹⁷⁰ But about the second¹⁷¹ signification, there is much to be said regarding the nature of accident in general and about its relation to substance, and its divisions—about which we treat extensively in *Disputations 37*,¹⁷² *38*,¹⁷³ and *39*.¹⁷⁴

Therefore, about this Book there is nothing more to be remarked.

Notes

¹ Once more, the thoughts of Tricot deserve recounting. As he has summarized: Diogenes Laertius (3rd cent. A.D.), in his list of 146 titles of Aristotle's works, mentions a work which he entitles "περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων" ("about things which are said in many ways"), which is none other than this Book. The Book itself, which is a kind of philosophical dictionary, raises some problems. It is generally admitted that it was authored by Aristotle; it is referred to in other books of the *Metaphysics*, as well as in the *Physics* and *De Generatione et corruptione*. Yet the critics are at odds over its place in the *Metaphysics*. The majority today think that it was not originally a part of the *Metaphysics*, whose plan it compromises. Its insertion between Books 4 and 6 probably came later and it breaks the bond between these two books. Add that certain terms which are extremely important for the *Metaphysics*, such as "εἶδος" ("form" or "species"), "ὑλη" ("matter"), "ὄρος" ("definition"), "τί ἐστί" ("what it is"), "ἐνέργεια" ("act"), etc. are passed over in silence, while other terms which have little or no importance (e.g. "κολοβός"—"truncated") are given a whole chapter. These and other reasons lead Tricot to think that Hermann Bonitz (*Metaphysica, pars posterior* [Bonn, 1846], p. 19) may have been right when he said that Book 5 has no relation to the books which precede or the books which follow it and that one should consider it as a kind of preface to the *Metaphysics* or even to the *Physics*. Yet the Greek commentators were of another opinion. For example, Alexander of Aphrodisias is at pains to show that Book 5 does belong in the place to which the tradition has assigned it. While his arguments, says Tricot, are far from probative, they do have plausibility. The important thing is that apart from its relation to the overall plan of the *Metaphysics*, Book 5 is an authentic work of Aristotle.

The terms studied in its chapters, which are of variable lengths and interest, are 30. Bonitz sees their distribution as apparently following no rule. St. Thomas, on the other hand, (*In lib. 12 Metaphys. expositio*, Cathala n. 749) has proposed the following classification: (1) terms which designate a cause, e.g. ἀρχή ("principle"), αἰτίον ("cause"), στοιχείον ("element"), φύσις ("nature"), ἀναγκαῖον ("necessity"), (2) terms designating the object of first philosophy or its parts, e.g. ἓν ("one"), ὄν ("being"), οὐσία ("substance" or "essence"), ταῦτα ("same"), ἀντικείμενα ("opposite"), πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα ("prior and posterior"), δύναμις ("potency"), ποσόν ("how much"), ποῖον ("such"), πρὸς τι ("toward something"); (3) terms which designate determinations of being, e.g.: τέλειον ("perfect"), etc. But Tricot thinks that this kind of classification is too systematic and he prefers that given by Ross (*Aristotle's Metaphysics*, vol. 1, pp. 289–90). For all of this, see J. Tricot, *Aristote...*, pp. xxiii–xxiv.

² For Suárez's view that Book 5 is focused not on things but on the signification of terms, cf. *DM* 40, 1, n. 5, vol. 26, p. 530.

³ *In lib. Metaphys*, V, t. 1, fol. 100vab.

- ⁴ On the verbal concern of Book Five of the *Metaphysics*, see also *DM* 40, 1, n. 5, vol. 26, p. 530. This is a theme which Suárez will repeat a number of times in the following commentary on this Book.
- ⁵ Cf. *DM* 12, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 373–80, where the question is: “Whether a cause and a principle are in every way the same?”
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, nn. 3–7, pp. 373–4.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, nn. 8–10, pp. 375–7.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 12, pp. 377–8.
- ⁹ See *Metaphysics* 5.1.1012b34–5.
- ¹⁰ Cf. *DM* 12, 1, nn. 13–23, vol. 25, pp. 378–81. These paragraphs contain one of Suárez’s most important treatments of the central metaphysical notion of analogy.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, nn. 26–33, pp. 382–3.
- ¹² Cf. Chapter 3; 194b16–195a3.
- ¹³ Cf. in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 372–961.
- ¹⁴ Note here the position given to the *Index of the Disputations*, that is, after this Index.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *DM* 15, 10, n. 54, vol. 25, p. 552.
- ¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, n. 55.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ *DM* 15, 10, nn. 40–53, vol. 25, pp. 547–52.
- ¹⁹ Cf. *DM* 15, 11, nn. 5–6, vol. 25, p. 559.
- ²⁰ Cf. *Physics* 2.1.192b20–23.
- ²¹ Cf. *DM* 40, 5, nn. 58–63, vol. 26, pp. 567–9.
- ²² Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a20–33.
- ²³ In the background here is the Aristotelian doctrine of “natural place.” The natural order and places of the elements left to themselves, from the center of the universe out, would be earth, water, air, and fire, with the heavenly bodies beyond. Were they left to themselves the elements would each assume a spherical shape. But under the action of the sun and the heavenly bodies beyond they are mixed together in such ways that they move out of their natural places even though they never fly off far from those places. Thus, the element of earth even when, as found in some mixture, it undergoes other motions, nevertheless retains a natural tendency to move toward the center of the whole earth and to be at rest around that center, which is also the center of the universe. And in the present passage, the element of fire retains a natural tendency to assume a sphere shape in the fourth place out from the center of the universe, just below the heavenly bodies. For Aristotle on the natural place of the elements, see *De Coelo* 1.3.270a3ff; 2.14.296b27ff; 297b7; *ibid.* 3.5.304b12ff; 4.4.311b4ff; and 4.5.312b20ff.
- ²⁴ Cf. “...παρὰ τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ προαίρεσιν...” *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a26–7.
- ²⁵ That is to say, the *violent* is the genus and the *forced* is a species of that genus.
- ²⁶ Cf. “Βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὐσα ἐν ἧ μὴδὲν συμβάλλεται ...ὀ πάσχων...” *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.1.1110a1–3. While it is not perfectly exact, Suárez’s translation is accurate for his purpose.
- ²⁷ “Connaturality” for Suárez, and for the Scholastics generally, was a natural agreement, attraction, or inclination which one thing would have with or toward another. For example, the intellect’s attraction to truth or the will’s attraction to something loved would be connatural. In the present context, the tendency of a heavy body, like a stone, toward the center of the earth would likewise be connatural.
- ²⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015b16–17.
- ²⁹ Again, note terminology that goes back at least to Henry of Ghent.
- ³⁰ In the Thomist tradition to which Suárez broadly belongs, a self-evidently true proposition (*propositio per se nota*) is one whose truth is known immediately from an analysis of its terms. Examples given by St. Thomas Aquinas (cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 1) are “a whole is greater than its part” or “man is an animal.” Thus anyone who knows what

a whole is and what a part is will immediately from consideration of the terms “whole” and “part” conclude that every whole is greater than its part. Again, anyone who knows what “man” means and what “animal” means will see without any demonstration the truth of the statement, “man is an animal.” For Suárez following St. Thomas on this, cf. *De divina substantia* I, c. 1, nn. 7–9, in *Opera*, vol. 1, pp. 2–3; *DM* 29, 3, nn. 33–34, vol. 26, pp. 58–9; and *De legibus* II, c. 8, nn. 3 and 6, vol. 5, p. 117.

- ³¹ *DM* 20, in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 745–785: “The First Efficient Cause and its Action, which is Creation.” English translation in: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002.
- ³² Cf. *DM* 29, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 22–34, where Suárez is asking: “Can it be evidently demonstrated that there exists some being which is by itself and uncreated?”
- ³³ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 34–47, where it is asked: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this being by itself?”
- ³⁴ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 16, vol. 26, pp. 184–206, in which Suárez asks: “What [can be known] about the divine will and its powers?”
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, nn. 52–6, pp. 201–203.
- ³⁶ See *DM* 28, 1, n. 12, vol. 26, p. 4.
- ³⁷ Cf. *DM* 35, 3, nn. 53–5, vol. 26, p. 497.
- ³⁸ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 21–23, vol. 25, pp. 32–3.
- ³⁹ Cf. *DM* 8, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 275–7, which asks: “Whether formal truth is in the composition and division of the intellect?”
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 277–83, where the question is: “What is the truth of cognition?”
- ⁴¹ Cf. *DM* 31, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 229–32, which asks: “What is the essence of a creature before it is produced by God?”
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, 12, nn. 38–47, pp. 294–8.
- ⁴³ Cf. *DM* 4, vol. 25, pp. 115–145: “About Transcendental Unity in General.”
- ⁴⁴ *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: “About Individual Unity and its Source.” For an English translation, cf. Francisco Suárez, *Disputatio V: Individual Unity and its Principle*, tr. Jorge J.E. Gracia, in *Suárez on Individuation*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982.
- ⁴⁵ *DM* 6, vol. 25, pp. 201–250: “About Formal and Universal Unity.” For an English translation, see: Francis Suarez, *On Formal and Universal Unity (Disputatio VI)*, tr. James F. Ross, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964.
- ⁴⁶ *DM* 7, vol. 25, pp. 250–274: “About Various Kinds of Distinctions.” In English: Francis Suarez, *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputatio VII)*, tr. Cyril Vollert, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947.
- ⁴⁷ As has been mentioned, in various editions of Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae*, the *Index locupletissimus* is sometimes before and sometimes after the *Index of Disputations* of which he is speaking here.
- ⁴⁸ Cf. *DM* 40, in *Opera*, vol. 26, pp. 529–587: “About Continuous Quantity.”
- ⁴⁹ *DM* 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination of the Category of Quantity.”
- ⁵⁰ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, V, c. 6, l. 7, Cathala no. 863.
- ⁵¹ Cf. “τὰ μὲν κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἐστὶν ἐν, τὰ δὲ κατ’ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ’ ἀναλόγιαν...” *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b31–32.
- ⁵² I have not found this in exactly so many words in Aristotle’s text. However, the main points are contained in *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016a1–b31.
- ⁵³ That is, first in the order of Aristotle rather than of Suárez here.
- ⁵⁴ That is to say, a four term analogy. For example, “two is to four as eight is to sixteen.”
- ⁵⁵ See especially, *Disputations* 5 and 6, as mentioned in notes 44 and 45, above in this Book.

- ⁵⁶ “ἀριθμῶ μὲν ὧν ἡ ὕλη μία.” *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b32–3.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. *DM* 5, in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: “About Individual Unity and its Source.”
- ⁵⁸ “The term *haecceitas* appears several times in the printed works of Scotus, although its authenticity has been questioned. In any case, it was used widely by followers of Scotus. See E. Gilson [*Jean Duns Scot*] p. 464, note 2.” Armand A. Maurer, CSB, *Medieval Philosophy*, 2nd edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), p. 412, note 21.
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b21–1034a8.
- ⁶⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a31–38.
- ⁶¹ For this, see *DM* 5, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 161–175, where the question is: “Whether designated matter is the principle of individuation in material substances?”
- ⁶² *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b32–3.
- ⁶³ That is, the one which is a property of being.
- ⁶⁴ The one which is in the category of quantity a principle of number.
- ⁶⁵ Cf. Averroes, *In lib. Metaphys.* V, 5, fol. 115rb.
- ⁶⁶ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 11, l. 11, Cathala nos. 1502, 1530, 1535; *ibid.*, c. 15, l. 15, nos. 1609–1618.
- ⁶⁷ For St. Thomas’ doctrine of individuality as rooted in “marked matter” (*materia signata*), see esp. M.–D. Roland–Gosselin, O.P., *Le “De Ente et Essentia” de S. Thomas d’Aquin* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 104–26.
- ⁶⁸ Here I am reading the “unitatem” of the Spanish edition rather than the “veritatem” of the Vivès edition.
- ⁶⁹ Cf. *DM* 39, 2, n. 29, vol. 26, p. 518.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, s. 2, p. 510–23, where Suárez asks: “Whether the division of accidents into nine kinds is enough?”
- ⁷¹ Cf. “τὰ ὕστερα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖ.” *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b35.
- ⁷² Rather cf. *DM* 4, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 125–31, which asks: “How many kinds of unity are there in things?”
- ⁷³ Cf. *DM* 2, 4, n. 8, vol. 25, p. 90.
- ⁷⁴ Cf. *DM* 31, ss. 1–3, vol. 26, pp. 224–35.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a31–34.
- ⁷⁶ Cf. *DM* 8, vol. 25, pp. 274–312: “About Truth or the True which is a Property of Being.” Strictly, what Suárez is treating in this Disputation is transcendental truth, which is a property of things themselves. The truth of the proposition as such is more a matter for the 54th Disputation.
- ⁷⁷ Cf. *DM* 9, vol. 25, pp. 312–328: “About Falsity or the False.”
- ⁷⁸ Cf. *DM* 54, vol. 26, pp. 1014–1041: “On Beings of Reason.” Cf. esp. *ibid.*, 1, n. 4, p. 1016, where Suárez directly links beings of reason to Aristotle’s “being as true.” For an English version of the 54th Disputation, cf. *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995. For much of what is involved here, see my article: “Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth”, *Vivarium*, 25, 1 (1987): pp. 47–75; 26, 1 (1988): pp. 51–72.
- ⁷⁹ On this, cf. John P. Doyle, “Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J.,” *Vivarium*, 22 (1984), pp. 121–160.
- ⁸⁰ Cf. *DM* 32, vol. 26, pp. 312–29: “About the Division of Created Being into Substance and Accident.”
- ⁸¹ *DM* 39, vol. 26, pp. 504–29: “About the Division of Accidents into Nine Supreme Kinds.”
- ⁸² On this, cf.: “The full list of ten categories occurs only in *Cat.* 1b 25–27, *Top.* 103b 20–23. The present list of eight is common, cf. *An. Post.* 83a 21, *Phys.* 225b 5, and

- shorter lists are commoner still." W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), vol. 1, p. 308.
- ⁸³ Cf. *In lib. Metaphys.* V, t. 14, fol. 117ra.
- ⁸⁴ *DM* 52, vol. 26, pp. 1006–1011: "About Position."
- ⁸⁵ *DM* 53, vol. 26, pp. 1011–1014: "About Habit."
- ⁸⁶ Cf. *Opera*, vol. 26, pp. 224–491.
- ⁸⁷ That is, the *Index of Disputations*.
- ⁸⁸ Cf. *DM* 7, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 271–4, which discusses: "How the same and the diverse are compared between themselves and with respect to being."
- ⁸⁹ Cf. "ὅσα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα ἔχει διαφοράν." *Metaphysics* 6.10.1018b7. The fact that Suárez's translation tracks the Greek as given here separates him from Fonseca, whose Greek text adds "αὐτῶν" between "οὐσίᾳ" and "ὄντα"; cf. *Comment. in lib. Metaphys.*, V, c. 10, tom. 1, col. 595.
- ⁹⁰ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 8, vol. 25, pp. 189–97, where it is asked: "Whether because of their individuation it is inadmissible for two accidents which are only numerically diverse to be simultaneously in the same subject?"
- ⁹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 5–6, p. 191.
- ⁹² Cf. *DM* 45, vol. 26, pp. 737–753: "About the Contrariety of Qualities."
- ⁹³ Cf. "ἐγγύτερον ἀρχῆς τινὸς" *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b10–11.
- ⁹⁴ Cf. "πρώτου", *ibid.* l. 9.
- ⁹⁵ Cf. "ἔνια", *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b9.
- ⁹⁶ Cf. "ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρότερα τοῦτον λέγεται τὸν τρόπον,..." *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b29–30.
- ⁹⁷ Cf. "ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον", *ibid.*, 1018b30. While the point is small, Suárez's agreement here with Fonseca's translation may be remarked.
- ⁹⁸ Subsisting or subsistence for Suárez is the mode of existing which belongs to an individual substance. This is the mode whereby it exists in its own right as opposed to the way in which, say, an accident exists only as the modification of substance. The thought then here is that there is a priority between cause and effect or among a series of causes as leading to the effect of an individual substance. For subsistence in Suárez, see: *Tractatus de Trinitate*, III, c. 4, n. 1, in *Opera*, vol. 1, p. 593; *Commentaria ac disputationes in Tertiam Partem D. Thomae, Opus de Incarnatione*, Qu. III, a. 1, Disp. XI, s. 3, n. 21, vol. 17, p. 447; *DM* 26, 1, esp. n. 21, vol. 25, p. 925 (where he summarizes his thought on the sequence of causes leading to subsistence); and *DM* 34, 4, n. 23, vol. 26, p. 374; *ibid.*, n. 28, pp. 375–6; *ibid.*, 7, n. 9, p. 414.
- ⁹⁹ The background here is the Aristotelian geocentric universe, with its numerous concentric or homocentric spheres of heaven.
- ¹⁰⁰ That is to say, as being measured by that third thing.
- ¹⁰¹ Cf. note 98, above.
- ¹⁰² The *Postpredicaments* are Chapters 10–15 of Aristotle's *Categories*. On the *Postpredicaments* see: Marcello Zanatta, *Aristotele: Le Categorie*, introduzione, traduzione e nota (Milano: Rizzoli, 1989), pp. 235–269. For Suárez's reference in this place, cf. *Categories* c. 12.14a26–b23.
- ¹⁰³ On this cf. *DM* 54
- ¹⁰⁴ Cf. note 98, above.
- ¹⁰⁵ See note 98, above.
- ¹⁰⁶ *DM* 26, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 916–20, which asks: "Whether every cause is more noble than its effect?" But more to the point, see: *ibid.*, s. 1, pp. 920–25: "Whether every cause is prior to its effect?" In this last Section, Suárez explicitly treats of the sequence of causes (final, material, formal, and efficient) for the subsistence of a thing, as well as the other points he mentions here in the *Index locupletissimus*. Particularly instructive is paragraph 21 (p. 925).

- ¹⁰⁷ Cf. St. John Damascene, *Dialectica*, Chapter 13, version of Robert Grosseteste, edited by Owen A. Colligan, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1953), p. 15. Note that Chapter 13 in Grosseteste's version is Chapter 7 in the text given in *ΙΩΑΝΝΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΔΑΜΑΣΚΗΝΟΥ, ΤΑ ΕΥΤΡΙΣΚΟΜΕΝΑ ΠΛΑΝΤΑ*, Sancti Patris Nostri, Joannis Damasceni, Monachi, et Presbyteri Hierosolymitani, *Opera omnia*, opera et studio P. Michaelis Lequien, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 94 (Paris: Apud J.P. Migne, 1860), cols. 551–2. In Damascene's Chapter there is a distinction drawn between the order of natural priority and priority which might exist between a genus and a species (which would represent for Suárez levels of formal causality in the sequence of causing subsistence) and the absence of such between individuals like Peter and Paul. This last thought seems to be that while Peter may be the cause of Paul, in the sense that he is Paul's father, nevertheless, given Paul's present existence, from Peter's existence or non-existence nothing follows, in the order of intelligibility or of physical reality, with respect to Paul, or, conversely, given Paul's existence or non existence nothing follows with respect to Peter.
- ¹⁰⁸ Cf. “ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἢ ἕτερον,...” *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15–16. It is worth noting here that Suárez's translation is more faithful to Aristotle's Greek than is that of Moerbeke, which apparently led St. Thomas astray in his interpretation here; cf. *In libros Metaphys. expositio*, V, c. 12, l. 14, Cathala no. 955.
- ¹⁰⁹ *DM* 20, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 445–54, which asks: “Whether it can be known by natural reason that the creation of some beings is possible, or even necessary? Or (what is the same) whether one being insofar as it is being can depend essentially on the effective causality of another?”
- ¹¹⁰ Aristotle's “μεταβολῆς”, *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15.
- ¹¹¹ Aristotle's “ἕτερον”, *ibid.* l. 16.
- ¹¹² See rather: *DM* 18, 7, nn. 21–26, vol. 25, pp. 636–8.
- ¹¹³ Cf. *DM* 43, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 637–44, which asks: “Do active and passive potency differ always in reality or sometimes only in concept?”
- ¹¹⁴ Cf. “ἢ ἕτερον”, *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a16. Note that Suárez's translation here is the same as Fonseca's.
- ¹¹⁵ Cf. *DM* 17, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 583–92, where the question is: “How many kinds of efficient causes are there?” For a more pointed application to heaviness and lightness, see: *DM* 18, 7, n. 26, vol. 25, p. 638.
- ¹¹⁶ For the four species of quality according to Aristotle, cf. *Categories*, c. 8.8b25–10a26. For the second species, cf. *ibid.*, 9a14–27.
- ¹¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 43, 1, nn. 7–15, vol. 26, pp. 635–7.
- ¹¹⁸ Rather, see *DM* 42, 3, nn. 11–13, vol. 26, pp. 613–4.
- ¹¹⁹ By “objective potency” Suárez means the lack of self-contradiction in a possible object of Divine power; cf. e.g. *DM* 20, 2, n. 40, vol. 25, p. 765; and *DM* 43, 1, n. 2, vol. 26, p. 634. On this, see my article: “Suarez on the Reality of the Possibles,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 44 (1967): pp. 29–40.
- ¹²⁰ See *DM* 31, 3, nn. 2–4, vol. 26, pp. 233–4.
- ¹²¹ Cf. *DM* 43, [prooemium], vol. 26, p. 633; *ibid.*, 1, n. 2, p. 634.
- ¹²² Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b35–1020a6.
- ¹²³ *DM* 43, vol. 26, pp. 633–663: “About Potency [and Act].”
- ¹²⁴ *DM* 40, vol. 26, pp. 529–587: “About Continuous Quantity.”
- ¹²⁵ *DM* 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination of the Category of Quantity.”
- ¹²⁶ See vol. 26, pp. 605–781.
- ¹²⁷ Note that for whatever reason Suárez has not given a title to this Chapter, which concerns “relation.”
- ¹²⁸ See *DM* 47, vol. 26, pp. 781–867: “About Created Real Relations.”

- ¹²⁹ While the point Suárez makes here is intelligible, in view of the many issues raised in *Disputation 47* (which runs 87 pages in length) it is surprising that he would not have tied some of these issues more closely to Aristotle's text. In contrast, Fonseca's treatment of this Chapter, including his Greek edition, his translation and explanation of the text, plus ten main questions with various sub-questions, is 125 columns long; see: *Comment. in lib. Metaphys.*, tom. 2, cols. 785–910.
- ¹³⁰ Cf. *DM* 10, 1, nn. 8–11, vol. 25, pp. 331–2; *ibid.* 3, nn. 11–18, pp. 350–52.
- ¹³¹ Aristotle's "πέρας", *Metaphysics* 5.17.1022a4.
- ¹³² This works for the Latin "terminus", but not for the Greek "πέρας," which means "term" in the sense of a limit or an extreme.
- ¹³³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.17.1022a9. Suárez's interpretation here equates Aristotle's "what something was to be" (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) with a definition.
- ¹³⁴ See note 79 above, this Book.
- ¹³⁵ Rather: *DM* 47, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 814–18, which asks: "About the term of a categorial relation."
- ¹³⁶ Here, "syncategorematic" words are those which by themselves do not suffice to signify a subject or a predicate in a proposition. Rather they have signification only when joined to categorematic terms which do so suffice. Examples of categorematic terms might be "man," "angel," or "stone." Examples of syncategorematic terms might be "this," "some," "all," "no," "if," which signify only in some way when they are joined to other terms.
- ¹³⁷ Aristotle's "τὸ καθὸ", *Metaphysics* 5.18.1022a14.
- ¹³⁸ That is to say, zealous with respect to virtue.
- ¹³⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.18.1022a24–25.
- ¹⁴⁰ Cf. Aristotle's "καθὸ"; 1022a14–24.
- ¹⁴¹ Cf. "καθ' αὐτό"; 1022a25–36.
- ¹⁴² On this, cf. Fonseca, *Comment. in libros Metaphys.*, V, c. 18, t. 23, tom. 2, col. 918, who has translated Aristotle's "καθ' αὐτό" (1022a25) as "secundum se sive per se" ("according to itself or through itself") thus adding the phrase "or through itself" beyond the actual words of Aristotle. Fonseca makes his intent more plain in his "Explanation" of the text: "*secundum se* (quod idem est atque *per se*):" ("*according to itself* [which is the same as *through itself*]").
- ¹⁴³ Chapter 4; 73a34–b24.
- ¹⁴⁴ Rather, cf. *DM* 42, 3, nn. 2–8, vol. 26, pp. 610–12, where Suárez explains the meanings of "habit" and "disposition."
- ¹⁴⁵ Rather cf. *DM* 53, vol. 26, pp. 1011–1014: "About the [Category of] Habit."
- ¹⁴⁶ Cf. *DM* 42, 3, nn. 2–4, vol. 26, p. 610–11.
- ¹⁴⁷ Cf. *DM* 44, vol. 26, pp. 663–737: "About Habits."
- ¹⁴⁸ Rather, see *DM* 42, 3, nn. 9–14, vol. 26, pp. 613–14.
- ¹⁴⁹ Cf. *DM* 49, vol. 26, pp. 897–912: "About Passion."
- ¹⁵⁰ Cf. *DM* 45, 1, nn. 5–7, vol. 26, p. 739; *ibid.*, 2, nn. 19–20, p. 746; *ibid.* 4, n. 12, p. 751.
- ¹⁵¹ Cf. *DM* 54, ss. 3–5, vol. 26, pp. 1026–39.
- ¹⁵² See *Physics* 4.3.210a14–24.
- ¹⁵³ See *DM* 37, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 493–8, where the principal question is: "Whether the common character of an accident consists in inherence?"
- ¹⁵⁴ A part which is contained an exact number of times in some whole.
- ¹⁵⁵ Aristotle's "πᾶν"; 1024a5.
- ¹⁵⁶ Aristotle's "ὅλον", *ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁷ Ambiguity here would come from the fact that the Latin "*omne*" can mean "all" or "every."
- ¹⁵⁸ Cf. Aristotle: "κολοβόν", *Metaphysics* 5.27.1024a11.

- ¹⁵⁹ Literally: “Usage does not have it so.”
- ¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categoris Commentarium*, ed. A. Busse, in *Commentaria Aristotelis Graeca*, vol. 4/1 (Berlin: Typis et Impensis G. Reimer, 1887), p. 1, l. 17–3, l20. For the Latin translation of Boethius, cf. *Porphyrii introductio in Aristotelis Categorias a Boethio translata*, *ibid.*, IV/1, pp. 26–8. For an English translation, see: *Porphyry the Phoenician: Isagoge*, Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), pp. 28–33.
- ¹⁶¹ That is to say, the Aristotelian philosopher of nature.
- ¹⁶² Cf. *DM* 13, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 390–402, which inquires: “Whether the material cause of generable and corruptible substances is one or many?”
- ¹⁶³ Rather: *DM* 35, 3, nn. 34–6, vol. 26, pp. 450–51.
- ¹⁶⁴ That is, the first of Porphyry’s predicables.
- ¹⁶⁵ *DM* 5, vol. 25, pp. 145–201: About Individual Unity and its Source.”
- ¹⁶⁶ *DM* 6, vol. 25, pp. 201–250: “About Formal and Universal Unity.”
- ¹⁶⁷ *DM* 7, vol. 25, pp. 250–274: “About Various Kinds of Distinctions.”
- ¹⁶⁸ *DM* 9, vol. 25, pp. 312–328: “About Falsity and the False.”
- ¹⁶⁹ Cf. 1.4.73b3–5; 10–16.
- ¹⁷⁰ Cf. *DM* 19, s. 12, vol. 25, pp. 742–5, which asks: “Whether chance and fortune should be numbered among efficient causes?”
- ¹⁷¹ The Latin again says “first” (*priorem*)—which I think is a mistake.
- ¹⁷² *DM* 37, vol. 26, pp. 491–498: “About the Common Character and Concept of an Accident.”
- ¹⁷³ *DM* 38, vol. 26, pp. 498–504: “About the Relation of Accident to Substance.”
- ¹⁷⁴ *DM* 39, vol. 26, pp. 504–29: “About the Division of Accidents into Nine Supreme Kinds.”

THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹ About Being Insofar As It Falls Under the Consideration of This Science, Or Insofar As It Must Be Excluded from It

Up to now the Philosopher has spent his time with preambles and in (so to speak) the vestibule of this doctrine. For he is not [now] beginning to discuss the doctrine (*re*) itself but is returning to set forth its object.² And first he states that the object of this science is being insofar as it is being, inasmuch as it includes immobile beings and beings which are really separable [from matter]. And on this occasion he teaches much about the properties of this science and about the division and the relations of speculative sciences. Then he excludes certain beings from the consideration of this science, namely, being by accident and being as true.

Chapter One That This Science Is about Being As Being, and Therefore It Is the First of the Speculative Sciences and It Is Diverse from the Others

All those things which Aristotle teaches in this Chapter about this science are treated by us in the introductory *Disputation 1*,³ and have almost [all] been treated by Aristotle himself in Book 1, Chapter 1, and Book 4, Chapter 1.

Question 1. Whether the object of this science is being insofar as it is being? See *Disputation 1, Section 1*.⁴

Question 2. Whether this science is speculative, and whether it is first in that order [of speculative science]? See *Disputation 1, Section 5*.⁵ /p. XXVII/

Question 3. Whether this science is universal and whether it treats of all beings, and how [it may do so]? See *Disputation 1, Section 2*.⁶

Question 4. Whether this science establishes the objects of other sciences and shows their essences in some way? See the same *Disputation 1, Section 4*.⁷

Question 5. It is also usual to ask here: whether being insofar as it is being has principles and causes which are considered in this science? This has been treated in *Disputation 3, Section 3*.⁸

Question 6. Finally, because of the last words of the Philosopher in this Chapter, it is customary to ask: if there were no immaterial substances, could a metaphysical science be distinguished from physics?—which question, and passage from Aristotle, I have treated in *Disputation 1, Section 1*.⁹

Many other questions are usually raised in this place about habit¹⁰ and the practical and the speculative act, such as: in what way they differ and in what the proper character of each consists. And especially it is usual to ask about the division of speculative science into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. But these things, inasmuch as they pertain to the preamble of this science, are sufficiently treated by us in *Disputation 1, Sections 5*¹¹ and *6*.¹² But as regards those things themselves, they pertain more to the science about the soul (*de anima*),¹³ which considers the intellect and its operations. However, as a complement to this science, we touch upon them below when we are explaining that species of [the category of] quality which is habit, in *Disputation 44, Section 8* [sic].¹⁴

Finally, many logical (*dialectica*) matters are spoken of here, matters which pertain to the books of the *Posterior Analytics*, such as: whether a science presupposes the existence (*an est*) and the essence (*quid est*) of its subject, or whether in some way it demonstrates that?¹⁵—and similar questions.

Chapter Two

Being by Accident and Being As True Are Excluded from the Consideration of This Science

Question 1. Concerning the first part of this Chapter, in which Aristotle removes being by accident from the consideration of this science, it can first be asked: about what being by accident is he speaking? For being by accident (*ens per accidens*) can be said in two ways:¹⁶ first, in the sense (*ratione*) of being, inasmuch as it is not a being by itself (*ens per se*) but consists of several beings; second, in the sense of an effect, which is usually called a contingent effect, inasmuch as it does not have a direct (*per se*) cause but rather one which is outside the intention of the agent.¹⁷ Since, therefore, “being by accident” is said equivocally in these two ways, the Philosopher seems to be proceeding in an inept manner—for in the beginning he speaks about the first way and excludes that being by accident because it is not one but several beings,¹⁸ but afterwards,

from Text 5¹⁹ on, he speaks about being by accident in the second way. For in order to show that there are beings of this kind, he shows that there are contingent effects and that not all things happen necessarily.

But it must be said that Aristotle excludes being by accident in both ways, as is clear from the context. Neither is there an equivocation but from a (*uno*) being by accident or by aggregation insofar as it is being, he passes to an effect by accident. For the manner in which beings by accident in the first way arise is a causality [which is] by accident and outside the intention of natural agents. For, although sometimes an accidental composite seems to result by one direct (*per se*) action, still, in that way it is not entirely a being by accident, but it is in some manner essential (*per se*), in line with what we have said in *Disputation 5*.²⁰ Because, therefore, a being by accident is not, properly speaking, one [being], and it is not produced by one act of generation, and it is not directly intended by nature, and therefore from the fact that things which happen by accident and contingently do not fall under a science, Aristotle correctly infers that beings by accident as such do not fall under a science. And it does not matter that a being by aggregation can sometimes be directly intended by an intellectual agent. For either under that character it is in some way directly in an order to some end which is intended by that agent, or indeed that same thing itself is merely contingent and by accident, and, accordingly, as such it does not fall under a science.

Question 2. But now the question remains: in what sense is it true that a being by accident does not fall under a science? But because this issue is treated in Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, where the subalternation of sciences is discussed,²¹ and it is clear enough by itself, we should say briefly that because science is concerned only with necessary things, being by accident as such is not a scientific object (*scibile*). Likewise, because a being by accident is as such not [one] being, but rather beings, also for this reason it does not fall under one science.

From the first reason, you should conclude that not only those things which happen rarely and by accident, but also those which are [indifferent] to one outcome or another (*ad utrumlibet*) and which as such (*per se*) ordinarily (*moraliter*) come to be from the intention of an agent, for example, free acts,²² as such do not fall under a science. And from this it may be understood that those doctrines are foolish which forecast free futures in a particular and definite way²³—about which [we treat] elsewhere.²⁴

From the second reason, you should conclude that a being which is made up of many things of different kinds, even though simply it is a being by accident, nevertheless, if it is considered under some feature which is es-

entially one in relation to some effects or properties, can /p. XXVIII/ fall under a science, especially a subalternate science, as is extensively treated in logic (*dialectica*).

Finally, we must consider that it is one thing to speak about a being by accident with respect to the thing subject to this designation, and something else to speak about the formal character itself of being by accident. Said in another way: it is one thing to speak about a being by accident as it actually exists (*in actu exercito*) and [another to speak about it] as it is designated (*in actu signato*). Thus, being by accident, with respect to the underlying reality as it actually exists, does not fall under a science and this is immediately evident from what has been said. And in this way we have shown in *Disputation 1, Section 1*, that being by accident is not included under the object of this science.²⁵

However, the formal character of being by accident can be considered in a scientific manner. For it is conceived by means of one essential formal character which has its own properties. And in this way we have treated of the divisions of being into being by itself (*per se*) and being by accident (*per accidens*) and we have explained the proper real (*quoad esse*) character of being by accident in *Disputation 4, Section 3*.²⁶ Similarly, while disputing about efficient causes, we have spoken about beings by accident with respect to contingent things: whether they exist, and what causes they may have, in *Disputation 19*,²⁷ almost through the whole *Disputation*, where on this occasion we also discuss fate and fortune, and other causes by accident. In a similar way, as they exercise causality by accident, these causes do not fall under a science. However, the formal character of that causality, in what it consists and whence it arises, does fall under a science. And this [is enough] about the first part of this Chapter.²⁸

Afterwards, Aristotle excludes from the consideration of this science the being which he calls true, to which the false is opposed as non-being. And he argues that these are only in the mind's composition and division, and are therefore beings of reason. As regards this section, many doubts can be raised. First: is truth only in the intellect's composition and division, or is it also in the apprehension of simple [intelligibles]? Indeed, Aristotle seems openly here to affirm the first and to deny the second, in these words: "Because, however, being as true and non-being as false, since it is with regard to composition and division, etc."²⁹ And below: "True or false is not, however, like good and evil, in things but in the mind. But not in the mind with respect to simple things and with regard to essences as such."³⁰ In this, he clearly affirms truth to be in composition, and denies it to be in things as opposed to the mind, and declares it not to be in every operation

of the mind, for it is not in the simple operation by which an essence is known but only in composition. But since what he says here is doctrinal and not restricted (*indefinitus*) it equates with being said universally and any exception or distinction [to it] will be an open contradiction or limitation of Aristotelian doctrine and outside his intention. Therefore, Averroes,³¹ Alexander of Aphrodisias,³² Duns Scotus³³ and others simply so expound [the text] without explanation or limitation.

But St. Thomas³⁴ and Alexander of Hales³⁵ clearly limit it and say that there is some truth in the mind's simple concept. This opinion we have extensively defended in *Disputation 8, Section 3*.³⁶ And the brief resolution [of the issue], which Giles of Rome mentioned in *Quodlibet 4, q. 7*,³⁷ is that truth is of two kinds: one which has falsity as its opposite, and a second which does not have falsity, but rather ignorance, as its opposite. Therefore, Aristotle in this place is speaking about the first falsity [sic], about which it is universally true that it is found only in composition and division. But the second truth has a place in simple conception.

That this is a legitimate understanding of Aristotle we gather from Aristotle himself. For, first of all, that distinction of two kinds of truth is taken from him in *De Anima*, III, c. 6, text 26,³⁸ and *Metaphysics* VI, c. 12 [sic],³⁹ where the commentators, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias,⁴⁰ St. Thomas,⁴¹ and Alexander of Hales,⁴² as well as Themistius, in comment 45 of his commentary on *De Anima* III,⁴³ [c. 6] note it. Thus in the first place, Aristotle says as follows: "But there is indeed a saying something about something, that is, an affirmation; and every [affirmation] is true or false. But not every act of understanding [is such], but that which is about what something is from its essential nature is also true, and is not something about something but, like vision, is true of its proper object."⁴⁴ In this place he has distinguished another way of truth besides that which is as "something about something,"⁴⁵ that is, in a composition. But that this truth does not have an opposite falsity, Aristotle has declared in *Metaphysics* IX, the last chapter, where in text 21, he has said that the true and the false are found in composition and division.⁴⁶ Then he asks in Text 22, how [the true and the false] can be found in simple things, and he answers that the true and the false are also found in them in their own way: the true properly, but the false only improperly and by ignorance, or by accident. For "to touch"⁴⁷ [simple things], he says, is to say the true. But lest someone think that "to say" is taken here as synonymous with "to compose," as in the place cited from the *De Anima*, he inserts the following: "For saying is not the same as affirmation"⁴⁸ (indeed "to say" is here taken for that which is to conceive a thing as it is). But "not to touch," he

says, “is to ignore,”⁴⁹ as if to say: except by accident there is not falsity here but ignorance, that is: by adding a composition and attributing a foreign concept to that whose concept it is not.

Also in this way, Aristotle, in *De Anima* III, /p. XXIX/ c. 3, text 161,⁵⁰ has said that sometimes there is falsity in the imagination and in the senses. But he understands this not properly and *per se* but *per accidens*. For the sense itself, when it is deceived, fails only in apprehending not what is but something else—which is an improper falsehood and rather a certain ignorance. *Per accidens*, however, falsity follows, not so much in the sense as in the intellect, because it attributes what appears to the sense to a thing to which it does not belong. But this difference between truth and falsity as regards simple things, that truth is proper but falsity improper, Aristotle has explained in the place cited from *Metaphysics* IX, when, without qualification, he calls this truth truth. But the second [he] rather [calls] ignorance, or falsity by accident, as we more extensively explain in *Disputation 9, Section 1*,⁵¹ from Aristotle himself in *Metaphysics* V, chapter 29.⁵²

Finally, it is clear that in the present place, i.e., *Metaphysics* VI, Aristotle is speaking of that truth which has its own opposite falsity. For in other places he has distinguished two kinds of truth and says that the second kind is without composition. Also, in this place he has (not without thinking of what he was doing) always combined the true and the false, so as to indicate that he is speaking about that being true to which the false is opposed as non-being. Again, above in Book 5, chapter 7, text 14, among the ways being may be taken, he has put that way by which being signifies the truth of a composition;⁵³ and here he is alluding to that being true when he says that being true is found only in a composition. For in the beginning of this Chapter, Aristotle has taken up again the three divisions of being⁵⁴ which he posited in *Metaphysics* V, chapter 7,⁵⁵ namely: into being *per se* and being *per accidens*, into being as true and non-being as false, and into being in act and being in potency. And first he excluded being *per accidens* and then immediately after being as true. Therefore, he is speaking here about the same thing of which he spoke in Book 5.

Question 4. From what has been said, another question emerges: are the true and the false found in things [outside the mind]? Indeed, it seems that Aristotle here says that they are not.⁵⁶ But this has the same explanation; for also in things there is no truth which has a real opposite falsity. However, there is their own real truth,⁵⁷ about which we have extensively treated in *Disputation 8, Section 7*.⁵⁸ Moreover, it is clear that Aristotle was aware of

this truth, when he said in *Metaphysics* II, Chapter 1: “As each thing is, so it is true.”⁵⁹ And those beings which are most perfect are the truest.

Question 5. Again, it may be asked in this place whether good and evil are in things—about which we have spoken in *Disputations 10*⁶⁰ and *11*.⁶¹ However, a difference has been pointed out here by Aristotle:⁶² the goodness which has an opposed real evil is found in things; but the truth which really has an opposite falsity is not found in things, but in the mind. And thus the matter is clear.

Question 6. A final question can be raised: do beings of reason belong to the consideration of metaphysics? For by the same reason that Aristotle excludes being as true⁶³ he also excludes every being of reason. This is true, speaking about the direct and proper object [of metaphysics], as I have said in *Disputation 1, Section 1*.⁶⁴ But this does not preclude that on occasion and to distinguish it from real being, being of reason may be considered in this science, as we note in the *last Disputation* [i.e. 54] of this work.⁶⁵ In line with this, Aristotle, when he excludes being as true here, promises to treat it elsewhere⁶⁶ and he has treated it the last chapter of Book 9.⁶⁷

Notes

¹ Following Tricot: While this book does not refer to Book 3, it is nonetheless related to it and it too belongs to Aristotle's early Platonic period. Its interest is particularly located in the passage at the end of Chapter 1, in which Aristotle tries to reconcile the theological conception of metaphysics which he has inherited from Plato with the ontological conception given in Book 4, which concerns being insofar as it is being. One thing which Tricot sees emerging here is that Chapter 1 of Book 6 does indicate the unity of Books 1, 3, 4, and 6. Against Jaeger, he thinks it is impossible to separate Chapter 1 of Book 6 from the remaining Chapters 2–4, of the same Book, which pass to consider being *per accidens* (Chapters 2–3) and being as true (Chapter 4), neither of which fall within the object of metaphysics. Cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote...*, p. xxv.

² I found this sentence difficult to translate literally. Its gist seems to be that Aristotle is not yet getting to the meat of his subject matter, because the object of this discipline has still not been clearly established. He is therefore returning to that task, which was left incomplete in Book 4.

³ Cf. *DM 1*, in *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 1–64: “About the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics.”

⁴ *Ibid.*, s. 1, pp. 2–12, where it is asked: “What is the object of metaphysics?”

⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 5, pp. 37–52, which asks: “Whether metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science, and whether it is true wisdom?”

⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 12–22, which asks: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”

⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 4, pp. 26–37, where it is asked: “What are the tasks of this science? What is its goal? Or what is its utility?”

⁸ Cf. *DM 3*, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 111–115, which asks: “By what principles can properties be demonstrated of being? And whether among these, this is the first: ‘It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.’”

- ⁹ Cf. *DM* 1, 1, n. 16, vol. 25, p. 7; also see *DM* 2, 2, n. 31, p. 30. For the original hypothesis, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a28. For St. Thomas' commentary on this hypothesis, cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, VI, c. 1, l. 1, Cathala no. 1170.
- ¹⁰ That is, the first species of quality.
- ¹¹ *DM* 1, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 37–53, where the question is: “Whether metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science, and whether it is true wisdom?”
- ¹² *Ibid.*, s. 6, pp. 53–64, which asks: “Whether among all sciences metaphysics is most of all desired by a human being by a natural appetite?”
- ¹³ That is, the Aristotelian psychology. See Book 3, my note 63, above.
- ¹⁴ Rather, cf. *DM* 44, 11, nn. 68–69, vol. 26, p. 715, where Suárez relates the “common opinion,” which on the basis of three degrees of abstraction distinguishes the three theoretical sciences of Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics, and then gives his own thoughts about the basic question raised by such a division of science. Also: *ibid.*, 13, nn. 19–54, pp. 728–37, where he discusses differences between practical and speculative acts and habits. For much of Suárez's teaching on scientific habits, see my article: “Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit”, *The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 15 (1991), pp. 309–331.
- ¹⁵ For the principle that no science proves the existence of its own subject, cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.10.76b4–8. Aristotle seems to restrict the principle to particular sciences and not to apply it to metaphysics; cf. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b1–16; for Suárez's recognition of this, see *DM* 1, 4, n. 4, vol. 25, p. 29.
- ¹⁶ It may be noted here that neither of these ways of speaking of accidental being is aimed at the being of categorial accidents. Aristotle, and Suárez after him, will take up this latter being in Book 7, immediately following.
- ¹⁷ Neither Aristotle nor Suárez is in this place talking about accidents in the sense of categorial accidents, that is, quantity, quality, etc.
- ¹⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.2.1026b2–7.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.* 1026b23–1027a19.
- ²⁰ Cf. *DM* 5, 1, nn. 4–5, vol. 25, pp. 146–7; but also see *DM* 4, s. 3, pp. 125–31, where the question is: “How many kinds of unity are there in things?” and where Suárez lays out in detail his doctrine of essential versus accidental beings.
- ²¹ Cf. *Posterior Analytics* 1.9.76a10–11; also: 1.30.87b19–20.
- ²² For discussion of moral necessity and freedom in Suárez and the Jesuit tradition after, see especially Sven K. Knebel: “*Necessitas moralis ad optimum*: Zum historischen Hintergrund der Wahl der besten aller möglichen Welten,” *Studia Leibnitiana*, 23 (1991), pp. 3–24; “*Necessitas moralis ad optimum (II)*. Die früheste scholastische Absage an den Optimismus nach einer unveröffentlichten Handschrift von 1617: Jorge Hemelman S.J. (1574–1637)” *Theologie und Philosophie*, 67 (1992), pp. 544–535; “*Necessitas moralis ad optimum (III)*. Naturgesetz und Induktionsproblem in der Jesuitenscholastik während des zweiten Drittels des 17. Jahrhunderts,” *Studia Leibnitiana*, 24 (1992), pp. 182–215; “*Necessitas moralis ad optimum (IV)*. Repertorium zur Optimismusdiskussion im 17. Jahrhunderts,” *Studia Leibnitiana*, 25 (1993), pp. 201–208; “Augustin de Herrera, A Treatise on Aleatory Probability: De necessitate morali in genere [Compluti (Alcalá de Henares), 1673] Quaestio X, newly edited, translated and annotated, *The Modern Schoolman*, 73 (1996), pp. 199–264; and Wille, *Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik, 1550–1700*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000.
- ²³ Suárez has in mind the pseudo-science of astrology.
- ²⁴ Cf. e.g. Suárez, *De opere sex dierum*, II, c. 9, n. 7, in *Opera*, vol. 3, pp. 157–8.
- ²⁵ Cf. *DM* 1, 1, n. 5, vol. 25, p. 3.
- ²⁶ *DM* 4, s. 3, pp. 125–31, which asks: “How many kinds of unity are there in things?”

- ²⁷ Cf. *DM* 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: “About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [we treat] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance.”
- ²⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b18. Also note that at this point in modern (post Bekker) editions of Aristotle we move from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 of Book 6.
- ²⁹ Cf. “τὸ δ’ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν, καὶ μὴ ὄν ὡς, ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ περὶ σύνθεσιν ἔστι καὶ διαίρεσιν, . . .” *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b18–19.
- ³⁰ Cf. “οὐ γὰρ ἔστι το ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν. . . ἀλλ’ ἐν διανοίᾳ. περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλὰ καὶ τὰ τί ἔστιν οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ.” *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25–28.
- ³¹ *In lib. Metaphys.* VI, c. 2, fol. 152rb.
- ³² Cf. *In Arist. Metaphys.*, VI, c. 4, ed. Hayduck, p. 457, ll. 23–36.
- ³³ For this, see Pseudo–Scotus (Antonio Andreas), *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, VI, Summae II, C. 2, in Ioannis Duns Scoti, *Opera omnia* (ed. 1639), Tom. iv, p. 217b.
- ³⁴ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VI, c. 3, l. 4, Cathala nos. 1234 and 1236, which seem to discount what has been said in no. 1233.
- ³⁵ That is, Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros* VI, t. 8, fol. 181v.
- ³⁶ Cf. *DM* 3, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 283–9, where Suárez asks: “Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?”
- ³⁷ Cf. B. Aegidii Columnae, *Quodlibeta*, IV, qu. 7, ed. de Coninck (Lovanii: Typis Hieronymi Nempaei, 1646), pp. 215b–216b.
- ³⁸ Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b26–29.
- ³⁹ This should probably be: *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b17–1052a4, esp. 105123–4.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. Pseudo-Alexander (Michael of Ephesus), *In Arist. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 10, ed. Hayduck, p. 599, ll. 18–600, l. 11 and 600, l. 38–601, l. 13.
- ⁴¹ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 10, l. 11, Cathala no. 1904.
- ⁴² Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros*, IX, t. 20, fol. 275ra.
- ⁴³ For this, see Themistius, *In libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis*, Book 6, ed. Ricardus Heinze, in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. 5 (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1899), p. 112, ll. 10–11; also cf. Themistius, *Commentaire sur le traité de l'ame d'Aristote*, traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, édition critique et étude sur l'utilisation du commentaire dans l'oeuvre de saint Thomas, par G. Verbeke (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain; Paris: Éditions Béatrice–Nauwelaerts, 1957), p. 251, ll. 47–48.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. “ἔστι δ’ μὲν φάσις τι κατὰ τινος, ὡσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πάσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πάς, ἀλλ’ ὁ τοῦ τί ἔστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθὴς, καὶ οὐ τι κατὰ τινος· ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ τὸ ὄρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, . . .” *De Anima* 3.6.430b26–29.
- ⁴⁵ Cf. “τι κατὰ τινος” *ibid.*, l. 26.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b1–3.
- ⁴⁷ Aristotle: “θιγγεῖν” *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b24.
- ⁴⁸ “οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸ κατὰ φάσις καὶ φάσις. . .” *ibid.*, 1051b24–25.
- ⁴⁹ Cf. “τὸ δ’ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν.” *ibid.* 1051b25.
- ⁵⁰ Cf. *De Anima* 3.3.428b14–429a2.
- ⁵¹ Cf. *DM* 9, 1, nn. 14–20, vol. 25, pp. 317–19.
- ⁵² *Metaphysics* 5.29.1024b17–25a13.
- ⁵³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a31–33.
- ⁵⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.2.1026a33–b1.
- ⁵⁵ See 1017a7–b9.
- ⁵⁶ *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25–26.
- ⁵⁷ That is to say, their transcendental truth, which is a property of their being.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. *DM* 8, s. 7, vol. 25, pp. 295–307, where the question is asked and answered affirmatively: “Whether there is some truth in things which is a property of being?”

⁵⁹ Cf. “ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.” *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30–31.

⁶⁰ *DM* 10, vol. 25, pp. 328–55: “About the Good or Transcendental Goodness.”

⁶¹ *DM* 11, vol. 25, pp. 355–372: “About Evil.”

⁶² Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25–27.

⁶³ *Metaphysics* 6.4.1028a3.

⁶⁴ Cf. *DM* 1, 1, n. 6, vol. 25, pp. 3–4.

⁶⁵ Cf. *DM* 54, [prooemium], vol. 26, pp. 1014–15.

⁶⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b29.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 9.10.1051a34–1052a11.

THE SEVENTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹ About the Principal Significate [of the Word ‘Being’] Which Is Substance

In this Book, the Philosopher begins to treat of the principal subject and in some way the only object (as he himself has said in the First Chapter²) of this science, namely, substance. And, first, he proposes his intention; then he explains what substance is and especially treats of “what something is”³ (*Quod quid est*⁴); and finally he spends a long time treating the opinions of the philosophers about various kinds of substances.

Chapter One That Substance Is Being in the First Sense and the First Object of This Science

Question 1. In this place, the question of the analogy of being between substance and accident could first be treated, since Aristotle evidently teaches that here. Cf. *Disputation 32, Section 2*.⁵

Question 2. Second, it is usually asked whether accidents “in the abstract” are beings, since Aristotle seems to ask that question here. But apart from what we have said in that place [i.e. *Disputation 32*] about the division of being into substance and accident, there is nothing to add. For when accidents are called “in the abstract” nothing is added to or taken away from those accidents. For the expression “in the abstract” expresses only an extrinsic denomination derived from our way of conceiving or signifying. Hence there can be question only about those accidental forms or modes not insofar as they are signified in this or that way, but in themselves or insofar as they are forms of a certain kind. /p. XXX/ For they are rightly called accidents “in the abstract” because as they are forms they are not otherwise able to be signified. Therefore, about these forms there is no other question except that they are beings, indeed diminished and imperfect, but still true beings, which can also be simply and without addition called such, as I have said in the cited place [i.e. *Disputation 32*].

However, there is a difference between a concrete and an abstract accident in the way of signification, inasmuch as the former includes a subject in its signification while the latter does not [include a subject] but only signifies the form. And from this it seems that a concrete [accident], as that which exists, is being in a more absolute way than [what is] only an abstract [accident]. For this is the argument which Aristotle makes here. But it must be said that an abstract and a concrete accident are the same, and they involve the same being, if they are taken formally and essentially (*per se*) as they should be taken. For materially it is certain that a concrete [accident] by reason of the subject which it connotes is more a being, because it is subsisting, or it is composed from something subsistent and an accidental form. However, although in that way it has more entity, it has less essential (*per se*) unity, because it is a being by accident (*per accidens*). But about this distinction of accident into abstract and concrete, I have said a lot in *Disputation 39, Section 2* [sic].⁶

Question 3. In that place,⁷ I have also raised the common question which is usually treated here, namely, whether concrete accidents formally signify a subject?—as Avicenna thinks,⁸ and some Nominalists follow him, taking their basis for this from the present place in Aristotle. Or do they formally signify a quality?—as Averroes (*Commentator*),⁹ St. Thomas,¹⁰ and more frequently the [Scholastic] Doctors teach from Aristotle, who says in the *Categories*, in the Chapter about Substance: “White signifies only a quality.”¹¹

But neither opinion is fully (*satis*) taken from Aristotle. For in this place it is only for purposes of an argument (*solum argumentando*) that he says a concrete being seems to be more than one that is abstract because it includes a subject—which is true even if the subject is included [only] as connoted. But in the Chapter about Substance he does not say: “White signifies only a quality [or ‘suchness’]”—but rather, “White signifies a such (*quale*¹²),” in which a subject is also included. But Aristotle’s intention there was only to say that it does not signify “such a something” (*quale quid*¹³), like second substances, but “such an accidental thing” (*quale accidentale*) which he calls only “such” (*quale*).

Nevertheless, just as the second opinion is more common so also it is more true, as is clear enough from the very use of the words and as has been sufficiently proven in the mentioned place. Cajetan also may be looked at in the Chapter [sic] *On Being and Essence*.¹⁴

Question 4. Again, it is usual to ask here whether inherence is of the essence of an accident, for the reason that Aristotle here says that an accident is “a being of a being.” This is treated in *Disputation 37, Section 1* [sic].¹⁵

Moreover, how what Aristotle says here is true—that substance is prior to accident by nature, in knowledge, by reason, and in time—is treated throughout *Disputation 38*, where the text of the Philosopher is extensively explained.¹⁶

Chapters Two And Three What Is Substance and How Many Are There?

Questions 1 and 2. These two questions, namely, what is substance and how many substances are there, are treated at length in *Disputation 33*, where there is special discussion of the division of substance into first and second,¹⁷ to which St. Thomas¹⁸ reduces the four membered division which Aristotle here¹⁹ gives when he divides substance into “what something was to be”,²⁰ that is, the essence and quiddity of a thing; “the universal itself”,²¹ that is, the supreme genus of substance; and the “genus”²² (understand: contained under that [supreme genus]); add also both “species”²³ and “first subject”,²⁴ that is, first substance. For the first member is not properly substance, indeed it is not proper to the category of substance, but analogous to every quiddity of a thing, and therefore it was omitted from the category of substance. But the second and the third [members] are contained under second substance. The fourth, indeed, is the same as first substance, about which it has been explained in the same place [*Disputation 33*] how it is most of all called substance.

Question 3. Here could be treated the division of substance into matter, form, and the composite, which Aristotle also treats below in Chapters 10,²⁵ 13,²⁶ and 15,²⁷ of this Book, and in Book 8, Chapters 2²⁸ and 3,²⁹ Book 12, Chapter 3, Text 14,³⁰ and at the beginning of *De Anima*, Book 2.³¹ However, we have treated it in *Disputation 33, Section 1*.³² Here it seems we should only note that Aristotle in this place has divided first substance into those three members, which must be taken with the same proportion. However, he could have in the same way divided either second substance, or substance in general, as he seems to have done in *De Anima*. But this does not matter very much, because Aristotle knew that from one division given in detail the others could be easily understood.

Question 4. Fourth, it is usually asked here with respect to Text 7, at the end:³³ whether form is substance in a principal way and prior to matter and the composite? For the text of Aristotle is ordinarily understood in this way, as is clear from the interpretation of St. Thomas,³⁴ Alexander of Hales,³⁵ Duns Scotus,³⁶ and Averroes.³⁷ But there has been occasion for

error because the old translator³⁸ did not translate faithfully. /p. XXXI/ For where the Greek text has “and that” (*et ipsum*)³⁹ he translates “and by that” (*et ipso*).⁴⁰ For this reason [Alexander of] Aphrodisias explains it in another way, namely: not only form but also the composite is more perfect than matter,⁴¹ which is what Aristotle immediately afterwards says in Text 8.⁴² Or indeed the sense is that if form is more perfect than matter, the composite is more perfect than both. This is explicitly treated in *Disputation 15, Section 7*,⁴³ where also form is compared with matter. And in that place there is explained Aristotle’s reasoning,⁴⁴ by which he proves that form is more perfect than matter, because it is separable [from matter]. For [this] is understood “permissively”⁴⁵ or about form and matter as such, since in the whole range of form there is some separable form, but not in the whole range of matter. For that sufficiently indicates an greater perfection on the part of form with respect to matter from their own genus and from the common character of act and potency of the same genus.

Question 5. The fifth question is especially proper to this place: what sort of substance is prime matter, and whether it is pure potency or has some actuality? We discuss this extensively in *Disputation 13, Sections 4*⁴⁶ and following.⁴⁷ Necessarily joined with this question is a question about substantial form: whether there is such? This question Aristotle also raised here and we have discussed it at length in *Disputation 16* [sic].⁴⁸ Therefore, what Aristotle defines in this place is only that matter alone is not that first substance which we most of all call substance but it is a certain potency to that. However, Aristotle does not deny that matter has its own substantial entity, although it is potential in order to receive form. When, therefore, Aristotle signifies there that matter is most known, either he is speaking only in the way of making an argument or indeed he understands matter to be most known under the common character of matter or of the subject of changes, but not indeed under the proper character of prime matter.

Question 6. Sixth, it can be asked whether quantity is substance, which Aristotle denies here and rightly so. We have discussed this in *Disputation 43* [sic], *Section 2*.⁴⁹

Chapter Four About the Definition or the Quiddity of a Thing

Aristotle at the end of the preceding Chapter promised that he would treat of substantial form. But because substantial form is what completes the quiddity of a substance, or, as he talks, the “what something was to

be” (*quod quid erat esse*), therefore from that “what something was to be” there arises debate (*disputatio*). And he tacitly directs this debate against Plato, with the result that he shows that separate Forms or Ideas are not necessary—neither because of definition, nor because of the being of individuals, nor because of the generations of things. Therefore, in this Chapter he treats of quiddity, or “what something is”⁵⁰ (for this term is more proper and concrete than “quiddity”). He treats [this], I say, “logically,” as he himself says,⁵¹ or in relation to definitions. But because “what something is” extends more widely than substantial form taken rigorously, here, therefore, he more generally discusses that [namely, “what something is”]. And on this occasion many things are prefaced about the order of teaching by proceeding from things more known to those which are less known⁵²—about which to delay or raise a question is superfluous, since that method is everywhere repeated by Aristotle, and to explain it is the proper task of a logician.

Question 1. First, therefore, it can be asked: whether it is true that in the beginning of this Chapter Aristotle says that it is “the what something was to be” of a thing which is essentially and first (*per se primo*) predicated of that thing⁵³—that is, as he himself explains, in such way that in the definition of the predicate the subject is not posited? And a reason for doubting can be that a genus is predicated essentially and first (*per se primo*) of a species, as for example, animal is predicated of man, and nevertheless it is not “the what something was to be” of man. Again, a difference, such as “rational,” does not express “what something is,” because it is not predicated quidditatively (*in quid*) but rather qualitatively (*in quale*). And still it is predicated in an essential and first way. However, this question must be left for the Book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle extensively discusses the modes of essential (*per se*) [predication].⁵⁴ And briefly we must say that “what something was to be,” taken logically, is nothing other than the essential definition and the quiddity of a thing, which, as it is formally in the mind or in the [spoken] word (*voce*) is the concern of logic. But insofar as it is the essence of the thing objected to the mind, or expressed in the definition, it is the metaphysical essence, which, when it is explained in relation to the definition, is said to be explained logically. And this is the way the Philosopher is speaking here.

But this definition can either as a whole be predicated of the thing defined, and then there is a proper and adequate predication of quiddity. Or, again, it can be predicated by parts expressing only the genus, or only the difference. And in that case, even though absolutely the whole “what something is” is not predicated, nevertheless, some part of it is explicitly

predicated and the whole is implicitly [predicated]. For neither the genus nor the difference is predicated as a part, but as in some way expressing the whole. And therefore under “what something was to be” not only the definition, but also the genus and the difference are comprehended, with that character by which they are predicated of the thing defined. And in this way animal is said to be the “what something was to be” of man, not the whole thing formally, but still the whole thing confusedly. And it does not matter that a difference may be said /p. XXXII/ to be predicated qualitatively (*in quale*), because it is predicated “as something qualitative” (*in quale quid*), that is, as essential and constituting the essence of the thing. Hence, it is clear that all accidental predicates, of whatever kind they are, are excluded from the “what something was to be”, for the reason that they are not predicated of a thing “essentially and first” (*per se primo*).

Question 2. Secondly, it can be asked here: whether accidents have a “what something was to be,” that is, whether, and how, they can be defined? Aristotle treats this subject most extensively here in Texts 12⁵⁵ and after, and in the whole following Chapter. But here there can hardly be a question about a thing (*de re*), but only about a name (*de nomine*). Therefore, the summation of what Aristotle says is contained in this: if we speak metaphysically about “what something was to be,” that is, about an essence, it is clear that accidental things have some real essence, just as they are real beings. For a being is constituted in the character of being by an essence. But just as accidents are beings analogically and “to a certain extent” (*secundum quid*), in this way they have an essence only to a certain extent and with the same proportional analogy.

From this, further speaking logically about “what something was to be,” that is, about a definition, it is clear that it must be said with the same proportion that accidents can have some definition. For they have a real essence which is metaphysically composite (*non ominino simplicem*⁵⁶). But every real and composite essence can be explained by some statement (*oratio*) and expressed conception of the mind; and this amounts to being defined.⁵⁷ Likewise, accidents have their proper genera and differences; therefore, they can be defined through those. However, just as an accidental essence is imperfect, so it can be defined only in an imperfect way. This imperfection can consist either in the fact that its genus and difference are very incomplete and imperfect within the range of being, much more than is the genus of the soul⁵⁸ or of matter,⁵⁹ or certainly in the fact that accidents cannot be defined except by putting some added thing in the definition, so that in relation to that [added thing] an essence of this kind will be explained. In this way it was said earlier that substance is prior in

definition to accident and that accident cannot be defined except through substance. For in order that its definition truly and properly disclose its essence, it is necessary that it explain it through some relation to substance, about which subject we have spoken in *Disputation 37, Section 1* [sic].⁶⁰

However, note this that Aristotle seems in this Text to sometimes be speaking about “being by accident” (*ens per accidens*) and sometimes about an accident—about which two, however, the reasoning is not altogether the same in relation to definition. For a being by accident in fact does not have a definition, it must be explained through a number of definitions, or an aggregate of definitions. For just as it is not a being, but rather beings, in this way it does not have an essence but rather essences—and the same is proportionally true about its definition. But accident taken properly is, I say, “a being by itself” (*ens per se*), not inasmuch as it is distinguished from “a being in another” (*ens in alio*), but inasmuch as it is distinguished against “by accident.”⁶¹ Or it is “by itself” not in the character of being (*ratio entis*), but in the character of unity (*in ratione unius*), and in this way it can be defined with one definition, but not with a definition that is perfectly one, for some added thing must be put into it. And in this regard it is compared in some way to a being by accident.⁶²

Chapter Five

Questions concerning the Definitions of Accidents Are Answered

The only Question. Here there is nothing worth noting besides a certain rule which is usually inferred from this Chapter: namely, that it is not redundant when an accident is joined in an adjectival way to a concrete subject which it connotes, as for example when we say “snub nose,” or “curly hair,” or even “white body.” For this rule holds not only in proper accidents, as certain people say, but also in common [accidents] in respect to an adequate subject which they connote. For the reason of an apparent redundancy is the same for all of these, by the fact that the second word⁶³ may seem to signify the same thing which both together signify. For “white” signifies a body which is “dispensing of vision” (*disgregativum visus*⁶⁴), and “snub” signifies a curved nose. Hence the argument is made that in place of the name there can be posited the thing defined and therefore that to say “curly hair” would be just as if to say hair of a certain shape.

Nevertheless, it is certain that Aristotle teaches that in these cases there is no redundancy. This is sufficiently clear from the common way of speaking,

which is regarded as very proper and not wrong. But the reason is because these concrete terms do not formally signify subjects, but only connote them. And when they are posited adjectivally or in the role of a predicate, they are not posited in the manner of a formal significate but only in the manner of something formal which they apply to a material thing. And, therefore, there is no repetition or redundancy. Neither can we posit in them the whole definition of a concrete accident itself in place of that concrete accident, because it includes in its definition (St. Thomas says here⁶⁵) something which is outside its essence. Or more clearly: because in a definition there is posited that subject or that material thing in place of a genus, and nevertheless in predication or composition with /p. XXXIII/ that material thing it is added only by reason of being formal.

Chapter Six

Whether ‘What Something Is’ Is the Same As ‘That of Which It Is’?⁶⁶

With this Chapter, Aristotle tacitly shows that besides⁶⁷ the being of individuals there are no necessary separate quiddities, for “what something is” is not separated from “that of which it is”—about which subject we say many things toward the explanation of this Chapter in *Disputation 34, Section 3*,⁶⁸ where we treat of nature and individual (*suppositum*) and the distinction between them. The only thing to note carefully is what Aristotle understands by “what something is,” and what is that with which he compares it. For Aristotle’s meaning and the answer to the question depends upon understanding these things. Therefore, by “what something was to be” Aristotle understands the essential definition of a thing. And here he is taking “what something is” in the same way as in preceding chapters, as is clearly evident from the connection of the context. In [chapters] above he always treated “what something is” in this sense; and all the commentators (*expositores*) agree on this.

But certain ones say that Aristotle equates “what something is” with what is defined. But there is a problem with this, because according to this way [of thinking] not only in the case of substances, but also in that of accidents, “what something is” would be the same as “that of which it is”—which Aristotle denies. The argument is clear because in all things what is defined would be the same as its definition and vice versa. They answer that Aristotle is not denying this in the case of accidents but in that of “beings by accident” (*entia per accidens*)⁶⁹ which do not have a “what

something is.” But there is a problem with this inasmuch as Aristotle here is not saying, about those things which are said accidentally, that they do not have a “what something is,” but rather he is supposing that they have it, but in a less perfect way, as he taught in the preceding chapter. And he is denying that it is the same as “that of which it is.”

Therefore, I am quite content with the explanation of Alexander of Hales,⁷⁰ which he took from the Commentator [i.e. Averroes],⁷¹ that “what something is” is here related to first substance, or to a subject to which it is attributed. For all things which in some way have a “what something is” belong to the class of first substance (*sunt ipsius primae substantiae*). And in this way the teaching of the Philosopher is most clear—“what something is” is the same as “that of which it is.” That is to say, [the same] as that subject to which it is attributed inasmuch as it is essentially (*per se*) its “what (*quid*).” But it is not [the same] as that of which it is said by accident (*per accidens*). Therefore, the Philosopher compares “what something is” to every subject about which it is said, and he sets up two general rules.

The first is that with regard to that about which it is said essentially (*per se*), it is the same as that. The second is that with regard to that of which it is said by accident, it is not the same. And because “what something is” is substantial, since as such it is said not by accident but only essentially of anything, it is therefore the same as “that of which it is.” But something, however, which is accidental, if it is as such (*formaliter*) compared with something of the same kind as itself and [something] essentially subject to itself in predication, is also the same as “that of which it is.” For example, “the what something is” of whiteness [compared] with whiteness or with this whiteness. But because a “what something is” of this nature is accidental, it can also be said by accident (*per accidens*) of a substance. And therefore with respect to “that of which it is” in this way, it is not the same, because it does not belong to it as its “what something is” but as its accident.

And when Aristotle’s opinion is explained in this way, it most appropriately prepares the way to show that Ideas are not separate from particular things and substances, which is what Aristotle intends. In this way also, questions end (*cessant*) here about the distinction of nature from supposit⁷² and about the distinction of abstract from concrete even in substances which are conceived universally, as for example, man and humanity—which questions we have treated in the mentioned *Disputation 34*.⁷³

Question 1. Up to now this has been the proper place to treat the question about the identity of a definition with what is defined. But because this is logical, and it is not difficult, I am ignoring it.

Question 2. This could also be the place to treat the question, how what is defined in common, or rather the species, is the same as the individual about which it is essentially said. This is treated in *Disputation 5*,⁷⁴ which concerns individual unity. However, you should gather from this that when Aristotle says that “what something is” is the same as “that of which it is” he is not excluding every distinction of reason, whether such is founded in our way of conceiving, as for example between the definition and the defined, or whether it is founded in the thing conceived, as for example between the species and the individual. Therefore, he is excluding a real distinction, that is, one in the nature of things, and every distinction which impedes formal and essential predication. And [understanding it] so, the text of Aristotle will be easy [to comprehend] with respect to remaining issues.

Chapter Seven

How and by What the Forms of Things Are Made

Here Aristotle starts to complete the third part of his debate against Plato: that Ideas are not necessary for generation. And on this occasion, in this and the following chapter, he distinguishes various principles and modes of generation—namely, from art, or from nature, or by chance, etc.—which we extensively discuss in *Disputation 18*, which is about efficient causality.⁷⁵

Question 1. Here as Aristotle’s text occasions it, it is usual to discuss especially: first, /p. XXXIV/ whether all things which exist are produced from some kind of matter—which opens up the question of whether Aristotle knew about Creation. But in this place Aristotle is speaking about natural actions; and in these the general statement is true which affirms that all things come to be from some other matter. And, in the same way, we should accept a certain proposition which Text 24 contains: “Therefore, just as it is said, coming to be is impossible, if there is nothing pre-existing.”⁷⁶

Question 2. Secondly, it is usual to ask whether all things which have matter could be or not be, because of the word of the Philosopher, in Text 22: “All things which come to be by nature⁷⁷ have matter. For it is possible that each one of them could be or not be; but this is by matter.”⁷⁸ But this question does not have its basis in this text, because in this text it is said only that everything which can be or not be has that from matter. But the proposition which affirms this cannot be simply converted; and Aristotle

does not say that. This question is treated in *Disputation 13, Section 8*,⁷⁹ and following.⁸⁰

Question 3. Thirdly, it can be asked: whether all things which are generated from seed can be generated from putrefaction without seed? For Aristotle here in Text 22⁸¹ clearly affirms that the same things which are made from seed can be made without seed. For this reason, Averroes, [commenting on] *Physics*, Book 8, Comment 46, affirms this of all animals without distinction.⁸² But Avicenna in Book 2, of his *Sufficiantiae*,⁸³ completely denies that this can happen. For he thinks that those animals which come to be without seed from putrefaction are distinguished by species from others generated from seed which appear to be similar.⁸⁴

But both opinions are generally at odds with experience. For we see that some animals are generated from putrefaction which seem completely similar to those which come to be through seminal reproduction. And in plants the same thing is evident. And on the other side it is outside every natural occurrence that perfect animals, such as horses and lions, etc., be generated except by a proper and essential generation.

Therefore, St. Thomas in this place⁸⁵ correctly distinguishes, when he accurately interprets the words of the Philosopher, "For certain things which are the same come to be from seed and without seed."⁸⁶ For he has said "certain things"⁸⁷ because that it not common to all things. Therefore, there is a distinction between perfect and imperfect living things. For these latter can be caused without seed by the power of the heavenly bodies, because they are so imperfect and the dispositions which are necessary for their forms can come to be in a subject by chance from the contingent concurrence of other agents. But the prior kind of living things are so perfect and require such an exact and wonderful organization that they can in no way be produced except by a proper and essential cause. And in this way experience teaches this about both kinds of living things, as I have said. And in this answer against Avicenna and Averroes, the partisans of both the school of St. Thomas and of Duns Scotus agree, as do Alexander of Hales⁸⁸ and others.

Question 4. From this another question arises: what kind of cause induces substantial forms into these living things? And do the heavens have enough power to do this? About this I have spoken in *Disputation 15, Section 1*.⁸⁹

Question 5. Again, it can be asked whether the generation of things of this kind should be called 'casual'⁹⁰? But this is easily answered. For it is casual with respect to particular agents, but with respect to the sun it is not casual. This is the view of St. Thomas,⁹¹ whose opinion is defended

by Javellus, in [his] Question 10,⁹² against the attacks of Jandun.⁹³ But the matter is simple. In another way, it can be said that that generation, with respect to the concurrence of causes which dispose the matter, is accidental and by chance. But once that disposition is present a substantial form of this type is induced directly (*per se*) and intentionally by a universal agent.⁹⁴ We have taken this up in the last [mentioned] *Disputation, the last Section*.⁹⁵

Question 6. Moreover, it can be asked here how artistic exemplars (*exemplaria artium*) concur [in the production of] their effects? For Aristotle says here that health arises in matter from health in the mind,⁹⁶ that is to say, without matter. I have explained this question and this text in *Disputation 25, Sect. 3* [sic].⁹⁷

[*Question 7.*] Finally, it can be asked whether immanent actions are true actions? For Aristotle seems explicitly to affirm this when he says: “However, of generations and motions, intellection is indeed called the latter and effecting or making are called the former.”⁹⁸ About this we have debated at length in *Disputation 48, Section 2*,⁹⁹ and *Disputation 49, Section 4*.¹⁰⁰

Chapter Eight

About the Same Thing and That It Is Not the Form But the Composite Which Is Directly Made

Question 1. It is first asked by the Philosopher: whether the form is directly (*per se*) generated.¹⁰¹ We have discussed this question briefly in *Disputation 15, Section 4*.¹⁰²

Question 2. Whether this is true not only in the case of substantial forms but also in that of accidental ones? We have discussed this in the same place, in paragraph number 6, where we briefly answer in the affirmative.

Question 3. Whether substantial forms are introduced into matter by some universal agent cause or by particular causes? About this question we have debated extensively in *Disputation 15, Section 2*,¹⁰³ and in *Disputation 18, Sections 1*¹⁰⁴ and *2*.¹⁰⁵ /p. XXXV/

Question 4. Does each thing generate something similar to itself? This question is answered from the same places and from the division of efficient causes into univocal and equivocal, which is treated in *Disputation 17, Section 2*.¹⁰⁶ Two things only must be noted.

One is that Aristotle is properly speaking about generation, comprehending under that the alteration which is dispositive for that. But he is not

speaking about every causation. For a local mover does not effect something similar to himself. Neither do agents through all their immanent actions intend the production of things similar to themselves. But each potency¹⁰⁷ is said to do that which is proportioned and fitting to its own perfection. For these act not so much in order to communicate themselves but rather to perfect themselves. And therefore, they do not properly cause things similar to themselves. However, if “similarity” is broadly extended to an equivocal causality, these can also be said to cause something similar to themselves.

Secondly, therefore, it must be noted that Aristotle in this place has not said that all things are generated by things similar to themselves. Rather, in an indefinite way, he says: “In certain things it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as that which is generated.”¹⁰⁸ This, therefore, is generally and with all correctness true in the case of univocal causes; in the case of equivocal causes it is true with respect to an eminent and virtual similarity; but in the case of artificial, or intellectual, causes [it is true] according to an ideal or an intentional representation. Therefore, what is usually said about this matter poses no difficulty; on this see [Paul] Soncinas [commenting] on this Book, [in his] Question 14,¹⁰⁹ and Javellus, [in his] Question 12,¹¹⁰ as well as other authors.

Chapter Nine

Some Questions and Answers about the Same Thing

Question 1. First it is usual to ask here about the eduction of a form from the potency of matter, what and of what sort it is? And whether some part of the form precedes in the matter? About this [we discuss] at length in *Disputation 15, Sections 2*¹¹¹ *and 3*,¹¹² where, in the second section, Text 29¹¹³ of this Chapter is explicitly treated.¹¹⁴

Question 2. How the potency of a seed, or accidental potencies, cause substantial generation. About this, [we have spoken] extensively in *Disputation 18, Section 2*.¹¹⁵

Also all the questions which were noted in the previous Chapter have a place also in this one, since almost the same doctrine is repeated [here] by Aristotle.

Chapter Ten

About Quiddity in Relation to Definition

Question 1. Here at the beginning it could be asked: does it pertain to the first philosopher¹¹⁶ to discuss definition? About this [see] the introductory *Disputation 1, Section 4*,¹¹⁷ where we have shown that the form of defining, both in the mind and then after in speech, pertains to the logician. But it belongs to the metaphysician to explain the basis for a definition, which is the essence of a thing. However, because this very essence and quiddity, as it is in itself, is known with difficulty, for that reason Aristotle speaks much about that definition insofar as it is crafted by us or must be crafted so that in relation to us he may explain the character of an essence, and especially so that he show that matter belongs to the essential character of some things, so that by this character he may show against Plato that of such things there cannot be Ideas separate from matter. Therefore, for this reason, he is talking in these Chapters about definition, in the treatment of which [Chapters] we will briefly touch on all things which are merely logical.

Question 2. Therefore, second, it is asked: is it of the essence of a definition that it consist of parts? About this, Aristotle's opinion here, which is affirmative, is explicit enough. And if the name itself and the task of definition is explained, there is no difficulty. For we cannot through simple concepts know and explain the essences of things. Therefore, in order distinctly to conceive and explain the nature of something, we divide it into several concepts, so that we may know what is proper to it, what is common, what is essential, and what is accidental. Finally, by appropriately joining together essential concepts of the thing, we may conceive it distinctly. And that distinct conception, we call its essential definition, either conceived in the mind or expressed in speech. In this way, therefore, it is evident with regard to the nature of a definition that it be a statement (*oratio*), and that it consequently have parts. Hence, the most proper way to search for a definition is through a division of common concepts by rejecting those which are alien down to those which are proper, as Aristotle says, more extensively in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 2, Chapter 14.¹¹⁸

Question 3. Third, do the parts of a definition correspond to parts of the thing defined? The Philosopher seems to affirm that at the beginning of this Chapter when he says: "As the definition (*ratio*) is related to the thing, in a similar way a part of the definition is related to a part of the thing."¹¹⁹ And that can be inferred from both the task and the aim of a definition. For because it distinctly states the whole essence of a thing, and

for this task it uses, so to speak, “partial concepts,” it seems necessary that proportionate parts in the thing defined correspond to those concepts.

But on the other hand, it is a fact that the thing defined is often something simple, and it does not have true parts. /p. XXXVI/ Again, even though it may have parts, the parts of the definition do not always correspond to those parts; but rather each part of the definition expresses the whole essence of the thing, although less distinctly than the [whole] definition itself. For a genus and a difference, even though they are parts of the definition, do not signify parts of the thing defined, but rather the whole thing in a confused and incomplete concept.¹²⁰

Some think that Aristotle is speaking only about natural and composite things, and that in these his statement is universally true—for the reason that to the genus there corresponds a generic form and to the difference there corresponds a specific form, which forms are distinct. But this reply first supposes a false opinion about a plurality of forms following the order of essential predicates—which opinion we have disproven in *Disputation 15*.¹²¹ Then besides it is against both the simple and the common meaning of Aristotle's words.

Therefore, the Philosopher can be interpreted in two ways. First, that he is speaking only by a proportional comparison and not in an absolute way, but with a proportioned distribution. For he wants the parts of the definition to keep among themselves that proportion which the parts of the thing have with one another and with the whole. This is not because it is necessary that every defined thing have parts, but because the comparison is made to that [kind of thing] which has parts. But the proportion consists in this that the parts of the definition are compared, like the parts of the thing, as potency and act.

The second interpretation is that parts of a thing may be said to be either physical parts, if the thing is physically and properly composed, to which the parts of the definition correspond, whether really (*secundum rem*), if the definition is given in a physical way, or according to proportion or imitation, if the definition is proper and metaphysical: through a proper genus and difference. Or more broadly, parts of a thing may be those metaphysical grades precisely conceived which are indicated through the genus and difference as they are parts of the definition.

Question 4. The fourth and principal question with regard to this Chapter is: whether matter is a part of the quiddity of a material substance? And, consequently, whether matter is to be placed in the definition of such things? The first question is explicitly treated in *Disputation 36, Section 2*,¹²² where with Aristotle¹²³ and St. Thomas¹²⁴ we embrace the affirmative

position. From this it follows that in a quidditative definition of material substances matter is placed not as something added, for this is outside the perfection and nature of a complete substance, but as an existing part of the intrinsic essence of such things. But matter is placed in such a definition, either explicitly, if the definition is given in a physical way, as when man is said to consist of body and soul, or implicitly, as included in a metaphysical genus, as when man is called a rational animal. Finally, matter is placed in a definition according to some universal character, and not as designated matter (*materia signata*), for this is proper to individuals, as Aristotle teaches here, and as St. Thomas¹²⁵ and others explain at length.

Question 5. From this there arises a fifth question: whether something singular is definable as it is singular, and consequently whether designated matter (*materia signata*) can be placed in its definition. But the question concerns a singular, not as such (*in actu signato*), if I may say it so, that is: as concerns the common character of singularity.¹²⁶ For when it is taken in this manner there is already something common which can be defined in its own way, just like person, supposit, and other things of this nature. But the question concerns an actually existing (*exercito*), if I may speak thus, singular. And in this way Aristotle here, in Text 35,¹²⁷ denies that a singular is defined. For in this way he denies that designated matter is placed in a definition. He has the same opinion below in Chapter 15, Text 53,¹²⁸ and above in Chapter 4, Text 13,¹²⁹ he said that only a species can be properly defined. And in the *Posterior Analytics*, Book 1, Chapter 7,¹³⁰ he says that there is neither a science nor a definition of individuals. In that place this matter is treated explicitly.

But there is a problem as to why an individual cannot be defined, since it can be resolved into two concepts, namely, into the concept of the species and that of a proper individual difference. For what certain people say¹³¹—that an individual does not have a proper individual difference but only an individual accident—is false, as is clear from what we have said in *Disputation 5*.¹³² Moreover, there is science¹³³ about eternal individuals, for example, about God or an angel (for Aristotle denied this only about material individuals). Why, therefore, can there not be a proper definition of those same individuals? But if there can be such a definition of these, there will also be such of others as they are abstracted from time and from actual existence. Because of this there are some who think that a singular thing is definable of itself and from its nature, however it is not defined by us because we do not apprehend its proper difference.

But I think the question is purely verbal, and that Aristotle's speech is more correct just as it is more accepted.¹³⁴ For a properly enunciated definition explains the essence of a thing. Hence, just as an individual does not have another essence apart from the essence of its species, so neither is it thought to have another proper definition. Likewise, the contraction of a species to an individual is as it were material in the concept of such an entity. And therefore, that which an individual adds beyond /p. XXXVII/ a species is not so much explained by its proper definition as by an application of an essential definition to this entity. Therefore, properly there is defined a species, which consists of a genus and essential difference. But the highest genus and individuals do not have in this way a proper definition, even though they can be in some way described and explained. But the fact that there is neither science nor demonstration about singular things must be understood in almost the same way. For about these as they are such only contingent and mutable things are known. But if some necessary things appear to be demonstrated, that is always by virtue of some universal middle term; and in this way it is an application of a universal science to a particular thing rather than a proper science of particulars. This is perhaps true in the case of all created things, because nothing is essentially singular except for God about Whom there can be a most perfect science. And this is particularly so with regard to human science, for angelic science is of another character through its intuition of singular things as they are in themselves.¹³⁵

Question 6. Again, it can be asked here: whether the parts of the thing defined are prior to that thing itself which is defined? Again, whether it is always permitted to put a definition in place of a part of that definition?

Question 7. Aristotle seems to propose these questions here. And indeed he treats the first more explicitly and in sum he answers: formal parts are prior but material parts are not. But by formal parts he understands those which are taken from the form as such, or which formally correspond to that, or finally which are taken equally as universal and defined as that. Hence by material parts he understands individuals or all those which contract the essence (*ratio*) of the thing defined to a particular matter which it does not by virtue of its own formal nature require, as for example, in the case of a sphere that it be [made of] brass. However, formal parts are said to be prior to the thing defined by a certain priority of nature or of causality, sometimes also by an order of subsisting¹³⁶—although not always, because sometimes just as a whole cannot be without these parts, conversely neither can the parts be outside the whole, as Aristotle has noted here.

But about the second question Aristotle says almost nothing, and its resolution can be taken from what was noted above, in Chapter 4. For if that which is put in a definition is truly essential and has its own proper definition, nothing impedes that it be posited in place of its definition. For in this way since man is defined as a rational animal he is rightly said to be a living sensible rational thing. Indeed, in this way the definition is more distinct. But if a part of a definition is so simple that it does not have a definition it is not necessary in place of that part to posit its description, as is clear in the case of the highest genera and differences—and for this reason transcendentals are not posited in definitions. Likewise, if that which is posited in a definition is not essential, but rather something added, the definition is not posited in its place, because [otherwise] there would often be committed a redundancy (*nugatio*) or a vicious circle, as was said briefly in Chapter 4. And Aristotle himself should be understood in this way in *Topics*, Book 2, Chapter 2.¹³⁷

Chapter Eleven

What Are Formal Parts and What Are Material Parts

Question 1. In this Chapter there is nothing new to be asked. For almost nothing is added in it, but rather again the question about matter is introduced. Is it a part of the specific essence or not? The answer is affirmative. And for this reason it is said that formal parts, or those which are part of the definition of the species, do not exclude sensible matter in natural things, nor intelligible matter in mathematical things. But in the first they exclude individual matter; and in the second they exclude sensible matter. Hence formal parts are said to be those which are required according to the specific nature and for some task which is fitting by reason of that nature, even if they include matter in a universal or proportionate way. But material parts are said to be those which are quasi accidental to the common nature of the species. All of which tends to this that, contrary to Plato, Aristotle concludes that the common and specific essences (*rationes*) of these things cannot be abstracted from all matter.

Question 2. He again presses the question: whether “what something is” is the same as “that of which it is”—which question we already raised above. And this place in particular, and also the words of the Philosopher, have been explicitly interpreted in *Disputation 34, Section 5* [sic], at the end.¹³⁸

Chapter Twelve

An Essential Unit (*Per Se Unum*) Is Produced from the Parts of a Definition, That Is, from a Genus and a Difference

Question 1. Here the first question can be: from where do a thing defined and a definition have essential unity? But the sense of this is not from where do a thing defined and a definition compared between themselves have unity. For this has already been treated. For they have that from identity. But the sense is since a definition says or contains several things, from where does the thing defined, about which all those things are said, have the fact that it is one and not several? Logically (*consequenter*), the same thing must be understood about the definition itself. And /p. XXXVIII/ the answer is rather self-evident. For a definition is one because it consists of a genus and a difference which are related as a proper potency and act. Likewise, a thing defined is one because its essence consists of a genus and a difference as a metaphysical and essentially ordered genuine act and potency. But from act and potency of this kind there is always produced an essential unit (*unum per se*), even in the case of physical [parts], as is taught below in Book 8¹³⁹ with regard to matter and form and as is taken from *De Anima*, Book 2, Text 7.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, much more is this the case [when the thing is composed] from metaphysical parts. This is shown from a second argument of the Philosopher in this place, namely, from the fact that “a genus is not beyond its species,”¹⁴¹ or outside them. Hence, it is only the very essence of the species as it is conceived in a confused way. And (as St. Thomas correctly states) therefore, a genus cannot exist without species, because “the forms of the species are not different from the form of the genus.”¹⁴² Therefore, in reality they express the same essence and they differ only in concept as determinable and determining. Therefore, they compose an essential unit. Hence, for this reason, both the thing defined and the definition have their own (*propriam*) unity.

But it must be noted that the definition and the thing defined can be considered either as they are formally in the mind or as they are objectively. In the first way, the definition is properly and really (*secundum rem*) composed of mental concepts which are really diverse. However, it is said to have unity in the manner of a certain artificial whole, because of some subordination and conjunction of such concepts. But objectively it does not have a real composition by virtue of genus and difference, but only a composition of reason by denomination from the composition of

mental concepts. The thing defined, however, has in neither way a real composition, but only a composition of reason, also by virtue of genus and difference. Moreover, this phrase, “thing defined,” more properly seems to be said about an objective concept rather than a formal one,¹⁴³ although on the other hand “definition” more properly seems to be said about a formal rather than objective concept. Therefore, this unity is seen more essentially (*per se*) in the thing defined than in the definition. And thus Aristotle in this Chapter is principally speaking about the essential unity of the thing defined or of the essence insofar as it is composed of genus and difference. But about this composition and the distinction and relation of the extremes those things should be seen which are extensively treated in *Disputation 6, Sections 9,¹⁴⁴ 10,¹⁴⁵ and 11.¹⁴⁶*

Question 2. But it can be further asked: whether a genus can be found outside all species? The reason for the question is that Aristotle says disjunctively: “A genus is [either] not outside those things which are its species or if it is [outside] it is so as matter.”¹⁴⁷ Hence, he seems to suggest that a genus can sometimes be found outside species, at least by way of unformed matter. But on the other side, [he suggests] that a genus can in no way be found outside all species, because in reality it is not distinguished from these and it does not express any essence other than these.

That a genus is outside all species can be understood in two ways: in one way really—with a separation in actual fact. And in this way it is simply impossible that a genus be outside species—as the arguments that have been made conclude. And Aristotle has taught this everywhere—arguing against the Ideas of Plato and bringing this objection that if there were Ideas of species separate from individuals there would have to be Ideas of genera separate from species. If therefore this text is understood about this separation, as it is commonly understood by St. Thomas¹⁴⁸ and others, the disjunction is added only in order to remove the equivocation of certain words, which seem to signify genera which are separated from species. But in reality, as such, they do not signify genera but rather the material part of a whole composite, as is clear in the example of “word” (*vox, φωνή*) which Aristotle uses.¹⁴⁹ For “word” can signify in general an articulated sound, and as such it is a genus; but inasmuch as it can signify a sound only as it is capable of such formation, it is matter. And the same is true about “body” (*corpus*), as St. Thomas remarks here.¹⁵⁰ For as it signifies in general a composite of matter and substantial form, it is a genus, and as such it is in no way separable from all species. But as it signifies the first subject which is apt to be informed substantially, it expresses matter.

But in another way it can be said that a genus is separable in concept (*secundum rationem*) from species in such manner that it is not predicable of them. And in this way also what Aristotle says is true: either it is not separable or it is not taken as a genus but as matter. And from both alternatives there is reached the intended conclusion, namely, [1] the genus is not separable because of an identity and a unity [of the composite], and [2] insofar as it is separated in some way, it is signified or conceived as matter and, in that way, it is proportioned to composing an essential unit with the difference.¹⁵¹

Question 3. The third question can be: how it is true that a superior difference is divided by inferior ones?¹⁵² For the Philosopher speaks as follows: “It is necessary that the difference be divided by a difference.”¹⁵³ But the reason for the question is that a difference seems indivisible; otherwise, if a difference is divisible by differences, it will proceed to infinity and will not constitute an indivisible species. The answer is that Aristotle is clearly speaking about subalternate differences, /p. XXXIX/ which he says are divided not inasmuch as they are differences, but because the thing which is constituted from them is as such further divisible by other formal differences. And there is no process to infinity, because an end is reached in some ultimate difference, as Aristotle himself says. Neither is it the case that such a difference does not constitute a species, but rather that it does not constitute an ultimate species.

But the Philosopher remarks that this division must be formal, in such way that a later difference essentially determines one that is before and is its modification or its act. Understand, however, that sometimes the later difference is of the same order as the one before and then it is only its quasi-determination on the same level, as for example, [the difference] *sensible* is determined by a certain way of sensing.¹⁵⁴ But sometimes the later difference belongs to a higher level, and raises the prior difference along with itself, in which way [the difference] *rational* is related to [the difference] *sensible*. And then it determines it not only by quasi-modifying it within its own grade, but also by adding a higher grade. However, because what is added is the formal actuation of the previous grade and is simultaneously the perfection of that within its own grade, not only is it a proper and formal difference, but also one which is most perfect.

Question 4. The fourth question is whether an inferior difference includes one which is superior? For the Philosopher seems to affirm that when he says: “If therefore these things are so, it is evident that the ultimate difference will be the substance and definition of the thing,”¹⁵⁵ and afterwards: “If therefore there is a difference of a difference, that which is ultimate will

be the species and the substance.”¹⁵⁶ And he gives as an example of this: “an animal having feet, two–feet.”¹⁵⁷ For the second includes the first,¹⁵⁸ as is self evident, and from this he concludes that in the definition there need be placed only the ultimate difference; for if prior differences are simultaneously included there will be redundancy, for example, if (in the mentioned example) it is said, “an animal having feet, two feet.”

But on the other hand, there is the fact that a superior difference is included in the genus, as, for example, “sensible” is included in animal. Therefore, it cannot be included in an inferior difference. The consequence is evident: first, because a genus is completely outside the concept of its difference, as was said in Book 3; and second, because otherwise a redundancy would always be produced when we would join a difference to a genus, which is plainly false. Likewise, whenever a remote genus is placed in a definition, it is not enough to place the ultimate difference, but it is necessary to add the intermediate differences, as is also said here. Therefore, they are not included in the ultimate difference; for otherwise redundancy would occur.

Some [commentators] explain, and St. Thomas indicates,¹⁵⁹ that Aristotle is speaking about a difference, not according to its precise concept, as it is a part of a definition, but rather as it is a certain whole which confusedly includes not only superior differences but also the genus itself. For only in this sense can it be true that the ultimate difference is the substance of a thing and its definition, that is, equivalently and implicitly.

In another way, [Alexander of] Hales indicates,¹⁶⁰ and Scotus¹⁶¹ also says, that an ultimate difference is called the substance and the definition of a thing inasmuch as it completes that thing, not because it includes all superior differences, but because it as such (*per se*) presupposes those, and by necessary consequence, all superior differences must belong to that to which the ultimate difference belongs. But even though this may be true it is not enough to explain the reasoning of Aristotle, namely, that redundancy occurs if the superior differences are placed together with the ultimate difference in a definition. For this, speaking as such (*per se*), does not follow. For there is no redundancy in saying “living, sensible, rational” even though “rational,” taken confusedly and in the manner of the whole thing, includes all the superior differences, because in that definition it is not joined in this way but according to its own precise concept. Neither is there any redundancy, for the reason that “rational” of itself presupposes the superior differences and it implicitly and inferentially indicates them. For it is enough that it not include them formally. Therefore, it seems that Aristotle thinks that the ultimate difference formally includes the

superior ones and for that reason there is redundancy. And this seems clear in Aristotle's example, because this difference "twofoot" formally includes this superior one, namely, "having feet."

Nevertheless, we must say that strictly speaking the ultimate difference does not include the superior differences formally, but only in a presupposing way (*praesuppositive*)¹⁶² or confusedly as the cited authors have truly said. From this it happens that there is no redundancy, strictly and generally speaking, when we put several essentially subordinated differences in a definition, when the definition is not given by way of a proximate but rather by way of a remote difference. This is both most certain and also taken from Aristotle himself in this Chapter. But sometimes there can be such a division of differences that in the concept of one there is formally included another and that there is a repetition when both are stated, as in the example mentioned by Aristotle. Aristotle uses this particular evidence (*indicium*) to show that the ultimate difference is an essentially superior act and is completing the one essence of what is defined, which is what was intended in this discussion. For from this evidence it can /p. XL/ be inferred that the same thing is true in other ultimate differences, even if they do not in this way formally include superior ones. It can also be added, in order to quietly answer the objection, that an ultimate difference, precisely taken, never formally includes superior ones. But sometimes it is so joined with them that it is neither conceived nor signified except by including the superior ones, as is clear in Aristotle's example; and this is enough for Aristotle's reasoning. Also, perhaps, Aristotle is not speaking about a difference which is ultimate and subalternate but about one which is ultimate, which he wants to show is only one and that in a definition two ultimate differences cannot be posited without redundancy, as we will presently explain.

Question 5. Another question is stated in this Chapter, namely, what conditions does an essential definition require in order that it be correctly offered? For there are many conditions brought together in this Chapter. First, that it be offered through things which belong essentially and immediately (*per se primo*) to the definition insofar as it is such; for they must explain its "what something is" (*quod quid est*). Second, that it be offered through a proper potency and act essentially ordered, and, if several differences are stated, that one essentially divides another. Third, that the ultimate difference be only one. For if there are more differences, either one includes the other, and in this way there will be redundancy, or neither one includes the other, and then either they are accidentally ordered, and in that case they do not make up one essence, or if they are

essentially ordered, one is potency and the other is act, and only this latter will be ultimate while the former will be more general. [Alexander of] Hales brings in a fourth condition,¹⁶³ namely, that the definition be set up in the right order: that those parts which are more common precede, and if more than one difference is stated, the one which is subalternate should be stated first, and then the one which is ultimate. But Aristotle has not said this, but rather at the end of the Chapter he indicates that this order does not pertain to substance—which indeed is true, if it is materially taken. However, formally, with respect to the character[s] of act and potency it is necessary that potency be presupposed and in this way be taken as prior, although perhaps it is not said first—and in this sense this condition coincides with the one preceding. The last condition which is inferred is that the definition should be proper to and reciprocal with the thing defined. This also Aristotle did not explicitly state. However, it is included in the fact that a definition must have unity from its ultimate difference, which expresses the proper substance and essence of the thing.

Question 6. A sixth question is usually treated here: whether the essential unity of a composite substance requires one form? Indeed, St. Thomas frequently introduces this question in this context, deducing the unity of form from the arguments which Aristotle uses here.¹⁶⁴ But Scotus in the same context argues in the other way and tries to answer [Aristotle's] arguments.¹⁶⁵ But the opinion of St. Thomas should be preferred, which opinion we discuss at length in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.¹⁶⁶

Chapter Thirteen About Second Substance or the Universal

From this Chapter on Aristotle begins to speak more precisely and more clearly about second substances, especially in order to conclude against Plato the debate about Ideas.

Question 1. Hence a first question is raised here: whether universals are substances, which question Aristotle particularly treats in this Chapter. And it can first be understood about all universals, and in this way it is evident that they all are not substances, which we have remarked in *Disputation 6, Section 7*.¹⁶⁷ Second, it can be understood in a special way about universals of the category of substance, which in the *Categories* are called second substances.¹⁶⁸ Hence, it is clear that such universals are the substances which we have discussed extensively in *Disputation 33, Section 2*.¹⁶⁹ But Aristotle in this Chapter contends that they are not substances

in an absolute sense, that is, essentially subsisting in themselves. And his arguments prove this, about which [arguments] one can read the commentators (*expositores*).

Question 2. Next on this occasion we can debate here about the universal: whether it is rightly defined as “that which is by nature apt to be in several things,”¹⁷⁰ which is the way in which the Philosopher defines it here, in Text 45. But this matter is discussed extensively through the whole of *Disputation 6*,¹⁷¹ where we consider what that aptitude is, how it is in things, and how it is distinguished from them.

Question 3. Here also can be treated [the question] in what sense is this proposition true: “From two beings in act there is not produced one in act, but from two in potency—for act separates.”¹⁷² These are Aristotle’s words here in Text 46. We speak at length of this axiom when we treat of the existence of a created thing, in *Disputation 21, Section 11* [sic].¹⁷³ But as regards the mind of Aristotle, it is clear that he is speaking about beings which are complete in act and insofar as they are such. For he advances this proposition in order to prove that universals cannot be whole substances which subsist of themselves and that in this way they are present in individual substances so that with them they compose an essential and actual unit. Thus there is no further difficulty. /p. XLI/

Chapter Fourteen Universals Are Not Substances Separate From Individuals

In this Chapter there is nothing which deserves to be noted. For I think it superfluous in a thing so clear to examine each of Aristotle’s arguments. For in them there is no peculiar principle or metaphysical dogma which needs a new explanation. Therefore, one may read the commentators (*expositores*).

Chapter Fifteen About the Same Thing

In this place, Aristotle incidentally mentions some notable statements which might be called into question.

Question 1. The first is this: There is no definition or demonstration of a singular thing, because it has matter,¹⁷⁴ in regard to which an attributive

proposition (*de inesse*) and a causal proposition contain difficulty. But this thing has been sufficiently treated around Chapter 10.¹⁷⁵

Question 2. The second is: That which has matter can either be or not be, and it is corruptible.¹⁷⁶ But this must be understood in line with the subject matter. For in this place he is treating only of sublunar things composed of matter and form.

Question 3. The third is that the form is not produced but rather the composite,¹⁷⁷ and consequently, not an Idea but rather a singular thing. About this there is discussion partly in Book 1, Chapter 2, and partly in this Book, Chapter 8.¹⁷⁸

Question 4. The fourth is: a definition must consist of several parts or terms. This is treated in Chapter 10.¹⁷⁹

Question 5. But whether Aristotle effectively concludes from this that a singular thing cannot be defined is not easy to answer. For the sum of the argument, as is gathered from the interpretation of St. Thomas and others, is that either both terms of the definition are common or that both are singular or that one of them is singular. If the first is true, the definition will not properly (*adaequate*) be that of a singular thing, but of itself it will also fit other things. If the second is true, it will not be a definition, but there will be synonymous words for a single term of the definition and not of the thing defined. But this argument seems ineffective with regard to this second alternative. For an individual difference, even though it is convertible with a particular thing, is not a synonymous word, because it signifies that thing in another way and through another concept, just as a specific difference is not synonymous with a species, even though it may be convertible with it.

The argument, therefore, of Aristotle most of all seems to conclude against those who say that Ideas are subsisting things, and consequently singular things, and nevertheless that they are separate from all individual contraction. For in this way they cannot be defined by an individual difference; and consequently they cannot have a definition consisting of common terms from which there cannot be crafted a definition so proper to an Idea as it is an Idea that it cannot fit other things. And Aristotle's other arguments proceed in this way, which, though they do have their problems, I think it useless to spend time explaining. Again in what way that argument can have some force with respect to true individuals, even material things, has been mentioned above in Chapter 10.

Chapter Sixteen

How Can Substances Be Composed of Several Parts?

In this place Aristotle says few things about the issue proposed. For immediately he returns to attack the Ideas of Plato,¹⁸⁰ with respect to which attack there is nothing new here. However, with respect to the first issue, various questions can be raised here about a plurality of forms; but there are two principal questions. First, whether elements remain formally in a mixture? And second, whether in the heterogeneous parts of animals there are partial forms of diverse nature? We briefly address these questions in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.¹⁸¹

Chapter Seventeen

“What Something Is” Is the Principle and the Cause of Those Things Which Belong to It

In connection with the first part of this Chapter questions of logic can be treated. For example: is it necessary to presuppose of a thing that it is (*an sit*) and what it is (*quid sit*)—or can these be demonstrated? Again, can the question “on account of what?” (*propter quid*) be asked with respect to “the what itself” (*ipsum quid*)?¹⁸² But these questions and others like them are treated in Book 2 of the *Posterior Analytics*;¹⁸³ and they contain no problem. For the whole “whatness” (*quidditas*) of a thing cannot have an intrinsic cause, unless form or matter is designated as a cause of the whole, or one part is in some way designated a cause of another part. However, that the essence of a thing be of a certain kind, or that from certain principles, for example: a rational soul and a body, there arises the whatness of a man, cannot have any other intrinsic cause besides the nature of such form and such matter. And in this sense it is true that there is no cause of “that which something is” [i.e. the essence] but it itself is the cause of other properties which belong to the thing. But speaking of an extrinsic final or efficient cause, /p. XLII/ or even an exemplar cause, sometimes there can be an “on account of which” (*propter quid*) cause of that [essence], in which way one definition is sometimes demonstrated, even *a priori*, through another, as is discussed in the beginning of Book 2, Chapters 8 and following, of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁸⁴ And we have said something of this in *Disputation 1, Section 4*.¹⁸⁵

Question 2. With regard to the second part of this Chapter there is a usually discussed question: whether a whole is distinguished from its

parts when these are taken together? We treat this in the *last Section of Disputation 36*.¹⁸⁶ And the resolution there is in agreement with Aristotle here who plainly teaches that a whole which is in some way an essential unit is distinguished from its parts as adding something beyond those parts¹⁸⁷—but not from those parts as they are taken together with that addition. But Aristotle nowhere sufficiently explains what that addition is. However, we have said that it is the union of the parts.¹⁸⁸

Notes

- ¹ About this Book, Tricot observes the following. While Jaeger has seen it as marking a new beginning in the progression of Aristotle's metaphysical thought, inasmuch as it extends the investigation of being as being even to sensible things, Tricot himself see links with Book 3, inasmuch as this Book solves some of the difficulties raised there, and an evident link with Book 6. For after excluding being *per accidens* and being as true from the object of metaphysics, Aristotle goes on in Book 7 to consider what is the being which is such an object. His answer is that it is substance, to which all the other categories are related, which is the basis of our knowledge and which itself is identified in last analysis with the quiddity or the form which can be defined. The plan of Book 7 has been well laid out by Bonitz (*Metaphysica...*, pp. 10ff.). Generally it is: given that being according to the categories (which has been isolated in Book 6) is related definitively to substance inasmuch as none of the other categories can exist without substance, it is substance which is the object of metaphysical investigations. But one cannot assign the pre-eminence of substance in this way to the genus, to matter, to the universal, nor to the individual as such or to its parts—but only to quiddity, that is to say, form—not in a Platonic sense, but a non-separated form, engaged in sensible reality, which form is the object of definition. For this, cf. Tricot, *Aristote...*, pp. xxvi–xxvii.
- ² Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028b6.
- ³ That is, the essence.
- ⁴ Aristotle's "τὸ τί ἐστὶ".
- ⁵ Cf. *DM* 32, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 319–29, which asks: "Whether being is analogically divided into substance and accident?"
- ⁶ Rather, cf. *DM* 39, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 505–10, which asks: "Whether accident taken commonly is immediately divided into quantity, quality, and the other supreme kinds of accident?" In this, see especially: nn. 10–16, pp. 507–10.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, n. 12, p. 508.
- ⁸ Cf. *Metaphysica* III, c. 7, in *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de Philosophia Prima sive scientia divina I–IV*, édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale, par S. Van Riet; introduction doctrinale par G. Verbeke (Louvain: E. Peeters and Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 155. Also see, *Logica* I, in *Opera Philosophica* (Venetiis, 1508; Réimpression en fac-similé agrandi avec un tableau des abréviations, Louvain: Edition de la bibliothèque S.J., 1961), fols. 4ra–5rb.
- ⁹ Cf. *In libros Metaphys.* VII, c. 1, fol. 153BC.
- ¹⁰ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 1, l. 1, Cathala nos. 1255–6.
- ¹¹ "οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ' ἢ ποῖόν..." *Categories* c. 5.3b19.
- ¹² Aristotle's "ποῖόν." Note here Suárez' willingness to look most likely at Aristotle's Greek text beyond the *Metaphysics*.
- ¹³ Aristotle's ποῖόν τι.
- ¹⁴ Cf. Thomae de Vio Caietani, O.P., in *'De Ente et Essentia' D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria*, c. 12, cura et studio P. M.–H. Laurent (Taurini: Marietti, 1934), p. 245.

- ¹⁵ Rather, see: *DM* 37, 2, n. 8, vol. 26, pp. 494–5.
- ¹⁶ Cf. *DM* 38, vol. 26, pp. 498–504: “About the Relation of Accident to Substance.”
- ¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 33, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 338–47, which asks: “Whether substance is correctly divided into first and second?”
- ¹⁸ *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 3, l. 2, Cathala nos. 1270–75.
- ¹⁹ *Metaphysics* 7.1028b33–6.
- ²⁰ That is: “τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι” *ibid.*, l. 34, which Suárez, and the Scholastics generally, render with the Latin phrase “*quod quid erat esse*” (“what something was to be”). On a modern translation of Aristotle’s phrase, cf. Joseph Owens, C.S.S.R. (*The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 3rd edition [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978], esp. pp. 181–8), who himself finally translates it as “what-IS-Being” in order to stress the timeless being of the form of a thing. On the Scholastic “*quod quid erat esse*”, see Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., *On Being and Essence, by St. Thomas Aquinas*, c. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1948), p. 27, note 6; and *ibid.*, 2nd revised edition (1968), p. 31, note 6. For a deep and broad consideration of the biological slant of Aristotle’s expression, cf. Pierre Aubenque, *Le Problème de l’être chez Aristote*, deuxième édition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), pp. 460–72.
- ²¹ Cf. “τὸ καθόλου” *ibid.*
- ²² “τὸ γένος” *ibid.*, l. 35.
- ²³ Cf. “τὸ εἶδος” *ibid.*, ll. 5–6.
- ²⁴ “τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον” *ibid.*, 1029a1–2.
- ²⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035a1–4.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.13.1038b2–3.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.* 7.15.1039b20–27
- ²⁸ *Ibid.* 8.2.1043a27–28.
- ²⁹ Cf. *ibid.* 8.3.1043b28–32.
- ³⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a9–13.
- ³¹ Cf. 412a6–9.
- ³² Cf. *DM* 33, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 330–8, where the question is: “What does substance signify and how is it divided into incomplete and complete?”
- ³³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a5–6.
- ³⁴ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 3, l. 2, Cathala nos. 1278–9.
- ³⁵ Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros*, VII, t. 7, fol. 188ra.
- ³⁶ Cf. Antonio Andreas, O.M., *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, Lib. VII, Summae II. Caput I, in I. D. Scoti, *Opera omnia* (ed. 1639), Tomus IV, p. 224a.
- ³⁷ *In lib. Metaphys.* VII, t. 7, fol. 158ra.
- ³⁸ In this place: William of Moerbeke.
- ³⁹ Alexander of Aphrodisias reads: “καὶ τὸ” (cf. ed. Hayduck, p. 463, l. 32), as does also Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 213a), who translates the phrase in question as “*et id*” (“and that”). Bessarion (fol. 54va) has “*illud quoque*” (i.e. “that also”), while Argyropoulos (54vb) has “*id profecto quod*” (“that indeed which”).
- ⁴⁰ Cf. William of Moerbeke in: *S. Thomae Aquinatis, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. Cathala et Spiazzi (Taurini: Marietti, 1964), p. 320, *Textus Aristotelis*, n. 570; or in *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΑ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ, ARISTOTELIS METAPHYSICA, METAFÍSICA DE ARISTÓTELES*, Edición trilingüe, por Valentín García Yebra, segunda edición revisada (Madrid, Editorial Gredos, 1990), p. 327, n. 570. William’s translation squares with the modern generally accepted text of Aristotle, which is “καὶ τοῦ”; cf. 1029a6. In this arcane textual dispute, Suárez most probably is in main following Fonseca, who has written: “Quidam codices, etiam Graeci, aliter habent hoc loco: dicunt enim formam etiam esse priorem, et magis ens, quam compositum: id quod D. Thomas verum esse ait, quatenus compositum includit materiam, quae est posterior, et minus ens, quam forma. Sed nos cum Alexandro, et aliis interpretibus, aliam

lectionem secuti sumus. Accedit Budaei correctio, qui pro “τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν” substituit “τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν”. Priorem lectionem secuti sunt Averroes, et ex Latinis Albertus, Alensis et alii nonnulli, sed posteriorem esse germanam vel ex eo, quod inferius hoc ipso capite tradit Aristoteles, plane intelligitur, cum ait, id quod separabile est, et hoc aliquid, maxime videri esse substantiam: nemo enim dubitat, quin compositum cum forma, quae eius pars est, comparatum, magis separabile sit, hoc est per se constans, atque cohaerens, et hoc aliquid, sive demonstrabile, quam forma ex qua est compositum.” (“Certain codices, even some in Greek, have another reading in this place. For they say that the form is also prior to and is more being than the composite. St. Thomas says that this is true inasmuch as the composite includes matter, which is posterior to and less being than the form. But we, together with Alexander [of Aphrodisias] and other interpreters, have followed a different reading. Add the correction of Budé, who in place of “τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν” has substituted “τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν”. Averroes, and from the Latins, Albert, [Alexander of] Hales, and some others, have followed the first reading, but it is clearly understood that the second reading is true, especially from what Aristotle teaches below in this very chapter when he says, that what is separable and individual seems most of all to be a substance. For no one doubts that a composite compared to a form which is its part is more separable (this is self-evident and coherent or else demonstrable) and more an individual than the form from which it is composed.”) *Comment. in Metaphy.*, VII, c. 3, explanatio; tom. III, p. 214. The Budé to whom Fonseca refers is, rather surprisingly given Fonseca’s Jesuit convictions, the Protestant humanist, Guillaume Budé (1468–1540), who among many other works authored: *Commentarii linguae graecae. Indice latino et graeco, locupletiore et diligentiore aucto*, Basiliae: In Aedibus Jo. Bebelius, 1530. As may be seen from the text above, Suárez has a view different from that of Fonseca about who held what opinion.

⁴¹ See, *In Arist. Metaphys.*, VII, cc. 2–3, ed. Hayduck, p. 463, ll. 31–33.

⁴² Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a29–30.

⁴³ Cf. *DM* 15, 7, nn. 6–9, vol. 25, pp. 523–5, where Suárez (n. 9) makes an explicit choice of Argyropoulos over the “old version” (*antiqua versio*).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 8, p. 524.

⁴⁵ That is to say, they can be separated—as opposed to “necessarily”, which is that they must be separated.

⁴⁶ *DM* 13, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 409–14, which asks: “Whether prime matter has some actual ungenerable and incorruptible entity?”

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 5, pp. 414–20, where the question is: “Whether matter is pure potency, and in what sense is that to be taken?”

⁴⁸ See rather *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”

⁴⁹ Rather, see *DM* 40, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 533–8, which asks: “Whether the quantity of mass is something distinct from a material substance and its qualities?”

⁵⁰ Aristotle’s “τὸ τί ἔστιν.”

⁵¹ Cf. “λογικῶς”, *Metaphysics* 7.4.1029b13. On this, cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote: La Métaphysique*, nouvelle édition (Paris: Vrin, 1991), tome 2, pp. 357–8, n. 3.

⁵² Again, note the “order of teaching” which is here marked by its procession from what is more known to what is less known.

⁵³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.4.1029b13–14.

⁵⁴ See *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34–b24.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.4.1029b13–1030b13.

⁵⁶ Literally: “not entirely simple.”

⁵⁷ Literally: “this is to be defined.”

⁵⁸ That is, the form of a living body.

⁵⁹ The point here seems to be that the form which is a soul and its corresponding matter would be more perfect inasmuch as they are parts of a substance.

- ⁶⁰ Rather, see: *DM* 37, s. 2, nn. 15–18, vol. 26, pp. 497–8.
- ⁶¹ For this, see the discussion of being by accident in Book 6, above.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*
- ⁶³ Or “first word” in the English translations.
- ⁶⁴ This is the Greek and medieval understanding of “white”—that it is a property of things which acts with light through the medium of air to somehow spread or thin out the faculty of vision. On this, see Suárez, *Tractatus de Anima* III, c. 15, n. 5, in *Opera*, vol. 3, p. 666.
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, VII, c. 5, l. 4, Cathala nos. 1351–4.
- ⁶⁶ Compare Suárez’s question here with Fonseca: “*Num Quod quid est sit idem cum eo, cuius est?*” (“Whether that which something is the same as that of which it is?”), *Comment. in Metaphys.* VII, c. 6, q. 1, tom. 3, p. 237a. Note that Aristotle’s terms here are τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι, which Fonseca (*ibid.*, c. 6, p. 231b) renders: “*quiditas*” (“whatness”) and ἕκαστον, which he translates as “*unumquodque*” (“each thing”).
- ⁶⁷ Here I am reading “praeter” in place of the Vivès’ edition’s “propter.”
- ⁶⁸ Cf. *DM* 34, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 359–67, where Suárez asks: “Whether the distinction of a supposit from a nature comes about through accidents or individuating principles, and therefore is not present in spiritual substances?” “Supposit” here is the subject which is the bearer of the nature. For Suárez directly, and at some length, interpreting Aristotle on this issue, cf. *ibid.*, nn. 18–22, pp. 365–7.
- ⁶⁹ Again, see Book 6, above.
- ⁷⁰ Bonini, *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros*, VII, t. 20, fol. 200vb.
- ⁷¹ *In lib. Metaphys.*, VII, t. 21, fol. 171va.
- ⁷² That is, the distinction between a common nature and an individual bearer of that nature.
- ⁷³ Again, cf. *DM* 34, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 359–67, where Suárez is asking: “Whether the distinction of a supposit from a nature comes about through accidents or individuating principles, and therefore is not present in spiritual substances?”
- ⁷⁴ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 148–61, which asks: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *DM* 18, vol. 25, pp. 592–687: “About a Proximate Efficient Cause and its Causality, and about Everything which it requires in order to Cause.”
- ⁷⁶ Cf. “ὥστε καθάπερ λέγεται, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι εἰ μὴδὲν προϋπάρχου.” *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032b30–31.
- ⁷⁷ Aristotle’s text adds here “or by art” (ἢ τέχνῃ); 1032–20.
- ⁷⁸ Cf. “ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὕλην· δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτὸν, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκάστῳ ὕλη.” *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a20–22.
- ⁷⁹ Cf. *DM* 13, s. 8, vol. 25, pp. 424–8, where the question is: “Through what does matter cause?”
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 9, pp. 428–34, which asks: “What is the causality of matter?”
- ⁸¹ *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a30–31.
- ⁸² Cf. Averroes, *In libros Physicorum*, VIII, c. 5, n. 46, ed. Junctas, 1562, vol. 4, fol. 387rb–vb, who in fact seems to say the exact opposite of what Suárez reports here.
- ⁸³ Cf. *Sufficiencia* II, c.3, in *Opera philosophica* (Venice, 1508—reprint: Louvain: Edition de la bibliothèque S.J., 1961), fol. 25vb–26ra.
- ⁸⁴ Again, this seems the opposite of Avicenna’s opinion in the place cited.
- ⁸⁵ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 7, l. 6, Cathala nos. 1398–1403. Note that St. Thomas (n. 1399) has reported Averroes and Avicenna in exactly the opposite way from that of Suárez. Thus he writes: “The words stated here have two problems. First, since there is a definite way of generation for any natural thing, things which are generated from seed and [things which are generated] by putrefaction do not seem to be the same.

[This is] what Averroes seems to think in [his commentary on] the eighth [Book of] the *Physics*, saying that an animal which is generated from seed and one which is generated from putrefaction cannot be the same. Avicenna, however, on the contrary thinks that all things which are generated from seed can be generated in the same species without seed by putrefaction, or through some way of mixing earthy matter together....” (“*Haec autem verba hic posita, duplicem habent dubitationem. Prima, quia cum cuiuslibet rei naturalis sit determinatus modus generationis, non videntur esse eadem quae generantur ex spermate, et per putrefactionem. Quod Averroes in octavo Physicorum sentire videtur; dicens, quod non potest esse idem animal in specie quod generatur ex spermate, et quod generatur ex putrefactione. Avicenna autem e contrario sentit, quod omnia quae generantur ex semine, eadem specie possunt generari sine semine per putrefactionem, vel per aliquem modum commixtionis terrena materiae....*”)

⁸⁶ “ἔνια γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος γίνεταί καὶ ἄνευ σπέρματος.” *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032a30–2.

⁸⁷ Aristotle’s “ἔνια”.

⁸⁸ Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros*, VII, t. 23, fol. 208rb–va.

⁸⁹ See esp. *DM* 15, 1, nn. 16–18, vol. 25, pp. 503–4.

⁹⁰ Here, I am substituting “casualis” for the Vivès reading of “causalis.”

⁹¹ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 7, l. 6, Cathala no. 1411.

⁹² Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, *In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita testualia metaphysicali modo determinata: in quibus clarissime resolvuntur dubia Aristotelis et Commentatoris, eaque ut plurimum decisa habentur iuxta Thomisticum dogma...*, VII, q. 10 (Venetiis, 1576), fols. 165v–167r. For Jandun’s opinion here, cf. esp. 166rv.

⁹³ Cf. John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae*, VII, q. 13 (Venetiis, 1554), fols. 93vLH–94rB.

⁹⁴ A universal agent such as the sun.

⁹⁵ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 11, vol. 25, pp. 557–66, which asks: “What is a metaphysical form, and what matter corresponds to it and what causality does it have?”

⁹⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032b5–7.

⁹⁷ Rather, see *DM* 25, s. 2, vol. 1, pp. 910–16, where the question is: “Whether an exemplar has the proper nature of a cause or is it to be reduced to one of the other causes?” In answer, Suárez prefers to reduce an exemplar to an efficient cause; *ibid.*, nn. 8–13, pp. 913–15. For the same reduction, cf. *DM* 8, 7, n. 14, vol. 25, p. 300.

⁹⁸ Cf. “τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἢ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἢ δὲ ποίησις...” *Metaphysics* 7.7.1032b15–16.

⁹⁹ See *DM* 48, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 873–81, which asks: “Whether action as such essentially relates to a term, even if it is immanent action—and therefore this last is also located in this category?”

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *DM* 49, s. 4, vol. 26, pp. 909–12, which asks: “Whether both successive and momentaneous passion belong to this category [of passion] and how do they differ under it?”

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033a27–28.

¹⁰² Cf. *DM* 15, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 516–7, where the question is: “Whether a form is properly produced when it is deduced from matter?”

¹⁰³ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 505–12, which asks: “In what way can a substantial form be produced in matter and from matter?”

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *DM* 18, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 593–8, where the question is: “Whether created things truly effect anything?”

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 598–615, where the question is: “What is the principle by which one created substance effects another?”

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *DM* 17, 2, n. 21, vol. 25, pp. 591–2.

- ¹⁰⁷ That is, potencies from which immanent actions stem. For example, intellect and will.
- ¹⁰⁸ Cf. “ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τινῶν καὶ φανερόν ὅτι τὸ γεννῶν τοιοῦτον μὲν οἶον τὸ γεννώμενον...” *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b29–31.
- ¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae*, VII, q. 14 (Venetiis, 1583), pp. 145–6; *ibid.* q. 7, pp. 135–7.
- ¹¹⁰ Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, *In omnibus Metaphysicae libris...*, VII, q. 12, fols. 169v–170v.
- ¹¹¹ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 505–12, which asks: “In what way can a substantial form be produced in matter and from matter?”
- ¹¹² *Ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 512–16, where it is asked: “Whether in the eduction of a substantial form it is necessary that matter precede in time?”
- ¹¹³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a9–14.
- ¹¹⁴ Cf. *DM* 15, 2, n. 8, vol. 25, pp. 507–8.
- ¹¹⁵ Cf. esp. *DM* 18, 2, n. 32–34, vol. 25, pp. 610–11.
- ¹¹⁶ That is, the metaphysician.
- ¹¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, nn. 28–30, vol. 25, pp. 34–5.
- ¹¹⁸ Cf. 98a1–19.
- ¹¹⁹ Cf. “ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει...” *Metaphysics* 7.10.1034b21–22.
- ¹²⁰ The thought occurs that here we have a possible *point de départ* for a discussion of objective vs. formal precision. On this, cf. Book 2, my note 46, above.
- ¹²¹ Cf. *DM* 15, 10, nn. 5–6, vol. 25, p. 537.
- ¹²² Cf. *DM* 36, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 482–6, where Suárez’s question is: “Whether the essence of a material substance consists in substantial form alone or also in matter?” On Averroes and Avicenna with regard to matter as part of the essence of a material substance, cf. esp. nn. 2–3, pp. 482–3.
- ¹²³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b11–12.
- ¹²⁴ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 10, l. 10, Cathala no. 1491. On the doctrine of St. Thomas here, see Armand Maurer, C.S.B., “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 13 (1951), pp. 165–176, reprinted in Armand Maurer, *Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), pp. 3–18.
- ¹²⁵ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 10, l. 9, Cathala nos. 1467–69.
- ¹²⁶ This is what the Scholastics referred to as “a vague individual” (*individuum vagum*); cf. Suárez, *DM* 6, 8, nn. 13–14, vol. 25, pp. 235–6; and *DM* 29, 1, n. 35, vol. 26, p. 32.
- ¹²⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a5.
- ¹²⁸ *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b27–8.
- ¹²⁹ Cf. *ibid.* 7.4.1030a5–7.
- ¹³⁰ Cf. possibly: *Posterior Analytics* 1.9.75b37–76a17.
- ¹³¹ The Vivès edition gives references to Javellus, *Metaphys.*, Bk 7, q. 16 and Antonius Andreas, *Metaphys.*, Bk. 8, q. 7.
- ¹³² Cf. *DM* 5, 1, n. 37, vol. 25, p. 160.
- ¹³³ That is, theology.
- ¹³⁴ That is to say, colloquial.
- ¹³⁵ On this, cf. Suárez, *De Angelis*, II, c. 6, n. 3, in *Opera*, vol. 2, p. 125.
- ¹³⁶ Cf. Book 5, my note 98, above.
- ¹³⁷ Cf. *Topics* 2.2.27–29.
- ¹³⁸ Rather, see *DM* 34, s. 3, nn. 18–22, vol. 26, pp. 365–7, esp. n. 20, p. 366.
- ¹³⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.2.1043a27–28; *ibid.* 8.3.1043b28–32.
- ¹⁴⁰ Cf. *De Anima* 2.2.414a14–19.

- ¹⁴¹ Cf. “εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἀπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἶδη...” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a5.
- ¹⁴² Cf. “...animal, which is a genus, cannot be without species, for the forms of species which are differences, are not other forms than the form of the genus, but they are forms of the genus with determination.” (“...animal, quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia formae specierum quae sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma generis, sed sunt formae generis cum determinatione.” St. Thomas Aquinas, *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 12, l. 12, Cathala no. 1549).
- ¹⁴³ Cf. Book 2, note 33 above.
- ¹⁴⁴ *DM* 6, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 236–44, which asks: “How in actual reality are unity of genus and unity of difference distinguished, both between themselves and from specific unity?”
- ¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 10, pp. 244–7, where the issue is: “Whether the abstract metaphysical realities of genera, species, and differences, can be predicated among themselves?”
- ¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 11, pp. 247–50, where it is asked: “What is the principle of formal and universal unity in things?”
- ¹⁴⁷ Cf. “εἰ οὖν τὸ γένος ἀπλῶς μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ ὡς γένους εἶδη, ἢ εἰ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὅλη δ’ ἔστιν...” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a5–6.
- ¹⁴⁸ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* VII, c. 12, l. 12, Cathala nos. 1545–50. While St. Thomas in this place is not as explicit as Suárez might like, his thoughts are certainly in line with the way in which Suárez construes them.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a6.
- ¹⁵⁰ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 12, l. 12, Cathala no. 1547.
- ¹⁵¹ That is the composition is of genus and differentia.
- ¹⁵² “Superior” and “inferior” here are higher and lower on a Porphyrian tree.
- ¹⁵³ Cf. “δεῖ γε διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς διαφορᾶν.” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a9–10.
- ¹⁵⁴ For example, “sensible” can be further differentiated as “seeing” or “hearing.”
- ¹⁵⁵ Cf. “εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερόν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὀρισμός...” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a18–20.
- ¹⁵⁶ Cf. “ἐὰν μὲν δὴ διαφορᾶς διαφορὰ γίνηται, μία ἔσται ἡ τελευταία τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ ἔχον...” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a25–26.
- ¹⁵⁷ Cf. “ζῶον πόδας ἔχον, δύο πόδας ἔχον...” *Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a22–25.
- ¹⁵⁸ That is, “having two feet” includes “having feet.”
- ¹⁵⁹ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 12, l. 12, Cathala nos. 1556–64.
- ¹⁶⁰ Cf. Bonini: *In XII Aristotelis Metaphysicae libros* VII, t. 43, fol. 229rb–vb and 230rab.
- ¹⁶¹ That is, Pseudo–Scotus, or Antonio Andreas: *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, VII, Summae II, Cap. XII, in Scoti, *Opera omnia*, tom. IV., p. 276b.
- ¹⁶² That is to say: in a way that presupposes them.
- ¹⁶³ Cf. Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros* VII, t. 43, fol. 230ra. Note that Bonini explicitly speaks in this place of only three conditions. Yet a look at his text confirms, at least in part, Suárez’s thought that he has in fact introduced a fourth condition.
- ¹⁶⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VII, c. 12, l. 12, Cathala no. 1564.
- ¹⁶⁵ Cf. Pseudo–Scotus: *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, VII, Summae II, Cap. XII, in Scoti, *Opera omnia*, Tom. IV, p. 277a.
- ¹⁶⁶ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 10, vol. 25, pp. 536–57, which asks and answers affirmatively the question: “Whether of one substance there is only one formal cause?”
- ¹⁶⁷ Cf. *DM* 6, s. 7, vol. 25, pp. 228–31, which asks: “Whether universals are real corporeal beings, substantial or accidental, and what causes do they have?”
- ¹⁶⁸ Cf. *Categories* c. 5.2b7.
- ¹⁶⁹ Cf. *DM* 33, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 338–47, which asks: “Whether substance is correctly divided into first and second?”

- ¹⁷⁰ Cf. “τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὁ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν” *Metaphysics* 7.13.1038b11–12.
- ¹⁷¹ *DM* 6, vol. 25, pp. 201–50: “About Formal and Universal Unity.”
- ¹⁷² Cf. “τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχεῖα οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐντελεχεῖα, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ἦ, ἔσται ἐν... ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει.” *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a4–7.
- ¹⁷³ Rather, see *DM* 31, s. 11, vol. 26, pp. 272–83, in which Suárez asks: “To what things does existence belong and is it simple or composite?” Cf. esp. *ibid.*, nn. 17–18, p. 277.
- ¹⁷⁴ Cf. “...των καθ’ ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην...” *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b28–29. Note that Aristotle’s text literally translates: “of singular things there is neither a definition nor a demonstration, because they have matter.” While Suárez’s translation is close, it is not exact.
- ¹⁷⁵ See above.
- ¹⁷⁶ Cf. “...ἤς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ’ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ διὸ φθαρτὰ...” *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b29–30. Again, while Suárez’s Latin translation is not word for word, in context it is correct.
- ¹⁷⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b20–27.
- ¹⁷⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033a27–b29.
- ¹⁷⁹ See above.
- ¹⁸⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.16.1040b27ff.
- ¹⁸¹ Cf. esp. *DM* 15, 10, nn. 40–64, vol. 25, pp. 547–55.
- ¹⁸² That is to say, “can there be a question of [an intrinsic] cause with respect to the essence itself?”
- ¹⁸³ Chapter 1, 89b23–35.
- ¹⁸⁴ Cf. 93a1–b14.
- ¹⁸⁵ Cf. *DM* 1, 4, n. 32, vol. 25, p. 36.
- ¹⁸⁶ Cf. *DM* 36, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 486–91, where the question is: “Whether a material substance is something distinct from matter and form taken together at the same time and distinct from the union of the two?”
- ¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.17.25–26.
- ¹⁸⁸ On the realistic character of a union according to Suárez, see *DM* 54, s. 2, n. 10; vol. 26, p. 1020. On some meanings of “union”, cf. *DM* 15, s. 6, n. 10; vol. 25, p. 521.

THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

About Sensible Substance

And Its Principles

This Book may seem to belong to physical rather than metaphysical doctrine. However, even though the things which are discussed in it are commonly considered in physics, the manner and the character of discussing them is proper to metaphysics, as we explain at length in the introductory *Disputation 1*.² From there, the subject matter of this Book is discussed by us in *Disputations 12*,³ *13*,⁴ *14*,⁵ and *15*.⁶

Chapter One

That Sensible Substance Exists with Matter and What That Is

In this Chapter, we should especially note the proposition in Text 3: “Sensible substances indeed have matter.”⁷ But a little before, in Text 2,⁸ he listed among sensible or natural substances heaven or the parts of heaven, and he clearly is speaking in the mentioned Text 3 about substantial matter, which he immediately defines saying: “However, I call matter that which, because it is not something in act, is something in potency.”⁹ From these [texts], therefore, various questions arise.

Question 1. Whether there is a substantial matter in things which is a certain true substance?

Question 2. Whether it is a being in pure potency, and in what sense that should be taken?

Question 3. Whether it exists in all corporeal things, including the heavens?

Question 4. Whether it is one or diverse in all things? With respect to this [question] we should note the words of Aristotle at the end of this Chapter: “For it is not necessary if something has local matter,¹⁰ that this thing also be generable and corruptible.”¹¹ In this passage he evidently thinks that there are different kinds of matter in generable and ungenerable things. But all these questions together with others which can be asked about matter are treated extensively in *Disputation 12*.¹²

Question 5. Another question is: whether there is a substantial form which is separable from matter? For Aristotle, in Text 3, says: “it is separable in concept.”¹³ The resolution is that a material form can sometimes not be separated in any way from the matter in a thing, as for example in the case of incorruptible bodies. But sometimes it can be separated, in such way, that it does not remain as separated but rather is destroyed. But an immaterial form can be separated really in such a way that it is preserved as separated. About this subject Aristotle seems to have mentioned nothing here. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias¹⁴ indicates that Aristotle said what he did say because of the rational soul and that the sense [of what he said] is that form is a separable thing (*ratio*) because for a form as such, by reason of its being a form, it is not repugnant to be separated. But matter, from the very essence of matter is not separable. Another interpretation is that form is separable in concept, that is, knowable precisely as an entity which is distinct from matter, even though it cannot be fully understood or defined without a relation to matter. And therefore when Aristotle says that it is separable in concept, it should not be understood that it is by definition, in such way that it can be defined without matter, but by understanding and with precision¹⁵ as has been said.

Question 6. Sixth, it can be asked with regard to a composite substance, what it is, and how it is related to its parts—about which we will speak in *Disputation 36*.¹⁶ But what Aristotle says in Text 3: that a composite is simply separable,¹⁷ is not to be understood as though it is separable from its parts, in such way that it can exist without them. For this is clearly repugnant. But it is called separable because it can subsist by itself distinct and separate from any other substance. And in this way there can consequently be explained the argument which he adds in these words: “For of those substances, which [exist] according to the essence (*ratio*),” (supply “of the form”, that is, which are constituted by a form), “certain ones are separable,” that is, subsisting in themselves, such as first substances, “but certain ones are not,”¹⁸ namely, second substances. Others explain these last words in a different way, but they do not explain the context nor the force of that causal conjunction, “For.”¹⁹ /p. XLIII/

Question 7. Finally, a question is asked here: whether only the composite is directly (*per se*) generated? This question is treated in *Disputation 15, Section 4*.²⁰

Chapter Two About Substantial Form

There is only one question here: whether there is a substantial form—whose existence Aristotle proves here only from a relation to accidental acts. But about this subject and others which pertain to this form, much has been said in *Disputation 15*.²¹

Chapter Three About the Formal Principle by Comparison with the Positions Of Plato And Pythagoras

This Chapter contains two parts. In the first, Aristotle treats of the forms and species of things in relation to the Ideas [of Plato] which he is always attacking. In the second part, he compares forms with numbers.

Question 1. In order to develop the first part, he first asks: whether a composite term signifies a substance, or an act and a form?²² And although he does not state of what term he is speaking, nevertheless he is without doubt treating of absolute terms which signify the substances of things, for example “man” or “horse.”²³ For he asks this question in order to conclude from the signification of a term that what is signified by these terms is not certain things which are separate from matter. However, he does not seem to respond clearly and distinctly to the question.

From this, Alexander of Aphrodisias²⁴ says that Aristotle has not responded to this question, because its resolution was clear, namely, that these terms signify form. But, as will be made clear, he is mistaken.

Others think that Aristotle is responding to the question in these words: “But in any case there will be an animal in both, not as said with one concept, but as one.”²⁵ From which words, Alexander of Hales concludes that the answer is that the term signifies both, namely the composite and the form, not however in a univocal way, but one first and the other in relation to that one.²⁶ However, this also cannot be true, for the reason that neither the term which names the whole, properly speaking, signifies the form without the matter, as is immediately evident, nor is there a true analogy in these terms. And therefore Scotus says that Aristotle is responding to the question only in a Platonic way and not giving his own opinion.²⁷

St. Thomas,²⁸ however, says that in these words Aristotle is not answering the question, except perhaps in an indirect and implicit way. That is to

say that rather [than directly answering it] he is inferring that something unacceptable follows from the opinion of Plato who said that the separate Idea of man was the essential man and that individuals [were men] by participating in that. Thus from this it follows, if [the term] "man" signifies both, i.e., the form without the matter, which is the Idea, and the composite, it signifies them analogically, which is absurd. For who says that Peter is analogically a man? Therefore, in this way, Aristotle concludes that all these [terms] signify only that [composite] and not just a form. And this seems to be what Aristotle most obscurely adds, namely, that the answer of Plato, which is that these terms signify only forms, is perhaps useful for something else, for example, in the case of substances which abstract from matter, but that in the case of sensible things it is useless. For a sensible substance does not express only "what something was to be,"²⁹ "unless a man is called a soul"³⁰—which is absurd. Therefore, a term which signifies a sensible substance cannot signify a form separate from matter.

Question 2. But from this interpretation two more questions arise, namely, whether in the case of a sensible substance its quiddity is only its form, or also its matter? Or whether it consists of both? For Aristotle in the cited words seems to think that only the form is "what something is" (*quid quid est*) and that the composite is "that of which it is" (*id cuius est*).

Question 3. Therefore, another question arises: whether in separate forms the "what something is" is identical with "that of which it is," while in sensible things these two are distinguished? For Aristotle seems to teach both in the cited words. However, I think there is great equivocation in these words and questions between the way in which they are presently treated in the Schools and the way in which Aristotle stated them, as has been mentioned above and will become evident from this place.

Therefore "form" as taken now in common usage is taken either for the form of a part or the form of the whole which, for example, is humanity. But Aristotle almost never makes explicit mention of the form of the whole, even though it could be comprehended under the term "quiddity." Therefore, Aristotle, besides the form of a part, which is the proper act of the matter, frequently in the seventh and in this eighth Book [of the *Metaphysics*], understands by "forms" those Platonic forms, which (according to the sense in which Aristotle treats the opinion [of Plato]) must be posited as separate and distinct not only from matter, but also from the singular forms which actuate matter. But because Plato asserted that those forms are the quiddities of those singular ones, he seems /p. XLIV/ to have posited them as abstract and separate in themselves, but by a certain participation extrinsic to those individuals and exercising in them

the task of a form by actuating the matter and constituting the individual. And therefore Aristotle also has spoken in this way in this opinion, as if in a sensible substance there is no other form besides an Idea. And in this way he often passes from one to the other. Hence, it is also that by the term “quiddity” or “what something was to be” he often signifies not the whole essence of a thing but only the form, agreeing in this way of speaking with Plato—not in order to assent on the subject matter but rather in order to conclude that the “what something is” of material things cannot consist in the form alone. And in the present instance he is speaking approximately in this way.

Hence, in the first question his opinion is that in the case of sensible things these terms signify the substance composed of matter and form. But in order to explain this more fully, we can distinguish between the adequate significate of a term and the formal or quasi-formal [significate]. For example, in this term, “man,” the adequate significate is the whole man, but the formal significate is humanity. But more formally it could seem to be the rational soul. Therefore, these terms adequately signify composite substances, as is self evident, for the term signifies that which is explained by the definition, as is clear above in Book 4, Text 28.³¹ But definitions of these things do not include forms alone but the composite of matter and form, as is clear from what was said in Book 7, Text 18,³² and following texts.³³ Therefore, the terms signify that [composite]. And the same thing is clear from the way everyone conceives. For no one through the term, “man,” conceives only a soul, nor does anyone say that the soul is a man. Therefore, man adequately signifies the composite itself. Rather it formally signifies the composite of matter and form, namely, the whole nature of man, which is not only the physical form, although it may be said to be the metaphysical form, or [the form] of the whole, which is humanity. But in neither way does it properly signify the soul, but rather it only includes that in what it does signify, just as it also includes matter, although in a different way. For it includes the soul as a form which constitutes the quiddity of the thing, while it includes the matter as inchoative of that thing.

From all of this there is inferred the answer to the second question as well as the interpretation of Aristotle about that question in this place. For it is without qualification true, and it is part of Aristotle’s opinion, that not only the form, but also the matter is part of the quiddity of a sensible substance, as we have declared extensively in *Disputation 36, Section 1*.³⁴ Nevertheless, in a special way the form is called the “the what something is” of any thing at all, because it contributes the ultimate spe-

cies and constitution. And in this sense Aristotle says here that a sensible substance not only includes the “what something is,” that is, the form constituting the “what something is,” but also the matter, as [Alexander of] Hales rightly [says].³⁵

And (in order that we answer the third question) in the same sense he says that in the form itself there is not distinguished the “what something is” from “that of which it is,” because every form is such by itself and it does not have [another] form constituting its specific being. But in a material thing, that which formally constitutes the quiddity is distinguished from the thing having that form. For the thing which has it is the whole composite, while the form is a part of that. Hence Aristotle in this place has not compared the whole nature to the subject [which is the bearer of that nature] (*suppositum*), in which sense that question is now being asked, as we discuss at length in *Disputation 34*.³⁶ Also he has not here compared the specific nature to individuals, because there usually is given another meaning to this question, as we explain in *Disputation 5, Section 1*³⁷ and *Disputation 6, Sections 1*³⁸ and *2*.³⁹ Hence, in this place Aristotle has also not distinguished between matter taken universally and designated or individuated matter, because Plato (as he [Aristotle] has attributed it to him) not only separated the Ideas and the essences of sensible things from designated matter but also from matter simply as such. And finally Aristotle is not stating whether these terms signify the substantial composite only in general or also in particular, about which subject we have spoken also when treating of universals in *Disputation 6, Section 5*.⁴⁰

Question 4. Moreover, other questions can occur with respect to the same part, questions that Aristotle has touched on. For example, whether only individuals are generated, as Aristotle thinks here, or also species?

Question 5. Again, does the whole include something else besides matter and form, as the Philosopher plainly implies here?

Question 6. And finally: can simple things be defined or [is that possible] only for composite things, as Aristotle indicates here? And this must be understood about a composite thing either in actual fact or by reason of genus and difference. About this and other questions there has been enough mention previously.

Question 7. With regard to the second part of the Chapter, a usual question is: whether a number is an essential unit (*per se unum*)?

Question 8. Again, is ultimate unity the form of a number? These two questions are extensively treated in *Disputation 41*, which concerns discrete quantity.⁴¹

Question 9. Again, it can be debated: whether the essences of things are like numbers?⁴² For this axiom is usually taken up in this place, and in order to perceive its true meaning, /p. XLV/ it is necessary to see that the word, “like,”⁴³ does not signify an adequate, nor even a true likeness, but rather an analogy (*proportio*)—which consists in this that just as numbers [are composed] from unities, so the essences of material things (for he is treating about these here, even though the same argument is valid about all created things) are composed of many essential (*quidditativa*) predicates, although in a different way. For the unities are really many, while the predicates are many only in concept. Likewise, just as the unities in any number are finite, so also are the essential predicates, as was mentioned above in respect to Book 2. From which it also happens that just as the division of a number does not proceed to infinity, so also neither does the resolution of a species into essential predicates. Rather it finally stops at some simple and first predicates. Wherefore, just as a number is changed by an added unity so also a species is changed by an added difference. And especially in this regard the essence of each thing is said to be like a number and to consist in some way in [what is] indivisible, just as does a number.

Question 10. But from this there arises another question: how can some forms become more or less? And in that case, is it the species itself or only the individual form which is changed increased or diminished? And does this happen only in the case of accidents or is it also in substantial forms? But we treat this subject, which concerns the intension of forms, extensively in *Disputation 46*, which is about the category of Quality.⁴⁴

Chapter Four About the Material Principle of Substances

In this Chapter Aristotle teaches almost nothing new. Hence almost all questions about matter, and indeed about causes, could be treated here.

Question 1. Is the prime matter of all generable things one?

Question 2. Second, is proximate matter diverse? And how should that be understood about proximate matter? And how about remote matter? And what is this distinction?

These questions have been treated in the *first Sections of Disputation 13*.⁴⁵

Question 3. Again: are there four causes of natural things?—which is treated at length in *Disputation 12*.⁴⁶

Questions 4 and 5. Do the end and the efficient cause amount to the same thing? Again, is there matter in substances which are naturally incorruptible? And of what kind might it be? See in *Disputation 13, Sections 9 and following*.⁴⁷

Question 6. Finally, here one can ask about the material cause of accidents, which Aristotle has mentioned at the end of the Chapter, and we have addressed that subject in *Disputation 14*.⁴⁸

Chapter Five

How the Material Principle Functions for Mutations⁴⁹

Question 1. In this Chapter there is usually treated the sentence of the Philosopher: "Whatever things exist without being changed or not [changed], have no matter."⁵⁰ In connection with this, there is usually treated here a question about the matter of the heavens, because from this sentence it is usually said that, according to the thought of the Philosopher, the heavens, from the fact that they cannot be changed, do not have any matter. But first of all Aristotle's sentence does not intend this. For inasmuch as he has said, at the beginning of this Chapter, that certain things exist and do not exist without generation and corruption,⁵¹ he is not speaking in the cited words about incorruptible things. For those things are not among those which can be and not be, but they necessarily are. Therefore, here he is speaking about those things which can be and not be without generation and corruption, that is, [a generation or corruption] which is related to them directly and immediately, of which kind are forms themselves. Therefore, it is about these that he says in the cited proposition that they do not have matter but they are acts of matter. However, the composites which comprise matter are properly changeable by generation and corruption. Then, if that proposition taken without qualification were also taken about the heavens, it would have to be understood in line with what is above, namely, that in those things there is no matter subject to change, but [there is] a proportionate⁵² [matter], as was said earlier.

Question 2. Near the end of this Chapter Aristotle touches on this question: whether there is a return (*regressus*) from privation to habit?⁵³ This can be understood either about a return to the same numerical habit or to the same numerical form, and in this way it touches upon the question of the resurrection which is somewhat foreign to this context. But we have treated it extensively in Tome 2 of the Third Part,⁵⁴ and in the present

work we often touch it along the way, especially in *Disputation 5, Sections 3 and following*,⁵⁵ where we treat of the principle of individuation.

Or the question can be understood about a return to a form which is the same in species, and in this case there is no doubt that there can be a return, but not immediately in all things. For wine does not come about immediately from acid, nor does an animal come from a corpse, although from air there may come water and from water air. And the reason which Aristotle suggests,⁵⁶ and St. Thomas /p. XLVI/ states better,⁵⁷ is because there are some forms to which matter relates immediately with an equal order while there are others which require a certain order, in such way that one thing is generated from another as from a *terminus a quo*. For the form of acid or the form of a corpse can be naturally introduced only after the form of wine or of an animal, and at their disappearance. And in these cases the natural order of generation cannot be changed in such a way that wine might come from acid. In the same way semen comes from blood, but not vice versa. And therefore in these things it is necessary that the matter first return to an element or to other forms in order that it can again in the end be disposed to a form of the same species as that which it has lost.

Chapter Six

Why an Essential Unit Is Produced from a Genus and a Difference, or from Matter and Form

Question 1. Aristotle has taken this whole Chapter to answer this question, which he mentioned above in Book 7, Chapter 12,⁵⁸ where we have made some remarks as well as several remarks in the Disputations about matter and form, especially *Disputation 15, Section 1*.⁵⁹ And in his discussion Aristotle has not taught anything else which merits remarking. We should only observe that when Aristotle at the end of the Chapter seems to exclude every medium by which matter and form may produce an essential unit, he does not exclude the mode of union.⁶⁰ For that is impossible, as we have shown in the same *Disputation 15, Section 6*.⁶¹ But he is excluding another distinct entity, by way of which that unity exists—and in this way the issue is clear.

Question 2. We should also observe how Aristotle says here that simple things and those abstracting from matter have in themselves unity and are something one, which plainly confirms the explanation we have given above in Chapter 3.

Question 3. Also from the doctrine in this Chapter there can be confirmed what we have said in *Disputation 3, Section 6* [sic],⁶² about the way of determining being to the most universal genera.

Notes

- ¹ Book 8 clearly effects the transition from 7 to 9. In Book 7, substance is regarded under its static aspect, without reference to change; Book 9 concentrates on potency and act (which are at the heart of change). In Book 8, this is already adumbrated when after some problems are solved which relate to the nature of matter and form, Aristotle explains the unity of the elements of the definition and the unity of composite substances, by the action of an efficient cause which makes being pass from potency to act. For this, cf. Tricot, *Aristote...*, p. xxviii.
- ² For this, cf. *DM* 1, s. 2, vol. 1, pp. 12–22, where the question is: “Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?”
- ³ *DM* 12, vol. 25, pp. 372–95: “Generally, about the Causes of Being.”
- ⁴ *DM* 13, vol. 25, pp. 395–461: “About the Material Cause of a Substance.”
- ⁵ *DM* 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–497: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
- ⁶ *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
- ⁷ “αἰ δ’ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν.” *Metaphysics* 8.1.1042a25–6.
- ⁸ *Ibid.* 8.1.1043a10–11.
- ⁹ “ὕλην δὲ λέγω ἢ μὴ τὸδε τι οὐσα ἐνεργεῖα δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸδε τι...” *ibid.*, 1042a, 27–8.
- ¹⁰ That is potency for a change of place.
- ¹¹ “οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶ τι ὕλην ἔχει τοπικὴν, τοῦτο καὶ γεννητὴν καὶ φθαρτὴν ἔχειν.” *ibid.*, 1042b5–7.
- ¹² *DM* 12, vol. 25, pp. 372–95: “In General about the Causes of Being.”
- ¹³ Cf. “...τῷ λόγῳ χωριστὸν ἐστίν.” *ibid.*, 1042a29.
- ¹⁴ Cf. Pseudo-Alexander (Michal of Ephesus), *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, VIII, c. 1, ed. Hayduck, p. 546, ll. 1–10.
- ¹⁵ Suárez generally uses “precision” as equivalent to an “abstraction” which does not require a separation.
- ¹⁶ *DM* 36, vol. 26, pp. 477–491: “About Material Substance in General.”
- ¹⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.1.1042a30–31.
- ¹⁸ Cf. “τῶν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἰ μὲν αἰ δ’ οὐ. *Metaphysics* 8.1.1042a31. “Separable” is χωριστὸν in the clause immediately before.
- ¹⁹ Aristotle’s γὰρ, Moerbeke’s “nam”.
- ²⁰ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 516–17, where the issue is: “Whether a form is properly produced when it is educed from matter?” Especially, cf. n. 4, pp. 516–17, where the composite is said to be the direct term of production.
- ²¹ *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.”
- ²² Cf. “πότερον σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὴν σύνθετον οὐσίαν ἢ τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν μορφήν...” *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043a29–31. Note here that Aristotle’s text translates “whether the term signifies the composite substance or the act and the form”. Suárez’ mistranslation follows Fonseca, who has correctly edited the Greek but in his Latin has placed “composite” with “term” (*nomen*) rather than with “substance”; Fonseca, *Comment.*, VIII, Cap. 3, tom. 3, p. 463b.
- ²³ How these terms as such may be “composite” escapes me.
- ²⁴ Cf. Pseudo-Alexander, *In Arist. Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 3, ed. Hayduck, p. 551, ll. 19–20.
- ²⁵ “εἶη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ζῶον, οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ λόγῳ λεγόμενον ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς ἔν.” *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043a36–7. Here again Suárez has mistranslated Aristotle.

Thus, the last phrase, “ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς ἓν” should be rendered, “but as toward one” or “but as in relation to one.” This time, Fonseca translated correctly: “Fuerit autem et in utrisque animal, non tamen ut id, quod una ratione, sed ut id, quod ad unum dicitur.” (“But the animal would also be in both, not however as that which is said with one meaning, but as that which is said in relation to one.”); cf. Fonseca, *Comment.* VIII, Cap. 3, p. 463b.

²⁶ Cf. Bonini: *In XII Arist. Metaphys. libros* VIII, t. 7, fol. 249v.

²⁷ Cf. Pseudo–Scotus [i.e. Antonio Andreas], *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, VIII, c. 3, in Scoti, *Opera omnia* (ed. 1639), tom. 4, pp. 300b–301a.

²⁸ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 3, l. 3, Cathala no. 1707.

²⁹ That is the essence as such—here, the form precisely as such.

³⁰ Cf. “εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται...” *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b3–4. Note that all of our intermediate translators have translated Aristotle literally: “*nisi et anima homo dicatur*” (“unless the soul is also called a man”)—which differs from Suárez’s “*nisi homo anima dicatur*” (“unless a man is called a soul”).

³¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.7.1012a22–24.

³² Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b11–12.

³³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043a29–b4.

³⁴ Cf. *DM* 36, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 477–82, which asks: “What is the essential nature of material substance and whether it is entirely the same as the nature of corporeal substance?”

³⁵ Cf. Bonini: *In XII libros Metaphys.* VIII, t. 8, fol. 250r.

³⁶ Cf. *DM* 34, vol. 26, pp. 347–423: “About First Substance or Supposit and its Distinction from Nature.”

³⁷ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 145–8, where the question is: “Whether all things which exist or can exist are singular and individual?” But also, cf. *ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 148–61, which asks: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?”

³⁸ Cf. *DM* 6, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 201–6, which asks: “Whether there is in things some formal unity which is distinct from and less than numerical?” Suárez’s concern here is with Scotistic “minor unity” as it is said to belong to a common nature. For a contrast between this and the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, cf. J. Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” *Mediaeval Studies*, 19 (1957), pp. 1–14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 206–11, which asks: “Whether a universal unity, which is distinct from formal unity, actually exists in things prior to the operation of the mind?”

⁴⁰ Cf. *DM* 6, s. 5, vol. 25, pp. 222–3, which asks: “Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect? And how should we answer the objections which have been stated against that?” But also, cf. *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 211–16: “Whether a common nature has of itself some unity of precision outside individuals prior to the operation of the mind?”

⁴¹ Cf. *DM* 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: “About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination of the Category of Quantity.”

⁴² Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b33.

⁴³ Aristotle’s πῶς; Moerbeke’s “aliqua liter.”

⁴⁴ Cf. *DM* 46, vol. 26, pp. 753–781: “About the Intension of Qualities.”

⁴⁵ Cf. *DM* 13, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 395–9, which asks: “Whether by natural reason it is evident that among beings there is a material cause of substances, which we call “prime matter?”; *ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 399–402: “Whether the material cause of generable substances is one or many?”; *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 402–9: “Whether the first and only material cause of generable substances is some simple body or a complete substance?” In this last Section, Suárez rejects the famous Scotistic doctrine of the “form of corporeity” (*forma corporeitatis*).

- ⁴⁶ See *DM* 12, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 388–95, where the question is: How many kinds of cause are there?”
- ⁴⁷ Cf. *DM* 13, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 428–34, which asks: “What is the causality of matter?”; *ibid.*, s. 10, pp. 434–8: “Whether a substantial material cause is found in incorruptible bodies?”; *ibid.*, s. 11, pp. 438–52: “Whether the matter of incorruptible bodies is of the same kind as elemental [matter]?”; *ibid.*, s. 12, pp. 452–3: “Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect?”; and *ibid.*, s. 13, pp. 453–5: “Of what kind is the causality of the matter of incorruptible bodies?”
- ⁴⁸ Cf. *DM* 14, vol. 25, pp. 461–497: “About the Material Cause of Accidents.”
- ⁴⁹ Suárez’s word is “transmutationes” which could be translated by a correct, but rarely used, English cognate “transmutations.” I prefer simply to translate it as “changes.”
- ⁵⁰ Cf. “ὅσα δ’ ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἔστιν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων ὕλη.” *Metaphysics* 8.5.1044b28–29.
- ⁵¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.5.1044b21–22.
- ⁵² Or “analogous.”
- ⁵³ That is, whether a privation can be reduced to the corresponding habit. For this, see *Metaphysics* 8.5.1045a3–6.
- ⁵⁴ For Suárez’s treatment of the Resurrection, in commentary on the Third Part of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas, see *Commentarii et disputationes in Tertiam Partem D. Thomae*, Disputationes 44–50, in *Opera*, vol. 19, pp. 744–952.
- ⁵⁵ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 161–75, which asks: Whether designated matter is the principle of individuation in material substances?”; *ibid.*, s. 4, pp. 175–7, where the question is: “Whether substantial form is the principle of individuation for material substances?”; *ibid.*, s. 5, pp. 177–80, which asks: “Whether the principle of individuation is the existence of a singular thing?”; and *ibid.*, s. 6, pp. 180–88: “What, finally, is the principle of individuation in all created substances?” This last Section (cf. n. 1, p. 180) contains Suárez’s own opinion that “each entity is by itself the principle of its own individuation” (*...unumquamque entitatem per seipsam esse suae individuationis principium*). On the relation of this opinion to the later position of Leibniz, see J.–F. Courtine, *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), pp. 496–519.
- ⁵⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.5.1045a3–6.
- ⁵⁷ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, VIII, c. 5, l. 4, Cathala nos. 1750–54.
- ⁵⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 7.12.1037b10ff.
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 498–505, which asks: “Whether there are substantial forms in material things?”
- ⁶⁰ On the Suarezian doctrine of modes, cf. J. Alcorta, *La teoría de los modos en Suárez*, Madrid, 1949.
- ⁶¹ Cf. *DM* 15, 6, nn. 7–11, vol. 25, pp. 530–2.
- ⁶² Cf. rather: *DM* 2, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 98–102, where Suárez’s question is: “How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?”

THE NINTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

About the Division of Being into Act and Potency

The division of being into being in act and being in potency, or into potency and act,² is famous—from which division Aristotle answers various questions, such as whether what comes to be has existed previously? For he says it preexists in potency and not in act. And just before, at the end of the last Book, from the same division he defined a question about the unity of a composite substance. Therefore, for this reason, after the Philosopher has treated of substance in this Book, he explains the aforesaid division. However, for understanding the whole Book it should be noted that it is one thing to divide being into being in potency or in act, but it is another thing to divide being into being which is in potency and being which is in act. For the first is not a division into essentially diverse beings, but into different conditions of existing of the same being. And in this sense the Philosopher says little in this whole Book. But we employ this division in *Disputation 31, Section 3*.³ However, the second division is on the basis of different essential characteristics of beings, whether of things existing in act or in potency only. For both conditions are present in both members [of this second division]. And in this sense it is treated by the Philosopher in the course of this Book. But taken in this way the division most of all is present in the cases of substance and quality. And therefore in the first of these cases it is treated by us in the debate about matter and form in *Disputations 13⁴ and 15*.⁵ But in the second case [it is treated] when we treat of the species of quality in *Disputation 43*.⁶

Chapter One

About Various Meanings of the Word “Potency”

Question 1. In this Chapter, Aristotle almost repeats what he has said in Book 5, Chapter 12,⁷ hence the questions mentioned there are also present here. However, other questions can be added, for example: whether “potency” is said univocally about active and passive potency. For here

Aristotle seems to teach that it is said analogically and that it is said of passive potency through a relationship [which it has] to active potency.⁸

The answer is that if the word “potency” is taken in a transcendental way (*transcendentaliter*),⁹ it is said of these two analogically; but if it is taken as it is a species of quality,¹⁰ in this way it is said univocally—about which subject matter we have treated at length in the cited place. But observe here that Aristotle in this place is not treating of potency inasmuch as it is the second species of quality, but rather [he is treating of it] broadly inasmuch as it comprehends all principles of acting. Hence he often calls art and other habits “potencies.”¹¹

Question 2. Again it can be asked: whether active and passive potencies are always distinct potencies, as Aristotle here suggests,¹² or do they sometimes coincide in the same thing, as seems to happen in the case of the potencies of the soul? About this we speak in the previously mentioned *Disputation 44, Section 1*.¹³

Question 3. Joined with this is another question: whether one same thing can undergo activity [emanating] from itself? For Aristotle in this place denies that in these words: “For this reason, nothing, insofar as it is a natural fact, suffers something from itself.”¹⁴ /p. XLVII/ These words can first of all be interpreted as spoken properly and with rigor about passion, that is, physical and corruptive passion, in such way that they do not include perfective passions, that is, immanent passions. Second, I think these words, “insofar as it is a natural fact,”¹⁵ can be better explained. For they seem to include two things. One is that nothing which exists in its natural and perfect condition undergoes activity from itself. The second is that nothing undergoes activity from itself, “insofar as it is a natural fact”—that is, precisely according to what it has from nature. But it needs something else, for example, species, or something like that.¹⁶ But this is most extensively treated by us in *Disputation 18*.¹⁷

Chapter Two About Rational and Non-Rational Potencies

In this Chapter, Aristotle is speaking only about an active potency, which he has above said is “essentially and immediately” (*per se primo*) a potency. And this is quite clear from the course of the text and from the divisions which it gives, as well as from the clarification or the differentiation which it adds.

Therefore, it can first be asked: what is a vital potency? And what is a non vital potency? For this division is suggested by the Philosopher when he says¹⁸ that certain potencies belong to the soul while others belong to inanimate things. Therefore, briefly it should be said that vital potencies are said to be all those which follow upon the soul inasmuch as it is a soul, or follow upon some grade of life. And because we do not conceive or distinguish a grade of life except by relation to a proper operation by which a living thing acts upon itself in order that it actuate itself or that it be perfected, therefore a vital potency is one which is a proximate and intrinsic principle of a vital operation by which a living thing perfects and actuates itself.

And within this genus, there can further be distinguished two potencies. One is a proximate principle by which a living thing perfects itself, but not according to that same potency. The second is what according to that same potency is a proximate principle of actuating itself. And this is properly a potency for an immanent activity, which potency is vital in a more perfect way. And this again is divided into rational and non-rational, which division Aristotle has more explicitly stated here.¹⁹

Question 2. About this, we can further ask whether the mentioned division is appropriate, as well as what is a rational potency and how many such potencies exist? These questions also belong to the science of the soul;²⁰ and therefore we should say briefly that every potency which follows upon the intellectual grade as such is called a rational potency, while every inferior potency can be called non-rational.

From this, two sorts of rational potency can be distinguished, the first eliciting or commanding and the second executing in subordination to that first potency. And this last can in a word be called “rational by command” (*imperative rationalis*) according to the doctrine of the Philosopher in Book 1, Chapter 13 of his *Ethics*.²¹ In the first way that potency is called rational which is rational in itself and elicits an act in a rational way. This again can be subdivided. For one kind is formally or essentially the reason itself, that is the intellect; the second kind is rational by participation, or through concomitance and governance (*regimen*), for example, the will. And Aristotle is speaking of both in this place because both follow from the grade of being rational. Or rather the Philosopher seems to speak about them in the manner of one thing for the reason that from the two there is perfected a kind of single adequate principle of human actions insofar as one moves with respect to exercise and the other with respect to specification. That is called a “rational by command” potency which, although in itself it is not rational, by its nature can obey reason,

in which way Aristotle, in the cited place from Book 1 of the *Ethics*,²² calls the sensitive appetite of man rational by participation, even though it is precisely as such non-rational. And to this order can be reduced an executive potency *ad extra*²³ insofar as it is subject to the motion of the will and of the reason, [that is to say, an executive potency] such as a potency to local motion, about which the Philosopher treats in Book 3, Chapters 9 and following, of his *De Anima*.²⁴

But from that place, especially Texts 41²⁵ and 42,²⁶ there arises a special difficulty. For Aristotle there seems to reject as insufficient this division of potencies into rational and non-rational. A first answer can be that this division can be taken in two ways. First, [it can be taken] as adequate to the potencies of the soul, and in this sense it is not proven by Aristotle in the cited place. In a second way [it can be taken] as a proper and special division of the potencies of a man or of the rational soul. And it is given by Aristotle in this way both here and in Book 1, Chapter 13, of the *Ethics*.²⁷ But the reason for the difference is that the potencies of a man have in some way an order to reason insofar as they all are rooted in the same rational soul. Therefore, they can be appropriately divided in relation to reason, or to the participation or to the lack of an act [of reason?]. But the potencies of brute animals or of other natural things do not have an order to reason. And therefore they are properly called neither rational nor non-rational. But this answer cannot be correctly fitted to this passage of Aristotle, for evidently under non-rational potencies it includes all those which act naturally and without /p. XLVIII/ reason. Hence, he explicitly gives an example of the non-rational potency in heat.²⁸ Again, because through that quasi-privative difference, namely *non-rational*, there can be included the mode of acting of all natural and vital potencies which do not come up to the level of reason. There does not, therefore, seem to be any doubt that this can be an adequate division of potencies not only in a man, nor only in a soul, but simply in every agent. Therefore, as St. Thomas notes,²⁹ Aristotle, in Book 3 [Chapter 9] of the *De Anima*, is proceeding not by defining but only by debating. Or at least he disapproves of that division as insufficient, not in an absolute way, but because it was not enough to explain the number and the variety of potencies.

Question 3. The third principal question here is: whether Aristotle has correctly marked the distinction between these potencies from the fact that only rational potencies are principles of contraries:³⁰ About this subject much has been said in *Disputation 10* [sic],³¹ in which we extensively discuss causes, both free and necessitated. And we explain what free potencies are and how they are principles of contrary actions. Again in *Disputation*

26, Section 6,³² we treat [the question] whether the same cause can cause contrary effects. And in both places we explain this passage of Aristotle.

Chapter Three That Potency Is Separable from Act

Question 1. In this Chapter Aristotle rejects the opinion of certain people who said there is no potency except when it is actually being fulfilled,³³ which is so absurd that it is immediately and self-evidently false. Hence, Aristotle's arguments are most clear. And from this is derived this principle: "A potency precedes its act," which if it is understood about a precession according to the order of nature is universally true. For since a potency is a cause of its own act, it precedes that act by a natural order. For we are speaking about a potency compared to an act, inasmuch as that act properly flows from that potency. I note this in order to exclude the potencies of generation or spiration, which are present in the case of Divine Persons, about which the reasoning and consideration are different. But if it is understood about a precession of duration, in this way that principle must be understood about what is possible, or indefinitely, not about a necessity, or universally. For both an active potency and also a passive potency can precede their acts in time. However, this is not necessary, either in respect to any potency whatever, or with respect to all acts. For a potency to illuminate does not temporally precede every illumination, nor does a potency of matter [temporally precede] every form.

Question 2. From the same Chapter, at the end, there is taken that common axiom which contains the definition of the possible, that is, "That is possible which when it is stated to exist nothing impossible follows."³⁴ This is evident, if possibility and its reduction to actuality are taken with proportion. For some things are possible according to a successive and not simultaneous act, as it is possible that a continuum be divided to infinity, not in such way that the whole possible division be posited at once but that it be successively posited and that it never be ended. So also something is possible separately (*divisim*) but not together (*composita*), for example, that a white thing become black. If therefore the reduction to act is accomplished proportionately, that proposition is evident, the reason for which we will explain in the following Chapter.

Chapter Four

Not Everything That Is Unproduced Is Capable of Being Produced

In order to confirm the description of the possible which he gave at the end of the preceding Chapter, Aristotle in this place rejects the opinion of those who said that each thing is possible even if it will not exist³⁵—which is so obviously false that it needs no refutation or explanation.

Question 1. It must be noted only that from the text of Aristotle some people infer not only that not every thing which will never exist is possible, but also that everything which will never exist is impossible—or (what is the same) that every thing which is possible will at some time exist, because every thing which never exists is impossible. This seems to be the explanation of the Commentator [i.e. Averroes] in this place, Texts 8 and 9,³⁶ which explanation Jandun defends, in this place, Question 5,³⁷ and [which explanation] Javellus relates and rejects in Question 10.³⁸ However, not only does it run counter to the mind and to the words of Aristotle, both here and in other places, but it also is evidently false and also contradicting basic truths of the Catholic Faith.

The first is clear: because the Philosopher in this place, as St. Thomas³⁹ and others correctly explain, explicitly teaches that certain things are indeed possible which will never exist, even though not all things which will never exist can possibly exist or be produced. And in Book 2 of the *De Generatione [et corruptione]*, Chapter 11, Text 64, he [Aristotle] says: “He who right now is about to walk will easily not walk.”⁴⁰ For in this passage, he is not only saying that something is possible, but also that what is now intended, or as it were on the threshold of being done, is sometimes not done. And the argument is evident from the principle stated in the preceding Chapter, because a potency can be prior in time to its act; hence it can be that someone /p. XLIX/ never exercise an act, even though he may be able to do so. Further, in Divine effects this is not only evident, but it is also certain as a matter of Faith. For God is able to do many things which He will never do. For in this way Christ said, in *Matthew* Chapter 26 [v. 53] : “Can I not ask my Father, etc.?” Finally, this follows by necessary consequence from the contingency and the freedom of some effects and causes. About this subject we treat at length in *Disputation 19, Sections 2*⁴¹ *and following*.⁴² And it is not true that everything which never exists is impossible, but [only] that which never exists, of itself and from within, in such way that it lacks capacity for existing.⁴³

Question 2. Lastly, we must consider what Aristotle concludes to in Text 9,⁴⁴ namely: when in a case of attributive propositions (*de inesse*) one thing is necessarily inferred from another, a similar order obtains in a case of propositions in the mode of possibility (*de possibili*), so that if an antecedent is possible the consequent also is possible. For example, if it is rightly inferred: “He runs, therefore he is moved,” it is also rightly inferred: “He can run, therefore he can be moved.” For otherwise if it would be possible to run, but impossible to be moved, either there could be a running without motion, which would contradict the first inference, or given a thing in motion which is supposed to be possible, something impossible would follow, namely, that running which was said to be impossible. Therefore, that teaching is evident and what the logicians say amounts to almost the same thing—that in a good inference there cannot be a true antecedent and a false consequent, because just as from something possible there does not follow something impossible, so neither from what is true [does there follow] what is false. And the *a priori* reason for this is that the consequent is virtually contained in the antecedent; but it is impossible that what is possible virtually contain what is impossible, or that what is true contain something false, since it is the very nature of the true that it contain nothing false. Again there is another reason: because to be in act necessarily entails to be possible, since act presupposes potency and, therefore, if between acts there is a necessary consequence, *a fortiori* also [there is such] between potencies.

However, St. Thomas⁴⁵ correctly remarks that this is said about the possible in general, as it abstracts from the necessary or the contingent, because it can happen that in a good attributive inference (*de inesse*), the antecedent is only contingently possible but the consequent is necessary. For example: “If he laughs, he is risible, or he is a man.” And the reason is that the act itself also abstracts from being necessary or contingent, and that from a necessary property there follows a contingent act, which act necessarily includes or presupposes a potency, not however under the same condition of necessary or contingent.

Chapter Five About the Order between Potency and Act

Question 1. Here it can be first asked: in one and the same subject does act sometimes precedes potency?—which is what Aristotle seems to affirm here. But this question is easily answered, if what was remarked above is

noted: that Aristotle here is calling every principle of acting “potency,” even if it is an art or a habit. Therefore, in this sense it is clear that some potencies, that is, principles of acting, presuppose their acts, by which they are generated, for in this way⁴⁶ art and habit are acquired by custom. But a proper natural active or passive potency is always presupposed, either in time or at least in nature, for its act. And it cannot happen that in the same thing an act precede such a potency, as Aristotle plainly teaches here. The reason is that such a potency is the cause of its own act, and not the effect of that act, except perhaps in the genus of final cause—which cause does not precede in being, but perhaps in apprehension and intention. And in this way the matter is clear, which matter Aristotle again mentions in Chapter 8.⁴⁷

Question 2. Secondly, it can be asked here in what way potency is reduced to act, and what difference is there in this between rational and non-rational potencies? But this subject has been extensively treated in *Disputation 19*.⁴⁸ Here it may be noted only that from this place in Aristotle there is plainly inferred the definition of a free potency, which we have treated at length in the cited place,⁴⁹ that is, “that which given all things required for acting, can either act or not act.”⁵⁰ For this is what the Philosopher says here: “But since it can be, it can be something, sometimes, and in some way, and whatever else is necessarily present in the definition.”⁵¹ For these words are equivalent to that phrase in the aforesaid definition, “given all things required for acting.” For Aristotle says all these things, and St. Thomas⁵² very well explains that they must be assumed or presupposed, in order that something can, without qualification, be or be possible. But about potency taken in this way Aristotle adds that this is the difference between natural and free potencies, or (what is the same) non-rational and rational potencies, as he himself says, that: “in the case of the first it is necessary, that when, to the degree that they are potential, they come near something passive or something active, the latter indeed acts while the former undergoes action.”⁵³ But of the second, he says: “With respect to those it is not necessary.”⁵⁴ This is just as if /p. L/ he had said that a free potency is such that when it has been brought near to acting, with everything which is required, it need not necessarily act, but it can act or not act. And he adds a very good reason. For because a free potency is through itself and from itself able to do contrary things, if when it were brought near to causing something to exist, it would act of necessity, it would simultaneously do contrary things, which is impossible.⁵⁵

Question 3. Third, it can be asked what determines a rational or a free potency to act? For Aristotle investigates this at the end of this Chapter.

And he answers only that this potency is determined by choice, and intention or desire, which being given (add in an effective and absolute way) it necessarily does what it can do.⁵⁶ This is immediately clear enough. But there remained further to be asked: what determines this potency to choice itself? However, about this the Philosopher asked nothing, because he believed there was nothing more to be asked, since this potency by its own natural power, as by a first act (I am speaking about natural and moral choices, and speaking strictly), and by willing itself or choosing, as by a second act, of itself determines to will and to choose. For by willing it chooses and by choosing it wills; however, not by itself alone or without the concurrence and the help of a required superior cause, for this is always presupposed. This opinion Soncinas has mentioned in his *Metaphysics*, Book 9, Chapter 14,⁵⁷ and he does not disapprove of it but rather defends it and thinks that it is consistent with the doctrine of the Philosopher in this place. But afterwards he adds that for this determination, at least as regards specification, the judgment of the intellect concurs.⁵⁸ But in what sense this is true, and whether this self-determination is to be attributed to the free potency itself we have most extensively treated in the mentioned *Disputation 19*, both in relation to the judgment of the intellect in *Section 6*⁵⁹ and in relation to the Divine Concurrence in *Section 4*,⁶⁰ and in *Disputation 27*, [sic] *Sections 2, 3, and 4*.⁶¹

Chapter Six⁶² What Act Is

In this Chapter there is no question of any importance. It may be noted only that Aristotle explains not so much what is the act which corresponds to active and passive potency as what it is absolutely to be in act insofar as this is distinguished from being in potency. And being in act most broadly in this way is clear and it is a kind of transcendent thing. Therefore, Aristotle does not explain it by a definition but by examples and by a kind of induction, because it can hardly be explained by a definition except by using act itself for that explanation. For to be in act is not different from actually or *de facto* having that which was in potency. Therefore, if being in act is distinguished from being in potency, it is nothing else but to actually exist, about the nature of which we speak at length in *Disputation 31*.⁶³ But if “in act” is said about an active potency, it is the same as to be actually operating. If it is said about passive potency, it will be the same as to actually receive or to be informed. All of this is explained by us partly

in *Disputation 43*, where we treat of active and passive potency and their acts,⁶⁴ and partly in *Disputations 48 and 49*, where we treat of action and passion,⁶⁵ which are the more immediate acts of these potencies.

Chapter Seven

When a Thing Is Properly Said To Be in Potency

Also in this Chapter there is nothing worth noting. For the Philosopher is only teaching that a thing is then properly and absolutely said to be in potency when it is in proximate potency, in such way that by the causation of one agent it can be reduced to act. But when it is only in remote potency it is not said to be properly and absolutely in potency, as for example water is not in potency a man or a horse. Indeed, simply speaking, neither is sperm, says Aristotle,⁶⁶ because it needs many transformations in order that a man come to be from that. All of which pertains only to the way we speak, because the thing itself is fairly self-evident.

But then he states in what way matter is said of a thing, and he teaches that it is predicated denominatively, not abstractly or essentially. For wood is said to be bronzed, not bronze.⁶⁷ And a bow is said to be wooden, not wood. And the reason is clear inasmuch as a part is not predicated of the whole except denominatively. For it is not predicated in the manner of a whole, because that which is affected by such denomination is the whole itself. Therefore, no question is left here which is of any importance.

Chapter Eight

[When] Act Is Prior to Potency⁶⁸

Question 1. First, it can be asked whether act is prior to potency by definition, or by concept, and cognition, as Aristotle here teaches. About this we treat explicitly in *Disputation 43, the last Section*.⁶⁹

Question 2. Second, does an act temporally precede a natural potency, at least at the level of species, or in diverse subjects? This question also has been treated in the same place.

Question 3. Last, is a potency, which is acquired by practice, that is, a habit, later in time /p. LI/ than its act? And how is it generated by that act? This was also mentioned in Chapter 5 and we have spoken about it in *Disputation 44*, which concerns habits.⁷⁰

Chapter Nine

[When] Act Is Prior to Potency in Substance and Perfection

Question 1. The first question, which is directly intended in this Chapter, is whether act is more perfect than potency. This is treated in the *last Section of Disputation 43*.⁷¹

Question 2. Are things which are later in generation more perfect? Aristotle assumes this proposition in this place⁷² as a principle from which he concludes that act is more perfect than potency.⁷³ The true sense of this principle is that when something is prior in generation in such a way that it is ordered to what comes after as a way to a goal, or as what has been started to what has been finished, then what is later is more perfect. And Aristotle's examples about a man and a boy, and about semen and a man, explain this sense. So also does the reason which he adds, when he says: "For that (namely, what is later in generation) now has the form, but this [did] not."⁷⁴ That is to say, the former has been brought to a goal and a consummation in comparison to the latter. But when something is later in generation as following upon and emanating from another, as a quality (*passio*) or a property with respect to a form, then it is not necessary that it be more perfect, as is self-evident, unless perhaps a comparison is made in such a way that what is posterior includes that which is prior and adds to it. For in this way the soul as qualified by its powers is more perfect than in its bare substance. And thus the matter is clear.

Question 3. Here a question could be treated about the distinction of two ends—into that which is the operation only or that which is something done. But we have sufficiently touched on this division in *Disputation 23, Section 2*.⁷⁵

Question 4. Fourth, there is a question here about the difference which Aristotle mentions between immanent and transient action—that the former remains in the agent while the latter is received in the patient. We have treated this subject at length, in *Disputation 48, Section 2*,⁷⁶ in the course of explaining the category of action.

Question 5. Fifth, from this Chapter there is derived a certain common axiom: Every potency is simultaneously for contradiction,⁷⁷ or as is commonly declared, it is a potency for contradiction. To this it is difficult to assign a true and doctrinal (*doctrinalis*)⁷⁸ sense. For first of all, as St. Thomas notes,⁷⁹ it seems it cannot be understood about an active potency, because it was said above by the Philosopher himself that not every active

potency, but only one which is rational, is to opposites. Also about passive potency it cannot be universally true, especially in the doctrine of the same Philosopher, because the matter of heaven is a potency to form and, nevertheless, it is not a potency for contradiction, since it is not subject to privation and is not in potency for a contradicting form. Moreover, heaven itself has a potency for motion, and nevertheless, according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, it is not a potency for contradiction, because [the heavens] cannot rest. But if someone says that Aristotle is speaking about a potency which is conjoined with, or subject to, privation, in this sense the proposition will be plainly awkward and as it were tautologous, and in no way useful for doctrine. For in that case it would be as if it were said that a potency to possession and to privation is a potency for contradiction.

But it must be said that Aristotle plainly is speaking about a potency which at once includes being in potency, which does not mean only a potency which is receptive with respect to a positive entity and its being able to be received (*capacitas*), but also includes a state in which it is said to be in potency and actually to lack. Indeed, that this is the mind of Aristotle is clear. For in this sense he says: “nothing is eternal in potency,”⁸⁰ which would otherwise not be true (according to his opinion) about the matter or the quantity of heaven, or about the intellect or the will of an angel. Again he says that in heaven there is no potency to being moved absolutely, which would also plainly be false, if he would be talking only about a receptive potency, with respect to its positive nature. Therefore, he is speaking about potency as it includes being in potency. And in this way it can be understood not only about passive potency, but also about active. This he himself seems to state below, when he says that rational potencies of themselves are potencies for contradiction, that is, which can act or not act; but non-rational potencies, “only because they are present and absent,”⁸¹ that is, only because they can be applied or not applied. For in this way they can sometimes act and sometimes not act. We explain this passage in *Disputation 26, Section 4, [sic] Number 14*.⁸²

But that in this sense the explanation is excessively clear is not an obstacle, both because in rigor it is not identical and also because in that sense it is useful for the intention or the argument of Aristotle, by which he wished to conclude that a thing is more perfect in act than in potency. For because of this eternal things are in act and not in potency.⁸³ It can also be said in explaining this more fully that a potency which is not /p. LII/ just to receiving a form, but also to its own action or passion, is a potency for contradiction, either simply with respect to a whole mutation

or a [whole] form, as in a potency for generation, or [it is a potency for contradiction] at least according to diverse parts, as in the potency for local motion of heaven, according to the opinion of the Philosopher—and in this way the proposition allows no exception. And the reason is because, according to Aristotle, no receptive potency, which by a proper action can receive its own act, has that act as connatural (*congenitum*) and immutable from eternity. For a potency of this kind is not actuated by a proper act, but is rather created joined with its act, and by its nature it is determined so that it is always under that act. That Aristotle indeed thought in this way is true in the case of incorruptible things, so that for this reason he believed them to be eternal. And in this sense he denies that there is any potency in these things, that is, that they can be in potency and, simply speaking, lack act.

But according to true doctrine, it must be said that all created things, of themselves and absolutely considered, are potential or only in potency, not passive but the active potency of the Creator, with a lack of self-contradiction (*non repugnantia*) on their part. But incorruptible things have this special character: that after they have been created, of themselves they do not have an intrinsic potency to non-being. And in this way it is true that they do not have a potency of contradiction with regard to that being in which they are incorruptible. However, from this it does not follow that they are eternal “from the part before” (*a parte ante*), because, in order that they be as such (*absolute*), they depend upon the free will of God.

Question 6. Finally, here we could debate whether according to Aristotle there are a number of beings which are necessary through themselves and are pure acts without any potency? For he seems to indicate that in this place when he says: “those things which are necessary”⁸⁴ are not in potency, because they are the first beings. “For if they did not exist, there would indeed be nothing.”⁸⁵ But we discuss this subject at length in *Disputation 30, Section 2*,⁸⁶ and *Disputation 35, Section 1*.⁸⁷ Still, with respect to this place, St. Thomas⁸⁸ and others expound it as being about necessary judgments based on only an essential or intrinsic connection of a predicate with a subject, which [judgments] are found also in the case of corruptible things. And insofar as they are necessary they are not in potency but rather always in act as regards truth or that essential connection. But if someone wants to understand Aristotle [to be speaking] about substances and things which necessarily exist, about which he certainly appears to be speaking, he may say that either Aristotle has spoken in the plural, not defining whether such beings are plural or only one, as if to say that whatever they are they are in act and not in potency. Or indeed

just as he said there were many eternal beings, so also he said there were many necessary beings; however, not equally so, but that one was necessary through itself and the rest necessary by the influence of another, or by a necessary emanation from another.

Chapter Ten

That in Good Things Act Is Better than Form but Not So in Bad Things

Aristotle here seems to limit a conclusion of the preceding Chapter, namely, that act is more perfect than potency, and he says that it should be understood to be so when the act is good for the potency but not if it is bad.

Question 1. There was much difficulty about this assertion: whether it should be understood only about a good or a bad act in moral matters or also in physical (naturalibus) matters. And if the latter is the case: should it be understood in relation to passive potency or only in relation to active potency? But all of this is treated in the *last Section of the cited Disputation 43*.⁸⁹

Question 2. Also, incidentally here Aristotle mentions the question about evil:⁹⁰ whether it is some proper nature—or what it is in things? About this we have formulated a special *Disputation, that is, the Eleventh*.⁹¹

Question 3. Again, He raises the question: whether there can be evil in incorruptible things?⁹² For Aristotle here absolutely denies this, because every evil is a kind of corruption and corruption is a kind of evil. And St. Thomas very well explains this in a word: it is true about incorruptible things formally insofar as they are incorruptible. For as such they cannot undergo privation. But to be evil does not occur except with some privation. Nevertheless, those things which are incorruptible in their substance, can be changeable in their accidents, their motions, or acts, and as such some manner of physical corruption can occur to some extent in them.⁹³ Likewise, things which are in their nature indefectible, can fail in moral matters, and as such moral evil can occur in the case of incorruptible things. This matter is very much debated by theologians, but we have touched on it in *Disputation 35, Section 5*.⁹⁴ /p. LIII/

Chapter Eleven

That in Cognition Act Is Prior to Potency

The Philosopher explains this conclusion here with the example of geometry, in which, by reducing to act, by way of division, that which is contained potentially in continuous lines, one comes to knowing truths of geometry. And with respect to the text there is indeed nothing deserving notice. But that conclusion is explained in the cited *Disputation 43, the last Section*.⁹⁵

Chapter Twelve

About Truth and Falsity: How They Exist In the Knowledge of Simple Things

Question 1. To connect this chapter with what has gone before, St. Thomas⁹⁶ says that in it Aristotle is showing that truth is found in act rather than in potency: about which we read almost nothing in the text. Therefore, it is probable that Aristotle is digressing here and returning to say something about being as true. For, in this whole work, he principally uses three distinctions regarding being: namely, of being *per se* (omitting being *per accidens*) divided into ten categories, of being in act or being in potency, and of being as true and non-being as false. Therefore, since he has spoken of the first two [distinctions] in these three books, 7, 8, and 9, although he has excluded being as true, along with being *per accidens*, from the consideration of this science, nevertheless, in this Chapter he briefly returns to that, particularly to explain how truth is found in the knowledge of simple things; for this was completely set aside in Book 6. And first of all, he repeats what he said in Book 6, namely, that truth and falsity are found in the judgment (*compositio*). About this opinion, many doubts can be raised, doubts which have been treated in *Disputation 8, Sections 1 to 6*.⁹⁷

Question 2. But further it is asked: is the truth of a judgment (*compositio*) taken from a composition of things, as Aristotle indicates? But the answer is clear: for the sense is not that to the mind's composition, in order that it be true, there must correspond a composition in reality, but rather a union or conjunction of extremes, which is signified by the mind's composition. For although our mind enunciates being or not being only by really composing its own simple concepts, it does not however attribute to the thing conceived that mode of composition; but it understands a

thing which is in itself simple by way of what is composite. Therefore, the truth of the mind's composition is based upon the union or the identity, which the extremes of the composition have in reality, whether that be an absolute and simple identity, or a union with some composition—unless perhaps in the very composition of the mind there is expressed a mode of identity or union, for instance, if you say: “The goodness of God is his wisdom,” or something of that sort. For then it is necessary that such a mode of identity correspond in reality between the extremes as is signified through the copula.

Question 3. Could the same proposition be true and false? Not indeed at the same time—for it is certain that in this way absolute truth, when it is present, excludes all falsity; which was treated in *Disputation 9, Section 1*⁹⁸—but successively. Aristotle, indeed, here affirms that, but there is some difficulty. However, we have defended the view of Aristotle in *Disputation 8, Section 2*.⁹⁹

Question 4. Whether there is some truth in the understanding of simple things has been discussed in *Disputation 8, Section 2*,¹⁰⁰ and above at the end of Book 6, some things have been noted for the explanation of this chapter.

Question 5. Whether in the understanding of simple things there may be some proper falsity, and how it happens by accident: *Disputation 9, Section 1*.¹⁰¹

Question 6. Whether the human intellect can know the quiddities of immaterial substances? For Aristotle says we have ignorance of them, not as a negation, but as a privation, indicating that the human intellect has the power to achieve that knowledge. In line with this, St. Thomas notes here¹⁰² that Aristotle in this passage has decided for the affirmative side of this question, which he had left undecided in *De Anima*, Book 3, Text 36.¹⁰³ But if one considers it correctly, Aristotle in Book 3 of the *De Anima* is speaking about “the conjoined intellect.”¹⁰⁴ But in order that the opinion in this passage be true, that the ignorance which we now have of the essence of immaterial substances is in the manner of a privation, it is enough that in our intellect as such (*secundum se*) there be a natural capacity for that knowledge, even though, because of the impediment of the senses, [those substances] cannot be fully understood in this life. Therefore, from this present opinion we do not have a complete resolution of the question which was proposed in *De Anima*, Book 3. Hence, St. Thomas affirms in that place¹⁰⁵ that the question has nowhere been decided by Aristotle. But about this we speak at length in *Disputation 35, Section 1*.¹⁰⁶

Question 7. Incidentally, also here it can be asked: whether from Aristotle's opinion all immaterial substances are necessarily beings in act, and whether he would rightly conclude that if they are in potency, they are generable and corruptible? For in this [place] /p. LIV/ Aristotle seems to say that he does not know any other way of production and [seems] to indicate that all incorruptible beings are necessarily beings in act. But about this subject we debate at length in *Disputation 20, Section 1*,¹⁰⁷ *Disputation 30, Section 2 [sic]*,¹⁰⁸ and *Disputation 35, Section 3*.¹⁰⁹

Notes

- ¹ Tightly bound to the preceding two books, Book 9 is devoted to the study of potency and act, their different species, and their mutual relations. In this book, Aristotle finishes his inquiries about the various ways in which to take being, of which he has spoken in Chapter 1, of Book 6. For this, cf. Tricot, *Aristote...*, p. xxviii.
- ² Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a35–b9; *ibid.* 6.2.1028b1–2.
- ³ Cf. *DM* 31, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 233–5, where Suárez asks: “How and in what do being in potency and being in act differ in creatures, or essence in potency and in act?”
- ⁴ See especially, *DM* 13, s. 4, vol. 25, pp. 409–14, where the question is: “Whether prime matter has some actual ungenerable and incorruptible entity?” and *ibid.*, s. 5, pp. 414–21, which asks: “Whether matter is pure potency, and in what sense is that to be taken?”
- ⁵ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 532–6, which asks: “Whether the dependence of matter on form is so great that one cannot be conserved without the other, even by Divine power?”
- ⁶ Cf. *DM* 42, vol. 26, pp. 605–33: “Generally about quality and its species.”
- ⁷ Cf. 1019a15–1020a6.
- ⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.1.1046a9–13. On this, see St. Thomas, *In lib. Metaphys.* IX, c. 1, l. 1, Cathala no. 1777: “*Haec autem potentia reducitur ad primam potentiam activam, quia passio ab agente causatur.*” (“But this potency is reduced to a first active potency, because passion is caused by an agent.”)
- ⁹ That is to say, in a way which is common to all the categories.
- ¹⁰ That is, as restricted to one category.
- ¹¹ Cf. e.g. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b22; *ibid.* 7.8.1033b8
- ¹² *Metaphysics* 9.1.1046a21–22.
- ¹³ Cf. *DM* 44, 1, n. 10, vol. 26, p. 666.
- ¹⁴ Cf. “*διὸ ἢ συμπέφυκεν, οὐδὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ...*” *Metaphysics* 9.1.1046a27–28.
- ¹⁵ Cf. Aristotle: “*ἢ συμπέφυκεν*” (“insofar as it is united by nature”). Hence, Moerbeke's translation “*inquantum simul natum est*” (“insofar as it has naturally come to be altogether”).
- ¹⁶ My conjecture is that Suárez is here thinking of how, say, an individual might be moved by the innate tendencies of its specific nature.
- ¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 18, s. 7, vol. 25, pp. 631–50, which asks: “Whether in order that it be able to act, an efficient cause must be really distinct from the recipient [of its action]?”
- ¹⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046a36–37.
- ¹⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b1–2.
- ²⁰ That is, “*De Anima*”—or “psychology.”
- ²¹ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13.1103a2–3.
- ²² Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13.1102b13–14.

- ²³ That is, a potency to something outside itself.
- ²⁴ Cf. *De Anima* 3, cc. 9–11, 432a16–34a21.
- ²⁵ Cf. *De Anima*, 3.9 432a24–b7.
- ²⁶ Cf. *ibid.* 10.433a32–b30.
- ²⁷ Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13.110213–15.
- ²⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.1.1046b6.
- ²⁹ For this, see S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium*, III, c. 9, l. 14, editio tertia, cura ac studio P.F. Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), pp. 189–98, nn. 796–846.
- ³⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b4–7.
- ³¹ Rather, cf. *DM* 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: “About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [we treat] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance.”
- ³² Cf. *DM* 26, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 944–9, where Suárez asks the question: “Whether the same thing can be the cause of several effects, especially of contrary effects?”
- ³³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.3.1046b29–33. Aristotle attributes this view to the Megarics. It seems to be first associated with Euclides of Megara (ca. 450–380 B.C.) and then, more famously, with Diodoros Cronos (d. 307 B.C.). On this, cf. Hans Seidl, *Aristoteles' Metaphysik*, IX, *Kommentar* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978), vol. 2, pp. 464–5.
- ³⁴ Cf. “ἔστι δὲ δυνατόν τοῦτο, ὡ ἐάν ὑπάρξῃ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐ λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον.” *Metaphysics* 9.3.1047a24–26. Note that while the sense is the same, the text here is not exactly congruent with the axiom derived from it.
- ³⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.4.1047b3–6.
- ³⁶ *In lib. Metaphys.* IX, c. 5, text. 8–9, vol. 8, fols. 232v–233v.
- ³⁷ Cf. John of Jandun, *Quaestiones in duodecim libros Metaphysicae*, IX, q. 5 (Venetiis, 1554), fols. 114vK–115vO.
- ³⁸ Cf. Chrysostomi Iavelli Canapicii, *In omnibus Metaphysicae libris quaesita testualia metaphysicali modo determinata: in quibus clarissime resolvuntur dubia Aristotelis et Commentatoris, eaque ut plurimum decisa habentur iuxta Thomisticum dogma ...*, IX, q. 10 (Venetiis, 1576), fols. 259r–261r. Javellus' opening remark (259r) is of interest: “In this question, in which I intend to speak only in a metaphysical way, and not as a theologian, I find two opinions, of which the first takes the negative side and the second the affirmative. The first is that of the Commentator [i.e. Averroes], which [opinion] Jandun, [in his fifth] question on Book 9 of the *Metaphysics*, tries to defend. The second [opinion] is that of Blessed Thomas.” (“*In hac quaestione, in qua intendo loqui mere metaphysic. et non ut theologus, invenio duas opiniones, quarum una tenet partem negativam, alia affirmativam. Prima est Comment. quam conatur defensare Iand. in lib. 9. metaphys. q. [quinta] secunda est B. Th.*” Again, from Javellus' text in this question, I think he is the source for Suárez's understanding of Jandun.
- ³⁹ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, l. 3; Cathala nos. 1808–1809.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. “μέλλων γὰρ ἂν βαδίσειεν τις οὐκ ἂν βαδίσειεν.” *De Generatione et corruptione* 2.11.337b7.
- ⁴¹ Cf. *DM* 19, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 693–700, where the question is: “Whether among efficient causes there are some which operate without necessity and with freedom?”
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 700–706, which asks: “Among efficient causes, if the first cause acts with necessity, can there be any one that acts freely? And, in general, does the freedom of an action require freedom in all the causes which influence it, or is freedom in one of them enough?”
- ⁴³ Such would be a thing which would entail its own self-contradiction.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.4.1047b14–30.
- ⁴⁵ See *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 4, l. 3, Cathala no. 1812.

- ⁴⁶ That is by repeated acts.
- ⁴⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b5.
- ⁴⁸ *DM* 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: “About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [we treat] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance.”
- ⁴⁹ That is, *Disputation* 19.
- ⁵⁰ Cf. e.g. *DM* 19, 2, n. 11, vol. 25, p. 696.
- ⁵¹ Cf. “ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τὶ δυνατόν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, . . .” *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b35–1048a2.
- ⁵² Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* IX, c. 5, l. 4, Cathala no. 1816.
- ⁵³ Cf. “τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, . . .” *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a5–7.
- ⁵⁴ “ἐκεῖνας δ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.” *ibid.*, 7–8.
- ⁵⁵ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a8–9.
- ⁵⁶ With this, cf. *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a10–15.
- ⁵⁷ See Pauli Soncinatis, O.P., *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae*, IX, q. 14 (Venetiis: Apud haeredem Hieronymi Scoti, 1583; Reprint: Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967), p. 245.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 245b.
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *DM* 19, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 719–24, where Suárez asks the question: “In what way is a free cause determined by a rational judgment?”
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 4, pp. 706–11, which asks: “In what way is there freedom or contingency in the action of a second cause, notwithstanding the concurrence of the first cause? And, consequently, in what sense is it true that a cause is free which, positing all that is required for acting, can act or not act?”
- ⁶¹ Rather, see: *DM* 22, s. 2, vol 25, pp. 809–26, which asks: Whether the concurrence of the First Cause with a second cause is something in the manner of a principle or of an action?; *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 826–9, where the question is: “In what way is God’s concurrence related to the action of a second cause and to the subject of that action?”; and s. 4, pp. 829–38: “In what way does God concur with second causes?”
- ⁶² In this Chapter Suárez gives no indication that he knows of a discrepancy between the text of Fonseca and those of others, including William of Moerbeke and Cardinal Bessarion with regard to lines 1048b18–35. On this cf. Fonseca, *In Metaphy. Arist.*, tomos III, p. 647, and W.D. Ross, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, 2nd edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), vol. 2, 253–4.
- ⁶³ Cf. *DM* 31, vol. 26, pp. 224–312: “About the Essence and Existence of Finite Being as such, and their Distinction.” Esp.: *ibid.*, s. 7, pp. 250–53, which asks: “What is the existence of a creature?”
- ⁶⁴ Cf. *DM* 43, vol. 26, pp. 633–63: “About Potency and Act.” See especially: *ibid.*, ss. 1–3, pp. 633–45, where the questions discussed are: (1) “Whether potency is sufficiently divided into active and passive, and what each of them is?”; (2) “Do active and passive potency differ always in reality or sometimes only in concept?”; and (3) “What is divided in that division and how is it defined?”
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *DM* 48, vol. 26, pp. 867–97: “About Action”; and *DM* 49, pp. 897–912: “About Passion.”
- ⁶⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.7.1049a2.
- ⁶⁷ Here I am reading (with Rábade et al.) “aeneum” and “aes” rather than the “aereum” (airy) and “aer” (air) of the Vivès edition.
- ⁶⁸ Here I am supplying “When” from the preceding Chapter heading, to carry on the sense of the accusative and infinitive construction from that heading to this.
- ⁶⁹ See *DM* 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, which asks: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?”

- ⁷⁰ On the topic here, cf. esp. *DM* 44, s. 7, vol. 26, pp. 679–81, which asks: “What acts does a habit cause?” and *ibid.*, s. 8, pp. 681–6, whose question is: “Whether an act is an essential efficient cause of a habit?”
- ⁷¹ Cf. *DM* 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, where the question is: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?”
- ⁷² Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a2–3. Note that in the text Suárez was following this is now Chapter 9, whereas in the modern text of Aristotle it is Chapter 8.
- ⁷³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.9.1051a4–15.
- ⁷⁴ Cf. “τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ’ οὐ.” *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a6–7.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. *DM* 23, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 847–51, where the question is: “How many ends are there?”
- ⁷⁶ Cf. *DM* 48, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 873–81, where Suárez asks: “Whether action as such essentially relates to a term, even if it is immanent action—and therefore this last is also located in this category?”
- ⁷⁷ Cf. “πάσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν...” *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b8–9.
- ⁷⁸ That is, *definitive*.
- ⁷⁹ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, IX, c. 8, l. 9, Cathala no. 1868.
- ⁸⁰ Cf. “ἔστι δ’ οὐδεν δυνάμει ἀίδιον.” *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b7–8.
- ⁸¹ Cf. “τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ μὴ...” *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b33.
- ⁸² Rather, cf. *DM* 26, 6, n. 14, vol. 25, p. 948. Although he got the Section number wrong, it should be noted that this is the only reference I have found in which Suárez also has given a paragraph number.
- ⁸³ Cf. Aristotle: in the case of eternal things, act and potency do not differ; *Physics* 3.4.203b30.
- ⁸⁴ Cf. “τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων” *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b18.
- ⁸⁵ “εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν.” *ibid.*, l. 19.
- ⁸⁶ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 64–72, which asks: “Can God be demonstrated to be infinite?”
- ⁸⁷ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 424–36, where the question is: “Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?”
- ⁸⁸ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 8, l. 9, Cathala no. 1873.
- ⁸⁹ *DM* 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, which asks: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?”
- ⁹⁰ Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.9.1051a17–21.
- ⁹¹ Cf. *DM* 11, vol. 25, pp. 355–372: “About Evil.”
- ⁹² Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.9.1051a19–21.
- ⁹³ Cf. St. Thomas, *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, IX, c. 9, l. 10, Cathala no. 1887.
- ⁹⁴ Cf. *DM* 35, 5, n. 7, vol. 26, pp. 467–8.
- ⁹⁵ *DM* 43, s. 6, vol. 26, pp. 656–63, which asks: “Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?”
- ⁹⁶ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, IX, c. 10, l. 11, Cathala no. 1910.
- ⁹⁷ Cf. *DM* 8, vol. 25, pp. 274–312: “About Truth or the True which is a Property of Being.” The Sections cited are: 1, pp. 275–7: “Whether formal truth is in the composition and division of the intellect?”; 2, pp. 277–83: “What is the truth of cognition?”; 3, pp. 283–9: “Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?”; 4, pp. 289–92: “Whether the truth of cognition or of the intellect does not exist in it until it judges?”; 5, pp. 292–4: “Whether truth of cognition exists only in the speculative intellect or also in the practical intellect?”; and 6, pp. 294–5: “Whether truth is in division as much as in composition?”
- ⁹⁸ Cf. esp. *DM* 9, 1, n. 6, vol. 25, pp. 313–14, where Suárez excludes all falsity in relation to the Divine intellect.
- ⁹⁹ Also see *DM* 9, 1, n. 22, vol. 25, p. 320.

- ¹⁰⁰ Cf. *DM* 2, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 277–83, which asks: “What is the truth of cognition?”; but also cf. *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 283–9, where the question is: “Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?”
- ¹⁰¹ See *DM* 9, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 312–21, which asks: “What and where is falsity? And is it a property of being?”
- ¹⁰² *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, IX, c. 10, l. 11, Cathala no. 1916.
- ¹⁰³ Cf. *De Anima* 3. 431b16–19.
- ¹⁰⁴ That is, the intellect as joined to the body, which intellect then needs images (*phantasmata*) for its operation; cf. “The foundation is that [text] of Aristotle in Book 3 of the *De Anima*: ‘A man who is understanding must look to images.’ From this there is derived the philosophical principle that a man’s conjoined intellect cannot naturally operate unless the imagination at the same time cooperates. Hence it happens that if the imagination is damaged, the intellect cannot reason or discourse in an orderly way.” (“*Fundamentum est illud Aristot., 3 de Anim.: Necessè est intelligentem phantasmata speculari. Ex quo habetur illud philosophicum principium, intellectum hominis conjunctum naturaliter operari non posse, quin simul phantasia cooperetur; unde fit ut, si phantasia sit laesa, intellectus non possit ordinate ratiocinari et discurrere.*”) Suárez, *De oratione*, II, c. 14, n. 3, in *Opera*, vol. 14, p. 187. Also, cf.: “But it must be taken into account that the intellect here is not separate from the body, inasmuch as it is a certain power of the soul, which is the act of the body.” (“*Considerandum tamen est quod intellectum hic dicit non separatum a corpore, inquantum est potentia quaedam animae, quae est actus corporis.*”) St. Thomas, *In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium*, III, c. 7, l. 12, editio tertia cura ac studio P.F. Angeli M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), p. 185, n. 786.
- ¹⁰⁵ Cf. *In Aristotelis librum de Anima*, ed. Pirotta, p. 185, n. 785.
- ¹⁰⁶ Rather, cf. *DM* 35, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 436–9, where it is directly asked: “What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?”
- ¹⁰⁷ Cf. *DM* 20, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 745–54, where Suárez’s question is: “Whether it can be known by natural reason that the creation of some beings is possible, or even necessary? Or (what is the same) whether one being insofar as it is being can depend essentially on the effective causality of another?”
- ¹⁰⁸ Rather, see: *DM* 30, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 113–15, which asks: “Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable and eternal?”
- ¹⁰⁹ See *DM* 35, 3, n. 52, vol. 26, pp. 456–7.

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

About Unity and Multitude As Well As Their Opposition and Differences

Although in Books 3 and 4, Aristotle may have said some things about unity (*de uno*), nevertheless, because he always attached that to being as its principal property, he returns to its consideration in this place and he gives it a more extensive and more elaborate treatment through this whole Book. However, all things which pertain to it we have treated in *Disputations 4 up through 7*², as well as in *Disputations 40*³ and *41*.⁴ For in the first [Disputations] we deal with transcendental unity and plurality and in the latter with number [in the category] of quantity⁵ and about the unity (*unum*) which is proportionate with those [numbers]. Therefore, we will note few things about the text.

Chapter One

About the Nature of the One in General

In this Chapter, Aristotle repeats what he said in Book 5.⁶ What was remarked there may be seen, for nothing occurs to be added.

Chapter Two

That the Character of Measure Belongs Directly and Immediately to Quantitative Unity

Question 1. It is usually asked in this place whether the first thing in any genus is the measure of the rest? For it is supposed that Aristotle in the beginning of the Chapter⁷ affirms that. His words are as follows: "There is most of all a measure of any genus; first and most properly [of the genus] of quantity; for from this it is attributed to the rest."⁸

This can be read and explained in two ways. First, as here punctuated, in such way that the word "first" is not a noun but an adverb. From this the plain meaning is that to be a measure in any genus, first and most properly belongs to quantity. And an added proof favors that, namely, that other

things measure and are measured only by a certain proportion to quantity. For the following words, “for from this it is attributed to the rest,” have this force. Moreover, the whole discussion in the Chapter tends to this.

Second, those words can be read in such way that “first” is a noun and the division of the words there is this: “Most of all the measure is the first of any genus.” Supply: “we have said,” and then let there be added: “and most properly in the genus of quantity.” And in this way from the first member of the division⁹ there is derived this axiom: “The first in any genus is the measure of the others,” which is easy [to accept] and true if it is correctly understood.

For some explain it so that through that [axiom] it is indicated that all things which are in some genus receive their perfection from that which is principal and first in that genus. And therefore of their nature they are measured by that as by an extrinsic measure which is most fitted [for the task]. But although this is sometimes the case, as, for example, when that first is such by its essence and the rest are by participation, for in such case that first is in the mentioned way a kind of *a priori* measure (so to speak) of the rest, that, however, is not universally necessary. Neither is it in any way asserted by Aristotle, as was noted at Book 2, Text 4.¹⁰ Therefore, in order that it be a general precept, it must be understood about an extrinsic measure which is proportioned to our way of understanding, whether it be a cause, or not, and whether it is *a priori*, or only from a certain requisite and necessary proportion. For thus we correctly infer that what comes closer to what is most perfect in any genus, is also more perfect. But it must be further understood that, other things being equal, simply and not only to a certain extent, the measure be rightfully applied. And in this way the matter is uncomplicated and needs no further discussion.

Question 2. Therefore, the questions in this place properly belong to the treatment of quantity, for example, whether the concept of measure has been explained by Aristotle? This we have explained in *Disputation 40, Section 3*.¹¹

Question 3. Again, is the character of measure found first and properly in [the category of] quantity, and in other [categories] as it were secondarily and by analogy? For that is what Aristotle seems to say here. But this matter has been spoken of in *Disputation 5, Section 6*,¹² and more extensively in *Disputation 4, Section 3*.¹³

Question 4. Another question is whether the character of measure directly and immediately (*per se primo*) belongs to unity or the one, as Aristotle also indicates, and in what way this agrees with [what he said]

before, since the one is not a quantity but rather the principle of number, as is said here now. About this, see *Disputation 40, Section 3*.¹⁴

Question 5. How is it true that the one is the principle of number? And about which “one”¹⁵ should that be taken? Cf. *Disputation 41, Section 4*.¹⁶ /p. LV/

Chapter Three The Philosopher Continues the Same Subject

In this Chapter, it is usually asked whether a measure should be homogeneous, [that is] of the same genus, with the thing measured? For Aristotle adds this in the present Chapter. But there is an easy answer, inasmuch as Aristotle's meaning is not that the measure and the measured must always be of the same genus properly taken. For the First Being is the measure of the rest and it does not belong in the same genus with them. Therefore, the meaning is that between the measure and the measured there must be a formal agreement. For if they are completely equivocal and agree only in name one cannot be measured by an approach (*per accessum*) to the other¹⁷ because they will be totally diverse. But this [formal] agreement sometimes is only analogous, as between God and other beings; sometimes it is generic, as between white and the other colors. And [Alexander of] Hales adds here that it cannot be a specific [agreement], because individuals are of the same nature, and therefore, there is not more reason why one or another should be the measure.¹⁸ However, this is true only about individuals insofar as they are equal. But insofar as they can be unequal that which would be most perfect, or most of all one, can be the measure of the others, either in intensity or in duration, or even in individual perfection, since among individuals of the same species there can be inequality in this. It is true also about a measure which stems from the nature of a thing; for, by a human adjustment of one thing to another,¹⁹ the quantity of one individual can be taken to measure another similar one.

The second question or proposition which should be noted here is whether knowledge (*scientia*) is measured by things or things are measured by knowledge? For Aristotle seems to affirm the latter in these words: “But we say also that knowledge and sensation are the measure of things.”²⁰ But he does not understand it to be the measure of objects, but of things which we know by measures. For measuring results by applying that measure to sensation or understanding. This is clear from the argument which he adds when he says: “moreover, because through them we know something.”²¹

Therefore, just as in *Physics*, Book 4, Chapter 14,²² Aristotle has called the soul the number numbering the parts of motion, so in this place he has called knowledge and sensation the measure of the measured. But in a comparison of objects the Philosopher immediately adds: “But now they are measured more than they measure.”²³ For St. Thomas²⁴ and others relate these words to the measuring of knowledge from an object. However, Aristotle meant only to explain that even in the very act of measuring one quantity by another, knowledge itself and sensation are also measured. For in measuring the quantity of a thing there is simultaneously measured the knowledge which is had of that quantity insofar as it represents it. But about this question, namely, the measure of truth, you can see the things said in *Disputation 8*, [which is] about Truth,²⁵ where we have said that the truth of our knowledge is measured from things, and not vice versa. But God’s knowledge is the measure of things and it is not measured from them. And we have stated what the difference is in this between natural and artificial things in relation to the human intellect, and between things according to their being of essence and according to their being of existence in relation to the Divine [intellect].²⁶

Chapter Four The One Is Not a Substance Separate from Individual Things

Principally here it is usually asked whether there is one first being, which is the measure of the rest, or one substance which is the measure of the others. However, as regards the mind of Aristotle, you should know that in this Chapter he is not directly treating [the question] whether there is one substance which is the measure of the rest or one first being which the measure of all. For in the whole text there is found almost nothing about this question; and St. Thomas, who explains [Aristotle] best, hardly mentions this matter. But the Philosopher does, together with Plato, treat the question whether the one itself is a kind of abstract substance which has no other nature except unity. And he explicitly proves that there is no such substance which is the one itself, which is evident beyond any need of proof. Moreover, I do not think that such a one was ever concocted by Plato.²⁷ Therefore, from this Aristotle concludes that, just as in quantity, quality, and other things, unity is nothing else but the entity of each undivided thing, so [it is] also in the case of substances. Finally, from this he concludes²⁸ incidentally that just as in colors there is one prime color, so

in substances there is one substance, which will not be something separate [from matter], but some singular substance.

From this the commentators (*expositores*) have taken the occasion to ask what this one substance is. And Scotus in this place, which Antonio Andreas transcribes in Question 1, Book 10, says that it is not God but a First Intelligence,²⁹ because this is in the category (*genus*) of substance, but God is not.³⁰ However, the Commentator [i.e. Averroes]³¹ and more fully Alexander of Hales³² declare that it is God. But the debate is almost about a name and is of little importance. /p. LVI/

For there is no doubt that God is the extrinsic measure of all things in a much higher way than an Intelligence can be. This is first, because of his supreme perfection, which most simply and eminently contains all perfections. Second, it is because of the ideas of all things which he has in himself. Third, it is because all beings are beings by analogy to this Being, and by participation of this; and all created substances are similarly participations of this substance and no other. Fourth, it is because if we talk about a measure as such in this way it evidently belongs most of all to God, because he is most of all indivisible, immutable, and perfect. If [we talk about a measure] with respect to ourselves, he is also more known to us than is a First Intelligence. Neither is it necessary that God be properly in a category (*genus*), but it is enough that he have some formal agreement [with the things measured], as was said in the preceding Chapter.

However, if someone wants to designate for substances an intrinsic measure in the category of substance, without doubt a First Intelligence can come under that concept. For it has the perfection which fits such a role, namely, that by comparison with it, the perfection of other things may be measured and known. Again, the highest species in the whole genus of animals, or of living things, or of bodies, can be in proportion the measure of all the species which are contained under that genus. Therefore, the first species of a whole genus can also be the measure of the rest.

You may say: according to Aristotle a measure must be minimal; but the perfection of God or an angel is not minimal, but rather is great or infinite; hence, the character of a measure is quite incompatible with God because he infinitely and thus equally surpasses all things. The answer is that a quantitative measure must be reduced to some minimum quantity in order that it be in some way indivisible. However, a measure of perfection should not be minimal but rather supreme, maximally indivisible, and simple. To be sure, infinity is no obstacle, because it is unequally participated in by creatures, and therefore from their side there is an unequal approach to the greatness of God, and in this way they are measured by that greatness.

Chapter Five About the Opposition between One and Many

Question 1. The first question here is: how are one and many opposed? This we briefly treat in *Disputation 5 [sic], Section 6*.³³

Question 2. Is the one prior to multitude, and division prior to indivision? [See] *the same Disputation, Section 7*.³⁴

Question 3. Do the same and the diverse adequately divide being? And how are they opposed? [See] *Disputation 7, Section 3*.³⁵ And from this it is clear what should be said about the like and the unlike, the equal and the unequal; for these all have the same proportion.

Question 4. How should we understand this proposition: “Those things whose matter is not one differ in genus”?³⁶ [See] *Disputation 35, Section 2 [sic]*.³⁷

Question 5. Whether genera of diverse categories should properly be said to differ or to be diverse? For Aristotle here suggests the first, and yet commonly they are thought to be utterly diverse (*primo diversa*). But about this matter there is enough in *Disputation 32, the last Section*,³⁸ in *Disputation 39, the last Section*,³⁹ and something in *Disputation 4, Sections 1⁴⁰ and 2*.⁴¹

The rest of what is said here about diversity and difference is sufficiently treated by the Philosopher, and also brought up above in Book 5, Chapters 9 and 10.

Chapter Six About Contrariety

From here to the end of the Book, Aristotle treats of opposites, and especially about contrariety, which matter is not very difficult and is for the most part proper to logicians; therefore, we discuss few things about opposites in this work. But those things which seemed necessary were said over the course of *Disputation 45*⁴² when we were discussing quality, which is the only category in which genuine contrariety is found. However, relative opposition has a proper place in the disputation which is about relative things, that is, *Disputation 47*.⁴³ Moreover, we do talk about negation and privation in the *last Disputation* concerning beings of reason.⁴⁴

Question 1. Therefore, in this Chapter we could first discuss that proposition which is presupposed at the Chapter’s beginning: “Where there is greater and lesser distance there is also a greatest or highest.”⁴⁵ For it seems

this is not totally true, because in the case of numbers there is greater and lesser distance; for two is farther away than three from five; and still there is no greatest [number]. The same is true in the forms and species of substantial things; for there is more distance between a man and a lion than between a lion and a horse; and yet there is no greatest distance; for given any perfect species, there could still be one more perfect. Again, this does not follow: there is given a greater or lesser distance, therefore there can be given one that is smallest. Therefore, neither does it follow that there is a greatest. The antecedent is clear, because between extremes which are maximally distant intermediates which are more or less distant can be multiplied to infinity, in such way that there is never /p. LVII/ reached an end which could be minimally distant from the extremes. For example, a supreme heat and one which would be least in intensity (supposing that these could be given) are maximally distant and between them there are certain [degrees of heat] which are more distant and others which are less distant, but still there is no heat which is at a minimal distance from the supreme heat. Finally, in [the category of] quantity there is given a greater and a lesser part, and still there is not a greatest or a least part, and therefore there can be given a greater or a lesser, but not a greatest, inequality [among those parts].

I answer that these arguments show that the consequence is not formal but that it holds only in the case of things in which there is no process to infinity. But the Philosopher presupposes as a matter of fact that this process is not given in the species of things or of qualities, and therefore he does not in a special way prove the inference, but rather he assumes it as certain that just as there is given in qualities, for example, a greater or a lesser distance, so also there is given a greatest. This he confirms by induction and experience from the proximate termini of changes which occur between certain ultimate and maximally distant termini. Finally, leaving aside a process to infinity, which is given only either in possible things, about which we are not talking, or in the division of the continuum, or in some proportion which results from that, as happens in almost all the examples given, "leaving aside," I say, this process, the inference is perfectly good. Therefore, St. Thomas in his Commentary⁴⁶ does not prove it in any other way except because there is no process to infinity. And in the same manner it can be inferred that there is a minimum distance if there is not such a process toward one or other of the extremes.

Moreover, by force of the inference, the conclusion is not that there is given a greatest distance in a positive way, but only in a negative way, that is, some distance than which there is no greater. But this evidently is inferred

from the fact that there is no process to infinity. But from that antecedent, or from the negation of a process to infinity, it cannot be adequately demonstrated that it is that [distance] alone that is greater than the others and that under the same genus there cannot be two distances of mutually contradictory or opposite species which are equally distant, as is self evident. However, perhaps this kind of maximum distance is enough for contrariety. For justice seems to be so much distant from injustice, just as temperance is from intemperance, and both distances are under the genus of a moral habit. And under the genus of vice prodigality is as distant from avarice as rashness is from cowardice. Therefore, although in something like a single line or a magnitude the extremes are maximally distant, not only negatively, but also positively, in comparison to intermediates, nevertheless, according to different lines and [different] considerations there can be several maximal distances even under the same genus in a way that is enough for contrariety, as has been stated.

Question 2. Secondly, it can be asked whether the definition of contrariety which is taken from this Chapter is a good one, namely, that it is: "The maximum distance of those things which differ most of all in the same genus, and expel each other from the same subject."⁴⁷ For almost all commentators (*expositores*) compose the definition in this way, and in this way Aristotle must be judged to approve the other definitions, which he mentions here, insofar as they are equivalent to this one. About this we have spoken in *Disputation 45*.⁴⁸

Question 3. In that Disputation we also treat the question: whether contrariety is found only in qualities, since the definition also appears to fit other things, unless something is subaudited.

Question 4. Whether to one thing only one thing is contrary, and how intermediates are opposed to extremes and to one another.

Question 5. Again, in what way do extremely contrary things exist in their intermediates, or can they be simultaneously in the same subject?

Question 6. On this occasion there is a question in the same place about the mixing of contraries. But about the intension and remission of these we treat in *Disputation 46*.⁴⁹

Chapter Seven

About the Difference between Contrariety And Other Oppositions

In this Chapter there is almost nothing worthy of mention. For what Aristotle says, that the first contrariety is between habit and privation, has this meaning: all contraries are in some way privatively opposite, and that is a kind of root of their opposition. However, the fact that privative opposition is included in contraries can be understood in two ways, namely, either because one contrary entails the privation of the other, or because one is imperfect and deficient in relation to the other, and therefore it is compared to that other in the manner of a privation. And both ways are true, but the Philosopher intends this latter one.

But also what is said here, that there is a medium between things privatively opposite, must be understood in such a way that in that medium there is a withdrawal from what is proper to the privation. For the medium belongs both to the form and to the aptitude for the form, about which [we have spoken] at length in the forementioned place.⁵⁰ /p. LVIII/

Chapter Eight

How One Is Contrary to One

We have treated this matter in the mentioned *Disputation 45*⁵¹. But what Aristotle considers here about the equal, how it is opposed to two things, namely, greater and less, contains no difficulty. For it is opposed in a kind of relative way, or rather by the lack of a certain relation which it could have; and therefore Aristotle says⁵² it is opposed in a kind of privative way. He also says that that opposition can be reduced to the kind which is between the one and the many, because equality is founded in unity, while the great and the small [are founded] in the lack of that unity, or in a difference of size or quantity.

Chapter Nine

How One Is Opposed to Multitude and to Number

Question 1. In this Chapter there is a question about what Aristotle says:⁵³ that multitude is related to number as a genus, and number adds to multitude the character of the numerically measured or measurable, and,

therefore, multitude is opposed to one in a kind of contrary or privative way, but number is opposed relatively. The reason for the question is that, just as every number is a multitude, so every multitude is a number. In what way, therefore, is multitude related to number as its genus? Again, every multitude is made up of units; therefore, it can be measured by unity; and in this, therefore, it does not differ from number.

This passage can be explained in two ways—first, that Aristotle is here thinking that only a multitude consisting of quantified things is a number and is measurable by quantitative unity, and only this [unity] is the principle of number. And therefore, multitude is called a genus, or a quasi-genus, because it encompasses quantitative number and every transcendental multitude. The second interpretation is that number signifies a definite and terminated multitude, but multitude abstracts from this, and of itself comprehends even an infinite multitude. Therefore number expresses a multitude which is measurable by unity, but multitude abstracts from this, because multitude by virtue of this comprehensive character can be immeasurable. Aristotle does not seem clearly enough to state which of these opinions is closer to his mind. However, the first interpretation, according to which he is here talking about a quantitative and sensible measure, is that of St. Thomas⁵⁴ and also common [to other interpreters]. But what is true in this matter is treated in *Disputation 41, Section 1*.⁵⁵

Chapter Ten

A Medium between Contraries Is of the Same Genus and Exists from Them

Question 1. First it can be asked: about what genus is Aristotle speaking here?⁵⁶ The question is not about a medium⁵⁷ by way of a denial of the extremes. For it is certain that such a medium is not established in this manner from the extremes and neither can it exhibit the other things which Aristotle teaches here about a medium. Again, [it is certain] also because such a medium is found between privative and relative opposites, which Aristotle denies here. Therefore, it is certain that Aristotle is here speaking about a positive medium, which is some positive form mid-way between extreme contraries. But such a medium seems to be found in three ways: one, by a formal mixture of the contraries in diminished degrees, for example, tepidity; two, by a virtual continence or participation of the extremes, for example, colors that are mid-way between extremes; and

third, by receding from both extremes, for example, a virtue between two extreme vices.

Therefore, it can be asked whether what Aristotle teaches here about a medium is absolutely and universally true about a formal or positive medium, or [only] about some particular medium. For Aristotle does not distinguish and he is speaking doctrinally. Therefore, what he says seems to be universal.⁵⁸ But apparently against this is the fact that a medium of the third kind cannot truly be said to come to be from the extremes, nor to be in the same genus with them, nor to be a kind of proximate term of a transition from one vice to its opposite extreme. However, in this Chapter Aristotle most strongly attributes these three conditions to media between contraries.

But we should say that he is speaking universally, as is explicitly clear from the end of the Chapter.⁵⁹ However, the doctrine most properly is verified about a medium taken in the first way (although whether there is such a medium is a separate question about which we speak in the mentioned *Disputation 45*⁶⁰). But in the case of a medium in the second way the two first questions do also have some proper place here. But the third question is not to be understood in such way that a medium through which one passes from one extreme to another must always be of the same character, but in the case of certain contraries there will occur a passage through a formal medium or a medium which formally contains the refracted extremes, but in other cases [the passage will be] through a virtual medium. But this latter occurs only when extreme qualities cannot be formally connected, about which I have also spoken in the cited place [i.e. *Disputation 45*⁶¹]. /p. LIX/

But the mentioned conditions are not verified properly in this way about the third kind of medium, but rather [they are verified] by certain analogy. However, we must consider that a habit of virtue which is a medium between extreme vices can be regarded either only in the character of a habit which inclines to a certain mode of operation, or in the character of a virtue or a moral good. In the first way it properly has the character of a mean and in this way it has a generic agreement with the extremes, but not at all in the second way. Hence it is not opposed to them as a medium in the same genus, but as something extremely opposite by reason of a contrary genus; in which way Aristotle, in the Chapter about Opposites, in the *Postpraedicamenta*, says that good and evil are opposed.⁶² Therefore, under this second consideration in no way does this medium come to be from the extremes. However, in the first way, even though it does not properly come to be [from the extremes], nevertheless it partakes in some

way of the nature of the extremes. For it has something of the operation and the inclination of both extremes. For instance, liberality inclines to giving, in which in some way it agrees with prodigality; but at the same time it inclines sometimes to keeping, in which it seems to draw closer to the other extreme. And for this reason also, even though it is not necessary to pass from vice to vice by way of virtue, it is, however, necessary to pass through a certain quasi-material participation or imitation of virtue. For no one passes from being avaricious to being prodigal, unless he first has begun to spend, which he could often do in a sincere way (*studiose*) if he wished.

Yet that principle: “There is no passage from one extreme to another except through a medium,”⁶³ must be understood about a change which occurs through proper physical motion. For what comes about through immanent actions or instantaneous mutations, does not necessarily come to be in such a way, as is self-evident.

Chapter Eleven⁶⁴

That Contraries Are Diverse in Species and a Specific Diversity Includes a Contrariety of Differences

Question 1. The principal question which is proper to this place is: whether differences which divide a genus into various species are contrary and, conversely, whether contraries differ in species? For Aristotle seems to affirm both. The second part [of the question] contains no difficulty, because it is clear that contraries which are under the same genus are necessarily diverse in species. For things which are of the same species, inasmuch as they are such, cannot be contrary, because they are similar.

Question 2. However, the second part [of the question] seems either improper or false, that is, that all differences which divide a genus into distinct species are contraries. Otherwise, there would be a genuine contrariety even in substance and in every genus—which is false, as is clear from Aristotle, in the *Categories*,⁶⁵ and from what we have said in *Disputation 45*.⁶⁶ But briefly it should be said that contrariety between physical forms is proper to qualities; but contrariety between metaphysical forms is extended to other categories. Add also that this contrariety, which can be called metaphysical, is less proper, because a genus is not compared to its differences properly as a subject from which the differences mutually expel each other. But it is called contrariety because it is an opposition

(*repugnancia*) between positive forms, and in this way it is very much similar to genuine⁶⁷ contrariety.

Question 3. Again, here it could incidentally be asked, whether a genus is contracted by differences in such a way that it is divided into diverse species and is essentially differentiated? For, as St. Thomas,⁶⁸ [Alexander of] Hales,⁶⁹ and others note, the Philosopher explicitly states that. However, there seems to be difficulty because of the unity of a genus and a univocity that is founded in reality itself. Nevertheless, Aristotle's opinion is most true, from which you have it that a genus does not differ in reality from the species in which it has been contracted. For this is the mind of Aristotle here, which I have treated at length in *Disputation 6, Section 9*.⁷⁰ You also have from this the fact that the principle or the form from which a genus is taken is not of the same essence in things which are specifically different; and, therefore, the forms from which generic and specific differences are derived are not distinct in reality, as we have discussed at length in *Disputation 15, Section 10*.⁷¹

Question 4. Finally, it can be asked here whether a genus and a species differ in species between themselves or whether they are of the same species? Aristotle here thinks that both should be denied—which I have explained in *Disputation 7, Section 3*.⁷²

Chapter Twelve That There Is Some Contrariety without Specific Diversity

Question 1. Immediately here there is question about what the Philosopher intends to assert, for it seems to be contradictory that contraries are not essentially diverse, as is gathered from the definition given above, and from what was said in the preceding Chapter, that contrariety cannot exist between similar things inasmuch as they are similar. However, things which belong to the same species are similar. But the question is easy; for contraries can be formally compared between themselves, inasmuch as they are under a genus under which they are essentially constituted, or in respect /p. LX/ to a subject to which they are denominatively attributed. In the first way they differ in species, for example, black and white inasmuch as they are such and are essentially located under the [genus of] the colored; and the mentioned reason for doubting proceeds on this basis. In the second way, they do not always cause a specific difference in a subject, and it is in this sense that Aristotle's question and answer in this

Chapter proceeds. For it is just as if he had asked why certain differences are between themselves essentially opposite with respect to subjects and indicate an essential difference between those [subjects], while other differences are incidental and indicate only an individual distinction. Indeed, sometimes they do not indicate this, but an accidental change in the same individual. Therefore, in this sense it is true that some contrariety does not establish a specific diversity in a subject.

However, Aristotle gives an argument, that a certain contrariety follows the form, and that [contrariety] is essential and is connected with an essential difference while another contrariety follows the matter and that is individual or accidental. In this it should be noted only that something can follow matter in a way that is essentially and necessarily connected with the essence of this matter as such; and a contrariety which follows matter in this way also produces an essential diversity, as will be said in the next Chapter with respect to the corruptible and the incorruptible. The reason is that matter also belongs to the essence of a thing. But something is said to follow matter because it follows upon the dispositions and the changes of matter. For inasmuch as matter is passive potency it is the principle and root of all extrinsic changes. Therefore, a contrariety which in this way follows matter is either completely accidental, if it comes to be merely by accident from outside, or at most individual, if it follows from a particular and individual disposition of matter, for example the condition of feminine or masculine sex, about which in particular Aristotle in this Chapter has proposed a question.⁷³

Chapter Thirteen

That Sometimes There Is Contrariety between Things Which Differ in Genus

Here there is a question only about this proposition: “The corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus”⁷⁴—in what sense is it true? This has been treated in *Disputation 35*,⁷⁵ and it has been noted a number of times in what has preceded.

Notes

¹ According to Tricot: Jaeger regards this Book is more independent of the other books and thinks that it was added later. It would be wrong, however, says Tricot himself, to consider this independence as absolute. It is true that no other Book makes explicit reference to this one. But this Book does refer in at least one place (Chapter 2, 1053b10)

to Book 3; and in other places there are obvious references to the same Book 3, as well as to Books 4 and 7. One may conclude from such references that Book 10 belongs to the main body of the *Metaphysics*. Tricot sees no reason to place it in time after Books 13 and 14 and thinks there is no sufficient reason to separate it from Books 7, 8, and 9. Cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote...*, pp. xxvii–xxix.

²The Vivès edition's reading of "1 to 9" is obviously erroneous. Rather, cf. *DM* 4, vol. 25, pp. 115–45: "About Transcendental Unity in General"; *DM* 5, pp. 145–201: "About Individual Unity and its Source"; *DM* 6, pp. 201–250: "About Formal and Universal Unity"; and *DM* 7, pp. 250–274: "About Various Kinds of Substance."

³*DM* 40, vol. 26, 529–87: "About Continuous Quantity."

⁴*DM* 41, vol. 26, pp. 587–604: "About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination of the Category of Quantity."

⁵Suárez treats directly of number in *Disputation* 41 and only indirectly in *Disputation* 40..

⁶See *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16–1017a6.

⁷Note that Suárez's "beginning of the Chapter [2]" here does not correspond to that of post-Bekker editions.

⁸Cf. "μάλιστα δὲ τὸ μέτρον εἶναι πρῶτῳ ἐκάστου γένους καὶ κυριώτατα τοῦ ποσοῦ· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰλλα ἐλήλυθεν." *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18–20.

⁹Literally: "from the prior words" (*ex prioribus verbis*).

¹⁰For Text 4, cf. *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23–31.

¹¹Cf. *DM* 40, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 538–43, which asks: "Whether the essence of quantity consists in the character of measure?"

¹²Cf. *DM* 5, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 180–88, which asks: "What, finally, is the principle of individuation in all created substances?"

¹³Cf. *DM* 4, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 125–31, which asks: "How many kinds of unity are there in things?"

¹⁴Cf. *DM* 40, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 538–43, where the question is: "Whether the essence of quantity consists in the character of measure?"

¹⁵Is it the one which is a property of being or the one which is restricted to the category of quantity; i.e, is it transcendental one or categorial one?

¹⁶Cf. esp. *DM* 41, 4, nn. 12–13, vol. 26, pp. 599–600.

¹⁷That is, by being laid alongside the other.

¹⁸Cf. Bonini: *In XII libros Metaphys.* X, t. 5, fol. 281b.

¹⁹For the extrinsic denomination involved in measurement here, cf. *DM* 40, 3, n. 8, vol. 26, p. 540; and *DM* 47, 10, 15, p. 825.

²⁰Cf. "καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δὲ μέτρον τῶν πραγμάτων λέγομεν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν..." *Metaphysics* 10.1.1053a31–2.

²¹"ὄτι γνωρίζομεν τι αὐταῖς,..." *ibid.*, 1053a32.

²²Cf. *Physics* 4.14.223a21–29.

²³Cf. "ἐπεὶ μετροῦνται μάλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν." *Metaphysics* 10.1.1053a32–3.

²⁴Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.* X, c. 1, l. 2, Cathala no. 1957.

²⁵Cf. *DM* 8, vol. 25, pp. 274–312: "About Truth or the True which is a Property of Being."

²⁶Cf. *DM* 8, 7, nn. 30–33, vol. 25, pp. 305–6; *ibid.*, 8, nn. 5–6, p. 309.

²⁷Evidently Suárez would separate Plato in this from the later Neo-Platonists.

²⁸Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a11–13.

²⁹Such as an Aristotelian Separate Substance, the Avicennian "Giver of Forms" (*Dator formarum*), or an Angel, etc.

³⁰For this, see Pseudo-Scotus, *In XII lib. Metaphys. Arist. expositio*, X, Summae I, c. 3, ed. Wadding (1639), tom. IV, p. 349. It is interesting to note that while Suárez does not have his reference exactly correct, he is aware that Antonius Andreas had a role in the

preparation of the *Expositio* attributed to Scotus. In this he anticipates Luke Wadding and his colleague, Cavellus (i.e. Hugh McCaughwell), who, in a “Judgment” (*Judicium*) prefixed to tome IV of the 1639 edition of Scotus’s *Opera omnia*, has asserted that Scotus authored the *Expositio* while Antonio Andreas corrected it, ordered it, and in places added to it.

³¹ Cf. *In lib. Metaphys.* X, c. 4, t. 7, vol. 8, fol. 257rAB.

³² Cf. Bonini: *In XII libros Metaphys.* X, t. 8, fol. 285r.

³³ Rather, see *DM* 4, s. 6, vol. 25, pp. 135–6, where Suárez asks: “How are the one and the many opposed?”

³⁴ *Ibid.*, s. 7, pp. 136–7: “Whether one is prior to many and indivision is prior to division?”

³⁵ Cf. *DM* 7, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 271–4, which asks: “How the same and the diverse are compared between themselves and with respect to being.”

³⁶ Cf. “διαφέρει... γένει μὲν ὧν μὴ ἔστι κοινή ὕλη...” *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b28.

³⁷ Rather, cf. *DM* 35, 3, nn. 37–41, vol. 26, pp. 451–2.

³⁸ Cf. *DM* 32, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 319–29, where the question is: “Whether being is analogically divided into substance and accident?”

³⁹ Cf. *DM* 39, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 523–9, which asks: “Whether the mentioned division [of accidents] is univocal or analogous?”

⁴⁰ Cf. *DM* 4, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 115–22, where Suárez’s question is: “Whether transcendental unity adds some positive character to being, or only something privative?”

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 122–5, which asks: “Whether ‘one’ as such expresses only a negation which it adds to being? Or [does it express] something else?” On “utterly diverse” (*primo diversa*), also see *DM* 45, 2, n. 4, pp. 741–2.

⁴² Cf. *DM* 45, vol. 26, pp. 737–53: “About Contrariety of Qualities.”

⁴³ Cf. *DM* 47, vol. 26, pp. 781–867: “About Created Real Relations.”

⁴⁴ Cf. *DM* 54, vol. 26, pp. 1014–1041: “About Beings of Reason.” For this, see my English translation: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis) Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.

⁴⁵ Cf. “ἐπεὶ δὲ διαφέρειν ἐνδέχεται ἀλλήλων τὰ διαφέροντα πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον, ἔστι τις καὶ μεγίστη διαφορά...” *Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a3–4. While Suárez’s citation is not literally exact, it does capture the sense of Aristotle’s dictum. Perhaps Suárez was led away by his eye lighting on “distance” (διάστημα, in line 9) in place of “difference” (διαφορά) here.

⁴⁶ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, X, c. 4, l. 5, Cathala no. 2023.

⁴⁷ While this is not a quotation from Aristotle, the question is whether it squares with his doctrine.

⁴⁸ For this, see *DM* 45, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 741–6, where the question is: “What is the proper definition of contraries and what is their difference from other opposites?”

⁴⁹ Cf. *DM* 46, vol. 26, pp. 753–781: “About the Intension of Qualities.”

⁵⁰ That is, *Disputation* 45.

⁵¹ See *DM* 45, 2, n. 12, vol. 26, p. 744.

⁵² Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.4.1055b21.

⁵³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.6.1057a2–3.

⁵⁴ Cf. *In 12 libros Metaphys.*, X, c. 6, l. 8, Cathala nos. 2089–2094.

⁵⁵ Cf. *DM* 41, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 587–93, where Suárez asks: “Is discrete quantity a genuine species of quantity?”

⁵⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.7.1057b2–4.

⁵⁷ Here with Rábade *et al.* I am reading “medio” instead of the Vivès edition’s “modo.”

⁵⁸ Again, note this attribute of “doctrinal” speaking.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.7.1057b29–34.

- ⁶⁰ Cf. *DM* 45, 2, n. 19, vol. 26, p. 746, in which place Suárez gives a cross-reference to his explanation here with regard to Book 10, Chapter 10.
- ⁶¹ For such issues, cf. *DM* 45, s. 4, vol. 26, pp. 748–53, which asks: “Whether contraries can be simultaneously in the same subject? And in what way can something be composed of contraries?”
- ⁶² Cf. *Categories* c. 11.13b36.
- ⁶³ This principle is not in Aristotle’s text at this point.
- ⁶⁴ Modern editors from Bekker on have divided Book 10 into ten chapters—as does Moberbeke, and also Bessarion in the Bekker edition (in the 1562 *Junctas* edition Bessarion has nine chapters). Suárez has distinguished 13 chapters. Most likely his source is Fonseca. Though Fonseca’s edition of Book 10 had not appeared by the time (1597) the *Disputationes metaphysicae* saw the light, my guess is that it was available in manuscript form, at least among the Jesuits. To complete Book 10 and make a total of 13 Chapters, Fonseca has (in Tome IV, pp. 32–46) distinguished four chapters. Thus: Chapter 10 for Fonseca (p. 32) corresponds to Chapter 7 of Bekker (1057a18–1057b34); Fonseca’s Chapter 11 corresponds to Chapter 8 (1057b35–1058a28); Chapter 12 corresponds to Bekker Chapter 9 (1058a29–1058b25); and Chapter 13 corresponds to Bekker Chapter 10 (1058b26–1059a14).
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *Categories*, c 5.3b24–5.
- ⁶⁶ See esp. *DM* 45, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 746–8, where the question is: “Whether genuine contrariety is found among qualities, either all of them or only them?”
- ⁶⁷ Here I read with Rábade “*propriae*” instead of the Vivès’ “*proprie*.”
- ⁶⁸ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.* X, c. 8, l. 10, Cathala nos. 2113 and 2119.
- ⁶⁹ Cf. Bonini: *In XII libros Metaphys.*, X, t. 24, fol. 300v.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. *DM* 6, s. 9, vol. 25, pp. 236–44, which asks: “How in actual reality are unity of genus and unity of difference distinguished, both between themselves and from specific unity?”
- ⁷¹ Cf. *DM* 15, s. 10, vol. 25, pp. 536–57, which asks: “Whether of one substance there is only one formal cause?”
- ⁷² Cf. *DM* 7, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 271–4, where the question is: “How the same and the diverse are compared between themselves and with respect to being.”
- ⁷³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29–32.
- ⁷⁴ Cf. “ἀνάγκη ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἀφθαρτον.” *Metaphysics* 10.10.1058b27.
- ⁷⁵ See *DM* 35, 3, nn. 37–41, vol. 26, pp. 451–2.

THE ELEVENTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

In this Book Aristotle isn't teaching anything new, but he returns to a kind of summary of what he taught in earlier books, adding a number of things which he taught in the Books of the Physics.² Therefore, almost all interpreters (*interpretes*) and writers (*scriptores*) raise no question in regard to this whole Book, nor do they note anything besides what contributes to the understanding of the text. Beyond others, St. Thomas teaches this rather clearly.³

Therefore, in the first two Chapters the Philosopher again proposes almost all the questions which he proposed in the Third Book without answering anything. Therefore, I think it is superfluous to repeat them again here.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, he takes up again what he treated most extensively in the whole of Book 4. That is, in the Third Chapter he presents the object of this science and the analogy of being, in virtue of which he says one object can be set up for this science to which then it pertains to consider the first principles and the first causes, the properties, and oppositions of things. In this place, he mentions incidentally how there can be a medium between things which are privatively opposed, which has already been noted in Book 10, around Chapter 7.

In the Fourth and Fifth Chapters Aristotle defends the truth of this proposition: "It is impossible that one same thing be simultaneously affirmed and denied of another same thing."⁴ And he adds nothing to what he said in Book 4. But by the way in Chapter 3 he touches a question concerning the continuity of alteration and augmentation. We treat some points about this subject in *Disputation 46*.⁵

Again, in the Sixth Chapter, he repeats what the task and the object of this science is, and he mentions the division of science into speculative and practical, and [the division] of the latter into productive or mechanical and active or moral, as well as [the division] of the former into physics, mathematics, and metaphysics—which he also gave in Book 6.⁶ And on the present occasion he states the different modes of defining physically and metaphysically, through matter and without matter, about which he spoke very extensively in Book 7. He also repeats here the proposition which we noted around Book 6, Chapter 2 [sic],⁷ namely, that if there is

no substance separate from matter, natural science or physics is the first of all, which we also state in the place just remarked. Finally, in that [sic] Chapter he has this proposition: "If there is in things some nature and substance which is separable and immobile, in that degree there is divinity, and this," he says, "will be the first /p. LXI/ and chief principle."⁸ This should be noted in connection with what we have discussed in *Disputation 29, Section 2*, with regard to Aristotle's thought about the first principle.⁹ And to it can be added what he proposes (albeit [only] in discussion) in Chapter 2, where he says that the more expert philosophers have posited some such first principle and substance: "For in what way," he says, "will there be order if there is not something which exists perpetually, separately, and permanently?"¹⁰

Then in Chapter 7¹¹ Aristotle repeats what he taught in Book 6 of the *Metaphysics*, namely, that being by accident and being as true¹² do not fall under this science. And on this occasion he recalls what he taught, both there and in Book 2 of the *Physics*,¹³ about contingent effects, fortune, and chance. Concerning these things, places in the Disputations have been indicated in what is above; for example, about being as true we speak in *Disputation 8*¹⁴ and about contingency in *Disputation 19*.¹⁵

In the remaining Chapters, from 8 to 11, Aristotle recapitulates much of what he taught in the *Physics* from Book 3 to Book 6. For in Chapter 8 he studies the definition of motion and the way in which it is related to the *mobile*, to the mover, to action, and to passion. And he has the same doctrine here as in the Third Book of the *Physics*,¹⁶ which doctrine, insofar as it pertains to metaphysics, we treat in *Disputations 48*¹⁷ and *49*,¹⁸ which concern action and passion. On this occasion, the Philosopher [also] mentions some points about act and potency, which are treated at length in *Disputation 43*.¹⁹

In Chapter 9, he repeats what he teaches about the infinite in Book 3 of the *Physics*²⁰ and in the *De Coelo*.²¹ I note only that the Philosopher in this place is extending his remarks a bit and is showing that there cannot be an infinite, not only in sensible bodies, but also absolutely even in separate beings. However, he always presupposes that the infinite is a property of a quantified thing, and so he is saying nothing which could contradict the infinity of God.

In the Tenth Chapter he continues on the subject of motion and distinguishes different species of motion and change. In this note only that having surveyed all the categories he shows that there is change only in quality, quantity, and place (*ubi*). And when he goes through the other categories he omits time (*quando*), possession (*habitus*), and position

(*situs*), perhaps because he thought that time, motion, and passion had the same nature, since time is a property (*passio*²²) of motion. Moreover, as we noted above at Book 5, Chapter 7, he often puts aside possession and position as of little importance, as well as improper and diverse from the rest [of the categories].

Finally, in Chapter 11, Aristotle recalls the explanation of certain terms which we usually employ in these matters which relate to motion, for example, to be together or separately, to be touched, to be in sequence, to be contiguous or continuous, or the like, which have been treated in Book 5 of this work and in Book 5, Chapter 11 [sic] of the *Physics*,²³ and which do not need interpretation or discussion.

Notes

¹ Doubts have been raised by 19th century scholars (e.g. Spengel, Rose, Christ) about the authenticity of Book 11. But now the general opinion is that this Book is authentic, at least in its first section, Chapters 1–8. This first section is a kind of shorthand repetition of Books 3, 4, and 6. Its authenticity was rejected in the 19th century by Natorp (*Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* I, 178) for reasons of its intrinsic order and especially because of its Platonic character in certain places. In reality, says Tricot, the Aristotelian tone of these Chapters is evident, and Jaeger was right to decide in favor of their authenticity. The second part, Chapters 9–12, is artificially attached to the first part. It can be considered as a kind of introduction to the *Metaphysics* and is composed of extracts from the *Physics*, Books 1, 3, and 4. These extracts, which seem to have been carefully chosen, are generally attributed to one of Aristotle's pupils. But there is no reason to deny that they are genuinely the work of Aristotle himself, who may have judged it opportune to give, before passing to the explicit exposition of his metaphysics, a brief résumé of his theories on change and the infinite. According to Pseudo-Alexander (cf. ed. Hayduck, p. 635, l.35), Book 11 could have been put in this place immediately before Book 12, because Book 12 would be a new version of Books 7, 8, and 9, as Book 11 would be of Books 3, 4, and 6. For this, cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote...*, pp. xxix–xxx.

² Cf. note 1, immediately preceding.

³ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, XI, c. 1, l. 1, esp. Cathala nos. 2146–55.

⁴ Cf. “οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ καθ’ ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, . . .” *Metaphysics* 11.5.1061b36–62a1. Note that Suárez's formula here does not match that of Aristotle, at least in this place. For a closer match, see: “οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς. *Metaphysics* 4.4.1008a36–b1. Suárez himself would regard the first Aristotelian formulation here as metaphysical and the second as dialectical; cf. *DM* 3, s. 3, n. 5, vol. 25, pp. 112–113.

⁵ Cf. *DM* 46, vol. 26, pp. 753–81: “About the Intension of Qualities.”

⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18–19.

⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a27–29. For Suárez, see *Index*, Book 6, Chapter 1, Question 6.

⁸ I have not found this precise proposition in the place indicated by Suárez. However, it does agree with what Aristotle says in Book 6, Chapter 1. Moreover, with some cutting it squares with what he says a little later in Book 11; cf.: “εἶπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία

τοιαύτα, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ... ἐνταῦθ' ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή." *Metaphysics* 11.7.1064a34–b1.

⁹ Cf. *DM* 29, 2, nn. 25–37, vol. 26, pp. 42–7.

¹⁰ Cf. "πῶς γὰρ ἔσται τάξις μὴ τινος ὄντος αἰδίου καὶ χωριστοῦ καὶ μένοντος," *Metaphysics* 11.2.1060a26–7.

¹¹ Cf. *Metaphysics* 11.8.1065a1–5.

¹² Here let us note the ambiguity in Suárez's phrase, "ens verum." It can mean either "true being" or "being as true." While the former can be equivalent to "real being" the latter usually means "being in the truth of a proposition," but it can also indicate the truth which follows on being, i.e. transcendental truth, which is the main concern of the immediately to be mentioned *Disputation* 8.

¹³ See *Physics* 2.4.195b31–196b9.

¹⁴ Cf. *DM* 8, vol. 25, pp. 274–312: "About Truth or the True which is a Property of Being."

¹⁵ Cf. *DM* 19, vol. 25, pp. 687–745: "About Causes which act Necessarily and [Causes which act] Freely or Contingently, where [there is Treatment] also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance."

¹⁶ Cf. *Physics* 3.1–3.200b12–202b29.

¹⁷ Cf. *DM* 48, vol. 26, pp. 867–97: "About Action."

¹⁸ *DM* 49, vol. 26, pp. 897–912: "About Passion."

¹⁹ Cf. *DM* 43, vol. 26, pp. 633–63: "About Potency and Act."

²⁰ Cf. *Physics* 3.4–7.202b30–208a3.

²¹ See *De Coelo* I, ch. 5, 6, and 7; 271b1–276a17.

²² Suárez's ambiguity here is deliberate but the equivalence of "passio" as a category and "passio" as a property escapes me.

²³ Cf. *Physics* 5.3.226b18–227b2.

THE TWELFTH BOOK OF THE METAPHYSICS¹

Chapters One, Two, Three, Four, and Five

In these first five Chapters Aristotle repeats and summarizes what he treated above in Book 7 about substance and its principles, as well as many things which he taught in the First Book of the *Physics*. For example in the First Chapter he proposes only that metaphysical science first and foremost discusses substance, which is something immediately evident and something he has often repeated, which we explain at length in the *First or introductory Disputation*.²

In the Second Chapter,³ after a division of substance into sensible and separable, which [latter] is non-sensible, incorruptible, and eternal, he proposes three principles⁴ of a natural thing or a sensible substance, and he explicitly shows the existence of matter. He adds that matter is common to all bodies, but not, however, the same [kind of matter]. He says all these things in the cited places, and we treat them in *Disputation 13*.⁵

Question 1. Here we can discuss whether according to Aristotle creation is possible? For in this place he indicates without any qualification that nothing can be made from non-being.⁶ This has been discussed in *Disputation 21* [sic].⁷

Question 2. Again, we can discuss whether according to Aristotle all immaterial substances are immobile? For in this place he calls them so,⁸ about which see *Disputation 35*.⁹

Question 3. Next, in the Third Chapter¹⁰ he shows that besides matter forms are necessary, not separate as Plato said, but informing matter. These forms, although it is not they which are properly generated, but rather the composites of them and matter, still do not exist before generation takes place. All of this was said also in Book 7, and was treated in *Disputation 15*.¹¹ But Aristotle here is proposing a hard question, that is, granted that a form does not exist before generation, does it remain after the corruption of the whole [composite]? And he answers simply that “in certain things there is no obstacle to this happening, namely, in the case of an intellectual soul, for in other things,” he says, “this is perhaps impossible.”¹² But we are leaving consideration of this for the Books of the *De Anima*.¹³ /p. LXII/

Question 4. Afterwards in Chapter 4, he teaches that the three posited principles¹⁴ are analogously and proportionately the same in all categories of accidents. For in all there can be considered a potency or a subject, a form or the accident itself, and its privation. In this place it can be asked whether accidents, whether taken in the abstract or as concrete, consist of their own proper physical potency and act? These questions are pretty much outside the intention of the present Book, in which all of this is cursorily put aside in order to discuss the higher substances. Neither would it be Aristotle's intention to give to individual accidents proper and distinct receptive potencies in their own genera, but only to explain those three principles of things proportionately in them. But those questions we have treated in *Disputation 14, Question 3* [sic].¹⁵ But, further, the Philosopher extends his remarks to all causes, saying that the same things which are [causes] of substances are proportionately and analogously [also] in accidents. And incidentally here he recalls some points about principle, cause, and element, which he made more at length in Book 5. They were explained there and were more extensively in the *Disputations about Causes, from 12 up to 27* [inclusive].¹⁶ However, he adds here a proposition which should be noted, namely, that "outside all particular causes there is a cause which as the first of all moves all [the rest]."¹⁷ To deal with this, we have in the place mentioned dedicated *Disputations 20,*¹⁸ *21,*¹⁹ *and 22,*²⁰ besides further things which we have here and there said in other *Disputations, especially in 24*²¹ *and 25.*²²

Finally, in the Fifth Chapter, he pursues the same goal, in various ways showing that the principles of all things are the same, either because substances are the causes of all accidents and in this way the principles of substances are the principles of other things, or because among substances some are first, and the causes of others, for example, the heavenly bodies and their souls, that is, as St. Thomas explains,²³ the motive Intelligences (which are called 'souls' either properly or metaphorically). And therefore he [Aristotle] adds, "or intellect, appetite, and body,"²⁴ that is, intelligent and loving substances and the bodies which they proximately use or which they move and through which they cause. And lastly he repeats that act and potency are the principles of all things; not, however, in the same way²⁵ but by analogy. All of these things are clear from the cited *Disputations*, and there is nothing to be added here.

Chapter Six

Besides Natural Substances There Is Some Perpetual and Immobile Substance

Question 1. The first question here is: whether to demonstrate that substances of this kind exist is a physical or a metaphysical task? This is treated in *Disputation 29, Section 3* [sic]²⁶, and in *Disputation 35, Section 1*.²⁷

Question 2 Did Aristotle correctly demonstrate this in the present [Chapter]? His argument in sum is this: It is impossible that all substances be corruptible; therefore, some eternal substance is necessary. The antecedent is clear, since if all substances were corruptible, there would be nothing eternal, because substances are the first beings, without which others cannot be. The consequent, however, is false, because it is necessary that motion at least be eternal. Therefore. . . . He proves the minor, because time could not begin anew, in such a way that it would not be before. For without time there cannot be a before and after. But time does not exist without motion, because either they are the same or time is a certain property of motion. Therefore, it is just as necessary that motion, just as much as time, be eternal and continuous, “which,” he says, “can be said of no [motion] except that which is circular and local.”²⁸ Hence, this whole argument is reduced to the proposition that without time there is no before and after, and, therefore, there can be no beginning of time.

As regards this last part, this argument is extremely ineffective. For if we speak in line with our way of conceiving, besides a real before and after, there is conceived an imaginary one. And in this way real time could have a beginning, before which it would not be. But this “before which” does not signify a time before, but only something imaginary.²⁹ However, if we speak in line with fact, before this time there preceded an infinite eternity, with which this time did not always co-exist. In this way that “before” does not express prior time, but rather the eternity which pre-existed in God when there was no time. Therefore, Aristotle’s argument is neither strong nor necessary. However, it can become effective through a dilemma: because either corruptible substances have always existed or not; if the first, it is necessary that there be some eternal substance, more perfect than they, from which they may have emanated; but if they have not always existed, it is not less necessary that such a substance exist, in order that they may have taken their origin from that.

Question 3. Does Aristotle show well enough that such a substance is not potency but rather act for the reason that it moves perpetually? One

reply is that from what has already been said /p. LXIII/ it is clear that the argument here proceeds from a false and insufficiently proven principle. However, even accepting that principle, nevertheless, from it alone we cannot conclude that the substance in question is pure act. For a created substance could cause such perpetual motion, if such were possible. Therefore, from that motion the only conclusion is that the substance of that mover is always in the act of moving. Add that for this [argument] it must also be supposed that this substance is always the same, which has not been proven; for several movers can move successively and can cease to move one by one.³⁰ Finally, even if the same mover is always in the act of moving, it does not follow that it cannot cease to move. For it can be moving perpetually not from necessity but from freedom. We deal with this matter more at length in *Disputation 30, Section 8* [sic],³¹ and *Disputation 35, Section 1* [sic].³²

Question 4. Does the Philosopher sufficiently prove that these substances are immaterial because they are perpetual? It is indeed difficult to grant efficacy to this argument; for the defect of its inference is immediately apparent in the heavens themselves, which are eternal and not immaterial. See *Disputation 30, Section 1* [sic],³³ and *Disputation 35, Sections 1 and 2*.³⁴

Question 5 Did Aristotle think the same thing about all the Intelligences as he did about the first, with respect to necessity of being, simplicity of nature, and actuality? This is treated in *Disputation 39, Section 2* [sic],³⁵ as well as in *Disputation 25* [sic], and there³⁶ is explained this passage in which Aristotle speaks in a confused and indiscriminate way about that supreme order of substances, but sometimes in the singular and sometimes in the plural.³⁷

The other things which Aristotle treats here about act and potency,³⁸ have been noted with respect to Book 9.

Chapter Seven About the Attributes of the Prime Mover

Question 1. Is it well enough inferred from the motion of the heavens that there is one immobile first mover? About this we have spoken at length in *Disputation 30, Sections 1 and 8* [sic].³⁹

Question 2. From Aristotle's opinion, does the prime mover move the heavens only as an end, or also as an agent? For here he seems to attribute to it only the first way of causing. But he does this only in order to show

its immobility, for in other respects he acknowledges its efficiency, as we have extensively discussed in *Disputation 23*[sic]⁴⁰ and *Disputation 30, Section 17*.⁴¹

Question 3. According to Aristotle, does the prime mover move the first sphere by means of another Intelligence or by itself? For in this place he may suggest the first, unless it is explained that it moves as moved not by another but by itself. For in this way the immobility of the prime mover is better explained, inasmuch as, not only in the genus of agent [cause], but also in the genus of end, it moves not as moved by another, but inasmuch as it acts on its own (*propter se*) without motion. For just as in the genus of agent, so in the genus of end, it is first and supreme. But in all the rest that he has said, Aristotle thinks there is no other mover of that sphere besides that which is first and immobile. He has, however, spoken of this more in the books of the *De Coelo*.⁴²

Question 4. Whether the prime mover is the first intelligible in act, inasmuch as it is the most actual and most simple substance? For the Philosopher in this passage thinks of it in this way. This is treated in *Disputation 38, Section 11* [sic].⁴³

Question 5. Whether the prime mover is the first desirable thing, which is the same as to ask whether it is the ultimate end? We discuss this in *Disputation 24*.⁴⁴ But from this place you have Aristotle making a distinction of two ends. One is pre-existing; the other is not pre-existing. The first is to be achieved through means; the second is also to be produced. Therefore, he says that the first is present in the prime mover, but not the second.

Question 6. Whether the prime mover is the eternal substance of all things, simple, and actual or pure act? See *Disputation 30, Section 3*.⁴⁵

Question 7. Whether the prime mover is a being which is by its nature absolutely necessary and which can in no way be otherwise than it is? See *Disputation 29, Section 1* [sic].⁴⁶

Question 8. Whether, according to Aristotle, the prime mover moves from a necessity of nature or rather from a preconceived goal and its necessity? See *Disputation 30, Section 16*.⁴⁷

Question 9. Whether, according to Aristotle, the heavens and nature depend upon the prime mover, not only with regard to motion, but also with regard to their substance? See *Disputation 20*,⁴⁸ *Section 1*,⁴⁹ and *Disputation 29, Section 2*.⁵⁰

Question 10. Whether the prime mover has the best, as well as eternal, and actual, life, endowed with the highest and most perfect joy, which stems from its self-contemplation? We treat this at length in *Disputation*

30, Section 14.⁵¹ There is, however, no doubt that Aristotle in this place is correctly thinking and speaking about God. These words of his are worthy of note: "If God exists always as well as we do sometimes, that is admirable; but if he exists even better, that is more admirable—but that is the way he exists."⁵² It seems, indeed, that the Philosopher himself at times experienced a certain great pleasure in some kind of speculation of the Separate Substances, especially of the First [Substance], in which [speculation] then in other passages he placed human happiness. Therefore, he extrapolates from this, and comes to an admiration of Divine perfection. And in this he is reasoning truly. The intellect understands by way of a certain conjunction /p. LXIV/ with the thing understood, and as it has that thing in itself it contemplates, and this last operation is its best condition and in that order speculation is the best and most pleasurable of all. Therefore, if God is the supreme intelligible, and most of all joined with Himself, and contemplates Himself eternally through Himself, his life and pleasure are admirable.

Question 11. Whether God is not only an eternal and best living thing but also his own life, because He is his own operation and pure act. For Aristotle here thinks of God in this way, and rightly so, as we consider it in *Disputation 30, Sections 3⁵³ and 14.*⁵⁴

Question 12. How what Aristotle states here is true, namely, that in God there is a continuous and eternal duration (*aevum*); cf. *Disputation 30, Section 8,*⁵⁵ and *Disputation 50, Section 1.*⁵⁶

Question 13. Just as God is the principle of all things, is he in the same way the best and most splendid of things? This is treated by us in the mentioned *Disputation* [i.e. 30].⁵⁷ And it is relevant with regard to this text, for Aristotle plainly indicates all of this, when he chides the Pythagoreans and Speusippus for the fact that they would deny⁵⁸ that God is the best and most splendid, even though [they admit] he is the principle, because [they think] principles, and that which comes to be from them, are not always equally perfect, as is clear in the case of a seed. However, he responds that a proximate and instrumental principle is not always equally perfect; but the chief, and especially the first, principle is necessarily most perfect.

Question 14. Whether Aristotle thought that God is without qualification infinite, and whether he correctly proved that from the fact that He moves in an infinite time? See *Disputation 30, Section 2.*⁵⁹

Question 15. Whether the first immaterial mover exists as absolutely unable to be affected, and whether this is adequately demonstrated by natural reason? Cf. *Disputation 40 [sic], Sections 1 and 8.*⁶⁰

Chapter Eight

About the Number of Separate Substances

In this Chapter, Aristotle, from the number of mobile spheres of heaven, proves the number of immaterial moving Substances; and he infers their order and properties from the order of the mobile spheres. About this reasoning various questions arise.

Question 1. Can it be adequately proven that the heavens are moved by some Separate Substance besides the First? This pertains to the books of the *De Coelo*, but we will take it up in *Disputation 35, Section 1*.⁶¹

Question 2. Granted that they are moved in this way, is it necessary that the heavens be moved by as many Separate Substances as there are such heavenly bodies? See the same place.

Question 3. Whether the number of Separate Substances can be proven to be not more than the number of the heavenly spheres? Or, conversely, is the number of the spheres greater than that of the Separate Substances? Or can neither be adequately proven? See the same place.

Question 4. Whether a superior sphere is moved by a superior and more perfect Intelligence, and whether this should be understood about individual or specific perfection? In this place, the question is usually raised: whether the sphere of the sun is more perfect than the superior spheres of the planets. But it does not belong in this place and it is not relevant to the present matter; for whatever about substantial perfection, as regards the character of being mobile it is certain that the higher a sphere is, the more it has the nature of a perfect mobile, both because of its great size and also because it is superior and contains its inferiors.

Question 5. Whether from the incorruptibility of heaven, or from the eternity of motion itself, it is correctly inferred that the Separate Substances are incorruptible and perpetual? See *Disputation 35, Sections 1*⁶² and *2*.⁶³

Question 6. Whether, according to Aristotle, from the eternal motion of heaven it can be inferred that those Substances have no magnitude, and that consequently they are infinite? See the same place and also *Disputation 30, Section 4* [sic].⁶⁴

Question 7. Whether Aristotle thought that such Substances exist as first movers of the lower spheres? And in what sense did he think that one was first and another second? We raise all these questions in *Disputation 29, Section 2*,⁶⁵ and in *Disputation 35, Section 2*.⁶⁶ And those things which directly pertain to a metaphysician are treated at length; those things which are properly physical and pertain to the books of the *De Coelo*⁶⁷ are only briefly explained.

Question 8. And for the same reason we are omitting the rest of the Chapter, in which Aristotle treats extensively of the number of the heavenly spheres. Again, he treats of the unity of heaven, that is, of the whole celestial sphere, and consequently of the whole universe, showing it to be one. His argument, however, is weak, namely, that if there were several heavens, they would have several principles which would be only numerically different. This he proves to be impossible, because such principles would have to have matter. But that first inference is weak, because several worlds can come from the same principle, as we discuss at length in *Disputation 29, Section 1* [sic].⁶⁸

Question 9. The refutation of that inference also raises a question about the principle of individuation, about which we treat broadly in *Disputation 5, Section 2, and following*.⁶⁹ But in this whole argument of Aristotle we should keep in sight his rather modest words: "Reasonably it should be so thought, for what is necessary may be left to be decided by more capable people."⁷⁰ For he correctly understood that these /p. LXV/ were probable arguments and not demonstrations.

Chapter Nine Containing Certain Doubts about The Divine Intelligence

Question 1. The first question asked by Aristotle is whether the Divine mind is always actually understanding? And he gives an argument for doubting. If it is not always actually understanding, "what excellence will it have? For it will be like someone sleeping."⁷¹ But if it is always actually understanding, then it will have its excellence from the act of understanding; therefore, it will not be itself the most excellent substance.

The answer is that it is always actually understanding not by an intellection which is added to its substance, but by its own most noble substance itself. And in this way he answers both sides of the argument.⁷² We treat this matter explicitly in *Disputation 30, Section 15*.⁷³ But the Philosopher adds here another proof of the answer he has given, namely, that if God were not his own intellection, the continuation of understanding would be onerous for him. But this proof is not convincing, otherwise it would prove the same thing about all other Intelligences. Therefore, even though an action is not the same as a substance, its continuation need not be onerous. For it does not contradict its nature, nor does it cause any contrary alteration or change.

Question 2. What does the Divine mind understand? Is it itself or something else? And is it something else which is always different, or always the same? The answer is: “It is evident that it understands what is most divine and most honorable”⁷⁴—“with the result that it understands itself.”⁷⁵ Therefore, he virtually makes the following argument. The Divine mind is the supreme and most excellent Intelligence or the act of intelligence itself. But for excellence of understanding the excellence of the thing understood is very important. For this reason it is better not to see, rather than to see certain things—if they are most vile. Hence, not every understanding is the best, but rather that which is of the best thing understood. Therefore, the Divine mind understands that which is best. Therefore, it understands its own self; otherwise there would in fact be something else more excellent than it.

Question 3. From this, however, there arises a third question: whether according to the Philosopher God knows nothing outside himself, but only himself? For, at first glance, Aristotle seems to think the latter about God. But, with St. Thomas,⁷⁶ it can be interpreted that God does not directly and immediately know anything other than himself either in such way that he is perfected by that, or in such way that he is impeded or distracted from knowing the most excellent object. But about this matter we have spoken more at length in *Disputation 30, Section 15*.⁷⁷

Question 4. Another question arises from the resolution of a doubt which the Philosopher proposes here: namely, whether in all things which lack matter, and therefore in all Intelligences, the act of understanding (*intellectio*) and the thing understood are the same and, consequently, that an Angel is its own act of understanding? For it seems that Aristotle suggests this position. For when he had proposed the doubt about the way in which the Divine mind can be its own understanding (*intelligentia*), since the act of understanding is usually distinguished from its object, he answered that the act of understanding is not distinguished from its object except as a form without matter is distinguished from a form which is in matter. Therefore, since the Divine mind lacks matter, it is not necessary that a thing which is understood in it be distinguished from the act of understanding—which argument, if it is efficacious, must be extended to all Intelligences. But it can be said that the argument was made only in a kind of analogous way, in order to explain how in Divine knowledge, because of its supreme immateriality and spirituality, it is necessary that its proper object not be distinguished from that knowledge itself. However, it is not necessary that this be true in the case of any Intelligence whatever, nor is there any reason why we should say that was Aristotle’s intention.

About this, [we have treated] at length in *Disputation 34 [sic], Section 4*.⁷⁸

Question 5. The fifth question is whether God always and necessarily remains in actual knowledge of himself, as the Philosopher here states. He proves this best from the fact that God would change [from this knowledge of himself] to something worse, whether he would cease [knowing himself] in order to be only in first act like a sleeper, as was said in the course of Question 1, or whether (which pertains to this Question) he would pass from the contemplation of himself to that of other things, for he would always pass to something less excellent. About this matter we treat in *Disputation 30, Section 15*.⁷⁹

Question 6. Does God understand by a simple act of understanding or by composing?⁸⁰ Aristotle chose the first and the matter is evident. See *Disputation 30, Section 15*.⁸¹

Chapter Ten

There Is One Prince and Governor of the Universe

This is the position which Aristotle intends to assert in this Chapter, which he also wants to be the conclusion of the whole work⁸² and a kind of peroration worthy of so great a philosopher. But he demonstrates it with an argument as follows. The good of the universe consists in the appropriate order of its parts, in such way that this good is a kind of intrinsic good which inheres in the universe itself. But it cannot have a good of this kind unless there is in it someone supreme who is its Governor, who is at the same time outside it and its ultimate end, from whom it emanates and to whom it tends as the extrinsic good /p. LXVI/ of the universe. Therefore, one supreme Prince and Governor is necessary in the universe.

The Philosopher first explains this argument by the example of an army, whose intrinsic good consists in an appropriate order. But for this it requires a leader, who is [himself] the greater good of the whole army, because the order of the army is from him and for him. Then he clarifies the first proposition he has assumed,⁸³ by explaining briefly the order of parts in the universe by comparison with a house and a well ordered family.⁸⁴ And the matter as such is clear enough.

He does not explicitly bring up the minor proposition,⁸⁵ but he does indeed intend it, and on this occasion he again here digresses in order to lightly touch upon and to reject the opinions of the ancients about principles, so as to infer from this that in none of the mentioned ways can it

be rightly understood how the marvelous order of this universe subsists and is conserved from those principles without any supreme governor.

In passing he mentions the best arguments, even though most briefly and rather obscurely, such as the fact that it is not enough to say that all things come to be from contraries, unless there is posited another supreme Principle which disposes them in such a way and orders their interactions, with the result that neither of them entirely removes the other, but rather that the succession of generations endures. Again, there is another argument because without this Principle there cannot be assigned a cause why this individual participates in this species now and not before, and one individual [participates] before and another after. However, as St. Thomas⁸⁶ has very well noted, he has both arguments in these words: “But both for those who establish two principles, it is necessary that there be a third more principal principle (that is, because of the first argument), and also for those who [conceive] Forms (that is, Ideas), [it is necessary] that there be another more principal principle; for, why has there been participation or is there now participation?”⁸⁷ Behold the second argument! But, finally, at the end of the Chapter, he adds this proof of the minor [premiss]: A plurality of governing principles, or of first principles, is not good,⁸⁸ and it does not contribute to good government; “but beings are unwilling to be governed badly; therefore, let there be one Prince.”⁸⁹

Question 1. Various questions arise about this conclusion of the Philosopher and about his proofs for it.

First, whether by the argument here or by other natural means it is sufficiently demonstrated that there is only one God? This we treat at length in *Disputation 29, Section 1* [sic],⁹⁰ and *Disputation 30, Section 10*.⁹¹

Question 2. Whether God has providence over this universe, of what sort it may be, and what Aristotle thought about this? See *Disputation 30, Sections 16 and 17*,⁹² in addition to what has been said in *Disputation 22*.⁹³

Question 3. Whether God is called the supreme good of the universe only as its ultimate end, or whether also as its efficient cause? This has often been mentioned in what has been said above and passages in the Disputations have been indicated. Here it may be noted only that Aristotle in this Chapter a number of times (*saepe*) concludes to and joins both together, and he reproaches the ancients who neglected the second consideration (*ratio*). However, he particularly praises Anaxagoras, because he posited a Mind as the first mover, which is to say, an efficient cause. And he adds immediately: “But it moves for the sake of something; therefore it is second, unless it is as we say,”⁹⁴ that is to say, that it moves for the sake of itself.

Other things which can be sought about natural knowledge of God or the First Cause, and of Intelligences, we discuss at length in our Disputations—particularly: about God under the concept of first cause in *Disputations 20*,⁹⁵ *21*,⁹⁶ and *22*;⁹⁷ under the concept of first exemplar in *Disputation 26*;⁹⁸ under the proper concept of God in *Disputations 29*⁹⁹ and *30*;¹⁰⁰ and about the created Intelligences in *Disputation 35*,¹⁰¹ as the following Index¹⁰² will show in more detail.

Notes

¹ According to Tricot: The general interpretation of this Book and its place in the *Metaphysics* have given rise to considerable difficulties. For the most part, from Bonitz up to Jaeger and Ross, it has been regarded as an independent treatise, which has as its object only the establishment of the spiritual nature of an eternal, immobile, mover of the universe. Tricot (along with Hamelin, *Le Système d'Aristote*, 2^e éd. par L. Robin [Paris, 1920], pp. 34–35) does not agree. It is true that Book 12 does not contain any references to the other Books and that notably the discussion of substance in it makes no reference to Book 7, and also that the other books make few references to Book 12. But one should not conclude that Book 12 is self-sufficient and in no way attached to other parts of the *Metaphysics*. The question of references here, says Tricot, is secondary. First, because there are implicit references, for example, the discussion in Book 12, Chapter 4, is governed by certain questions from Book 3 (the 6th aporia, for instance, which opens Chapter 3 of Book 3). Further, the intrinsic link between passages of Book 12 and passages from other Books is beyond doubt. For example, the problem of the existence of an immobile subject as the object of theology which is posed in Book 6, Chapter 1, presages the important developments of Book 12, Chapters 6 to 8, on the nature of the Prime Mover, etc. Again, Book 12 and *Physics*, Book 8 are, says Tricot, solidly linked. Book 12, Chapter 1, refers the study of sensible substances to physics, but these substances are not excluded from metaphysics, for which they constitute at least secondary objects which enter the domain of metaphysics insofar as they are dependent upon the Prime Mover (cf. Book 12, Chapter 7, 1072b13). Yet it would be too much to claim with Bonitz that Book 12 has an essentially physical character; on the contrary it is very distinct in its object from *Physics*, Book 8, which was itself already a metaphysical conclusion for the whole science of nature. Book 12 goes beyond the Prime Mover which is presented in the *Physics* as a pure Form, transcendent, and unextended. In Book 12 it is shown that the Prime Mover is Thought of Pure Thought and that it is the *raison d'être* of substances and not only the cause of their movement. In a word, says Tricot, Book 12 it has for its proper object “being insofar as it is being”—God himself. In this way, First Philosophy receives its true name—it is “Theology.”

According to Jaeger (*Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* [Berlin, 1912], p. 122; *Aristotle: Fundamentals...*, p. 221), Book 12 belongs to the early stage of Aristotle's career and it would be if not contemporaneous with Books 1 and 3, at least anterior to Book 6 and to the group: 7, 8, and 9. Thus Book 12 would betray the influence of Plato by its conception of a personal God anterior to the ontological conception of a metaphysics of being insofar as it is being. Again, it would have for its exclusive object supersensible substances, while sensible substances would belong to physics, the science which is preparatory to the supreme science in which it finds its achievement and its perfection. The first of these reasons presupposes Jaeger's theory of two different opposing stages and two conceptions in Aristotle's work. To Tricot these conceptions seem complementary rather than contradictory one of the other.

The second reason wrongly supposes that metaphysics excludes the study of sensible substances. Tricot himself is firmly convinced that Book 12 comes both chronologically and logically after Books 7, 8, and 9. The theory of substance and of act which is expounded in 7, 8, and 9 is perfected in Book 12 by the theory of Prime Mover and Pure Act. On the other side, Book 12 is linked with Books 13 and 14, which like 12 are interested in supersensible substances. An exception must be made for Chapter 8 of Book 12, whose style is entirely different and which belongs in the last period of Aristotle's life. It constitutes as is well known an incursion of the author into the domain of cosmology—to the detriment of his metaphysics.

Book 12 is divided into two parts, very unequal in their importance. The first part (Chapters 1–5) establishes the primordial role of the efficient cause, a role which can only belong to individual substances and not to genera and universals. This accentuates the necessity of an individual motive cause and in this roughly prepares for the demonstration of the existence and the nature of the Prime Mover, which then will be the object of Chapters 6 to 10. This second part is in the eyes of all commentators, ancient, medieval, and modern, of prime importance. For this, cf. J. Tricot, *Aristote...*, pp. xxx–xxxiv.

² Cf. esp. *DM* 1, 1, nn. 14–17, vol. 25, pp. 6–8.

³ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.1.1069a30–b7 and 1069b24–27.

⁴ That is, form, matter, and privation.

⁵ Cf. *DM* 13, vol. 25, pp. 395–461: “About the Material Cause of a Substance.”

⁶ Cf. *Metaphysics* 11.6.1062b24–5.

⁷ Rather, cf. *DM* 20, 1, nn. 24–6, vol. 25, pp. 751–3, where Suárez discusses the Aristotelian dictum (*Physics* 1.8.191b13–14) that from nothing nothing is made.

⁸ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.2.1069b24–6.

⁹ Cf. esp. *DM* 35, 3, nn. 48–50, vol. 26, pp. 455–6.

¹⁰ *Metaphysics* 12.3.1069b35–1070a21.

¹¹ Cf. *DM* 15, vol. 25, pp. 497–566: “About a Substantial Formal Cause.” In this, especially see s. 7, nn. 8–9, pp. 524–5, where Suárez explains Aristotle's doctrine in *Metaphysics*, Book 2, Chapter 8.

¹² Cf. “ἐπὶ ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως.” *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a25–7. This, of course, was an important text for Scholastics attempting to understand Aristotle's position with respect to human survival after death. It also seems important as a possible link to Plato's doctrine on this.

¹³ Cf. Suárez, *Tractatus de Anima* I, c. 10, in *Opera*, vol. 3, pp. 529–42, where he proves the immortality of the human soul; and *ibid.*, VI, pp. 782–801, where he discusses its condition when after death it is separated from the body.

¹⁴ Form, matter, and privation.

¹⁵ Rather, cf. *DM* 14, s. 3, vol. 25, pp. 471–93, which asks: “What substance could be a material cause of accidents?”

¹⁶ Cf. *Opera*, vol. 25, pp. 372–961.

¹⁷ Cf.: “ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς πρῶτον πάντων κινῶν πάντα.” *Metaphysics* 12.4.1070b34–5.

¹⁸ *DM* 20, vol. 25, pp. 745–85: “The First Efficient Cause and its Action, which is Creation.”

¹⁹ *DM* 21, vol. 25, pp. 785–801: “About the First Efficient Cause and its Second Action, which is Conservation.”

²⁰ *DM* 22, vol. 25, pp. 802–43: “About the First Cause and Another of its Actions, which is Conservation or Concurrence with Second Causes.”

²¹ *DM* 24, vol. 25, pp. 890–99: “About the Ultimate Final Cause.”

²² *DM* 25, vol. 25, pp. 899–916: “About an Exemplar Cause.”

- ²³ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, XII, c. 5, l. 4, Cathala no. 2474.
- ²⁴ Cf. "...ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα." *Metaphysics* 12.5.1071a3.
- ²⁵ Literally: "not however the same."
- ²⁶ In fact, the question is explicitly raised in *DM* 29, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 21–34, which asks: "Whether it can be demonstrated in a physical or a metaphysical way that there is a certain uncreated Being?"
- ²⁷ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 424–36, where the question is: "Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?"
- ²⁸ Cf.: "κίνησις δ' οὐκ ἔστι συνεχῆς ἀλλ' ἢ ἡ κατὰ τόπον, καὶ ταύτης ἡ κύκλω." *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b10–11.
- ²⁹ On imaginary time, cf. *DM* 50, 9, nn. 10–11, vol. 26, p. 586; *DM* 54, 4, n. 7, p. 1030; and *ibid.* 6, n. 3, p. 1039.
- ³⁰ On this hypothesis, cf. *DM* 29, 1, n. 11, vol. 26, p. 24.
- ³¹ Rather, see *DM* 30, s. 9, vol. 26, pp. 116–36, where Suárez's question is: "How can immutability be compatible with divine liberty?"
- ³² Rather, cf. *DM* 35, s. 5, vol. 26, pp. 466–8, which asks: "What can be known by natural reason about the will of the Intelligences?"; and *ibid.*, s. 6, pp. 468–77, where the question is: "What can be known by natural reason about the power of acting and the efficacy of the intelligences?"
- ³³ Rather, cf. *DM* 29, 1, nn. 7–17, vol. 26, pp. 23–6.
- ³⁴ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 424–36, which asks: "Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?"; and s. 2, pp. 436–9, where the question is: "What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?"
- ³⁵ Rather, cf. *DM* 35, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 439–58, which asks: "What attributes can be known as regards the essences of created Intelligences?"
- ³⁶ Possibly: *DM* 35, 3, n. 24, vol. 26, p. 447; or *ibid.*, 4, n. 2, p. 459.
- ³⁷ Cf. *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b21, 1072a12–15.
- ³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, 1071b19–29.
- ³⁹ Rather, cf. *DM* 29, s. 1, nn. 7–17, vol. 26, pp. 23–6; *ibid.*, 2, nn. 15–20, pp. 39–41.
- ⁴⁰ Rather, see *DM* 20, vol. 25, pp. 745–85: "The First Efficient Cause and its Action which is Creation"; *DM* 21, pp. 785–801: "About the First Efficient Cause and its Second Action, which is Conservation"; and *DM* 22, pp. 802–43: "About the First Cause and Another of its Effects, which is Conservation or Concurrence with Second Causes."
- ⁴¹ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 17, vol. 26, pp. 206–24: "What [can be known] about the divine omnipotence and its action?"
- ⁴² That is, Aristotle's work "On Heaven [and Earth]." Cf. *De Coelo* 1.9.279a33–4, which is the only place I have found that seems to fit what Suárez is saying here, namely, that there is no mover beyond the First.
- ⁴³ Possibly a combination of: *DM* 30, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 72–4, where the question is: "Can God be demonstrated to be pure act and simple in every way?"; *ibid.*, s. 8, pp. 113–15, which asks: "Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable?"; and s. 15, pp. 170–83, which asks: "What can be known by natural reason about the divine knowledge?"
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *DM* 24, vol. 25, pp. 890–99: "About the Ultimate Final Cause or about the Ultimate End."
- ⁴⁵ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 72–4, where asks: "Can God be demonstrated to be pure act and simple in every way?"
- ⁴⁶ Rather, see *DM* 28, 1, nn. 8–12, vol. 26, pp. 3–4, where Suárez presents a division of being into Necessary and contingent; also, cf. *DM* 30, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 113–15, which asks: "Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable?"

- ⁴⁷ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 16, vol. 26, pp. 184–206, where Suárez’s question is: “What [can be known] about the divine will and its powers?” Especially, cf. *ibid.*, nn. 52–6, pp. 201–203, where Suárez discusses Aristotle’s doctrine.
- ⁴⁸ Here I read with Rabade et al. “XX” instead of the Vivès “29”.
- ⁴⁹ Cf. *DM* 20, s. 1, vol. 25, pp. 445–54, which asks: “Whether it can be known by natural reason that the creation of some beings is possible, or even necessary? Or (what is the same) whether one being insofar as it is being can depend essentially on the effective causality of another?”
- ⁵⁰ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, which asks: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God exists, by showing that there is only one Uncreated Being?”
- ⁵¹ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 14, vol. 26, pp. 165–70, which asks: “Whether God can be demonstrated to be essentially living with an intellectual and most happy life?”
- ⁵² Cf. “εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὐἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ᾧδε.” *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b24–6.
- ⁵³ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 3, vol. 26, pp. 72–4, which asks: “Can God be demonstrated to be pure act and simple in every way?”
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, s. 14, vol. 26, pp. 165–70, which asks: “Whether God can be demonstrated to be essentially living with an intellectual and most happy life?”
- ⁵⁵ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 8, vol. 26, pp. 113–15, where Suárez asks: “Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable?”
- ⁵⁶ Cf. *DM* 50, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 912–16, where the question is: “Whether duration is something really distinct from the being of the thing which is enduring?” Also, cf. *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 922–6, which asks: “What is eternity? And how is it distinguished from created duration?”
- ⁵⁷ See especially, *DM* 30, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 60–64, which asks: “Can God be demonstrated to be a supremely perfect being?”
- ⁵⁸ Actually, “he would deny” (*negaret*).
- ⁵⁹ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 64–72, where Suárez is asking: “Can God be demonstrated to be infinite?”
- ⁶⁰ Rather, see *DM* 30, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 60–64, which asks: “Can God be demonstrated to be a supremely perfect being?”; and *ibid.*, s. 8, pp. 113–15, which asks: “Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable?”
- ⁶¹ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 1, vol. 26, pp. 424–36, where the question is: “Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?”
- ⁶² *Ibid.*”
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, s. 2, pp. 436–9, which asks: “What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?”
- ⁶⁴ Rather, cf. *DM* 35, s. 4, nn. 6–14, vol. 26, pp. 441–4; *ibid.*, nn. 24–32, pp. 447–9, and nn. 45–7, pp. 454–6.
- ⁶⁵ Cf. *DM* 29, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, where the question is: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God exists by showing that there is only one uncreated being?”
- ⁶⁶ Cf. *DM* 35, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 436–9, which asks: “What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?”
- ⁶⁷ This comes close to the point made by Tricot; cf. note 1, above.
- ⁶⁸ Rather, see *DM* 29, 2, n. 37, vol. 26, p. 47. Looking at this passage, I believe that the remote background here is the famous and powerful condemnation by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277 of 219 propositions, of which one (n. 34) was: “That the First Cause could not make several worlds” (*Quod prima causa non posset plures mundos facere.*); for this, see Henricus Denifle, O.P., *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*, tomus I (Paris, 1889/ impression anastatique, Bruxelles: Culture et Civilisation, 1964), annus 1277, n. 473, p. 543.

- ⁶⁹ Cf. *DM* 5, s. 2, vol. 25, pp. 148–61, where the question is: “Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?” In what follows, see especially Section 5, pp. 177–80, which asks: “Whether the principle of individuation is the existence of a singular thing?”
- ⁷⁰ Cf. “...εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἀφείσθω τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις λέγειν.” *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a15–17.
- ⁷¹ Cf.: “τὶ ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ’ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ καθεύδων...” *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17–18.
- ⁷² Literally, “both reasons for doubting.”
- ⁷³ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 15, vol. 26, pp. 170–83, which asks: “What can be known by natural reason about the divine knowledge?”
- ⁷⁴ Cf. “δῆλον τοῖνυν ὅτι τὸ θεϊότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ...” *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b25–7.
- ⁷⁵ Cf. “αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ...” *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b33–4. Note the long unremarked ellipsis in what Suárez reproduces as a single sentence from Aristotle.
- ⁷⁶ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, XII, c. 9, l. 11, Cathala nos. 2611–16.
- ⁷⁷ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 15, vol. 26, pp. 170–83, which asks: “What can be known by natural reason about the divine knowledge?”
- ⁷⁸ Rather, cf. *DM* 35, 4, nn. 2–3, vol. 26, p. 459, where Suárez discusses Aristotle’s opinion in *Metaphysics*, Book 12, and Averroes’ explanation of it.
- ⁷⁹ See *DM* 30, s. 15, vol. 26, pp. 170–83, where the question is: “What can be known by natural reason about the divine knowledge?”
- ⁸⁰ That is, *judging*, in the complex way in which humans do.
- ⁸¹ Cf. esp. *DM* 30, 15, n. 41, vol. 26, p. 182.
- ⁸² As we have seen, Suárez was aware of the existence of two further books (13 and 14) of the *Metaphysics*. In the Middle Ages, St. Albert the Great, among others, had commented on them. They had also appeared in Bessarion’s translation together with Averroes’ commentary in volume 8 of the 1562 Venice edition of Aristotle. Although Fonseca’s translation of them without commentary was first published only in 1612, there is a chance that when Suárez was writing his fellow Jesuit’s translation may have existed and possibly even was available in manuscript form.
- ⁸³ That the intrinsic good of an army consists in order.
- ⁸⁴ *Metaphysics* 12.1075a13–15; 18–20.
- ⁸⁵ That order requires a leader.
- ⁸⁶ Cf. *In 12 lib. Metaphys.*, XII, c. 10, l. 12, Cathala nos. 2640–42.
- ⁸⁷ Cf. “καὶ τοῖς δύο ἀρχᾶς ποιούσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἀρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἶδη ὅτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα. διὰ τί γὰρ μετέσχεν ἢ μετέχει;” *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075b17–20.
- ⁸⁸ Cf. “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκυοιρανίη...” *Metaphysics* 12.10.1076a4, where Aristotle is quoting Homer, the *Iliad* II, 204.
- ⁸⁹ Cf. “τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύσθαι κακῶς...” ‘εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω.’” *Metaphysics* 12.10.1076a4–5. Aristotle’s citation continues from the *Iliad* II, 204. For Suárez himself directly quoting this passage from Homer, cf. *DM* 29, 2, n. 27, vol. 26, p. 44.
- ⁹⁰ Rather, see *DM* 29, s. 2, vol. 26, pp. 34–47, which asks: “Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is Uncreated Being?”, and *ibid.*, s. 3, pp. 47–60, which asks: “Can this same thing be demonstrated in some *a priori* way?”
- ⁹¹ Cf. *DM* 30, s. 10, vol. 26, pp. 137–41, where the question is: “Whether the fact that there is only one God can be demonstrated.”
- ⁹² Cf. esp. *DM* 30, 16, nn. 18–19, vol. 26, p. 189, and nn. 52–6, pp. 201–203; *ibid.*, 17, n. 52, p. 224; also: *ibid.*, 15, nn. 41–3, pp. 182–3.

- ⁹³ Cf. *DM* 22, vol. 25, pp. 802–43: “About the First Cause and another of its Actions, which is Conservation or Concurrence with Second Causes.”
- ⁹⁴ Cf. “ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἔνεκά τινος ὥστε ἕτερον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμεῖς λέγομεν...” *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075b9–10.
- ⁹⁵ *DM* 20, vol. 25, pp. 745–785: “The First Efficient Cause and its Action which is Creation.”
- ⁹⁶ *DM* 21, vol. 25, pp. 785–801: “About the First Efficient Cause and its Action which is Creation.”
- ⁹⁷ *DM* 22, vol. 25, pp. 802–43: “About the First Cause and another of its Actions, which is Conservation or Concurrence with Second Causes.”
- ⁹⁸ Cf. *DM* 26, vol. 25, pp. 916–949: “About the Relation of Causes to Effects.”
- ⁹⁹ *DM* 29, vol. 26, pp. 21–60: “Whether there is a First and Uncreated Being.”
- ¹⁰⁰ *DM* 30, vol. 26, pp. 60–224: “About the First Being or God: what He is.”
- ¹⁰¹ Cf. *DM* 35, vol. 26, pp. 424–477: “About Immaterial Created Substance.”
- ¹⁰² That is: “An Index of the Disputations and Sections which are contained in this Work” (*Index Disputationum et Sectionum Quae in Hoc Opere Continentur*); cf. Vivès edition, vol. 25, pp. lxvii–lxxiii.

AN INDEX OF THE DISPUTATIONS AND SECTIONS WHICH ARE CONTAINED IN THIS WORK

IN THE FIRST TOME

The First Disputation

About the Nature of First Philosophy or Metaphysics

(vol. 25, pp. 1–64)

Section I. What is the object of metaphysics?

Section II. Whether metaphysics is concerned with all things at the level of their proper natures?

Section III. Whether metaphysics is one single science?

Section IV. What are the tasks of this science? What is its goal? Or what is its utility?

Section V. Whether metaphysics is the most perfect speculative science, and whether it is true wisdom?

Section VI. Whether among all sciences metaphysics is most of all desired by a human being by a natural appetite?

Disputation Two

About the Essential Nature or Concept of Being

(vol. 25, pp. 64–102)

Section I. Whether being insofar as it is being has in our mind one formal concept which is common to all beings?

Section II. Whether being has one concept or [one] formal objective character?

Section III. Whether the character or the concept of being is, in reality and prior to being understood, in some way prescinded from its inferiors?

Section IV. In what does the character of being insofar as it is being consist? And how does it belong to inferior beings?

Section V. Whether the character of being transcends all the characters and differences of inferior beings, in such a way that it is intimately and essentially included in them?

Section VI. How being insofar as it is being is contracted or determined to its inferiors?

Disputation Three
*About the Properties and Principles
of Being in General*
(vol. 25, pp. 102–115)

Section I. Whether being insofar as it is being has some properties and of what kind they are?

Section II. How many properties are there and what order do they have among themselves?

Section III. By what principles can properties be demonstrated of being? And whether among these, this is the first: 'It is impossible that the same thing be and not be.'

Disputation Four
About Transcendental Unity in General
(vol. 25, pp. 115–145)

Section I. Whether transcendental unity adds some positive character to being, or only something privative?

Section II. Whether 'one' as such expresses only a negation which it adds to being? Or [does it express] something else?

Section III. How many kinds of unity are there in things?

Section IV. Whether unity is an adequate property of being? And about the division of being into the one and the many.

Section V. Whether the division of being into the one and the many is analogous?

Section VI. How are the one and the many opposed?

Section VII. Whether one is prior to many and indivision is prior to division?

Section VIII. Whether the division of being into the one and the many is the first of all divisions?

Section IX. Whether transcendental unity is numerical unity?

Disputation Five
About Individual Unity and Its Source
 (vol. 25, pp. 145–201)²

Section I. Whether all things which exist or can exist are singular and individual?

Section II. Whether in all natures an individual or singular thing as such adds something over the common or specific nature?

Section III. Whether designated matter is the principle of individuation in material substances?

Section IV. Whether substantial form is the principle of individuation for material substances?

Section V. Whether the principle of individuation is the existence of a singular thing?

Section VI. What, finally, is the principle of individuation in all created substances?

Section VII. Whether the principle of individuation of accidents is to be taken from their subject?

Section VIII. Whether because of their individuation it is inadmissible for two accidents which are only numerically diverse to be simultaneously in the same subject?

Section IX. Whether it contradicts the individuation of accidents that several which are only numerically different be successively in the same subject?

Disputation Six
About Formal and Universal Unity
 (vol. 25, pp. 201–250)³

Section I. Whether there is in things some formal unity which is distinct from and less than numerical?

Section II. Whether a universal unity, which is distinct from formal unity, actually exists in things prior to the operation of the mind?

Section III. Whether a common nature has of itself some unity of precision outside individuals prior to the operation of the mind?

Section IV. What is the aptitude in a universal nature that it be in many things?

Section V. Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect? And how should we answer the objections which have been stated against that?

Section VI. By what operation of intellect are universal things produced?

Section VII. Whether universals are real corporeal beings, substantial or accidental, and what causes do they have?

Section VIII. How many kinds of universal, or universal unity, exist?

Section IX. How in actual reality are unity of genus and unity of difference distinguished, both between themselves and from specific unity?

Section X. Whether the abstract metaphysical realities of genera, species, and differences, can be predicated among themselves?

Section XI. What is the principle of formal and universal unity in things?

Disputation Seven

About Various Kinds of Distinctions

(vol. 25, pp. 250–274)⁴

Section I. Whether besides a real and a rational distinction there is some other distinction in things?

Section II. By what signs or modes can the various distinctions of things be discerned?

Section III. How the same and the diverse are compared between themselves and with respect to being.

Disputation Eight

About Truth or the True Which Is a Property of Being

(vol. 25, pp. 274–312)

Section I. Whether formal truth is in the composition and division of the intellect?

Section II. What is the truth of cognition?

Section III. Whether the truth of cognition exists only in composition and division or also in simple concepts?

Section IV. Whether the truth of cognition or of the intellect does not exist in it until it judges?

Section V. Whether truth of cognition exists only in the speculative intellect or also in the practical intellect?

Section VI. Whether truth is in division as much as in composition?

Section VII. Whether there is some truth in things which is a property of being?

Section VIII. Whether truth is said of the truth of cognition before the truth of things, and how?

Disputation Nine
About Falsity or the False
(vol. 25, pp. 312–328)

Section I. What and where is falsity? And is it a property of being?

Section II. What is the origin of falsity?

Section III. Whence arises the difficulty of attaining truth?

Disputation Ten
About the Good or Transcendental Goodness
(vol. 25, pp. 328–355)⁵

Section I. What is the good or goodness?

Section II. How is the good related to the concept of an end? Or rather how many kinds of good are there?

Section III. What then is the good which is convertible with being as its property?

Disputation Eleven
About Evil
(vol. 25, pp. 355–372)⁶

Section I. Whether evil is something in things, and how many kinds of evil are there?

Section II. How many evils exist?

Section III. Where does evil exist, what is its source, and what causes does it have?

Section IV. Why evil is not numbered among the attributes of being.

Disputation Twelve
In General about the Causes of Being
(vol. 25, pp. 372–395)

Section I. Whether a cause and a principle are in every way the same?

Section II. Whether there is some common character of cause, and what that is as well as what nature does it have?

Section III. How many kinds of cause are there?

Disputation Thirteen
About the Material Cause of a Substance
(vol. 25, pp. 395–461)

Section I. Whether by natural reason it is evident that among beings there is a material cause of substances, which we call “prime matter”?

Section II. Whether the material cause of generable substances is one or many?

Section III. Whether the first and only material cause of generable substances is some simple body or a complete substance?

Section IV. Whether prime matter has some actual ungenerable and incorruptible entity?

Section V. Whether matter is pure potency, and in what sense is that to be taken?

Section VI. How can matter be known?

Section VII. What does matter cause?

Section VIII. Through what does matter cause?

Section IX. What is the causality of matter?

Section X. Whether a substantial material cause is found in incorruptible bodies?

Section XI. Whether the matter of incorruptible bodies is of the same nature as elemental matter?

Section XII. Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect?

Section XIII. Of what kind is the causality of the matter of incorruptible bodies?

Section XIV. Whether in the case of incorporeal things there can be a substantial material cause, and how quantity is related to this material cause?

Disputation Fourteen
About the Material Cause of Accidents
(vol. 25, pp. 461–497)

Section I. Whether there is a true material cause of accidents?

Section II. Whether a substance as such can be an immediate material cause of accidents?

Section III. What substance then could be a material cause of accidents?

Section IV. Whether one accident can be the immediate material cause of another?

Disputation Fifteen
About a Substantial Formal Cause
 (vol. 25, pp. 497–566)⁷

Section I. Whether substantial forms are given in material things?

Section II. In what way can a substantial form be produced in matter and from matter?

Section III. Whether in the eduction of a substantial form it is necessary that matter precede in time?

Section IV. Whether a form is properly produced when it is educed from matter?

Section V. What is the proper nature of a substantial form and what is its proper causality in its own genus?

Section VI. What is the nature of a form's causing?

Section VII. What is the effect of a formal cause?

Section VIII. Whether a substantial form is a true cause of matter and matter is its effect?

Section IX. Whether the dependence of matter on form is so great that one cannot be conserved without the other, even by Divine power?

Section X. Whether of one substance there is only one formal cause?

Section XI. What is a metaphysical form and what matter corresponds to it and what causality does it have?

Disputation Sixteen
About an Accidental Formal Cause
 (vol. 25, pp. 566–580)

Section I. Whether all accidents exercise true formal causality and with respect to what effect?

Section II. Whether every accidental form is educed from the potency of a subject?

Disputation Seventeen
In General about Efficient Cause
 (vol. 25, pp. 580–592)⁸

Section I. What is an efficient cause?

Section II. How many kinds of efficient causes are there?

Disputation Eighteen

About a Proximate Efficient Cause and Its Causality, and about Everything That It Requires in Order to Cause
(vol. 25, pp. 592–687)⁹

Section I. Whether created things truly effect anything?

Section II. What is the principle by which one created substance effects another?

Section III. What is the principle by which created substances effect accidents?

Section IV. Which accidents can be principles of acting?

Section V. Whether accidents alone, without the concurrence of substantial forms, may effect other accidents?

Section VI. Whether an accident is only an instrument in the production of another accident?

Section VII. Whether in order that it be able to act, an efficient cause must be really distinct from the recipient [of its action]?

Section VIII. Whether in order that it be able to act, an efficient cause must be simultaneously united or approximate to the recipient?

Section IX. Whether in order to act, an efficient cause requires a recipient which is dissimilar to itself, and in what proportion?

Section X. Whether action is the proper feature of the causation or the causality of an efficient cause?

Section XI. Whether an efficient cause, in its causing, corrupts or destroys something, and in what way?

Disputation Nineteen

About Causes That Act Necessarily and [Causes That Act] Freely or Contingently, Where [We Treat] Also of Fate, Fortune, and Chance
(vol. 25, pp. 687–745)¹⁰

Section I. Whether among created efficient causes there are some which act necessarily, and of what kind is that necessity?

Section II. Whether among efficient causes there are some which operate without necessity and with freedom?

Section III. Among efficient causes, if the first cause acts with necessity, can there be any one that acts freely? And, in general, does the freedom of an

action require freedom in all the causes which influence it, or is freedom in one of them enough?

Section IV. In what way is there freedom or contingency in the action of a second cause, notwithstanding the concurrence of the first cause? And, consequently, in what sense is it true that a cause is free which, positing all that is required for acting, can act or not act?

Section V. What then is the faculty in which the formal liberty of a created cause resides?

Section VI. In what way is a free cause determined by a rational judgment?

Section VII. What is the root and the origin of a failure of a free cause?

Section VIII. With respect to what acts is there indifference in a free cause?

Section IX. Whether there is freedom for a cause while it is actually operating?

Section X. Whether from the freedom of efficient causes there arises contingency in the facts of the universe, or can there be such without that [freedom]?

Section XI. Whether for some true reason fate can be numbered among the efficient causes of the universe?

Section XII. Whether chance and fortune should be numbered among efficient causes?

Disputation Twenty

The First Efficient Cause and Its Action, Which Is Creation

(vol. 25, pp. 745–785)¹¹

Section I. Whether it can be known by natural reason that the creation of some beings is possible, or even necessary? Or (what is the same) whether one being insofar as it is being can depend essentially on the effective causality of another?

Section II. Whether an infinite power of acting is required in order to create? And therefore is it so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to a creature?

Section III. Whether an instrument of creation can be given?

Section IV. Whether creation is something in a creature which is really (*ex natura rei*) distinct from it?

Section V. Whether newness of being is essential to creation?

Disputation Twenty–One
*About the First Efficient Cause and Its Second
 Action, Which Is Conservation*
 (vol. 25, pp. 785–801)¹²

Section I. Whether it can be demonstrated by natural reason that created beings always depend in their being on the actual influence of the First Cause?

Section II. What action then is conservation and how does it differ from creation?

Section III. Whether, in being conserved, all things depend upon God alone?

Disputation Twenty–Two
*About the First Cause and Another of Its Actions, Which Is Con-
 servation or Concurrence with Second Causes*
 (vol. 25, pp. 802–843)¹³

Section I. Whether by natural reason it can be sufficiently proven that God directly and immediately operates in the actions of all creatures?

Section II. Whether the concurrence of the First Cause with a second cause is something in the manner of a principle or of an action?

Section III. In what way is God's concurrence related to the action of a second cause and to the subject of that action?

Section IV. In what way does God concur with second causes?

Section V. Whether, in their operating, second causes depend only on the First Cause or also on other causes?

Disputation Twenty–Three
In General about Final Cause
 (vol. 25, pp. 843–890)

Section I. Whether an end is a true real cause?

Section II. How many ends are there?

Section III. What effects does a final cause have?

Section IV. What is or in what consists the character of the causing or the causality of a final cause?

Section V. What then is the proximate reason in an end for its final causing?

Section VI. What things can exercise final causality?

Section VII. Whether being known is a necessary condition in order that an end be a final cause?

Section VIII. Whether an end moves because of its real being or because of its being known?

Section IX. Whether the causality of an end has a place in Divine actions and effects?

Section X. Whether in the actions of both rational and non-rational agents there is true final causality

Disputation Twenty-Four

About the Ultimate Final Cause or about the Ultimate End

(vol. 25, pp. 890–899)

Section I. Whether it can be sufficiently proven by natural reason that there is some ultimate end and that there is no process to infinity in final causes?

Section II. Whether the ultimate end essentially and properly concurs with all proximate ends in order to cause finally, and, consequently, whether all agents in all their actions intend an ultimate end?

Disputation Twenty-Five

About an Exemplar Cause

(vol. 25, pp. 899–916)

Section I. Whether an exemplar exists? What is it? And where is it?

Section II. Whether an exemplar has the proper nature of a cause or is it to be reduced to one of the other causes?

Disputation Twenty-Six

About the Relation of Causes to Effects

(vol. 25, pp. 916–949)

Section I. Whether every cause is more noble than its effect?

Section II. Whether every cause is prior to its effect?

Section III. Can there be or should there be a number of causes of one effect?

Section IV. Can the same effect be simultaneously from several total causes of the same genus and species?

Section V. Whether the same effect can be produced separately by several total causes?

Section VI. Whether the same thing can be the cause of several effects, especially of contrary effects?

Disputation Twenty–Seven

About the Relation of Causes among Themselves

(vol. 25, pp. 949–961)

Section I. Which of the four causes is most perfect?

Section II. Can causes be causes one to another?

IN THE SECOND TOME

Disputation Twenty–Eight

About the Division of Being into Infinite and Finite

(vol. 26, pp. 1–21)¹⁴

Section I. Whether being is correctly divided into infinite and finite?

Section II. Whether the stated division is sufficient and adequate?

Section III. Whether [the division] is analogous, in such way that being is not said univocally but rather analogically of God and creatures?

Disputation Twenty–Nine

Whether There Is a First and Uncreated Being

(vol. 26, pp. 21–60)¹⁵

Section I. Can it be evidently demonstrated that there exists some being which is by itself and uncreated?

Section II. Can it be demonstrated *a posteriori* that God alone is this being by itself?

Section III. Can this same thing be demonstrated by some *a priori* way?

Disputation Thirty

About the First Being or God: What He Is

(vol. 26, pp. 60–224)

Section I. Can God be demonstrated to be a certain supremely perfect being?

Section II. Can God be demonstrated to be infinite?

Section III. Can He be demonstrated to be most simple pure act?

Section IV. How is every substantial composition excluded from God?

Section V. How is every accidental composition excluded from God?

Section VI. How are the attributes of God related to his essence?

Section VII. Whether it can be shown by natural reason that God is immense?

Section VIII. Whether by natural reason God may be demonstrated to be immutable?

Section IX. How can immutability be compatible with divine liberty?

Section X. How may the unity of God be demonstrated?

Section XI. Whether God is invisible, and what can be investigated about this by natural reason?

Section XII. Whether it may be demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended nor quidditatively known?

Section XIII. Can God be demonstrated to be ineffable?

Section XIV. Whether God can be demonstrated to be essentially living with an intellectual and most happy life?

Section XV. What can be known by natural reason about the divine knowledge?

Section XVI. What [can be known] about the divine will and its powers?

Section XVII. What [can be known] about the divine omnipotence and its action?

Disputation Thirty–One

About the Essence and of Finite Being As Such, and Their Distinction

(vol. 26, pp. 224–312)¹⁶

Section I. Whether the existence (*esse*) and essence of a creature are distinguished from one another?

Section II. What is the essence of a creature before it is produced by God?

Section III. How and in what do being in potency and being in act differ in creatures, or essence in potency and in act?

Section IV. Whether the essence of a creature is constituted in the actuality of essence by some real being which is not distinct from that which has the name and character of existence?

Section V. Whether besides the real being of actual essence there is some necessary being by which a thing exists formally and actually?

Section VI. What distinction can be present or be understood between a created essence and existence?

Section VII. What is the existence of a creature?

Section VIII. What causes, particularly intrinsic ones, does a created existence have?

Section IX. What is the proximate efficient cause of created existence?

Section X. What are the effects of existence and how does it differ in this from essence?

Section XI. To what things does existence belong and is it simple or composite?

Section XII. Is a created essence separable from its existence?

Section XIII. Of what kind is the composition of existence and essence, or what kind of composition is essential to created being?

Section XIV. Whether actual dependence and subordination to the first uncreated being is of the essence of a created being?

Disputation Thirty–Two

About the Division of Created Being into Substance and Accident

(vol. 26, pp. 312–329)

Section I. Whether being is immediately and sufficiently divided into substance and accident?

Section II. Whether being is analogically divided into substance and accident?

Disputation Thirty–Three

In General about Created Substance

(vol. 26, pp. 329–347)

Section I. What does substance signify and how is it divided into incomplete and complete?

Section II. Whether substance is correctly divided into first and second?

Disputation Thirty–Four

About First Substance or Supposit and Its Distinction from Nature

(vol. 26, pp. 347–423)

Section I. Whether first substance is the same as supposit, or person, or hypostasis?

Section II. Whether in creatures supposit adds to nature some real positive thing which is really distinct from that nature?

Section III. Whether the distinction of a supposit from a nature comes about through accidents or individuating principles, and therefore is not present in spiritual substances?

Section IV. What is created subsistence? And how is it related to a nature and a supposit?

Section V. Whether every created subsistence is indivisible and completely incommunicable?

Section VI. What efficient or material cause does subsistence have?

Section VII. Whether subsistence has any causality? And in what way are actions said to belong to supposits?

Section VIII. Whether in second substances concrete things are distinguished from abstract things? And how the highest character of substance and categorial coordination is to be established in them?

Disputation Thirty-Five
About Immaterial Created Substance
(vol. 26, pp. 424–477)

Section I. Whether it can be proven by natural reason that there are in the universe some spiritual substances besides God?

Section II. What can be known by natural reason about the quiddity and essence of created Intelligences?

Section III. What attributes can be known as regards the essences of created Intelligences?

Section IV. What can be known by natural reason about the intellect and the knowledge of the Intelligences?

Section V. What can be known by natural reason about the will of the Intelligences?

Section VI. What can be known by natural reason about the power of acting and the efficacy of the Intelligences?

Disputation Thirty-Six
About Material Substance in General
(vol. 26, pp. 477–491)

Section I. What is the essential nature of material substance and whether it is entirely the same as the nature of corporeal substance?

Section II. Whether the essence of material substance consists in substantial form alone or also in matter?

Section III. Whether a material substance is something distinct from matter and form taken together at the same time and distinct from the union of the two?

Disputation Thirty–Seven

About the Common Character and Concept of an Accident

(vol. 26, pp. 491–498)

Section I. Whether accident taken in general expresses one objective concept or character?

Section II. Whether the common character of an accident consists in inherence?

Disputation Thirty–Eight

About the Relation of Accident to Substance

(vol. 26, pp. 498–504)

Section I. Whether a substance is temporally prior to an accident?

Section II. Whether a substance is cognitively prior to an accident?

Disputation Thirty–Nine

About the Division of Accidents into Nine Supreme Kinds

(vol. 26, pp. 504–529)

Section I. Whether accident taken commonly is immediately divided into quantity, quality, and the other supreme kinds of accident?

Section II. Whether the division of accidents into nine kinds is enough?

Section III. Whether the mentioned division is univocal or analogous?

Disputation Forty

About Continuous Quantity

(vol. 26, pp. 529–587)

Section I. What is quantity, especially continuous quantity?

Section II. Whether the quantity of mass is something distinct from a material substance and its qualities?

Section III. Whether the essence of quantity consists in the character of measure?

Section IV. Whether the nature and the formal effect of continuous quantity is divisibility, or [is it] the distinction or the extension of the parts of a substance?

Section V. Whether in continuous quantity there are points, lines, and surfaces which are true things themselves and really distinct from the quantified body?

Section VI. Whether lines and surfaces are proper species of continuous quantity which are distinct from one another and from the body?

Section VII. Whether place is a true species of continuous quantity which is distinct from other species?

Section VIII. Whether motion or its extension constitutes a genuine species of continuous quantity?

Section IX. Whether time as such is a quantity which constitutes a particular species distinct from the rest?

Disputation Forty–one
*About Discrete Quantity and the Coordination
of the Category of Quantity*
(vol. 26, pp. 587–604)

Section I. Is discrete quantity a proper species of quantity?

Section II. Is discrete quantity found in spiritual things?

Section III. Whether speech is a true species of quantity?

Section IV. Of what kind is the coordination of the genera and species of quantity?

Disputation Forty–Two
In General about Quality and Its Species
(vol. 26, pp. 605–633)

Section I. What is the common character or essential mode of quality?

Section II. Whether quality is appropriately and sufficiently divided into four species?

Section III. Whether the four species of quality are completely distinct among themselves?

Section IV. Whether the division of quality into four species is sufficient?

Section V. Whether the doubled terms with which the mentioned species are proposed signify their essential or accidental differences?

Section VI. What properties belong to quality?

Disputation Forty–Three
*About Potency [and Act]*¹⁷
(vol. 26, pp. 633–663)

Section I. Whether potency is sufficiently divided into active and passive, and what each of them is?

Section II. Do active and passive potency differ always in reality or sometimes only in concept?

Section III. What is divided in that division and how is it defined?

Section IV. Whether every potency is natural and naturally infused?

Section V. Whether a proper act corresponds to each potency, and how?

Section VI. Whether act is prior to potency in duration, perfection, definition, and cognition?

Disputation Forty–Four
About Habits
(vol. 26, pp. 663–737)

Section I. Whether habit exists, what it is, and in what subject it is?

Section II. Is a habit acquired in a potency for moving with respect to place?

Section III. Whether habits exist in brute animals?

Section IV. Whether there are genuine habits in the intellect?

Section V. Whether habits exist in order to cause acts?

Section VI. What does a habit actually cause?

Section VII. What acts does a habit cause?

Section VIII. Whether an act is an essential efficient cause of a habit?

Section IX. Whether a habit is generated by one or by several acts?

Section X. Whether and how a habit is increased by acts?

Section XI. Of what kind is the extensive increase of a habit?—where there is also [discussion] about the unity of a habit.

Section XII. How is a habit diminished or lost?

Section XIII. How many kinds of habits exist?—and particularly about speculative and practical [habits].

Disputation Forty-Five
About Contrariety of Qualities
 (vol. 26, pp. 737–753)

Section I. What is opposition and how many kinds of opposition exist?
 Section II. What is the proper definition of contraries and what is their difference from other opposites?
 Section III. Is genuine contrariety found among qualities, either all of them or only them?
 Section IV. Whether contraries can be simultaneously in the same subject? And in what way can something be composed of contraries?

Disputation Forty-Six
About the Intension of Qualities
 (vol. 26, pp. 753–781)

Section I. Whether among qualities there is an intensive range? And what is that?
 Section II. Why is this range found only among qualities, but not in all qualities?
 Section III. Whether this range is achieved by change or by continuous succession?
 Section IV. Whether in this range there is a greatest and a least endpoint?—where other smaller questions are examined.

Disputation Forty-Seven
About Created Real Relations
 (vol. 26, pp. 781–867)

Section I. Whether relation is a true category of real being, different from other [categories]?
 Section II. Whether a categorial relation is actually and really distinguished from all absolute beings?
 Section III. How many kinds of relation exist? And which is truly categorial?
 Section IV. How does a categorial relation differ from a transcendental one?
 Section V. What is the essential definition of a categorial relation?
 Section VI. About the subject of a categorial relation.

Section VII. About the basis of a categorial relation and about the reason for that basis.

Section VIII. About the term of a categorial relation.

Section IX. What distinction must there be between the basis and the term [of a relation]?

Section X. Whether three kinds of relatives were correctly divided on a threefold basis by Aristotle?

Section XI. About the first kind of relations, based on number or unity.

Section XII. About the second kind of relations, based on potency or action.

Section XIII. About the third kind of relations, based on the character of measure.

Section XIV. Is the mentioned division sufficient, and does it comprehend all relations?

Section XV. Whether all the relations of the third kind, and only these, are non-mutual?—where we discuss the relations of God to creatures.

Section XVI. Is the formal term of a relation another relation or some absolute character?—where incidentally various questions are also explained.

Section XVII. In what way the category “toward something” can be ordered under one supreme genus.—where also we discuss the individual distinction of relations.

Section XVIII. What are the properties of a relation?

Disputation Forty-Eight

About Action

(vol. 26, pp. 867–897)

Section I. Whether an action essentially involves a relation to a principle of acting?—where we also discuss relations which arise extrinsically and intrinsically.

Section II. Whether action as such essentially relates to a term, even if it is immanent action—and therefore this last is also located in this category?

Section III. Which of the mentioned relations is more essential to action, in such way that it takes its species from that?

Section IV. Whether action as such entails a relation to a subject of inhesion and what that subject is?

Section V. What is the essence, what are the causes, and what are the properties of action?

Section VI. How many species and genera of actions exist up to the supreme genus?

Disputation Forty-Nine*About Passion*

(vol. 26, pp. 897–912)

Section I. Whether passion is really distinct from action?

Section II. How is passion related to motion or change? And finally what is passion?

Section III. Whether the inhesion which is essential to passion is actual or aptitudinal only?

Section IV. Whether both successive and momentaneous passion belong to this category and how do they differ under it?

Disputation Fifty*About "When" and in General about Durations*

(vol. 26, pp. 912–972)

Section I. Whether duration is something really distinct from the being of the thing which is enduring?

Section II. What is the formal character of duration by which it is distinct in nature from existence?

Section III. What is eternity? And how is it distinguished from created duration?

Section IV. Does eternity include in its formal nature some relation of reason?

Section V. What is "aevum" and how does it differ from successive durations?

Section VI. Is there also an essential difference between aevum and other permanent created durations?

Section VII. Do permanent corruptible created things have their own proper duration and what kind is that?

Section VIII. Do successive things have their own proper duration which is called time?

Section IX. Whether time is really distinguished from motion?

Section X. Does it belong to some time to be a measure of duration?

Section XI. What things are measured by this time?

Section XII. What duration belongs to the category of "when" and how does it constitute that category?

Disputation Fifty–One
About “Where”
 (vol. 26, pp. 972–1006)

- Section I. What is “where” in bodies? And is it something intrinsic?
 Section II. Is “where” the place of a body, in such way that by that alone a body can truly to be said to be in place?
 Section III. Whether even in the case of spiritual substances there is a true and intrinsic “where”?
 Section IV. How do the “wheres” of a spirit and of a body differ or keep the same proportion between themselves?
 Section V. Does “where” belong only to substances or also to accidents?
 Section VI. How should the category “where” be distinguished and ordered, or what properties may be assigned to it?

Disputation Fifty–Two
About Position
 (vol. 26, pp. 1006–1011)

- Section I. What is position and how does it differ from “where”?
 Section II. How can species, genera, and some properties be assigned to position?

Disputation Fifty–Three
About [the Category of] Habit
 (vol. 26, pp. 1011–1014)

- Section I. What is habit and how does it differ from substance and quality?
 Section II. How can species, genera, and some properties be attributed to habit?

Disputation Fifty–Four
About Being of Reason
 (vol. 26, pp. 1014–1041)¹⁸

- Section I. Whether some things are truly said to be beings of reason, and how are they under being or what kind of being do they have?
 Section II. Whether a being of reason has some causes and what then are they?

Section III. Whether being of reason is correctly divided into negation, privation and relation?

Section IV. Whether being of reason is sufficiently divided into the mentioned members?—where is explained the whole variety of the beings of reason which can arise.

Section V. What is common and what is proper to negation and privation?

Section VI. How many are the ways of relations of reason and what is common to all of them and what is proper [to each]?

Notes

- ¹ English translation: Francisco Suárez, *Disputatio V: Individual Unity and its Principle*, tr. Jorge J.E. Gracia, in *Suárez on Individuation*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982.
- ² English translation: Francis Suarez, *On Formal and Universal Unity (Disputatio VI)*, tr. James F. Ross, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964.
- ³ English translation: Francis Suarez, *On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputatio VII)*, tr. Cyril Vollert, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947.
- ⁴ English translation in: *The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Suárez: Metaphysical Disputations X and XI and Selected Passages from Disputation XXII and Other Works*, Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by Jorge J.E. Gracia and Douglas Davis, München: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
- ⁵ English translation in: *The Metaphysics of Good and Evil according to Suárez: Metaphysical Disputations X and XI and Selected Passages from Disputation XXII and Other Works*, Translation with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by Jorge J.E. Gracia and Douglas Davis, München: Philosophia Verlag, 1989.
- ⁶ English translation: Francis Suarez, S.J., *On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV*, translated by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000.
- ⁷ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- ⁸ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- ⁹ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19*, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- ¹⁰ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrency: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2002.
- ¹¹ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrency: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2000.
- ¹² English translation in: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrency: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2000.

- ¹³ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God (Disputationes Metaphysicae 28 and 29)*, Translated from the Latin by John P. Doyle, South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2004.
- ¹⁴ English translation in: Francisco Suárez, *The Metaphysical Demonstration of the Existence of God (Disputationes Metaphysicae 28 and 29)*, Translated from the Latin by John P. Doyle, South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2004.
- ¹⁵ English translation: Francis Suarez, *On the Essence of Finite Being as such, On the Existence of that Essence and their Distinction*, translated from the Latin with an Introduction, by Norman J. Wells, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1983.
- ¹⁶ Here in the *Index Disputationum* the title of this Disputation is "*De Potentia*." However, in the *Disputationes metaphysicae* themselves it is given as "*De Potentia et Actu*;" cf. vol. 26, p. 633.
- ¹⁷ English translation: Francisco Suárez, S.J., *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis) Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, translated from the Latin, with an Introduction and Notes, by John P. Doyle, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995.

RATIO ET DISCURSUS TOTIUS OPERIS

Ad Lectorem

Quemadmodum fieri nequit ut quis Theologus perfectus evadat, nisi firma prius metaphysicae jecerit fundamenta, ita intellexi semper, operae pretium fuisse ut, antequam Theologica scriberem Commentaria (quae partim jam in lucem prodire, partim collaboro, ut quam primum, Deo favente, compleantur), opus hoc, quod nunc, Christiane lector, tibi offero, diligenter elaboratum praemitterem. Verum, justas ob causas, lucubrationes in tertiam D. Thom. partem differre non potui, easque primum omnium praelo mandare oportuit. In dies tamen luce clarius intuebar, quam illa divina ac supernaturalis Theologia hanc humanam et naturalem desideraret ac requireret, adeo ut non dubitaverim illud inchoatum opus paulisper intermittere, quo huic doctrinae metaphysicae suum quasi locum ac sedem darem, vel potius restituerem. Et quamvis in eo opere elaborando diutius immoratus fuerim quam initio putaveram, et quam multorum expostulatio, qui commentaria illa in tertiam partem, vel (si sperari potest) in universam D. Thom. Summam, perfecta desiderant, tamen suscepti laboris nunquam me poenitere potuit, confidoque lectorem sententiam meam, vel ipso adductum experimento, comprobaturum.

Ita vero in hoc opere philosophum ago, ut semper tamen prae oculis habeam nostram philosophiam debere christianam esse, ac divinae Theologiae ministram. Quem mihi scopum praefixi, non solum in quaestionibus pertractandis, sed multo magis in sentiis, seu opinionibus seligendis, in eas propendens, quae pietati ac doctrinae revelatae subservire magis viderentur. Eamque ob causam, philosophico cursu nonnunquam intermisso, ad quaedam Theologica diverto, non tam ut illis examinandis aut accurate explicandis immorer (quod esset abs re de qua nunc ago), quam ut veluti digito indicem lectori, quam ratione principia metaphysicae sint ad Theologicas veritates confirmandas referenda et accommodanda. Fateor me in divinis perfectionibus, quae attributa vocant, contemplandis, immoratum fuisse diutius quam alicui fortasse praesens institutum exigere videretur; at compulit me rerum imprimis dignitas et altitudo, deinde quod mihi nunquam visus sum luminis naturalis, atque adeo nec metaphysicae, limites transilire.

Et quoniam judicavi semper, magnam ad res intelligendas ac penetrandas, in eis convenienti methodo inquirendis et judicandis, vim positam esse, quam observare vix aut ne vix quidem possem, si, expositorum more, quaestiones omnes, prout obiter et veluti casu circa textum Philosophi occurrunt, pertractarem, idcirco expeditius et utilius fore censi, servato doctrinae ordine, ea omnia inquirere, et ante oculos lectoris proponere, quae de toto hujus sapientiae objecto investigari et desiderari poterant. Illud vero objectum quodnam sit, explanat prima hujus operis disputatio, simulque in ea praefamur dignitatem, utilitatem, et caetera quae in prooemiis scientiarum scriptores praemittere consueverunt. Deinde in priori tomo ejusdem objecti amplissima et universalissima ratio, qua, videlicet, appellatur ens, ejusque proprietates et causae diligenter expenduntur. Et in hac causarum contemplatione latius quam fieri soleat immoratus sum, quod et perdifficilem illam, et ad omnem philosophiam et Theologiam utilissimam esse existimaverim. In tomo autem altero inferiores ejusdem objecti rationes prosecuti sumus, initio sumpto ab illa entis divisione *in creatum et creatorem*, utpote quae prior est, et entis quidditati vicinior, et ad hujus doctrinae decursum aptior; qui subinde procedit per contentas sub his partitiones, ad usque genera omnia, et gradus entis, qui intra hujus scientiae terminos seu limites continentur.

Quia tamen erunt permulti, qui doctrinam hanc universam Aristotelis libris applicatam habere cupient, tum ut melius percipiant quibus tanti philosophi principiis nitatur, tum ut ejus usus ad ipsum Aristotelem intelligendum facilius sit ac utilior, hac etiam in re lectori inservire studui, indice a nobis elaborato, quo, si attente legatur, facillime (ni fallor) poterunt omnia, quae Aristoteles in libris Melaphysicae pertractavit, et comprehendere, et memoria retineri: rursusque prae manibus haberi quaestiones omnes quae inter illos libros exponendos excitari solent.

Demum benignum lectorem admonendum duximus, unum quidem opus hoc esse, nec ejus disputationes fuisse ab uno volumine sejungendas, nisi aliqua nos ratio coegisset. Nam imprimis ne mole sua nonnihil afferret molestiae, in duo volumina illud divisimus; deinde vero, ut, quoad fieri posset, nostrorum laborum studiosis debitum officium praestaremus, hoc prius emisimus statim ac e praelo prodiit; quamvis aliud eo jam processerit, ut existimem, non prius hanc partem perfectam fore, quam illa fuerit in lucem edita. Utinam utraque, et caetera, quae molimur, in magnam Dei Optimi Maximi gloriam, et Ecclesiae Catholicae utilitatem cedant. Vale.

DISPUTATIO II

[Prooemium]

*Ordo ratioque doctrinae in hoc opere servanda.*¹—His suppositis quae de objecto seu subjecto hujus scientiae tradidimus, necessarium imprimis est, ejus propriam et adaequatam rationem, ac deinde proprietates ejus et causas exponere, et haec erit prior principalis pars hujus operis. In posteriori praecipuam ejus partitionem proponemus, atque ita res omnes, quae sub ente continentur, illius rationem includunt, ut sub objectiva ratione hujus scientiae cadunt, et a materia in suo esse abstrahunt, quantum ratione naturali attingi possunt, investigabimus et explanabimus. Ut enim majori compendio ac brevitate utamur, et conveniente methodo universa tractemus, a textus Aristotelici prolixa explicatione abstinendum duximus, resque ipsas, in quibus haec sapientia versatur, eo doctrinae ordine ac dicendi ratione, quae ipsis magis consentanea sit, contemplari. Nam, quod spectat ad Philosophi textum in his Metaphysicae libris, nonnullae partes ejus parum habent utilitatis, vel quod varias quaestiones ac dubitationes proponat, easque insolutas relinquat, ut in toto tertio libro, vel quod in antiquorum placitis referendis, et refutandis immoretur, ut ex primo fere libro, et ex magna parte aliorum constare facile potest, vel denique quod eadem quae in prioribus libris dicta fuerant, vel repetat, vel in summam redigat, ut patet ex libro 11, et aliis. Quae vero utilia sunt, scituque digna et necessaria, insudarunt satis in eis explicandis, prout in littera Aristotelis continentur, varii expositores Graeci, Arabes et Latini, ex quibus nos praecipue utemur Alexandri Aphrodisaei, Averrois, et maxime omnium divi Thomae expositione. Rerum vero ipsarum examinationem in sequentibus disputationibus trademus, simulque curabimus Aristotelis mentem ac sensum, et singula testimonia, in quibus fere quaestiones omnes fundari solent, accuratius declarare. Ut vero Aristotelis studiosis omni ex parte satisfaciamus, in fine hujus operis indicem quaestionum omnium, quae circa textum Aristotelis, et servato ejus ordine, tractari solent, vel nobis occurrerunt, posuimus, et loca in quibus nos eas disputatimus, designavimus. Quod si fortasse sententiae aliquae Aristotelis, quarum cognitio ad alias scientias utilis est, in his libris occurrant, quae in nostris disputationibus, servato doctrinae ordine quem instituimus, tractari non possint, in eodem indice breves circa textum Aristotelis annotationes tradimus, in quibus,

quidquid in disputationibus tactum non est, et aliquid difficultatis vel utilitatis habet, declaramus. In praesente ergo disputatione explicanda nobis est quaestio, quid sit ens in quantum ens; nam, quod ens sit, ita per se notum est, ut nulla declaratione indigeat. Post quaestionem autem, an est, quaestio quid res sit, est prima omnium, quam in initio cujuscunque scientiae de subjecto ejus praesupponi, aut declarare, necesse est. Haec autem scientia, cum sit omnium naturalium prima atque suprema, non potest ab alia sumere vel probatam vel declaratam subjecti sui rationem et quidditatem, et ideo ipsam statim in initio tradere et declarare oportet.

Note

¹ *DM 2*, [prooemium], in *Opera*, vol. 25, p. 64.

INDEX LOCUPLETISSIMUS IN METAPHYSICAM ARISTOTELIS

In quo ordo et ratio librorum ac capitum ejus aperitur, omniumque brevis summa proponitur, et quaestiones omnes, quae in eis moveri solent aut possent, designantur, cum locis in quibus in sequenti opere disseruntur. Quod si quae breviores, ad textus intelligentiam pertinentes, in ipso opere omissae sunt, in hoc indice pro cujusque rei difficultate et utilitate breviter expediuntur.

LIBER PRIMUS METAPHYSICAE

Totus hic liber prooemialis est, et in duas partes dividitur. Prior proprie prooemium continet, in quo materia et dignitas hujus doctrinae aperitur: prius generalius in primo capite, deinde specialius in secundo. In posteriori parte per septem alia capita antiquorum philosophorum opiniones de principiis rerum referuntur ab Aristotele, et confutantur.

CAPUT PRIMUM PROOEMIALE

QUAEST. 1. Quis sit verus sensus illius axiomatis Aristotelis: *Omnis homo naturaliter scire desiderat?*¹ Disp. 1. sect. 6.

Q. 2. An visus utilior caeteris sit ad scientiam, et ob eam causam prae illis diligatur? Ibid.

Q. 3. Quae animalia bruta solum sensum, quae vero memoriam, quatenam etiam experientiam vel prudentiam participant, et quomodo? Ibid.

Q. 4. Qualiter homo per memoriam experientiam, per experientiam vero artem et scientiam acquirat, et quae sit inter haec constituenda differentia? Ibid. Sententia vero Poli, quam Aristoteles hic affert, scilicet: *Experientia genuit artem, inexperientia fortunam,*² apud Platonem in Gorgia sic habet: *Multae quidem artes insunt hominibus experientia perite adinventae. Peritia enim efficit ut via nostra per artem incedat, imperitia vero ut per fortunam temere circumvagetur.* Quae sententia /col. b/ et verborum significatione et sensu videtur satis diversa, verba tamen Aristotelis explicant nomina *peritiae* et *imperitiae*, apud Platonem non tam late sumenda esse quam in absoluta significatione prae se ferunt; peritia enim non solum de experientia, sed

etiam de arte dicitur, et ideo non proprie dici potuit peritiam generare artem, nisi ratione experientiae. Secunda vero pars illius sententiae melius videtur apud Platonem explicari; inexperientia enim non tam generat fortunam, quam fortunae et casui hominem exponit.

Q. 5. An experientia sit absolute necessaria ad scientiarum principia cognoscenda? Ibid.

De subsistentia—Q. 6. Quo sensu dictum sit ab Aristotele, actiones omnes circa singularia versari? Disp. 34, Sect. 9.

Hic tamen circa textum Aristotelis, observare oportet, eum asserere, medicum, per se curare Socratem, seu singularem hominem, per accidens vero hominem; rationem insinuat, quia accidit Socrati ut homo sit. Utrumque vero habet difficultatem, quia Petrus non per accidens, sed per se est homo. Quod si accidere ibi non significet ex accidente convenire, sed absolute inesse, ut D. Thomas exponit, non recte infert Aristoteles hominem per accidens curari. Neque etiam satisfacere videtur expositio alia, quam idem D. Thomas et Alensis afferunt, nimirum, quod, licet Petro absolute non accidat esse hominem, Petro tamen ut curato accidit; id enim non videtur verum quia, /p. II/ ut Petrus curari possit, necesse est quod sit homo; non ergo medici curatio per accidens circa hominem exercetur, cum ex propria ratione sua non possit circa aliam naturam fieri, sicut visio non fit per accidens circa colorem, etiamsi semper necessarioque exerceri debeat in singulari circa particularem colorem; nam, sicut color est objectum visus, ita suo modo corpus humanum est objectum medicinae. Respondetur, Aristotelem non loqui de curatione absolute et abstracte, quo modo potius concipitur quam exerceatur, sed loqui de hac actione curandi prout in re exercetur; et hanc ait per accidens versari circa hominem, non quia omnino hoc ei accidat, sed quia non per se primo et quasi adaequate versetur circa hominem, ut sic, sed ut contractum ad hunc singularem hominem ex cuius propria complexione et affectione maxime pendet curatio. Unde illud *per accidens*, idem esse videtur quod *per aliud*, saltem ratione distinctum; vel est idem quod *per partem*, eo modo quo singulare est pars subjectiva specifici totius: sic enim totum quodam modo per accidens dicitur moveri ratione partis. Et juxta haec optime quadrat expositio alterius propositionis, scilicet, accidere Socrati quod homo sit, id est, convenire ei tanquam parti subjective contentae sub homine. Vel certe dici potest accidere eo modo quo inferior differentia accidit generi, id est, extra rationem ejus; sic enim propriae conditiones individui sunt extra rationem speciei, quod satis est ut homo per accidens, id est, per aliud, sanari dicatur. Quanquam in hoc sensu potius dicendum esset Socratem accidere homini, quam e converso; tamen in re idem significatum est, et

eodem omnia tendunt, nimirum ut intelligatur actionem maxima ex parte pendere a conditionibus individui, quae magis sub experientiam quam sub artem cadunt, et ideo artem sine experientia expositam esse errori et fortunae, ut superius dictum est.

Qu. 7. An sola scientia speculativa vel etiam practica propter veritatis cognitionem appetatur. Disp. 1, sect. 6.

Qu. 8. Utrum scientia metaphysicae sit propter se maxime appetibilis ab homine. Disp. 1, sect. 6, per totam.

CAPUT II PROOEMII³

QUAEST. 1. Quidnam sapientia sit, et quot /col.b/ modis haec vox usurpetur. Disp. 1, sect. 5.

Q. 2. Quomodo sapientia res omnes earumque causas et principia contempletur. Disp. 1, sect. 2, per totam; et sect. 4 et sect. 5.

Q. 3. An universalissima sint nobis cognitu difficilima. Disp. sect.5.

Q. 4. An metaphysica scientias alias praesertim mathematicas, certitudine superet. Ibid.

Q. 5. An metaphysica seu sapientia certior sit quam habitus principiorum. Ibid.

Q. 6. An metaphysica per omnes causas proprie demonstret. Ibid.

Q. 7. An metaphysica caeteris scientiis aptior sit ad docendum. Ibid.

Q. 8. An metaphysica sit scientia speculativa, qua veritatis cognoscendae causa inquiritur. Disp. 1, sect. 4, princ.; et sect. 5, a principio.

Q. 9. An et quomodo sapientia seu metaphysica imperet aliis scientiis. Ibid.

Q. 10. An omnes scientiae subalternentur metaphysicae. Disp. 1. sect. 5.

Q. 11. An metaphysica simul sit scientia et sapientia. Ibid. per totam.

Q. 12. Quam sit metaphysica ad alias scientias utilis, sect. 4.

Q. 13. An et quomodo metaphysica demonstret objecta aliarum scientiarum. Ibid.

Q. 14. Quomodo metaphysica ad alias scientias comparetur ordine doctrinae. Ibid.

Q. 15. Quomodo metaphysica prima principia demonstret. Disp. 1, sect. 4.

Q. 16. Habitus principiorum quid sit. Ibid.

Q. 17. Tradatne metaphysica instrumenta sciendi, an dialectica, quidve in hoc munere sit utriusque proprium. Disput. 1, sectione 4.

Q. 18. Utrum admiratio ex ignorantia oriatur. Hoc enim axioma solet ex hoc capite sumi; ait enim Aristoteles, *propter admirationem coepisse homines philosophari*,⁴ ut nimirum acquisitione scientiae ignoracionem depellerent. Oportet autem advertere Aristotelem tantum dixisse: *Qui dubitat et admiratur, plane se ignorare existimat*.⁵ Duo igitur conjunxit, dubitationem scilicet et admirationem; non ergo necessarium videtur ut omnis qui admiratur, ignoret, sed solum is qui dum admiratur dubitat. Quod obiter notetur propter Christi admirationem, quae licet vera admiratio fuerit, non tamen fuit ex ignorantia profecta, ut late declaravi tom. 1. tertiae p., in comment. art. 7. q. q. 15. D. Thomae, ex quo loco vera expositio seu potius limitatio illius axiomatis petenda est. /p. III/

Q. 19. An expediat homini studio sapientiae vacare. De hac quaestione, quod clarissima sit, satis erit Aristotelem consulere, et quae in laudem et commendationem sapientiae eo loco dicit, diligenter notare. Habet enim nonnullas sententias consideratione dignas. Prima est: *Divina scientia seu contemplatio de Deo, quae sapientia dicitur, maxime libera est, ideoque in humana natura, quae multis modis serva est, perfecta esse non potest, sed solus Deus honorem suum sibi vindicat*.⁶ Oportet autem advertere, afferre Aristotelem, hoc ultimum dictum ex quodam Simonide, et significare, ut D. Thomas, Boetius et alii interpretantur, illum sensisse, non debere hominem divinam quaerere sapientiam, quia non congruit naturae ejus, sed solius Dei; et ideo (inquit Aristoteles) si, ut poetae aiunt, in Deum cadere invidia, maxime invidere hominibus hanc divinam sapientiam quaerentibus. Cui consonat illud Socratis: *Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos*. Faciet etiam consilium Sapientis: *Altiora te ne quaesieris*. At vero merito Philosophus dictum illud in eo sensu reprehendit, vel potius, ut Aphrodisias exponit, ita sententiam illam intelligit ac moderatur, ut Deus solus hanc sapientiam exacte ac perfecte possidere credatur. Ex quo non sequitur hominem non debere hanc sapientiam quaerere, ut Deo similis fiat quantum potuerit. Et hoc est quod sub disjunctione inferius Aristoteles ait: *Et eam, scilicet sapientiam, aut solus ipse Deus, aut maxime habet*.⁷ Ideoque negat, hominem quaerentem hanc scientiam esse Deo invisum, tum quia divinitas invida esse non potest, tum etiam quia alias infelix esset homo qui hanc scientiam assequeretur. Quae enim major infelicitas quam habere Deum adversarium et propriis commodis invidentem? Absurdum autem est dicere, sapientes, eo quod sapientes sint, esse infelices, cum in sapientia potius hominis felicitas et praestantia consistat. Et in eadem sententiam idem Philosophus, 10 Ethic., c. 7, reprehendit dicentes, oportere nos, cum simus homines, humana sapere, et mortalia cum simus mortales. Ipse vero ait oportere nos, quoad fieri possit, a mortalitate vindicare, atque omnia facere, *ut ei nostri*

parti quae in nobis est optima, id est, menti, convenienter vivamus; et c. 8 subdit, eum, qui sic vivit, et sapientiam colit, esse Deo charissimum, et ab eo maxime honorari et remune- /col. b/ rari. Haec autem intelligenda sunt de his qui sobrie et pro captu suo divinam sapientiam quaerunt; nam qui ratione aut iudicio suo divinitatem comprehendere aut metiri volunt, hi sine dubio Deo sunt invidi. Quibus consulit Sapiens ne altiora se quaerant, quia, ut alibi dixit, *scrutator majestatis opprimetur a gloria*. Non quia Deus illi invidet, sed quia temeritatis et superbiae ejus est ultor. Quod si haec, quae Aristoteles dixit de naturali sapientia, vera sunt ut revera sunt, multo altiori ratione in supernaturalem ac divinam contemplationem conveniunt, quae homines reddit pene divinos, et a corporis servitute quodammodo liberos atque immunes: sed de hoc alias.

Q. 20. An haec scientia disserat de Deo ut de objecto, an solum ut de principio et causa omnium rerum. Disp. 1, sect. 1. Quomodo autem juxta rationem naturalem verum sit Deum esse principium et causam rerum omnium, et habere in se quidquid est perfectionis, et excellentiae, et nulli invidere, sed omnibus benefacere, solumque ipsum se perfecte cognoscere se sapere (haec enim omnia Aristoteles de Deo indicat), tractatur late in disp. 30 et 31, quae sunt de naturali cognitione Dei.

CAPUT III DE VARIIS OPINIONIBUS ANTIQUORUM PHILOSOPHORUM CIRCA RERUM PRINCIPIA

Quaest. 1. Quot sint causae rerum naturalium; haec circa lib. 5 tractatur late, a disp. 12, per plures.

Q. 2. Quae fuerint antiquorum opiniones de rerum principiis, ibid., disp. 13, sect. 2 et 3.

Q. 3. An idem possit se ipsum movere, late disp. 18, sect. 4, per totam. Hoc autem loco verba Aristotelis sunt: *Neque id, quod subjicitur, suam ipsius mutationem efficit,*⁸ quae in fine dictae sectionis exponuntur.

Q. 4. Utrum sit evidens ordinem hujus universi non casu, sed ex actione alicujus agentis esse institutum, late disp. 30, sect. 2, et nonnulla disput. 23, sect. 1. Verba autem Aristotelis hoc loco sunt valde notanda: *Neque aequum est (inquit) tantam rem, scilicet ordinem universi, casui et fortunae tribuere. Itaque qui mentem, quemadmodum in animantibus, sic in natura, causam tum mundi, tum etiam totius ordinis esse dixit, is prae superioribus temere loquentibus quasi sobrius visus est;*⁹ sic etiam apud Platonem in Phaedone loquitur Socrates, in hoc valde Anaxagoram laudans, quod dixerit,

mentem omnia exornare /p. IV/ *omniumque causam esse*. Comparatio autem illa quae fit cum animantibus, dupliciter intelligi potest, primo, ut per animalia quasi per antonomasiam homines intelligantur, ut ex parvo ad magnum mundum argumentum fiat. Secundo, potest generatim sumi pro animantibus omnibus, in quibus compositio et ordinatio membrorum omnium tam est artificiosa, ut pro comperto habuerint cordatiores philosophi, fieri non posse sine auctore mente praedito. Ex quo sumitur argumentum ad probandum, majori ratione id existimandum esse de toto universo, in quo omnia sunt ita composita et ordinata, ut ea ratione tanquam unum animal a multis etiam philosophis appellatum sit, ut notavit Albert., in principio Metaphys., tract. 3, cap. 3.

CAPUT IV DE EISDEM OPINIONIBUS

Hoc capite nova non occurrit quaestio. Adnotetur solum confirmare hoc loco Aristotelem, quae superiori capite, opin. 4. de mente et mundi opifice dixerat, et adducto pulcherrimo exemplo antiquos philosophos, qui eam veritatem agnoverant, simul laudare et reprehendere, *quemadmodum* (inquit) *inexercitati in pugna faciunt: ii enim cum in omnem partem feruntur, insignes plagas persaepe inferunt; verum neque illi ex arte faciunt, neque hi videntur ea quae dicunt scientia tenere.*¹⁰

CAPUT V ET VI DE EADEM RE

Quaest. 1. Peculiaris quaestio posset circa haec capita tractari de opinione Platonis, quoniam illa celebrior est, an, scilicet, ideas posuerit eo modo quo illi Aristoteles attribuit; et an eo sensu recte impugnetur ab Aristotele, praesertim cum infert hic, c. 6, abstulisse efficientiam ideis, ponendo illas immobiles. De hac vero re dictum est tractando de universalibus, disp. 5; et de causa exemplari, disp. 25; et de efficientia intelligentiarum, disp. 35, sect. ult.

Secunda quaestio hic esse potest circa finem c. 6, an praeter quatuor causarum genera ponenda sit exemplaris vel alia, tractatur disp. 25, sect. 2; et tangitur disp. 12, sect. ult. /col. b/

CAPUT VII IMPUGNANTUR VETERUM OPINIONES

Q. 1. Circa hoc caput duo vel tria potissimum possunt inquiri. Primum, an rationes Aristotelis contra antiquos Philosophos, praesertim contra Platonicos, efficaces sint. Secundum, an quae de numeris et magnitudinibus Aristoteles, cap. 7, tractat, vera sint. Tertium, an forma sit tota quidditas rerum materialium, ut Aristoteles, hic cap. 7, text. 5, significat. Sed primam quaestionem omittendam censi, tum quod opiniones illae antiquorum philosophorum, prout ab Aristotele tractantur, antiquatae jam sint, et prorsus a philosophia relegatae; tum etiam quod in illis rationibus nihil Philosophus attigit, quod ad alias res cognoscendas aliquid utilitatis afferre possit; et ideo inutile reputo in illis rationibus aut explicandis aut defendendis immorari, sed legantur expositores, et praesertim Fonseca, cujus translatio tam est elegans et dilucida, ut fere sine expositore a quovis intelligi possit. Secunda quaestio multas amplectitur, quae a nobis tractantur in disputationibus de quantitate, quae sunt 40 et 41. Tertia tractatur disput. 36, sect. 1.

Liber Secundus Metaphysicae

De hoc libro varia sunt expositorum placita, quia non videtur caeteris cohaerere; quibus omissis, pars quaedam prooemii, vel quoddam ejus additamentum mihi esse videtur. Idque sumo ex ipso Aristotele, lib. 3, text. 2, ubi, se referens ad ea, quae in hoc libro dixerat, ait: *In iis quae prooemii loco dicta sunt.*¹¹ Nam quia in prooemio Aristoteles hanc scientiam potissimum contemplari veritatem, et postea, ostenderat quantum priores philosophi in illius investigatione erraverint, hoc loco iterum aperire voluit difficultatem quae in veritatis investigatione inest, et quis modus in ea tenendus sit, et quo principio vel fundamento utendum nobis sit, ne frustra laboremus.

CAPUT PRIMUM

DIFFICILE ESSE VERITATEM INVENIRE, QUAM HAEC SAPIENTIA INQUIRIT

Quaest. 1. Utrum pro dignitate veritatem assequi sit homini non solum difficile, sed etiam impossibile. Haec quaestio magis theologica est quam metaphysica; tractarique /p. V/ solet a Theologis in principio doctrinae de gratia Dei. Proponit vero eam Aristoteles in principio hujus capituli, et satis consentaneae ad doctrinam Catholicam eam definit. Absolute enim negat posse quemquam hominum pro dignitate veritatem assequi. Quid autem significet cum ait, *pro dignitate*,¹² intelligi potest ex eo quod subdit inferius, cognitione veritatis ex parte esse facilem, quia juxta vetus proverbium, *Ecquis ab ostio aberret?*¹³ id est, ut D. Thomas et Averroes exponunt, quia non facile assequatur principia, quae sunt veluti ostium et janua veritatis inveniendae? vel, ut exponit Alexander, quis non assequatur saltem ea quae facilia sunt? Sicut enim jaculator, si ei totum ostium in scopum proponatur, non errat, propter facilitatem attingendi, ita veritates aliquas et faciles assequi possumus, non tamen omnes. Unde subdit Aristoteles: *Quod autem totum et partem, id est, principia et conclusiones, habere non possumus, scilicet integre et sine errore, id ejus difficultatem declarat.*¹⁴ Ubi etiam per totum et partem intelligere possumus quod Theologi aiunt, singulas veritates, aut omnium collectionem. Veritatem ergo pro dignitate assequi, est totum et partem cognoscere; hoc est, non unam tantum vel alteram veritatem, sed omnes, absque errore. Quem sensum fortasse ipse Aristoteles non omnino

est assecutus tamen, cum naturali ductus lumine hominis imbecillitatem ad veritatem contemplantam subodoraret, illis verbis eam declaravit, quae rem ipsam comprehenderent, et cum Catholica doctrina consentirent. Et hoc ipsum confirmat indicium illud quo utitur, nimirum, *Quia singuli eorum, qui veritatem inquirunt, parum ad eam conferunt; ex omnibus vero in unum congestis magnitudo quaedam existit.*¹⁵ Ubi etiam observatione dignum est, non dixisse unam perfectam et exactam veritatis cognitionem ex omnibus confici, sed solum magnitudinem quamdam, quia revera quod unusquisque sua industria invenire potest, vel nihil, vel parum est. Quod vero omnes simul, aut unusquisque aliorum laboribus et industria adjutus scire valet, aliquid majus est, non tamen perfectum, nec omnibus erroribus liberum; et ideo absolute est homini impossibile humanis viribus pro dignitate veritatem contemplari. Quid vero in hoc per divinam gratiam possit, altioris contemplationis est; et ideo de hac quaestione pro loci opportunitate haec sunt satis.

Q. 2. Unde oriatur difficultas, quae in cogni- /col. b/ tione veritatis homini accidit, tractatur late d. 9, sect. 2.

Q. 3. An prima principia sint naturaliter nota. Haec quaestio implicite tantum ab Aristotele tangitur, quare immerito hic disputatur; eam vero pro hujus doctrinae opportunitate attigimus disp. 1, sect. 6, et disp. 2, sect. 3, in princ.

Q. 4. An possimus in hac vita quidditative cognoscere res actu, et maxime intelligibiles, substantias scilicet separatas, disp. 35, sect. 2, late.

Q. 5. An scientia speculativa et practica differant ex fine, quod illa in contemplatione veritatis sistat, haec ad opus illam referat; ideoque illa causam veritatis per sese inquirat, cum non sit absoluta scientia veritatis sine causa; haec vero solum causam investiget, quantum ad opus confert: de hac re aliqua tacta sunt disp. 1, plura in 44, quae est de habitibus.

Q. 6. Quis sit verus sensus illius pronuntiati: *Quod caeteris est causa ut talia sint, ipsum est maxime tale.*¹⁶ Ex hoc loco elici solet alio modo hoc axioma, videlicet: *Quod est maxime tale, caeteris est causa ut sint talia.* Ita refert hoc principium D. Thom., 1 p., q. 2, art. 3, rat. 4, et q. 44, a. 1, et 1 contra Gent., c. 13, quibus locis Cajetan. et Ferrar. in hoc sensu illud defendunt, et Capreolus, in 2, dist. 14, q. 1, a. 1, in fine, et lat. in 1, dist. 3., q. 1. Ab Aristotele autem non profertur nisi ut a nobis propositum est, et in rigore unum ex alio non sequitur, quia propositio universalis affirmativa non convertitur simpliciter. Quod autem haec sit mens Aristotelis, patet, tum ex verbis, tum ex contextu ac intentione Philosophi. Concludere enim intendit scientiam hanc esse de rebus maxime veris, quia disserit de primis causis et principiis veritatis caeterarum rerum;

quod autem est causa veritatis in aliis rebus, est in se maxime verum, quia unumquodque maxime tale est, quod caeteris est causa ut talia sint. Atque hoc modo explicatum axioma coincidit cum illo proposito lib. 1 Poster., c. 2: *Propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis*; hic vero explicatius dicitur, causam debere esse talem, ut in nomine et ratione cum effectibus conveniat; quod Scotus exponit de univoca convenientia; satis vero est si unitate rationis formalis seu ejusdem conceptus objectivi intelligatur, ut latius tradetur a nobis infra explicando analogiam entis, disp. 28, sect. 3. Atque hoc modo exponunt illud /p. VI/ pronunciatum hoc loco fere omnes expositores: Alexand., Comment., et D. Thomas, de quo plura tractantur infra, disputatione 29, sect. 2.

CAPUT II NON DARI PROCESSUM IN INFINITUM IN SPECIE AUT NUMERO CAUSARUM

Tractatum hunc inseruit hoc loco Philosophus,¹⁷ tum ut ostenderet veritatis cognitionem, quae ex causarum notitia pendet, etsi difficilis sit, non tamen esse impossibilem; tum etiam ut ostendat dari primas entium causas, circa quas dixerat hanc sapientiam versari. Quia vero materia ad disputationem de causis spectat, in disputationibus de causis omnes quaestiones nos inseruimus, quae hic desiderari possent.

Quaest. 1. Utrum genera seu species causarum sint in aliquo definito numero, Disput. 12, sect. 3, per totam.

Q. 2. Utrum in causis materialibus detur progressus in infinitum, vel in aliqua prima materia sistendum sit. Disputat. 15, sect. 6.

Q. 3. Utrum in causis formalibus physicis detur processus in infinitum. Disputat. 15, sect. 6.

Q. 4. Utrum in causis formalibus metaphysicis seu in praedicatis quidditativis detur processus in infinitum. Disp. 25, sect. 7.

Q. 5. Utrum praedicata essentialia ejusdem rei differant formaliter ex natura rei vel sola ratione. Disp. 5, sect. 2, et disp. 6, sect. 1, et latius in sect. 5.

Q. 6. Utrum dari possit processus in infinitum in causis efficientibus tam per se quam per accidens subordinatis. Disp. 29, sect. 1.

Q. 7. Utrum dari possit processus in infinitum in causis finalibus. Disp. 24, sect. 1.

Q. 8. Utrum infinitum cadat sub scientiam ita ut exacte cognosci possit. Haec quaestio solet hoc loco tractari occasione verborum Aristotelis,

text. 11: *Cognitio quoque ipsa evertitur: quae enim hoc pacto infinita sunt, quomodo intelligi possunt?*¹⁸ et text. 13: *Id autem quod additione infinitum est, tempore finito percurri nequit.*¹⁹ Juxta quae posteriora verba, priora sunt exponenda vel limitanda, et ita quaestio non habet difficultatem. Tractari enim potest aut de ente infinito simpliciter, et in tota entis latitudine, aut de infinito creato se- /col. b/ cundum quid. Item sermo esse potest vel de intellectu increato, vel de quovis creato, vel specialiter de humano, de quo solo Aristoteles locutus est. Ac denique potest quaestio esse de cognitione quacunque, etiam confusa et imperfecta, vel de cognitione perfecta distincta, de qua similiter Aristoteles est locutus.

De ente igitur infinito, qualis est solus Deus, tractamus late disp. 30, sect. 11 et sequent., ubi declaramus quomodo Deus, cum seipsum comprehendat, invisibilis sit et incomprehensibilis omni creaturae. De ente autem creato, cum verius existemus esse impossibile dari ens creatum actu infinitum in quacunque ratione, id est, tam in intensione, quam magnitudine aut multitudine, consequenter constat hujusmodi infinitum cognosci non posse vera ac distincta cognitione. Nam id, quod non clauditur sub latitudine entis, ex se non est verum nec intelligibile; hoc autem infinitum, cum sit impossibile, non clauditur sub latitudine entis; non est ergo proprie cognoscibile, cum haec sit proprietas consequens rationem entis, sed solum per ens finitum, adjuncta negatione limitationis aut termini, concipi aut excogitari potest ut impossibile. Posita vero contraria hypothesi, nimirum, hoc infinitum esse possibile, dicendum esset ab intellectu divino facillime cognosci ac comprehendi posse, cum sit infinitae virtutis longe eminentioris. De intellectu autem creato non potest ferri universale iudicium, quia nec tanta via intelligendi convenit necessario omni intellectui creato, neque etiam omni intellectui repugnat. Unde intellectus humanus cum sit imperfectissimus omnium, tantam virtutem non habet; angelicus vero, ut opinor, illam habere potest, quia ejus virtus est ordinis superioris, et abstractiori ac subtiliori modo intelligit.

Quocirca, esto non possit dari in rebus ens creatum actu infinitum, potest tamen in infinitum augeri, vel in intensione, vel in magnitudine, totumque illud augmentum potest simul uno intuitu cognosci, quod de intellectu divino certissimum est, ut praedicta disp. 30, sect. 12, ostendimus. De intellectu autem creato vidente clare divinam essentiam et creaturas in ipsa, id etiam frequentius admittunt Theologi, et merito, ut tractavi tom. 1 tertiae p., disp. 26, sect. 2 et 3. Extra illam autem visionem nonnulli id negant de cognitione infiniti in seipso, quam Theologi vocant in proprio gene-/p. VII/re; existimo tamen non repugnare non solum per cognitionem elevatam et supernaturalem, ut de scientia infusa animae Christi praedicto

loco tertiae partis tractavi, sed etiam propria et naturali vi alicujus intellectus creati; praesertim si non sit sermo de tota collectione infinita creaturarum possibilium, sed in aliqua determinata ratione. Nam, ut dicebam, licet necesse non sit omnem intellectum creatum habere tantam virtutem, et ideo nec intellectus humanus, nec forte inferiores Angeli illam habeant, tamen non excedit totum ordinem intellectus creati, quia non est necessaria ad hanc cognitionem virtus infinita simpliciter, nec infinita perfectio in genere entis, sed sufficit virtus finita superioris speciei et rationis.

Neque obstat quod virtus finita quo versatur circa plura, eo minuatur in singulis, ut ea ratione videatur non posse singula perfecte cognoscere, si infinita sint. Illud enim axioma intelligendum est, quando illa plura talia sunt, ut singula adaequent virtutem potentiae, et ideo multitudo illorum excedat talem virtutem; quando vero omnia comprehenduntur sub una adaequata ratione et virtute talis potentiae, non est necesse ita minui cognitionem et attentionem, ut non possint exacte singula cognosci, et omnia simul, quia tunc censentur cognosci per modum unius. Atque ad hunc modum dicunt Theologi, et attingemus infra, superiores Angelos per unam speciem intelligibilem simul cognoscere plura genera vel species rerum, exacte et sufficienter cognoscendo singulas. Et pari ratione tam perfectus potest esse Angelus ultima specie, ut uno intuitu cognoscat aliquam rerum multitudinem infinitam (ut aiunt) syncategorematicae sub aliquo certo genere vel specie contentam; quia hoc non requirit in cognoscente infinitatem simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid, seu eminentiam superioris rationis.

Dixi autem semper, *uno intuitu*, quia successive impossibile est hujusmodi infinitum cognosci ita ut exhauriatur, quia impossibile est, successive numerando exhauriri infinitum; alias numeraretur successive totum quod innumerabile est, et perveniretur ad finem ejus, quod infinitum est, quod involvit apertam repugnantiam contra rationem ipsius infiniti, ut constat ex 3 Phys., c. 7. Atque hac de causa, quia homines non simul, sed paulatim rerum causas cognoscunt, pro eodem duxit Aristoteles absolute prius in- /col. b/ ferre cognitionem rei per infinitas causas esse homini impossibilem, et postea quod sit impossibile cognoscere infinitas causas. Maxime cum ea successio solum tempore finito duret in quolibet homine. Verumtamen non solum in intellectu humano, sed etiam in divino id verum habet; quia haec repugnantia non oritur ex defectu virtutis intellectivae, sed ex ipsa natura infiniti, quae in hoc consistit, ut successive pertransiri non possit. Praecipue cum successio semper esse debeat in re actu finita; quod ex parte unius extremi, scilicet posterioris, seu termini desitionis omnes admittunt, et est per se evidens, quia in eo semper finitur succes-

sio; ex parte vero alterius extremi anterioris, seu inceptionis, multi aliter sentiunt; at ego id etiam verum esse opinor quia existimo non posse esse realem successionem, sive continuam, sive discretam, quae principio careat et aeterna sit, ut infra attingam, disp. 29, sect. 1., disp. 30, sect. 3. Hac ergo ratione, universe et absque limitatione verum est non posse infinitum successive cognosci, quod hoc loco Aristoteles praecipue intendit. Neque contra hoc difficultas alicujus momenti occurrit.

CAPUT III DE MODO ET ORDINE IN VERITATE INDAGANDA SERVANDO

Cum dixisset Philosophus veritatis cognitionem esse difficilem, non vero impossibilem, hic declarat quis modus in ea inquirenda tenendus sit, et quae impedimenta vitanda; estque ejus sententia perspicua, circa quam pauca interrogari possunt.

Quaest. 1. Utrum discendi ratio consuetudini sit accommodanda. Tractatur haec quaestio sufficienter in textu, ubi primum declarat tantam esse consuetudinis vim, ut saepe ratione illius veris praeferantur fabulosa; et quae praeter consuetudinem sunt, statim peregrina judicentur. Unde fit ut propter varias consuetudines, diversas etiam discendi rationes homines appetant; alii enim conjecturis, alii exemplis, alii testimoniis, alii vero exquisitis rationibus delectantur. Ex quo tacite concludere videtur Aristoteles non posse regulam certam ex consuetudine sumi, sed addiscentem debere institui, ut juxta rei exigentiam, unamquamque inquireat et approbet.

Ubi duo observare oportet: unum est, non esse idem iudicium ferendum de omni consuetudine; quaedam enim est prava et praeter /p. VIII/ rationem, ut eorum qui consueverunt rerum omnium aequalem demonstrationem petere; vel e contrario eorum qui ea tantum credenda putant, quae inveniunt in auctoribus sibi familiaribus, et reliqua omnium ut nova et insolita statim rejiciunt. Quos oportet Philosophi verba, lib. 1 Ethic., c. 6, attente legere et perpendere: *Melius* (inquit) *forsitan, et oportere videbitur, sua quoque, praesertim philosophos pro veritatis salute refellere; nam cum ambo sint amici, sanctum est honori veritatem praeferre.* Itaque quando consuetudo hujusmodi est, non est illi ratio docendi accommodanda, sed potius ipsa rationis efficacitate superanda est aut moderanda. Aliquando vero consuetudo est optima, et accommodat sanae doctrinae, et tunc optimum consilium est, discendi rationem consuetudini accommodari; quia, ut Aristoteles hic ait, quod consuetum est, semper est notius; discendi autem ratio a notioribus,

quoad fieri possit, sumenda est. Consuetudo etiam altera natura censetur; quae vero magis sunt naturae consentanea, facilius addiscuntur. Ut igitur Aristoteles ait, 2 Ethic., c. 1, *non parum, sed plurimum, quia potius totum refert, ut sic vel non sic homines ab adolescentia consuescant*. Quod non solum in moribus, sed etiam in scientia addiscenda verum est.

Alterum notandum est, non solum ex consuetudine, sed ex naturali ingenio ac peculiari cujusque constitutione oriri, ut alii aliter discere aut docere appetant, ut hic recte Fonseca notavit. Et quando ex hoc capite oritur ut disciplina, aliter quam debeat, tractetur, difficilius est naturam corrigere aut mutare, ut per se constat.

Q. 2. Quo sensu dictum ab Aristotele sit: *Absurdum est scientiam simul et modum scientiae quaerere*.²⁰ Omnes fere interpretes, per modum sciendi, dialecticam intelligunt, unde sumunt aliqui occasionem tractandi hoc loco de natura dialecticae, an, scilicet, scientia sit, et an necessaria ad alias scientias; quoniam Aristoteles in praedictis verbis videtur eam a scientia distinguere, et docere ante scientiam praemitti debere. Verumtamen has quaestiones in ipsam dialecticam rejiciendas censeo; et supponendum, doctrinam propriam dialecticae, quam dialecticam docentem vocant, esse veram scientiam. Procedit enim ex principiis evidentibus ad demonstrandas conclusiones suas, interdum a posteriori, seu ab impossibili, interdum etiam per propriam causam, ut ex discursu illius doctrinae satis constat. /col. b/ Tamen, quia illa tota doctrina eo tendit ut modum sciendi doceat, quamvis illum demonstrative doceat, ex fine appellata est ab Aristotele modus sciendi, et ab aliis scientiis distincta, quae tantum scientiae sunt, et modum sciendi non demonstrant, sed tantum participant ipsum a dialectica.

Dices: ergo saltem in dialectica ipsa non erit absurdum simul quaerere scientiam, et modum sciendi. Respondetur concedendo sequelam, quia in illa scientia modus sciendi, late ac generatim sumptus, inquiritur ut finis, seu ut objectum cognoscendum; scientia vero ipsa inquiritur ut forma et perfectio tali studio obtinenda. In aliis vero scientiis cum modus sciendi non quaeratur ut objectum aut finis, debet supponi ut instrumentum deserviens ad scientiam obtinendam; ideoque in aliis scientiis absurdum et operosum esset simul inquirere scientiam, et sciendi modum, et de illis, ut dixi, locutus est Aristoteles.

Quod vero in dialectica non sit impossibile simul inquirere modum sciendi et scientiam, ratio est, quia intellectus reflectitur in seipsum, et ita dum in suis actibus modum inquit, quo apte ad scientiam acquirendam disponantur, hanc ipsam formam seu dispositionem suorum actuum per proprias causas investigat, et in eis demonstrandis eandem dispositionem seu ratiocinandi modum tenet, atque ita in inquisitione et ostensione illius

modi sciendi, modum scientiae servat, et ita simul scientiam acquirit. Ad quod etiam juvatur naturali dialectica, quae in homine est principium omnis scientiae, quantum ad formam et modum discurrendi. Denique ideo specialiter in dialectica hoc non est absurdum, quia non potest aliter fieri, nec ante illam supponi potest alius sciendi modus acquisitus, nec procedi debet in infinitum, sed sistendum est in forma, quae simul sit quod et quo, id est scientia et modus sciendi.

Addi denique potest, praeter dialecticam, quae generalis est omnibus scientiis, esse in unaquaque scientia peculiarem ac proprium procedendi modum, qui etiam modus sciendi appellari potest. Quo sensu distinxit Averroes logicam communem, et propriam unicuique scientiae, ut Alexand. Alensis hic notavit; modum enim illum proprium sciendi appellavit propriam logicam; est enim applicatio quaedam dialecticae, vel alicujus partis ejus. Et hic etiam modus sciendi in singulis scientiis praemittendus est, ne confuse procedatur, ut tetigit etiam Aristoteles, 1 de Par- /p. IX/ tibus animal., c. 1, et lib. 1 Ethicor., c. 3, et in Physica aliisque fere scientiis observat. Et hoc etiam in tradenda dialectica fere ab omnibus auctoribus servatur, ut in principio perfunctorie, et absque exacta demonstratione viam sciendi praeparent; postea vero per ipsam dialecticam sciendi modum demonstrative perficiant.

Q. 3. Utrum in omnibus scientiis aequalis sit certitudo vel evidentia. Haec quaestio movetur occasione verborum Aristotelis, text. 6: *Mathematicorum accurata docendi ratio non in omnibus postulanda est.*²¹ Quae fere repetit infra, lib. 6, c. 1, et similia habet lib. 1 Ethicor., c. 2, et 7. Et in genere, quomodo in certitudine possit esse inaequalitas, tractatur in l. 1 Posteriorum, quamvis Theologi exactius id edisserant in materia de fide; in praesenti vero de gradu certitudinis metaphysicae comparatae ad mathematicam et physicam disserimus infra, disp. 1, sect. 5.

Q. 4. An omnis res naturalis habeat materiam. Proponitur propter particulam illam *fortasse*, quam ponit Aristoteles, text. 16, dicens: *Fortasse omnis natura materiam habet,*²² ubi nomine naturae res naturales et motui physico subjectas intelligit, juxta phrasim suam, ut patet ex l. 12, cap. 7, et aliis locis. Putant aliqui ergo adhibuisse Aristotelem illam particulam *fortasse*, quod non crederet coelos habere materiam. Sed facilius dici potest eam posuisse, quia existimabat eos habere materiam, licet non cum tanta certitudine sicut de aliis naturalibus rebus. Vel certe eam adhibuit, quia materia coelorum alterius rationis est. Verius tamen existimo nullum esse in ea voce mysterium, sed esse morem Aristotelis ita loqui modestiae causa, quando ex professo rem non disputat. Itaque illa quaestio parum est hoc loco necessaria; tractatur autem infra, disp. 13, sect. 10 et 11.

Q. 5. An sit una scientia rerum omnium vel plures. Hanc attigit Philosophus in ultimis verbis hujus capituli, et pro hujus scientiae opportunitate disseritur disp. 1, sect. 2 et 3.

Q. 6. An metaphysica ante vel post alias scientias addiscenda sit. Tangitur ab Aristotele ibid.; expeditur breviter disp. 1. sect. 4.

LIBER TERTIUS METAPHYSICAE

Dubitationes Omnes Quae in Hac Scientia Occurrunt, Summatim Continens

Solent expositores inquirere, cur Aristoteles /col. b/ les hoc loco in quaestionibus proponendis absque earum resolutione integrum librum consumpserit. Existimo tamen id fecisse ad exaggerandam hujus doctrinae difficultatem et utilitatem, et fortasse ad excitandum lectori desiderium inquirendi scientiam, in qua tot dubia expediuntur; et propter alias rationes, quas ipse tetigit c. 1, et sunt in eo satis perspicuae. Proponit ergo Aristoteles in primo capite varias quaestiones: in caeteris vero rationes dubitandi in utramque partem affert, nihil autem definit. Et in proponendis his quaestionibus nullam fere methodum vel certum ordinem servat, sed prout in mentem veniebant, ita eas effudisse videtur. Quod ideo moneo, ne quis putet teneri nos, aut rationem illius ordinis reddere, aut illum servare, cum de his quaestionibus disputaverimus. Ob utramque ergo rationem proponemus quaestiones omnes cum locis ubi a nobis tractatae ac definitae sunt. Quod si omissae aliquae fuerint ut inutiles ac parvi momenti, hoc etiam admonebimus.

CAPUT PRIMUM

Quaest. 1. Sitne unius scientiae, an plurium, omnes causas contemplari. Agitur ab Aristotele statim capit. 1, in principio. Veritas est hoc esse munus praecipue metaphysicae, quatenus unius scientiae esse potest, vide disp. 1, sect. 1 et 5.

Q. 2. An haec scientia simplicia tantum substantiae principia consideret, vel etiam prima principia complexa. Disputatur in utramque partem ab Aristotele hic, c. 2, text. 4; definitur vero affirmans ejus pars, lib. 4, c. 3, et a nobis, disp. 1, sect. 4, et disp. 3, sect. 3.

Q. 3. An haec scientia disputet de substantiis omnibus; versatur in utramque partem hic a Philosopho, cap. 2, text. 5, et definitur lib. 4, cap. 2, lib. 6, cap. 1, et a nobis disput. 1, sect. 2.

Q. 4. An praeter substantias sensibiles dentur aliae separatae. Haec solum tractatur hic ab Aristotele de ideis, et de rebus mathematicis, de quibus supra, lib. 1, cap. 6 et 7, et infra, lib. 7, cap. 12 et sequentibus. Sed hoc sensu censeo inutilem quaestionem, ideoque breviter expeditur a nobis disp. 4, sect. 1 et 2, et disput. 5, per totam; et aliqua addidimus in disp. 25, de causa exemplari. Propria vero quaestio est de substantiis angelicis, quae tractatur a Philosopho, lib. 12, c. 8, et nobis, disp. 35.

Q. 5. An eadem scientia sit de substantiis, et /p. X/ de illis quae per se substantiis accidunt. Versatur cap. seq., text. 6, et definitur pars affirmans, l. 4, c. 1 et 2. Et est res clara, magisque dialectica quam metaphysica, et in ordine ad hanc scientiam expeditur a nobis disputatione 1, sect. 1 et 2.

Q. 6. An communes affectiones entis, ut idem ac diversum et similes, considerentur in hac scientia, ibidem.

Q. 7. An genera et differentiae censenda sint principia rerum, vel potius partes physicae, ut materia et forma. Hanc versat in utramque partem Aristoteles in cap. 3 hujus libri. Nobis vero non videtur specialem disputationem requirere; utraque enim censemus dici posse principia, illa metaphysica, haec physica. Quia vero compositio metaphysica solum per rationem est, physica vero realis, ideo principia physica censemus esse propria rerum materialium, de illisque disputamus per totas disputationes 13, 14, 15 et 16. Principia vero metaphysica solum sunt principia secundum modum nostrum concipiendi, et secundum rationem, de eisque dicimus tractando de universalibus, disput. 5, sect. 1 et 2, et disput. 6, per totam.

Q. 8. An inter genera ea sint magis principia quae magis universalialia sunt. Hanc versat latissime Aristoteles fere toto cap. 3. Est vere inutilis; nam genera remota dici possunt magis principia extensive, propinqua vero, intensive, vel illa magis in ratione potentiae et materiae, haec in ratione formae ac perfectionis; sed haec solum pertinent ad loquendi modum.

Q. 9. An praeter materiam aliqua sit per se causa, atque ea separabilis, necne, et an una vel plures numero. Hanc ponit Aristoteles eisdem fere verbis versus finem capituli; habet autem ambiguum sensum. Nam si propria verba ut sonant sumantur, videtur quaeri an ultra causam materiale detur formalis, et aliae. Et hoc sensu tractatur haec quaestio infra, lib. 4, c. 2, et a nobis late, disp. 12, de causis in communi, in sequentibus. Non videtur autem hic esse sensus Aristotelis, quia statim, c. 4, quaestionem hanc cum aliis sequentibus disputat in sensu longe diverso. Alius ergo quaestionis sensus erit, an *praeter materiam*, id est, extra res singulares, *sit aliqua per se causa*. Ita enim uti solet Aristotel. voce illa *praeter*, in sensu Platónico; cum Platone enim hanc saepe agit quaestionem, et hoc sensu tractat illam, c. 4, text. 12, et a nobis definita est disput. 5 et 6, tractando

de uni- /col. b/ versalibus. Solum manet difficultas, quia tunc sequens quaestio cum hac videtur coincidere.

Q. 10. Est ergo decima quaestio, an sit aliquid praeter ipsum totum materiale individuum. Hanc quaestionem proponit Aristoteles, text. 2, illis obscuris verbis: *Sitne aliquid praeter simul totum?*²³ Exponit autem quid intelligat per *simul totum*, dicens: *Voco autem simul totum, cum aliquid de materia praedicatur,*²⁴ id est, ut interpretor, species de materiali individuo. Videtur ergo quaerere an in rebus materialibus species sit aliquid praeter individua, et in hoc sensu quaestio est cum Platone. Apparet autem eadem cum praecedente, prout a nobis exposita est. Nisi dicamus, ibi quaeri ex ratione quidditatis, et ita materialiter esse eandem quaestionem, formaliter vero diversam; vel certe ibi quaeri de reali separatione, hic de formali seu ex natura rei, prout a nobis disputatur, disputatione 5, sect. 2. Alii vero intelligunt generatim hic quaeri an quod quid est in rebus materialibus, sit idem cum eo cuius est. Quam quaestionem late Aristoteles prosequitur, lib. 7, c. 4 et 15, et nos late, disput. 34, fere per totam.

Q. 11. An principia non solum specie, sed etiam numero definita sint, id est, unicuique rei propria, et in distinctis rebus diversa. Haec tractatur infra, cap. 4, text. 13, et lib. 12. Sed non est in ea immorandum, nam certum est principia intrinseca multiplicari numero multiplicatis individuis, et non plusquam illa; idque aliter in formis, aliter in materia verum esse. Formae enim multiplicantur secundum suas entitates in diversis individuis; materia autem non semper, quia una numero entitas materiae subest successive diversis formis; variatur autem secundum dispositiones, atque ita materia proxima semper est diversa, vel specie vel numero, pro ratione formarum. Principia autem extrinseca non ita multiplicantur, quia unum esse potest diversarum rerum principium; aliquando vero multiplicantur, et semper sunt in numero finito, quia in nulla multitudine causarum datur progressus in infinitum, ut supra, lib. 2, annotatum est.

Q. 12. An rerum corruptibilium et incorruptibilium sint eadem principia. Tractatur ab Aristotele, infra, c. 1, text. 15, et l. 12, c. 4. A nobis vero in disp. 13, sect. 11. ubi de principiis intrinsecis, de extrinsecis vero disp. 29, sect. 2.

Q. 13. An omnia principia etiam corruptibi- /p. XI/ lium rerum sint corruptionis expertia. Tractatur ab Aristotele eisdem locis, sed in particulari disseritur de materia a nobis in propria disputatione. De forma vero solum habet controversiam in anima rationali, quae non spectat ad hanc scientiam. In causis autem extrinsecis fere non est locus huic quaestioni; causa enim proxima et univoca rerum corruptibilium esse debet corruptibilis; causa vero superior esse potest incorruptibilis aeterna. Necessarium etiam est

species omnes incorruptibiles ab aliqua re aeterna et incorruptibili ducere originem, ut demonstratur a nobis disp. 29, sect. 1.

Q. 14. An verum et ens sit ipsa rerum substantia, an vero aliquid aliud eis subjiatur. Haec disputatur ab Arist., c. 4, text. 16. Est tamen inutilis, et Platonica. Namque si de ente et uno transcendentibus sit sermo, satis constat non esse aliquid praeter substantiam seu essentiam indivisam uniuscujusque rei, de quo satis in disputatione 4 et 5 disserimus. Si vero sumatur per antonomasiam pro primo ente per se uno, sic constat esse quid separatum a caeteris rebus, non tamen esse substantiam earum, nec subjectum, sed primam earum causam, de quo disput. 22, sect. 1, et disputat. 29, sect. 1 et 2, copiose disserimus. Si tamen aliis occultis et metaphoricis significationibus sumantur ens et unum, explicentur illae, et facilis erit responsio.

Q. 15. An principia rerum sint ipsa universalialia, vel res singulares. Haec quaestio tractatur infra, c. 5, text. 20, et lib. 7, a c. 13, et intelligi potest moveri contra Platonem, an, scilicet, ideae sint principia rerum, et sic jam tractata est dicto loco et alias saepe. Potest etiam coincidere cum illa, qua quaeritur an actiones sint singularium, quae tacta est in lib. 1, et tractata disp. 34, sect. 9; vel, ut D. Thomas exponit, an principia talia sint secundum rationem universalem vel singularem, et sic tacta est disp. 5, sect. 3, 4 et 6.

Q. 16. An principia rerum causent aliter quam per motum. Haec de sola efficiente causa videtur proprie tractari, ut in disput. 22, sect. 1. Aristoteles autem nunquam in hoc sensu eam ex professo disputavit, sed videtur eam proponere propter ideas Platonis, quas ille dicebat alio modo inducere formas, et videtur illam discutere infra, cap. 6, text. 18. Quo etiam sensu traditur a nobis disp. 15 et 18, ubi de educatione substantialis formae et principio ejus effectivo disserimus.

Q. 17. An principia sint actu vel poten- /col. b/ tia. Haec de singulis principiis infra suis locis disputatur, scilicet de materia, forma, etc. At videtur hic proponi ab Aristotele propter elementa quae sunt principia misti, de quibus quaestio et, an sint actu vel potentia in misto. Quam quaestionem disputat c. 6, tex. 19, et nos disp. 15, sect. 10.

Q. 18. An numeri, figurae, longitudines et puncta, substantiae quaedam sint, necne. Tractatur ab Aristotele infra cap. 5, et lib. 13 et 14 latissime; in ea vero nihil dicendum est praeter ea quae inferius de quantitate disputamus, disp. 40 et 41.

CAPUT II
AFFERUNTUR QUINQUE PRIMARUM QUAESTIONUM
RATIONES DUBITANDI

Supervacaneum censeo singulas rationes adnotare, cum in textu et aliis expositoribus, et legi et facile intelligi possint. Quanquam vero Aristoteles inter proponendum has rationes nonnullas sententias proferat scitu et disputatione dignas, tamen cum hinc et inde argumentando semper procedat, nihil firmum de illius sententia habere possumus, ut etiam Averroes initio commentariorum hujus libri adnotavit. Et ideo, si recte procedendum est, nullum in toto hoc libro praebet Aristoteles fundamentum ad quaestiones quas incidentes seu textuales vocant, pertractandas. Nihilominus solent circa hoc caput sequentes tractari.

Quaest. 1. An scientiae mathematicae demonstrent per causam efficientem et finalem; partem enim negantem assumit ut veram Aristoteles argumentando in tex. 3. Tamen, cum illo argumento aliquid falsum Aristoteles apparenter confirmare nitatur, scilicet, nullam esse scientiam quae omnes causas consideret, constat ex illo testimonio nihil de Aristotelis sententia affirmari posse. Illam autem quaestionem praetermittendam censeo in hoc opere, tum quod ad naturam et rationem scientiarum mathematicarum declarandam potius spectet, tum etiam quod facillima sit. Nam constat res illas de quibus mathematicae disputant, secundum se habere causas efficientes et finales, nam quantitas, linea, puncta, ab aliquo et propter aliquid fiunt; tamen prout considerantur a scientiis speculativis mathematicis, abstrahuntur ab his causis, quia abstrahuntur a motu et ab omni usu. Et ita non dixit Aristoteles res mathematicas non habere causam efficientem et finalem, /p. XII/ sed mathematicas scientias non demonstrare per has causas.

Et ratio a priori esse videtur, quia mathematicae non considerant propriam essentiam et naturam quantitatis, sed solum proportionem quasdam, et proprietates quae ad eas consequuntur, non per causalitatem realem, sed per consecutionem tantum illativam. Ex quo intelligere licet, mathematicas etiam non demonstrare per causalitatem materialem, quod ut notius videtur Aristoteles reliquisse, quia hae scientiae abstrahunt a materia. Unde nec per formam propriam ac physicam demonstrare possunt, quia forma et materia sunt quasi correlativa. Atque hinc tandem inferunt aliqui, mathematicas non demonstrare per ullam causam, ideoque non esse proprie scientias propter quid, solumque demonstrare conclusiones suas veras esse interdum ab impossibili, interdum a signo et quasi ad sensum. Sed, licet de multis

demonstrationibus mathematicis hoc verum sit, tamen negandum non est quin interdum fiat in illis scientiis demonstratio propter quid, quae est per causam. Sed distinguendum est de causa: alia enim est realis per proprium influxum, quae dicitur in ordine ad esse, et de hac est verum non intervenire in mathematicis demonstrationibus, ut insinuavit Averroes, 1 *Physic.*, in princip. Alia est causa in ordine ad cognitionem, quae magis dicitur ratio, quae sufficit ad demonstrationem a priori, ut patet cum unum attributum divinum per aliud demonstramus, et hoc modo demonstrat mathematicus per causam, ut cum per definitionem trianguli aliquid ostendi de hoc vel illo triangulo.

Q. 2. Solet autem occasione verborum Aristotelis secundo hic quaeri, an entia mathematica sint bona, quam satis attingimus in disp. 10, sect. 2.

Q. 3. Utrum omnes actiones sint cum motu. Hoc enim etiam affirmat Aristoteles in discursu illius rationis, ubi etiam multa dicit pertinentia ad materiam de causis, ut quod immobilia non habeant efficientem, neque finem. Quod de intelligentiis creatis est falsum; sed, ut dixi, nihil eorum, quae hic assumuntur ab Aristotele, necesse est ab eo affirmari ex propria sententia. De priori tamen propositione disputamus late tractando de creatione, disput. 12, sect. 1, ubi partem negativam demonstramus. Quod vero hic sumit Aristoteles, exponi potest de actione physica, nam supponit res mathematicas non habere /col. b/ aliam superiorem actionem. Altera vero propositio disputatur ibidem, et disp. 29, sect. 1 et 2, et disp. 35, sect. 1. Hoc autem loco per immobilia solum mathematica intelliguntur, et haec non solum secundum rem, sed secundum talem abstractionem et considerationem dicuntur non habere causam, ut declaratum est.

CAPUT III

TRACTATUR QUAESTIO DE PRINCIPIIS AN SINT IPSA GENERA VEL ELEMENTA SEU PRINCIPIA PHYSICA

De quaestione, quam Aristoteles ex professo disputat, nihil novum occurrit praeter ea, quae c. 1, q. 7, notata sunt. Circa ea vero quae obiter attingit Philosophus, nonnullae quaestiones occurrunt, praesertim circa text. 10.

Quaest. 1. An genus praedicetur per se de differentiis quibus contrahitur, vel ut aliter quaeri solet, an sit de ratione generis, ut habeat differentias extra sui rationem, id est, in quarum intrinseco et essentiali conceptu genus ipsum non includatur. Hoc enim aperte supponit Philosophus in ratione quam textu 10 conficit. Et ne quis dicat non procedere hic definiendo,

sed argumentando tantum, id ex professo probat idem Philosophus, libro sexto Topicorum, capite tertio. Quocirca quaestio haec in uno sensu metaphysica est, in alio dialectica. Est enim metaphysica, quatenus distinguit quaestionem inter genus et differentiam, et praecisionem unius ab alio, ac modum compositionis speciei ex illis, et in hoc sensu indicatur posterioribus verbis supra positis, et satis est a nobis tractata disputatione 6, sect. 5, et sect. 6, et ad eandem conferent, quae in disputatione 2, sect. 6, et disputat. 39, sect. 2 tractantur.

Est autem dialectica haec quaestio, quatenus inquirat qualitatem praedicationis, scilicet, an illa praedicatio generis de differentia, vel e converso, sit per se, ut, *rationale est animal*, vel, *animal est rationale*. Et hoc sensu tractant eam hic late Jandunus, quaest. 12, qui affirmat esse per se; et Antonius Andr., quaest. 2, et Javellus, quaest. 2, qui id negant; et Niphus, disput. 2, qui variis distinctionibus utitur; sed res est et aliena et satis clara. Illae enim propositiones non sunt in primo aut secundo modo dicendi per se, quos Aristoteles posuit in lib. 1 Posteriorum, quia in eis nec praedicatum est de ratione subjecti, nec subjectum de ratione praedicati. Et ratio a priori sumitur ex decisione prioris sensus. Nam cum genus et differentia ita comparentur /p. XIII/ ut unum sit extra conceptum et rationem essentialem alterius, et alioqui differentia non sit proprietas manans ex natura generis, ut est per se notum, fit ut unum de alio nec per se primo, nec per se secundo praedicari possit. Quod si quis alioqui juxta alios modos *per se* positos ab Aristotele, lib. 5 Metaphysic. cap. 18, vel alios qui excogitari possunt, scilicet, ut *per se* distinguitur contra per aliud, vel ut excludit compositionem per accidens, sic differentia sicut per se conjungitur generi, id est, immediate et non per aliud, vel sicut genus et differentia per se, et non per accidens unum componunt, ita dici potest unum de alio per se praedicari. Sed hi modi per se applicati per praedicationes, non sunt ita usitati sicut priores; praeterquam quod illae praedicationes non sunt admodum naturales, sed aliquo modo impropriae, et in hoc etiam deficiunt a propositionibus per se. Nam, licet differentia divisiva comparetur ad genus per modum formae, tamen minus universalis est quam genus; e contra vero, licet genus sit universalius, comparatur tamen ad differentiam ut potentia, et non ut actus, et ideo non tam proprie et directe praedicatur. Absolute ergo propositiones hae rejiciendae sunt a numero propositionum per se.

Q. 2. An habere differentias extra sui rationem, in quibus non includatur, nec de eis per se praedicetur, sit non solum de ratione proprii generis, sed etiam de ratione omnis praedicati univoci, vel habentis unum conceptum objectivum communem omnibus contentis sub illo. Hanc quaestionem

attigimus disputat. 2, sect. 5 et 6, ubi ostendimus, non oportere ut ea proprietas conveniat omni praedicato communi secundum eundem objectivum conceptum; et disp. 39, sect. 2, ostendimus non convenire omni praedicato essentiali seu quidditativo, et Aristotelem hoc loco solum de proprio genere locutum fuisse, quidquid nonnulli expositores contendunt. Idemque attigimus disp. 32 et 30.

Q. 3. An species per se praedicetur de differentia constituyente ipsam, ut *rationale est homo*. Hanc tractant hoc loco auctores supra citati, et quidam affirmant, alii negant, alii distinctionibus utuntur. A nobis vero praetermissa est, tum quod dialectica sit, tum quod (ut bene Fonseca in commentariis indicavit) Aristoteles tam claram existimaverit partem negantem, ut eam sine probatione reliquerit et declaratione. Neque obstant quae alii obji- /col. b/ ciunt, scilicet, in ea propositione subjectum esse de ratione praedicati, et ideo esse in secundo modo dicendi per se, nam haec est ejus definitio. Item quia haec propositio: *Homo est rationalis*, est in primo modo dicendi per se; ergo convertens erit etiam per se saltem secundo modo. Haec (inquam) et similia non obstant; nam illa propositio non est naturalis, sed indirecta, improprissima et praeter naturam, et ideo est extra omnem latitudinem propositionum per se. Nam definitiones illae modorum per se, intelligendae sunt de praedicatis et subjectis propriis et connaturalibus, non de iis quae a nobis inverso et contra naturali ordine componuntur et convertuntur. Unde etiam dici potest, genus in illis definitionibus propositum per se, esse propositionem propriam et naturalem. Atque eadem ratione non est necesse propositionem per se converti in aliam per se, quando per conversionem fit indirecta et impropria. Adde etiam hanc esse per se primo modo: *Homo est animal*; hanc vero, *animal est homo*, nullo modo. Video controversiam esse de modo loquendi; et multos censere hanc propositionem, *Risibile est homo*, esse per se in primo modo, licet sit indirecta. Sed nihilominus prior modus est formalior et magis proprius. Alioqui etiam illa propositio: *Rationale est homo*, esset in primo et secundo modo per se; quod est absurdum. Sunt ergo hae propositiones indirectae extra ordinem propositionum per se. Vide Cajetanum, lib. 1 Poster., cap. 4 et 18.

CAPUT IV

Disputat hic Aristoteles in utramque partem plures quaestiones in primo capite propositas, scilicet a quaestione 9 usque ad 14. Nihil tamen definit, nec novum quid, aut nostra disputatione aut notatione indigens affert.

CAPUT V

Hic disputat quaestionem 18 de rebus mathematicis, seu quantitate, an, scilicet, haec sit substantia, necne; nihilque dicit notatione dignum, aut nova disputatione indigens; sufficiunt ea, quae de quantitate disserimus disputatione 40, sec. 1 et 2. Est tamen hic locus observandus pro iis quae ibi traduntur. /p. XIV/

CAPUT VI

Hic disputat caeteras quaestiones supra praemissas, et semper fere revertitur ad inutilem disputationem de ideis cum Platone. Quare nihil novi solet hic etiam disputari.

LIBER QUARTUS METAPHYSICAE

De Subjecto Hujus Doctrinae, Ejusque Partibus, Affectibus, ac Principiis

CAPUT I

DE SUBJECTO METAPHYSICAE

Quaest. 1. Utrum ens in quantum ens sit metaphysicae subjectum; id quod in hoc loco Aristoteles affirmat, disp. 1, sect. 1, per totam.

Q. 2. Quenam entia seu quas rationes entium metaphysica sua contemplatione attingat. Disp. 1, sect. 2, per totam.

Q. 3. An ens secundum se habeat passiones quae per se illi insint, et in hac scientia de illo demonstrantur. Disp. 3, sect. 1.

Q. 4. Quotnam illae passiones sint, quemve ordinem inter se servant. Disp. 3, sect. 2.

Q. 5. An haec scientia versetur circa prima principia, et quid muneris circa illa exerceat. Disp. 1, sect. 4.

Q. 6. An ratione objecti vel principiorum, aliae scientiae subalternentur metaphysicae. Disp. 1, sect. 5.

Q. 7. An haec scientia habeat aliqua prima principia, ex quibus demonstrat. Disp. 3, sect. 2.

Q. 8. An haec scientia consideret primas rerum causas et principia, et quo modo. Disp. 1, sect. 4, et disp. 12, in principio.

Q. 9. An ens in quantum ens habeat causas reales. Locis proxime citati.

Q. 10. An ens in quantum ens dicat unam aliquam rationem objectivam. Haec quaestio hic habet locum propter ea verba Aristotelis: *Quoniam vero principia summasque causas quaerimus, illud necessarium esse perspicuum est, naturae alicujus per se eas esse.*²⁵ Et in fine capituli concludit: *Quapropter a nobis primae causae entis quatenus ens est, sumendae sunt.*²⁶ Ex quibus sententiis inter se collatis constare videtur, ex sententia Aristotelis, ens in quantum ens, dicere aliquam naturam, vel aliquam rationem communem per modum unius naturae, cujus proprietates per se, principia et causae possunt in hac scientia investigari. Tractamus autem dictam quaestionem disp. /col. b/ 2, sect. 2. Cui quaestioni annexae sunt sequentes.

Q. 11. Utrum ens habeat in nobis unum conceptum formalem communem omnibus entibus. Disp. 2, sect. 1, per totam.

Q. 12. Utrum ens in quantum ens sit aliquid reipsa praecisum ab inferioribus. Ibid., sect. 3.

Q. 13. Utrum praescindi saltem possit secundum rationem. Disp. 4, sect. 2.

Q. 14. Utrum ens in quantum ens includat actu vel potentia inferiora. Disp. 2, sect. 2.

Q. 15. Utrum ens in quantum ens significet immediate omnia suprema genera, vel tantum mediate. Ibid.

Q. 16. In quo posita sit communis ac praecisa ratio entis. Ibid., s. 4.

Q. 17. An ens dicatur essentialiter vel accidentaliter de particularibus entibus, maxime de creatis. Ibid.

Q. 18. An ratio entis transcendat omnia, ita ut in omnibus modis et differentiis includatur. Ibid., sect. 5.

Q. 19. Quomodo contrahatur ens ad inferiora. Disp. 2, sect. 6.

Q. 20. Hic etiam tractari potest, an existentia creaturae distinguatur ab ejus essentia, de qua re est copiosa disp. 31, quae plures continet quaestiones, quae tum ibi, tum etiam in indice disputationum, disp. 31, videri possunt.

CAPUT II DE ANALOGIA ENTIS ET NONNULLIS EJUS PROPRIETATIBUS

Quaest. 1. An ens sit univocum vel analogum tum ad ens creatum et increatum, tum ad substantiam et accidens. Prior quaestio tractatur disp. 28, sect. 3; posterior, disp. 32, sect. ult.

Q. 2. An recte Aristoteles analogiam entis cum analogia sani comparaverit. Et ratio difficultatis est, quia videtur longe diversae rationis, ut ex praedictis disputationibus constat. Duobus modis responderi potest: primo comparasse illa in analogia absolute, non tamen in modo analogiae, quia in modo non sunt similia; *sanum* enim ita est analogum, ut forma quam significat, uni tantum significato intrinsece insit; aliis per denominationem extrinsecam. *Ens* vero significat formam seu rationem omnibus significatis intrinsece inhaerentem. Unde fit, ut *sanum* non significet unum conceptum communem omnibus significatis, sicut significat *ens*. /p. XV/

Ex quo fit ulterius, cum Aristoteles aequiparat ens et sanum in eo, quod sicut una scientia agit de sano quoad omnia significat ejus, quatenus

ab una sanitate derivantur, ita una scientia tractat de ente, cum (inquam) haec comparat, intelligi etiam debere secundum similitudinem, non secundum aequalitatem. Nam sanum, secundum totam analogiam suam, non est adaequatum objectum unius scientiae, directe sub se comprehendens sua significata, tanquam proprias partes subjectivas talis objecti, directe, vel (ut aiunt) in recto pertinentes ad objectum talis scientiae; solum enim principale significatum sani, est adaequatum et directum objectum medicinae; reliqua vero, quae analogice dicuntur sana, in obliquo pertinent ad illam scientiam, ut signa sanitatis, vel instrumentum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. At vero ens est objectum adaequatum directe complectens suas quasi partes subjectivas, ut in disputationibus capite praecedenti citatis ostensum est. Unde fit, ut ens secundum adaequatam significationem possit esse extremum demonstrationis, in qua proprietates illi adaequatae de ipso demonstrantur; sanum vero minime, sed solum ratione primarii significati.

Secundo responderi potest, de ente dupliciter posse nos loqui: uno modo, ut comprehendit tantum vera entia realis, et illa omnia transcendit et sub se continet. Alio modo, ut extenditur ad multa, quae vere et intrinsece entia non sunt, solumque per quamdam attributionem extrinsecam entia dicuntur, ut sunt privationes, vel entia omnino per accidens aut rationis. Priori modo videtur locutus de ente Aristoteles in capite superiori, et illo modo est proprie adaequatum objectum et directum unius scientiae, ut habet analogiam cum unitate conceptus, et rationis objectivae intrinsecae inventae in omnibus significatis etiam secundariis, ut dictis locis ostendimus, et quoad haec est comparabile cum *sano* non secundum aequalitatem, sed tantum eo modo quem nunc explicuimus. Posteriori modo videtur hic locutus Aristoteles de ente, et sic includit respectu multorum significatorum analogiam plurium conceptuum, et secundum extrinsecam denominationem respectu aliquorum, et quoad haec comparatur cum sano, etiam in modo analogiae, et in modo quo sub unam scientiam cadit, ut facile ex dictis constat.

Nec mirum videri debet, quod in diversa significatione sumat Aristoteles nomen entis in his duobus capitibus, nam in eis diverso /col. b/ modo loquitur; in priori enim cum adaequatum objectum metaphysicae constituat, agit de ente secundum proprium ejus conceptum objectivum; in hoc vero capite agit de tota amplitudine significationis nominis entis; unde satis expresse plura numerat, quae vera entia non sunt, ut privationes et similia, quae ipsemet excludit ab objecto metaphysicae, directo, scilicet, et adaequato, lib. 6. in fine.

Q. 3. Utrum ad metaphysicam spectet agere de propria ratione substantiae, propriisque principiis ejus. Disp. 1, sect. 2.

Q. 4. Utrum metaphysica tractet de speciebus entis, secundum proprias rationes eorum, et in universum scientia de genere sit etiam de speciebus. Tractatur disp. 1, sect. 2. Et resolutio simpliciter est negativa. Verba autem Aristotelis in textu 2, in quibus haec quaestio fundatur, scilicet: *Unius generis una est scientia, quare et entis quotquot sunt species, unius scientiae genere est contemplari, et specierum species*,²⁷ haec (inquam) verba ambigua sunt, et ibidem late explicantur. Solum in hoc notetur, sermonem esse formalem de speciebus entis in genere scibilis. Et ita dici potest genus entis scibilis ut sic, pertinere ad genus scientiae; varias autem species scibilium ad varias species scientiarum. Vel etiam omnia entia quatenus in una aliqua ratione scibilis conveniunt cadere sub unam scientiam, quae licet sit una specie, generalis dicitur ob universalem tractationem omnium entium sub alia ratione. Nihilominus tamen entium species, sub propriis rationibus (objectorum utique scibilium), ad scientias specie diversas pertinent.

Q. 5. An ens et unum idem sint et una natura. Disput. 4, sect. 1 et 2.

Q. 6. An ens et unum convertantur, seu (ut Aristoteles ait) mutuo se sequantur. Disp. 4, sect. 1.

Q. 7. An in hac reciprocatione recte comparaverit Aristoteles ens et unum ad principium et causam. Disp. 13, sect. 1, in solut. argumentorum.

Q. 8. An quae eadem generatione generantur, et eadem corruptione corrumpuntur, unum sint. Disp. 7, sect. 2.

Q. 9. An unum privative opponatur multitudini, ut hic Aristoteles significat. Disput. 4, sect. 6.

Q. 10. An dialectica et sophistica versentur circa omne ens, et in eo convenient aliquo modo cum metaphysica. Hoc enim videtur affirmare Aristoteles in textu, spectat ta- /p. XVI/ men ad dialecticos potius quam ad nos. Et ideo breviter observandum est, id non debere intelligi de propria doctrina dialectica, et sophisticae artis, sed usu earum. Nam doctrina dialecticae seu topicae (hic enim in eadem significatione sumitur) solum versatur in docendo modo probabiliter concludendi aut argumentandi, praesertim ratione materiae. Sophistica vero circa modum apparenter concludendi. Unde sub hac ratione non versantur circa ens, aut entia omnia, sed circa talia opera intellectus. Usus vero dialecticae et sophisticae artis ad omnia extenditur, quia in omni re seu materia fieri possunt probabiles seu apparentes rationes. In quo excedunt hae partes logicae doctrinam demonstrativam; nam usus ejus non extenditur ad res omnes, sed in veris tantum ac necessariis versatur. Non ergo equiparatur doctrina metaphysicae

cum doctrina dialecticae, sed cum usu, estque comparatio proportionalis, non omnino similis, et ita est res clara.

Quamvis autem Aristoteles in hoc capite non tam disputet de uno, quam dicat esse disputandum, solent hic tractari quaestiones omnes ad unitatem pertinentes, imo et ad alias passiones entis. De quibus fuse egimus a disp. 4 usque ad 11, ut videre licet in indice superiori, ne hic fiat inutilis repetitio. Aliqui etiam hic disputant de esse existentiae, quomodo ad ens vel essentiam comparetur. De qua re late dictum est disp. 31.

CAPUT III

PERTINERE AD HANC SCIENTIAM PRIMA PRINCIPIA, ET MAXIME ILLUD QUOD EST OMNIUM PRIMUM

Quaestio unica. An hoc sit primum omnium principium: *Impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse.*²⁸ Disp. 3, sect. 3.

Caetera quae de tractatione principiorum hic dicuntur, tum ibi, tum etiam disp. 1, sect. 4, tractata sunt, et in superioribus sunt annotata.

CAPUT IV USQUE AD VIII

DEFENDUNTUR PRINCIPIA PRIMA: IMPOSSIBILE EST IDEM SIMUL ESSE ET NON ESSE, ET: NECESSE EST QUODLIBET AUT ESSE, AUT NON ESSE

Haec quinque capita consumit Aristoteles, in redarguendis quibusdam philosophis, qui haec principia vel negabant, vel se negare fingeabant; nisi fortasse id ipse finxit disputandi gratia. Utcunque id sit, nihil fere occurrit in /col. b/ his capitibus, quod utilitatem specialem afferat, aut occasionem alicujus quaestionis praebeat, praeter unum vel alium locum.

Quaestio prima tractari c. 4 potest, circa text. 13 et 14, an unum accidens possit esse subjectum alterius; quam quaestionem tractavimus disp. 44, sect. 4. Et locus praesens exponitur.

Q. 2. Posset circa text. 16 tractari, an quod non est, possit aliquid efficere; occasione illorum verborum Aristotelis: *Ea vero quae non sunt, quomodo loquentur, aut ambulabunt?*²⁹ Verum talis quaestio est satis aliena a praesenti instituto Aristotelis, solumque indicata est ut dicta verba Aristotelis notentur; tractatur autem a nobis fuse disp. 48 et disp. 31.

Q. 3. Circa cap. 8 moveri potest quaestio, an et quale definitum iudicium boni requiratur ad movendam voluntatem. Est enim hic locus ad

illam quaestionem diligenter notandus, ut observamus disp. 23, sect. 8, ubi quaestionem illam tractamus.

Q. 4. Quaestio quarta esse potest circa finem ejusdem capituli 4, an veritas et falsitas recipiant magis et minus, id est, sit una major alia. Aristoteles enim tam certam existimavit partem affirmantem, ut eo principio usus fuerit ad demonstrandum primum principium: *Idem simul esse et non esse impossibile est*. Quanquam, ut ipse praemittit in principio hujus capituli, in his rationibus non argumentetur ex notioribus, sed redarguat adversarium ex concessis. Unde verisimile est illam affirmativam partem fuisse ab adversario concessam. Absolute tamen videri potest falsa illa sententia, nam cum veritas consistat in indivisibili, et in omnimoda adaequatione intellectus ad rem, non videtur posse recipere magis nec minus. Et eadem ratione neque falsitas, quia si tollit veritatem, omnino tollit, et ita nulla potest esse major. Dicendum vero est, in falsitate posse esse magis et minus non formaliter per admisionem veritatis et falsitatis, ut recte probat ratio facta, sed quasi radicaliter per majorem vel minorem distantiam a veritate. Et haec plane est intentio Philosophi: nam hoc satis est ipsi, ut concludat aliquid esse determinate verum. At vero in veritate non dicitur esse magis vel minus per accessum vel recessum a falsitate; falsitas enim opponitur veritati per modum privationis, et ideo mensuratur ex illa, non vero e contrario. Solum ergo ratione fundamenti, aut majoris firmitatis seu necessitatis ejus rei, in qua veritas fundatur, potest /p. XVII/ una veritas dici major alia. Haec tamen res tota plenius constare potest ex his, quae disp. 8 et 9, de veritate et falsitate tractamus.

Q. 5. An contraria ita repugnent circa idem subjectum, sicut contradictoria circa quodlibet. Id enim videtur Aristoteles hoc loco affirmare. Ex quo aliqui inferunt, etiam in ordine ad potentiam absolutam repugnare duo contraria perfecta esse in eodem subjecto. De qua re dicimus in praedicamento qualitatis, disp. 45. Nunc constat Aristotelem solum loqui quatenus unum contrarium infert alterius privationem vel negationem; quod si haec impediatur, constat non esse aequalem repugnantiam. An vero impediri possit, Aristoteles non novit, et negaret quidem ille; nos autem non est cur negemus, nisi ubi specialis ratio intervenerit, de quo dicitur citato loco.

Q. 6. An duo contraria, in esse remisso possint naturaliter simul esse in eodem ut hic Aristoteles sentit, disputatur ibid.

Q. 7. Tractari praeterea potest, an omnia moveantur semper, vel omnia semper quiescant, et an aliquid sit penitus immobile, quod est primum movens. Sed haec in Physica tractantur, suntque illius scientiae propria,

quanquam de primo motore, non sub ratione primi motoris, sed primae causae, vel primi entis, agimus disp. 20 et 29.

Q. 8. Circa haec omnia capita quaeri solet, an sit veritas pura et sine falsitate in affirmationibus et negationibus, eaque percipi a nobis possit. De qua re quod disputatione dignum videtur diximus disp. de veritate et falsitate.

LIBER QUINTUS METAPHYSICAE

De Communium et Analogorum Nominum Triplici Significato, Ejusque Distinctione

Nondum Aristoteles rem ipsam aggreditur, nimirum, propriam objecti hujus scientiae tractationem. Sed prius nominum quorundam significationes in hoc libro distinguit. Nam, quia ens, quod objectum hujus scientiae constituerat superiori libro, communissimum est, etiam proprietates, causae, principia, et partes ejus nominibus communissimis significantur, quae multiplicia esse solent. Et ob hanc causam necessarium visum est Aristoteli ante rerum tractationem harum vocum analogiam exponere. Et hic est scopus hujus libri, ut Commentator notavit. Nam, licet haec doc- /col. b/ trina non de vocibus, sed de rebus praeipue disserat, tamen quia res non possunt, nisi vocibus explicari, necessarium visum est Philosopho exactam ipsarum vocum notitiam tradere. Quo fit, ut hic etiam liber, si Aristotelis mentem spectemus, inter praeambula ad veram scientiam metaphysicae tradendam annumerandus sit. Si vero morem interpretum consideremus, in eo res ipsae ad objectum metaphysicae pertinentes, praesertim praedicamenta omnia, et causae entis in quantum ens, tractari solent; in quarum cognitione magna hujus doctrinae pars consistit.

CAPUT I

DE COMMUNI RATIONE VERISQUE SIGNIFICATIONIBUS HUIUS VOCIS, PRINCIPIUM

Caput hoc ex professo declaratur in disp. 42, sect. 4, ubi sequentes quaestiones breviter expediuntur.

QUAEST. 1. Quot modis principium dicatur, et quomodo significationes ejus ad certam aliquam rationem revocari possint. Disp. 12, sect. 1.

Q. 2. An esse prius commune sit omni principio. Ibid.

Q. 3. Quae sit definitio principii in communi. Ibid. Declaratur definitio ab Aristotele datam, et divisio ibidem subjuncta.

Q. 4. An principium sit analogum, et qualis sit analogia ejus. Ibid.

Q. 5. An principium et causa convertantur. Ibid. Ibique varia de hac re Aristotelis dicta, tum in hoc capite, tum in aliis exponuntur.

CAPUT II DE CAUSIS

Eamdem hoc loco doctrinam de causis Aristoteles tradit, quam in l. 2 Physic. docuerat, ac pene eisdem verbis, cum tamen metaphysicae dignitas et amplitudo accuratorem et universaliorem disputationem postulare videretur. Cur autem id fecerit, expositores variis rationibus declarant. Ego vero existimo Aristotelem nihil habuisse, quod adderet praeter ea quae lib. 7 et 8, de principiis substantiae, et libro duodecimo de Deo et intelligentiis disputat. In expositione vero hujus capituli magnam sequentis operis partem consumpsimus, a disp. 12, usque ad 27, in quibus prius in communi generalem fecimus causarum partitionem, deinde sigillatim de singulis in specie, et de membris seu subdivisionibus /p. XVIII/ earum copiose disseruimus, ac tandem eas et inter se, et cum effectibus contulimus; ad quae tria puncta doctrina hujus capituli revocatur. Esset autem supervacaneum hoc loco titulos sectionum omnium, vel dubitationum transcribere, cum in sequenti disputationum indice ordinate contineantur, et ex illo facile peti possint.

CAPUT III DE ELEMENTO

Quaestio prima esse potest in hoc capite, an elementum recte sit ab Aristotele definitum. Haec vero parvi est momenti, nam descriptio ab Aristotele data solum est quaedam explicatio significationis illius vocis juxta communem usum ejus, et ideo breviter illam declaramus in disputat. 15, sect. 10. Atque idem censendum est de omnibus quaestionibus quae ex illa voce pendunt; sunt enim magis de nomine quam de re.

Q. 2. An materia sit elementum, de quo disp. 13, sect. 10.

Q. 3. An forma sit elementum. Ibidem.

Q. 4. An genus et differentia sint elementa. De qua nihil dicendum videtur, quia est solum quaestio de nomine; sed legi possunt quae de simili quaestione sub nomine principii notavi supra, lib. 3, cap. 1, q. 7.

Q. 5. Potest etiam hic quaeri, an sit de ratione elementi ut formaliter ac per se ipsum componat id cujus est elementum. Quod fere incidit in

illam celebrem quaestionem, an elementa maneant formaliter in misto; de qua dictum est disp. 15, sect. 10.

CAPUT IV DE NATURA

Quaest. 1. Caput hoc, quantum ad metaphysicam considerationem spectat, exposuimus disp. 15, sect. 11, ubi illam quaestionem communem, breviter expedivimus, quod sit proprium hujus vocis significatum, et an recte ab Aristotele traditum sit. Neque hic occurrit difficultas alicujus momenti, vel in littera Philosophi, vel in re ipsa, quia non agit hic nisi de significatione vocis.

Q. 2. Quaestio autem de definitione naturae in lib. 2 Physicorum tradita, non est hujus loci, licet eam, aliqui hic disputent.

Q. 3. Aliqua vero quaestio, quae hic obiter tractari solet, an partes materiae, quae diversas habent formas, possint esse continuae, in disput. 40, inter explicandam necessitatem quantitatis continuae, expedita est. /col. b/

CAPUT V DE NECESSARIO ET MODIS EJUS

Modi necessarii, quos Aristoteles tradit, satis clari sunt: ponit enim duplex necessarium ex fine, scilicet, vel simpliciter, vel ad melius esse, et tertium ex efficiente, quod violentum appellat.

Quaest. 1. Circa quem modum quaeri posset, an omne necessarium ex causa efficiente sit violentum. Sed quia res est facilis, notetur breviter, dupliciter posse esse aliquid necessarium ex causa efficiente. Uno modo ex sola illa; alio modo non ex sola illa, sed simul ex parte passi seu recipientis. Quod hoc posteriori modo est necessarium, non est violentum, ut patet de motu lapidis deorsum, etiamsi contingat fieri ab extrinseco agente; solum ergo prior necessitatis modus, qui pervenit mere ab extrinseco, pertinet ad violentiam. Sed rursus in illo distinctione opus est; nam aliquando passum non repugnat effectui seu motioni, licet eam non appetat, et tunc etiam necessitas illa non est violenta, ut patet de motu coeli, vel (extra omnem opinionem) de motu ignis in propria sphaera. Sola ergo illa necessitas est violentia, quae fit passo repugnante, quod satis Aristoteles declaravit hic in illis verbis: *Praeter propulsionem electionemque*.³⁰ Ubi obiter insinuavit, violentum generatim dictum superius quid esse ad coactum; nam coactum

proprie sumptum est contra electionem (ubi subintellige omnem appetitionem elicitam); violentum vero est, aut contra hanc, aut contra naturae appetitum et propensionem, in naturali potentia, sive activa sive passiva, fundatam. Aristoteles enim nihil inter haec distinxit. Unde etiam tacite explicuit, lib. 3 Ethicor., c. 1, et dixit violentum esse, *quod est ab extrinseco, passo non conferente vim*, positive esse intelligendum, *non conferente*, id est, repugnante, vel (ut sic dicam) non patienter ferente.

Dices : ergo addi potest alius modus necessarii, scilicet, quod est ab efficiente causa absque violentia vel connaturalitate. Respondetur hujusmodi necessarium vel nullum esse, vel reduci ad quartum modum, quem statim Aristoteles posuit, scilicet, quod non potest aliter se habere, quod dixit esse necessarium simpliciter, et per ejus participationem reliqua omnia necessaria nominari. Hoc autem ita declaro; nam vel ille effectus est a causa agente ex necessitate naturae, et sic tale necessarium pertinet ad necessarium simpliciter, quia non potest aliter se habere, et non habet aliam specialem rationem necessitatis. Vel ille effectus est a causa libera, solumque dicitur necessarius ex suppositione, quia, illa agente, passum resistere non potest. Et hic modus necessitatis, respectu agentis, ad illum reducitur, quo res, quando est, necessario est, qui hic praetermissus videtur, utpote impropriissimus, et nullam inducens necessitatem nisi conditionatam; respectu vero recipientis pertinet ad quartum modum, quia passum illud non potest aliter se habere altero sic agente. Unde statim Aristoteles videtur divisionem quamdam adungere illius quarti modi necessarii; nam aliquod est habens causam talis necessitatis, aliud vero quod non habet causam, sed per se tale est.

Q. 2. Circa hanc vero partitionem quaeritur, an secundum Aristotelem et veritatem dentur aliqua entia necessaria per se nullamque habentia causam suae necessitatis. Nam Aristoteles ita videtur hic affirmare, et multi censent Aristotelem ita sentire. Sed hic locus non cogit ut hoc Aristoteli imputetur. Nam imprimis illa divisio intelligi potest, non de entibus quoad existentiam, sed solum quoad esse essentiae, seu quoad veritatem complexionum abstrahentium a tempore, quae necessariae dicuntur, quia sunt aeternae veritatis. Et inter eas quaedam sunt habentes causam suae necessitatis, ut propositiones mediatæ, quae per priora principia demonstrantur; aliae quae non habent causam, ut principia per se nota. Vel si Aristoteles loquatur de entibus existentibus, licet in plurali tradat divisionem, necesse non est ut utrumque membram in plurali verificetur. Unde in fine solum sub conditione concludit, si aliqua sunt hujusmodi entia, illa esse sempiterna. Quid vero aliis locis senserit; videbimus in sequentibus; et rem totam disputamus variis locis sequentis operis; nam disp. 20, per totam, tractamus

de dimanatione omnium entium ab uno per creationem; disputatione autem 29, sect. 1, de necessitate primi entis; et sect. 2, quomodo hoc ei sit proprium; at vero in disp. 30, sect. 16, an primum ens agat ex necessitate naturae, et quid in hoc Aristoteles senserit.

Q. 3. E contrario vero etiam hic quaeri potest an sint aliqua entia, quae licet habeant causam, dici possint entia necessaria. Tractatur disp. 28, sect. 1, et in disp. 35, sect. 3, prope finem. /col. b/

Q. 4. Ultimo quaeri potest, an veritates complexae, quae necessariae dicuntur, habeant causam suae necessitatis, et qualis sit earum necessitas. Hanc tamen attigimus disp. 1, sect. 4, et disp. 8 de vero, sect. 1 et 2, et latius, disput. 31, sect. 2, et sect. 12, versus finem.

CAPUT VI DE UNO ET VARIIS MODIS EJUS

Quae circa hoc caput disputari possint, et ad rem maxime pertinent, tractantur in disp. 4, 5, 6 et 7, per plures quaestiones quae sequenti indice videri possunt. Circa textum vero nonnulla possunt de unitate quantitatis, et de continuatione disputari, ut an recte definiatur continuum per motum, scilicet, illud esse continuum, quod per se uno motu movetur. Secundo, an corpora heterogenea sint vere continua. Tertio, an partes vel substantiae habentes plures formas diversas, vere possint continuari. Quarto, an unum sit principium numeri, et quale principium sit. Quinto, an hoc aequè conveniat omni unitati, vel speciali modo ultima unitas dicatur forma numeri. Sexto, an ratio mensurae speciali ratione conveniat unitati. Haec tamen omnia in se facilia sunt, ideoque breviter attinguntur, et expediuntur inter disputandum de quantitate continua et discreta, disp. 40 et 41.

Q. 7. Septimo inquiri potest, quomodo Aristoteles dixerit, esse unum vel idem, verius praedicari de rebus specie diversis cum adjectione generis remoti quam proximi, ut homo et equus verius dici idem vivens, quam idem animal. Et ratio dubii est, quia major est unitas in genere proximo quam in remoto. Respondetur, Aristotelem non agere de re, sed de figura locutionis. Nam quoad rem certum est majorem esse unitatem in genere proximo, tamen in modo predicationis verior fit praedicatio minusque aequivoca sub ea forma quam Aristoteles posuit. Et ratio est, ut notavit D. Thomas, quia respectu generis remoti conveniunt species non solum in genere ipso, sed etiam in differentia contrahente illud; unde cum homo et equus dicuntur idem vivens, significatur non solum convenire in genere viventis, sed etiam in differentia contractiva ejus, quod verum

est; cum vero dicuntur esse idem animal, similiter significatur non solum utrumque esse animal, sed etiam, esse ejusdem rationis in aliqua ratione determinata animalis; illa enim sunt deter- /p. XX/ minata animalia, quae differentiis animalis differunt; cum ergo dicuntur unum vel idem animal, indicantur convenire in aliqua differentia contrahente animal, et eadem proportionali ratione, Petrus et Paulus non dicuntur unus homo, absolute loquendo: facilius autem dicuntur idem animal. Quanquam, quia haec spectant solum ad modum loquendi, servandus est communis usus, et cavenda omnis aequivocatio.

Solent etiam multa quaeri circa divisionem illam, quam Aristoteles ponit textu 12: *Alia sunt unum numero, alia specie, alia genere, alia analogia.*³¹ Videlicet, quo modo haec divisio differat a prima, qua dividitur *unum in unum continuatione, unum ratione formae, unum genere, definitione, seu specie, et unum omnimoda indivisione*, id est, individuum, seu indivisibile, ut alii volunt. Dico tamen breviter, divisionem partim esse eandem, partim diversam, quia aliqua membra formaliter continentur in prima, quae in secunda omittuntur, et e contrario, licet virtute in idem incidant. Nam unitas continuationis et indivisionis, quae in priori distinguuntur, sub unitate numerali comprehenduntur. Unitas item definitionis et formae ad unitatem specificam pertinent, sicut et unitas differentiae, cujus Aristoteles in neutra definitione expresse meminit; pertinet autem ad unitatem speciei. Ad quam etiam reducitur (secundum aliquos) unitas proprii et accidentis; sed hae magis pertinent ad unitates per accidens. At vero unitas analogiae, quia imperfecta est, omissa fuit omnino in prima divisione; imo in secunda videtur omissa unitas analogiae attributionis; nam Aristoteles solius proportionalitatis meminit. Sed Aristotelis verba facile possunt ad utramque accommodari, vel potest una facile ad aliam reduci, maxime illa analogia proportionis, quae mere extrinseca est; nam illa, quae est per intrinsecam et propriam convenientiam, aliquo modo potest ad unitatem generis revocari. Atque ita patet tum diversitas et convenientia inter illas divisiones, tum etiam earum sufficientia.

Q. 9. Sed quaerunt ulterius, an hae divisiones sint rationis vel reales, et an sint logicae, an metaphysicae. Quaestio tamen est parvi momenti, si supponamus (quod dicto loco fuse disputatum est) omnem unitatem universalem esse rationis, formalem autem esse rei aliquo modo. Nam hinc facile constat, plura membra illarum divisionum posse vel /col. b/ secundum rem, vel secundum rationem, atque adeo et logice et metaphysice explicari. Ab Aristotele autem potissimum traduntur, ut reales sunt, quamvis unitates communes saepe declaret per terminos logicos, quia sunt aptiores ad explicandum fundamentum quod in re habent hae

unitates; unitatem autem numericam, quia magis realis est, simpliciter per terminos reales declarat. Possunt ergo ambae divisiones partim reales, partim rationis censi.

Q. 10. Rursus circa illam definitionem Aristotelis: *Unum numero sunt, quorum est materia una*,³² hic late tractari solet de principio individuationis; de qua re integram fere disputationem quintam confecimus. Quoad sensum autem propositionis Aristotelis, licet Scotistae contendant non loqui de materia, quae est pars compositi, sed de materiali differentia, quam haecceitatem vocant, simplicior tamen et verior sensus est, loqui Philosophum de propria materia; hoc est enim apud Aristotelem significatum illius vocis, et non aliud. Et in eodem illa utitur agens fere de eadem re, lib. 7, text. 28, et lib. 12, text. 49, ut in dicta disp. latius ostendi. Et ideo difficile est accommodare verba illa, ut adaequatam definitionem contineant unitatis numericae, quia in Angelis et accidentibus est unitas numerica sine materia. Quapropter Commentator ait, non definiri ibi adaequate unum transcendens, sed unum quantitative. Et in idem fere incidit D. Thomas, dum ait, non definiri individuum in communi, sed explicari in rebus materialibus. Imo addendum est tantum explicari in substantiis materialibus simulque existentibus, vel intelligendum est de materia non absolute, sed signata certis accidentibus. Et revera Aristoteles hic non satis declaravit individuationis principium, sed quoad nos aliquo modo indicavit, quod sit individuum.

Q. 11. Per unitatem genericam Aristoteles plane hic intelligit unitatem praedicamentalem; unde quaeri etiam hic solet, an praedicamenta differant praedicamenti figura; quia vero haec quaestio propriam difficultatem habet in divisione novem praedicamentorum accidentium, ideo illam tractamus explicando illam divisionem, disput. 39, sect. 2.

Q. 12. Ultimo inquiritur, quo modo verum sit *posteriores unitates sequi priores*,³³ ut Aristoteles dicit, id est, quae sunt unum numero, esse etiam unum specie, genere et analogia. Nam Petrus, qui est unus numero, non est /p. XXI/ unus analogice, et Petrus et Paulus, qui sunt unum specie, non sunt analogice unum. Respondetur sensum esse, in re individua et singulari esse omnes unitates superiores, atque ita ea, quae sunt unum in inferiori unitate, necessario esse unum in superiori, etiamsi illa analogia sit; non est tamen necesse ut respectu illorum sit illa unitas analogica, sed satis est quod ipsum praedicatum analogum illis commune sit. Quo sensu aequivalet haec regula illi, quam tradunt dialectici, quod de quocumque dicitur praedicatum inferius, dicitur et superius, quocumque modo unum sit. Nam si Petrus est hic homo, erit et homo, et substantia, et ens, et ita si Petrus et hic homo

sunt idem numero, etiam sunt unum specie, genere et analogia, id est, sunt unum in ratione formali, specifica, generica et analogica.

CAPUT VII DE ENTE, EJUSQUE VARIIS MODIS SEU SIGNIFICATIS

Quaest. 1. Prior quaestio hic esse potest, de divisione in per se et per accidens, quam late explicamus disp. 4, sect. 4.

Q. 2. Altera est de divisione entis in ens in actu, et ens in potentia. De hac nonnulla tacta sunt disp. 2, sect. 4. Ex professo vero tractatur in disput. 31, per tres primas sectiones.

Q. 3. Addi hic potest quaestio, quid sit aliquid esse verum vel falsum, propter ea quae hic Aristoteles interposuit de esse, quod est in veritate propositionis. Sed ea res partim tractatur in disput. 8 et 9, quae sunt de veritate et falsitate, partim in disputatione ultima, quae est de entibus rationis. Hoc enim esse verum, quod hic Aristoteles distinxit, solum est esse objectivum in compositione mentis vera vel falsa, quod solum est esse rationis, seu per denominationem extrinsecam ab opere rationis. Quod vero ad Aristotelem attinet, advertendum est, ideo hic interposuisse sermonem de hoc esse, ut indicaret, licet de negationibus dicatur aliquo modo hoc esse verum, non tamen pertinere ad entia propria ac per se, neque ad praedicamenta, nisi reductione quadam.

Q. 4. Denique hic etiam tangitur divisio entis in praedicamenta, quam in disput. 32, et disput. 29 tractamus. Hic tantum adverto, solum septem membra accidentis Aristotelem numerasse, omissis *situ* et *habitu*; quod licet casu forte factum sit, nos autem libenter advertimus ex Commentatore, illa duo praedi- /col. b/ camenta parvi esse momenti, et nullius fere considerationis, et ideo de illis brevissime in disp. 52 et 53 hujus operis disserimus.

CAPUT VIII DE SUBSTANTIA

In hoc capite nihil occurrit notatione dignum, de ipsa vero re disputamus late disput. 31, usque ad 36, per plures quaestiones, quarum tituli et loca videri possunt in indice sequenti.

CAPUT IX DE EODEM, DIVERSO ET SIMILI

Quas divisiones Aristoteles tradidit de uno per accidens, et per se, et de variis modis unius, tradit hic etiam de eodem, et consequenter de diverso, quod tot modis dici potest, quot suum oppositum, et ideo nihil rei disputandum hic occurrit. Nam quae dicuntur de distinctione inter diversum et differens, solum spectant ad usum terminorum, sicut etiam quae de similibus et dissimilibus dicuntur. De eodem autem et diverso brevem addimus quaestionem ad disp. de Uno, disp. 7, sect. 3.

CAPUT X DE OPPOSITIS ET SPECIE DIFFERENTIBUS

Quaestio unica. Hic quaeri solet an duo accidentia solo numero differentia possint simul esse in eodem subjecto, occasione verborum Aristotelis in fine capituli, ubi inter ea, quae specie differunt, ponit, *omnia quae cum in eadem substantia sint, differentias habent*.³⁴ Tractatur autem late a nobis, disp. 5, sect. 8, ubi Aristotelem non universe intelligendum censuimus, sed de accidentibus omnino similibus in ratione individuali, ut ibi late exponimus. Reliqua quae de oppositis et contrariis Aristoteles hic dicit, in dialectica copiose disputantur; aliqua tamen attigimus in disp. 45, ubi de contrarietate qualitatum disserimus.

Cur autem post oppositorum et contrariorum enumerationem redierit Aristoteles ad diversitatem specificam declarandam, non oportet quaerere, quia neque in ordine horum capitulum, nec in singulis eorum membris, aut in enumerandis harum vocum significationibus certam aliquam rationem aut methodum video ab Aristotele observari. Cur enim prius egit de uno, postea de ente et substantia, deinde de eodem et diverso? Nulla sane ratione id fecit, sed solum quia parum inte- /p. XXII/ resse putavit hoc vel illud praenotare, in his praesertim minutioribus rebus.

CAPUT XI DE MODIS PRIORIS ET POSTERIORIS

Quaest. 1. Primum hic omnium quaeri potest, quae sit ratio prioris et posterioris, et an consistat in aliqua relatione reali vel rationis. Potest autem quaeri vel de sensu Aristotelis, vel de re ipsa. Aristoteles enim in principio

capitis ait, *priora esse, quae sunt alicui principio (seu primo) propinquiora*.³⁵ In qua descriptione videtur ponere rationem prioris in relatione propinquitatis ad aliquod tertium, non vero inter se. Ex quo videtur sequi, illud quod est primum, non esse prius caeteris, quod est absurdum. Propter quod aliquibus non placet, ut ea sit descriptio generalis priorum ut sic, sed assignatio cujusdam modi priorum. Duobus enim modis intelligi potest unum dici prius alio, vel per respectum ad aliquod tertium, vel per habitudinem quam inter se habeant. Prius membrum attigit Aristoteles in praedicata descriptione; unde etiam tacite divisionem insinuavit, dum ait, *quaedam*³⁶ priora talia esse. Deinde post illius membri explicationem et subdivisionem ita concludit: *Atque haec quidem hoc pacto priora dicuntur*.³⁷ Et statim videtur aliud membrum principale subungere, dicens: *Alio autem modo*,³⁸ etc. Hoc autem posterius membrum non declarat Philosophus aliqua descriptione communi, sed solum per quamdam bimembrem divisionem, videlicet quia quaedam inter se ita comparantur, ut unum sit vel prius ratione alio, vel prius natura seu subsistendi consequentia.

Est quidem haec interpretatio probabilis; sed recte potest prima illa descriptio ad omnia priora accommodari. Quando enim dicitur illud esse prius alio, quod est propinquius primo, clarum est supponi, et tacite dici, ipsum primum multo magis esse prius caeteris, quia (si licet dicere) multo magis est propinquum sibi ipsi, vel aliquid magis quam propinquum; ut, verbi gratia, si corpus illud est prius loco in universo, quod primo coelo propinquius est, multo magis ipsum primum coelum est prius caeteris. Itaque generaliter prioritas in quadam habitudine seu relatione consistit, inter ea quae prius et posterius denominantur; interdum vero haec habitudo mensuratur per aliquod tertium, et quasi fundatur in alia habitudine seu propinquitate et / col. b/ distantia ab illo; interdum vero in sola conditione aliqua extremorum, quae inter se comparantur, ut prius et posterius, quia nimirum unum habet existentiam, quando aliud nondum habet, vel quia unum est causa, aliud effectus, vel quia unum est dignius alio. Et quidem prioritas per se et intrinsece spectata, in hac habitudine extremorum inter se consistit: in ordine autem ad tertium est remote et fundamentaliter, vel (ut sic dicam) quasi mensurative.

Haec vero relatio, cum sit cujusdam ordinis, ut nomen ipsum prioris prae se fert, esse potest vel in ordine loci, vel temporis, vel motus seu generationis, vel causalitatis, vel cognitionis, vel naturae, vel subsistendi consequentia. Et ita numerantur varii modi prioris, qui sunt satis perspicui in Aristotele, tum hic, tum in Postpraed. Ex quo fit hanc relationem prioris, per se loquendo, non esse realem, quia saepe tribuitur iis quae in re non distinguuntur. Ut homo dicitur prior Petro subsistendi consequentia.

Interdum tribuitur respectu rei non existentis, ut ego dicor prior tempore Antichristo. Nonnunquam vero ratio prioris negatione quadam consumatur; dicitur enim aliquid prius tempore alio, quia existentiam habet vel habuit altero nondum existente. Interdum vero consistit in quadam comparatione relationum, ut cum dicitur prius, quod est primo propinquius. Denique aliquando haec prioritas habet fundamentum in natura, aliquando vero in sola humana existimatione vel designatione, ut etiam Aristoteles hic notavit. Per se igitur ad prioritatem non requiritur relatio realis; quatenus vero talis relatio coincidit aliquando cum aliqua alia, quae est realis, potest etiam esse realis: ut, verbi gratia, cum causa dicitur prior natura effectui, illa relatio prioris revera non est alia in re praeter relationem causae, quae propter quamdam convenientiam vel proportionalitatem, prioritas nominatur; tunc ergo relatio prioris erit etiam realis, et fortasse nunquam alio modo invenietur realis. Tandem facile intelligitur ex dictis hanc enumerationem priorum non esse divisionem aliquam univocam, sed analogam, imperfectam, et proportionalitatis. Non est enim hic attributio ad unum primum significatum, sed est proportio quaedam. Et videtur quidem primum dicta ratio prioris et posterioris in motu aut tempore: inde vero per quamdam proportionalem similitudinem ad alia translata.

Q. 2. Ultimo potest hic quaeri, cur Aristo— /p. XXIII/ teles hic praetermiserit eam prioritatem naturae, quae existit in causalitate. Respondetur, vel omisisse illam, quia nisi includat aliquam aliam prioritatem in subsistendi consequentia, impropria est, vel certe sub prioritate naturae illam comprehendisse, vel sub his quae dicuntur priora potestate. Videantur dicta de hac re, disp. 26 de causis, sect. 1. Damasc. certe, in sua Dialect., c. 7, non agnoscit aliam prioritatem naturae nisi eam, quae est in subsistendi consequentia.

CAPUT XII DE POTENTIA

Quaest. 1. Primo quaeri solet de definitione potentiae activae, scilicet: *Est principium transmutandi aliud, aut quatenus aliud est;*³⁹ habet enim plures difficultates. Prima, quia non comprehendit potentiam creandi: de hac vide disp. 20, sect. 1. Breviter dicatur, Aristotelem notioribus verbis usum fuisse, posse tamen accomodari vel extendi, si nomine *mutationis*⁴⁰ non rigorose, sed late utamur, pro quavis eductione de non esse ad esse, et consequenter per *aliud*⁴¹ non intelligamus solum subjectum, sed etiam terminum effectio- nis.

Secunda difficultas est, quia non comprehendit potentias activas actione immanente. Et tertia sit, quia non comprehendit gravitatem et levitatem, quae sunt principia movendi, non aliud, sed ipsum in quo sunt. De his disp. 18, sect. 3, et disp. 43, sectio. 2. Dico breviter comprehendi ratione illius particulae, *quatenus aliud est*,⁴² quia non agunt in proprium subiectum, nisi quatenus caret tali actu vel motu. Nec est necesse quod talis potentia quando inest ei, qui per illam movetur, per accidens ei inest, ut quidam interpretantur. Nam, licet in exemplo quod Aristoteles affert, de medico curante se, ita contingat, non tamen dixit Aristoteles necessarium esse, ut semper ita fiat. Alii rejiciunt has facultates, gravitatem, etc., quia solum sunt instrumenta motus. Sed non mihi placet, quia revera sunt propriissimae potentiae activae, licet respectu generantis denominationem instrumenti accipiant, satis improprie ac late, ut explicui disp. 17, sect. 2. Quarta difficultas e contrario est, quia sub hac definitione non solum comprehenduntur potentiae, sed habitus etiam, ut ars, in qua ponit exemplum Aristoteles. Respondetur (quia res est facilis) hic non sumi potentiam stricte pro secunda specie qualitatis, sed late pro quovis principio /col. b/ agendi, et ita comprehendi etiam formam substantialem quatenus aliquid agere potest. Sicut et potentia passiva, de qua statim Aristoteles agit, comprehendit materiam et quantitatem, ut receptiva est. Et similiter in alia acceptione potentiae, quam statim ponit, nempe ut posse dicatur qui bene potest, comprehendit habitus et dispositionem, quae conferat eam facilitatem, ratione cuius dicitur aliquis bene posse.

Q. 2. Rursus quaeri potest, quid sit potentia resistendi, quam etiam hic Aristoteles inter potentias numerare videtur; itemque an impotentia sit privatio potentiae, vel etiam positiva potentia. Sed prior quaestio tractatur disp. 43, sect. 1, alia vero disp. 40, sect. 3.

Q. 3. An potentia objectiva sit aliqua potentia realis, et consequenter unde dicatur res possibilis, quando actu non est. De hac re partim dixi disp. 31, sect. 3, partim disput. 43, in principio. Reliqua, quae de potentia passiva, et de aliis acceptionibus potentiae hic dicuntur, non habent difficultatem, suppositis, quae de potentia activa sunt notata; nam per proportionem ad illa reliqua sunt intelligenda; nam, ut in fine capitis Aristoteles dixit, illa est prima potentia, et per aliquam habitudinem ad illam omnis alia potentiae denominatio sumpta est. De hac vero materia, scilicet de potentia, et actu, late egimus disp. 43.

CAPUT XIII
DE QUANTO SEU QUANTITATE

Circa hoc caput graves occurrunt quaestiones, quas prosequimur disp. 40 et 41, et ideo eas hoc loco recensere necesse non est. Circa textum vero Aristotelis nulla specialis difficultas occurrit, quae ibi tractata non sit, eo vel maxime quod littera est perspicua, totaque difficultas est in rebus.

CAPUT XIV
DE QUALI ET QUALITATE

Hoc caput ex professo exponimus, a disp. 42 usque ad 46, neque est quod hic aliquid addamus.

CAPUT XV

Hoc etiam caput copiose tractamus disp. 47, et ideo nihil annotare necesse est.

CAPUT XVI
DE PERFECTO

In hoc capite nulla occurrit quaestio quae /p. XXIV/ nostra disputatione indigeat. Tradit enim Aristoteles communem descriptionem vel significationem perfecti, dicens illud esse perfectum cui nihil deest, eorum, scilicet, quae illi debita sunt ad suum complementum. Quam descriptionem in variis generibus declarat, seu diversos modos proponendo, quibus aliqua dicuntur perfecta, scilicet, magnitudine, et partium integritate, et complemento, et virtute, et finis consecutione, quae omnia in textu sunt perspicua, et in disp. 10, tractantes de bono, quae de perfecto necessaria videntur, tradimus; quoniam bonum et perfectum vel sunt idem, vel multum inter se connexa esse videntur, ut ibi notamus.

CAPUT XVII DE TERMINO

Nihil etiam hoc loco occurrit notandum aut disputandum, quia solum hic agitur de significationibus hujus vocis *terminus*,⁴³ quae in textu satis sunt perspicuae, et in primis etiam dialecticae rudimentis tradi solent. De re vero ipsa nulla occurrit quaestio, tum propter magnam analogiam et amplissimam significationem, nam *terminus* dicitur, et de voce ipsa significativa, quo modo tractatur a dialecticis, et peculiari ratione dicitur de definitione, ut hic Aristoteles annotat; dicitur etiam de termino reali, vel quantitatis, de quo agitur in praedicamento quantitatis, vel temporis, motus, habitudinis, seu relationis, inquisitionis, potentialitatis, de quibus variis locis disseritur. Tum maxime quia communis appellatio termini, prout metaphysicae consideratur, vel in quadam negatione consistit, quatenus res non tendit ultra terminum, vel in denominatione extrinseca, quia est id ad quod aliud tendit, vel in quo sistit, ut disp. 45, sect. 10, attingimus, explicando terminum relationis.

CAPUT XVIII DE SECUNDUM QUOD, ET SECUNDUM SE, AC PER SE

Ex ipsa capituli summa constat hic non agi de rebus, sed de significationibus harum vocum; sunt enim hae voces syncategorematicae, quae non significant res aliquas, sed habitudines rerum. Et ita ait Aristoteles dictionem, *secundum quod*,⁴⁴ saepe significare habitudinem causae formalis, ut si dicamus hominem esse studiosum secundum virtutem; aliquando vero dicere habitudinem causae materialis proxime, ut cum dicitur paries albus secundum superficiem; saepe etiam extendi ad alia causarum genera. Ac denique aliquando significare habitudinem situs, ut cum dicitur Petrus sedere secundum regem. Quae ultima acceptio est notanda; est enim in scholis parum usitata; re tamen vera est latina, et in rigore significat esse proxime post alium. Unde non solum ad ordinem situs, sed etiam ad ordinem perfectionis significandum extenditur, ut si dicas fidem esse perfectissimam virtutem secundum charitatem, id est, proxime post charitatem.

Deinde transfert Aristoteles sermonem ad significationem hujus vocis, *secundum se*,⁴⁵ et *per se*,⁴⁶ quas reputat ut synonymas, indicans *secundum* saepe idem significare quod *per*, ut ex prioribus significationibus ipsius *secundum quod*, colligi etiam potest; nam habitudines causarum particula

per, optime significat. Significationes autem vocis *secundum se*, aut *per se*, clarae sunt in textu. Adverte tamen, omissos hic videri aliquos modos per se, positos in lib. 1. Poster. Nam modus per se secundo, scilicet, cum passio praedicatur de subjecto, hic non ponitur, nisi reducatur ad tertium hic positum, qui est universalior, et dicitur de omni eo quod primo alicui inest seu convenit, quod potest propriae passioni attribui respectu proprii subjecti. Quartus etiam modus dicendi per se, ratione causalitatis, hic praetermissus est. Possunt etiam aliae significationes harum vocum annotari, quae hic non tanguntur, ut quod dictio *secundum quod* interdum diminuit significationem, ut cum dicitur: *Albus secundum dentes*; et dictio *per se* aliquando excludit unionem per accidens, ut supra circa tertium capitulum libri tertii annotavimus. Satis ergo est Aristotelem attigisse praecipuas significationes, ad quas vel aliae reduci possunt, vel ex eis intelligi. Neque hic occurrit quaestio aliqua disputatione digna.

CAPUT XIX DE DISPOSITIONE

Hoc caput ex professo exponimus disp. 42, sect. 2, explicando primam speciem qualitatis.

CAPUT XX DE HABITU

Prior pars hujus capitis pertinet ad speciale praedicamentum habitus, et ideo illam exponimus disp. 52, quae est de hac re. Posterior /p. XXV/ vero pars spectat ad eam significationem, qua speciem quamdam qualitatis propriae constituit, et ad alias etiam qualitates significandas transfertur, et ideo hanc partem tractamus in dicta disput. 42, et latius in disp. 44, quae est propria de habitibus.

CAPUT XXI DE PASSIONE

Significationes hujus vocis tractatas ab Aristotele, et multo magis significata ipsa tractamus disp. 42, sect. 2, explicando tertiam speciem

qualitatis, quae est passio et passibilis qualitas, et in disp. 49, quae est de praedicamento passionis.

CAPUT XXII DE PRIVATIONE

Caput hoc, quantum ad varios modos privationum quos Aristoteles in eo tradit, perspicuum et tritum est in dialectica vel mediocriter exercitatis. Nonnullae vero quaestiones in eo excitari possunt pertinentes ad entitatem privationis vel ad oppositionem privativam; ut an privatio aliquid reale sit, aut ens rationis et quomodo; an in privata oppositione detur aliquod medium, vel absolute, vel respectu talis subjecti. Item an privatio magis vel minus suscipiat. De quibus disserimus partim in disp. 45, quae est de oppositionibus, et partim disp. ult. totius operis, quae est de entibus rationis.

CAPUT XXIII DE HABERE ET IN ALIQUO ESSE

Circa hoc caput praeter notata de habitu nihil occurrit; videantur ergo dicta in disputationibus quas citavimus cap. 20, et de modis *essendi in*, videri potest ipsemet Philosophus, 4 Phys., cap. 3, et aliqua annotamus in disp. 37, quae est de essentia accidentis.

CAPUT XXIV DE ALIQUO ESSE, QUOT MODIS DICATUR

Hoc etiam caput non continet novam rem aut proprietatem entis, sed significationes hujus dictionis ex, et varias habitudines quas potest indicare, quae in textu satis sunt perspicuae. /col. b/

CAPUT XXV

Hic dividit Aristoteles partem in integram, seu quantitativam, aliquotam vel non aliquotam, subjectivam seu potestativam, essentialem, vel metaphysicam, quae omnia satis per constant.

CAPUT XXVI DE TOTO

Totum significat Aristoteles dupliciter dici, scilicet, vel respective ad partes, quia ex illis constat, vel ut opponitur mutilo, ut, scilicet, totum dicatur cui nulla pars deest, et haec significatio posterior constabit ex cap. sequenti, ubi de mutilo agit; priorem hic prosequitur. Et prius varia ejus significata enumerat, quae ex iis quae dicta sunt de parte, possunt esse perspicua, quia quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot etiam modis dicitur et reliquum. Item cum hoc totum sit unum compositione, quae dicta sunt supra de uno applicari hic possunt ad totum; nam fere quot sunt modi unius, sunt et totius, si unum cum compositione sumatur, et ideo de hac parte nihil addere oporteret.

Deinde vero exponit Philosophus usum horum terminorum *omne* et *totum*,⁴⁷ sed is consistit tantum in loquendi proprietate et consuetudine, quae servanda est. Neque enim ad rem quicquam refert, sive omnem, sive totam aquam dixeris, sive totam domum, vel omnem, licet prius cum majori proprietate, minori que ambiguitate, vel aequivocatione dicatur.

CAPUT XXVII DE MUTILO⁴⁸

In hoc etiam capite nihil occurrit, quod alicujus momenti sit; solum enim declarat Aristoteles quae conditiones requirantur, vel ex parte rei quae mutilatur, vel ex parte quae abscinditur aut abest, ut res mutila dicatur. Et ex priori capite ait requiri, ut quod mutilum fit, sit aliquod totum constans ex partibus, ut per se patet. Deinde ut sit continuum, nam numeri non mutilantur; nam per ablationem cujuscunque unitatis esse desinunt. Unde tertio necesse est ut sit totum heterogeneum; nam homogenum mutilari proprie non potest, cum in qualibet parte maneat ratio totius, nec totum requirat certam /p. XXVI/ partium compositionem. Necessarium etiam est ut res quae mutila manet, major sit, quam quae abscinditur, eandemque substantiae et essentiae denominationem accipiat; alias non erit res mutila, sed alia. Ex quo etiam necesse est ut pars quae deest non sit ex praecipuis; sine aliqua enim ex his res manere non potest, ut sunt caput et cor, etc. Oportet tamen ut sit ex prominentibus et dissimilibus, quia non quaelibet particula abscissa facit rem mutilam, ut constat ex usu loquendi. Denique ait Aristoteles talem debere esse partem, ut iterum generari non possit; non enim dicitur res mutila, etiamsi pili radantur, quia nasci iterum possunt.

Sed haec omnia, ut ex ipsismet constat solum spectant ad usum vocis; posset enim res dici mutila, pro eo tempore quo caret arte, etiamsi posset illam restaurare nutritione; sed hoc usus non habet.

CAPUT XXVII DE GENERE

Hic etiam non de re agitur, sed numerantur solum significationes hujus vocis *genus*, quae sunt satis vulgares, et a Porphyrio etiam traduntur in lib Praedicab. Hac vero occasione docet Aristoteles, duobus modis posse aliqua differre genere, nempe aut physico, id est subjecto seu materia, aut metaphysico seu logico, id est praedicamento. De qua distinctione aliqua infra notabimus lib. 10, circa cap. 5, et plura in disp. 13, sect. 2, et disp. 35, sect. 1. Quia vero una significatio generis est, ut significet primum praedicabile, ideo aliqui scriptores hic latissimam texunt disputationem de praedicabilibus. Sed quae de tractatione universalium metaphysica postulat, ea traduntur a nobis disput. 5, 6 et 7. Reliqua vero, quae dialecticorum sunt propria, eis relinquimus.

CAPUT XXIX DE FALSO

In hoc capite declarat Philosophus quomodo falsitas, falsique denominatio et rebus et orationibus, et hominibus tribuatur. Quae omnia quantum ad vocum significationem attinet, sunt satis in textu perspicua. De re vero occurrit hic disputatio, an sit, et quid sit falsitas, et an inter passiones entis numeranda sit, et ubi formaliter sit, ubi vero per solam denominationem extrinsecam. De qua re propriam disputationem instituimus, quae est numero 9./col. b/

CAPUT XXX DE ACCIDENTE

Accidens dupliciter dicitur, aut in ratione effectus, aut in ratione entis, quod est extra essentiam alicujus, eique aliquo modo inest, etiamsi per se secundo aut quarto modo posterioristico, id est vel ex intrinseca dimanatione ab essentia, vel ex certa aliqua et per se causa insit. Has ergo duas

significationes accidentis attingere videtur hoc loco Aristoteles, et de eis possunt graves quaestiones pertractari. Nam circa priorem occurrit gravis disputatio de causis et effectibus contingentibus, et de fortuna et casu; de qua re in disp. 19 copiose disserimus. Circa priorem vero significationem dicendum occurrebat de natura accidentis in communi, et comparatione ejus ad substantiam, ejusque divisione. De qua re late agimus in disp. 37, 38, et 39, et ideo circa librum hunc nihil amplius notandum occurrit.

LIBER SEXTUS METAPHYSICAE

De Ente Prout In Hujus Scientiae Considerationem Cadit, Vel Ab Illa Rejiciendum Est

Adhuc immoratur Philosophus in prooemiis, et (ut ita dicam) in vestibulo hujus doctrinae; non enim incipit de re ipsa dicere, sed ad constituendum ejus objectum regreditur. Et primo statuit objectum hujus scientiae esse ens in quantum ens, prout includit entia immobilia, et re ipsa separabilia, et hac occasione multa docet de proprietatibus hujus scientiae, et de divisione scientiarum speculativarum earumque comparatione. Deinde excludit quaedam entia ab hujus scientiae consideratione, scilicet, ens per accidens et ens verum.

CAPUT I

HANC SCIENTIAM ESSE DE ENTE UT ENS, IDEOQUE ESSE PRIMAM SCIENTIAM SPECULATIVAM, ET AB ALIIS DIVERSAM

Omnia quae docet Aristoteles in hoc capite de hac scientia et objecto ejus, tractantur a nobis disputat. 1 prooemiali, et ab eodem fere tractata sunt in lib. 1, cap. 1 et 2, et lib. 4, cap. 1.

Quaest. 1. Utrum objectum hujus scientiae sit ens in quantum ens. Disp. 1, sect. 1.

Q. 2. An haec scientia sit speculativa, et in eo ordine sit prima. Disp. 1, sect. 5. /p. XXVII/

Q. 3. An haec scientia sit universalis et tractet de omnibus entibus, et quomodo. Disp. 1, sect. 2.

Q. 4. An haec scientia constituat aliis scientiis objecta, et eorum quod quid est aliquo modo ostendat. Eadem disp. 1, sect. 1.

Q. 5. Solet etiam hic quaeri an ens, in quantum ens, habeat principia et causas, quae in hac scientia considerentur, quod disp. 3, sect. 3, tractatum est.

Q. 6. Denique propter ultima verba Philosophi in hoc capite quaeri solet, si nulla esset substantia immaterialis, an scientia metaphysica dis-

tingui posset a physica; quam quaestionem locumque Aristotelis tractavi disp. 1, sect. 1.

Alia multa solent hoc loco quaeri de habitu et actu pratico et speculativo, nempe quo modo differant, et in quo uniuscujusque propria ratio consistat, et praesertim agi solet de illa divisione scientiae speculativae in physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam; sed haec, quantum spectant ad prooemium hujus scientiae, satis a nobis tractantur disp. 1, sect. 5 et 6. Quantum vero ad res ipsas, magis spectant ad scientiam de anima, quae de intellectu ejusque muneribus considerat; tamen pro hujus scientiae complemento attinguntur a nobis infra, declarando illam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus, disp. 44, sect. 8.

Tandem multa dialectica hic attinguntur, quae ad libros Poster. pertinent, quae a nobis propterea praetermissa sunt, ut an scientia supponat, an est, et quid est, de suo objecto, vel illud aliquo modo demonstrat, et similia.

Caput II

Ens Per Accidens et Ens Verum ab Hujus Scientiae Consideratione Excludi

Quaest. 1. Circa priorem hujus capituli partem, in qua removet Aristoteles ens per accidens a consideratione hujus scientiae, quaeri potest primo, de quo ente per accidens loquatur. Dupliciter enim potest ens per accidens dici: primo, in ratione entis, quia non est unum per se, sed pluribus essentiis constat; secundo, in ratione effectus, quia non habet causam per se, sed praeter intentionem agentis evenit, quia alias dici solet effectus contingens. Cum ergo ens per accidens aequivoce his duobus modis dicatur, videtur Philosophus inepte procedere; nam in principio loquitur priori modo, et excludit illud ens per accidens, quod non est unum, sed plura; po- / col. b/ stea vero a textu 5 loquitur de ente per accidens posteriori modo. Nam, ut probet esse hujusmodi entia per accidens, probat esse effectus contingentes, et non omnia ex necessitate evenire.

Dicendum vero est, Aristotelem utroque modo excludere ens per accidens, ut ex contextu constat. Neque est aequivocatione usus, sed ab uno ente per accidens secundum esse, seu per aggregationem divertit ad effectum per accidens. Quia modus, quo consurgunt entia per accidens priori modo, est causalitas per accidens, et praeter intentionem agentium naturalium. Nam, licet interdum accidentale compositum videatur una actione fieri, et per se, sub ea tamen ratione non est omnino ens per accidens, sed aliquo modo per se, juxta ea quae tradimus disp. 5. Cum igitur

ens per accidens non sit unum, proprie loquendo, neque una generatione fit, neque per se intenditur a natura, et ideo ex eo quod sub scientiam non cadunt quae per accidens et contingenter eveniunt, recte infert Aristoteles entia per accidens ut sic non cadere sub scientiam. Nec refert, quod ens per aggregationem potest interdum per se intendi ab agente intellectuali, quia vel sub ea ratione est aliquo modo per se in ordine ad aliquem finem a tali agente intentum, vel certe illud idem est mere contingens et per accidens, atque ita ut tale est, sub scientiam non cadit.

Q. 2. Jam vero quaestio relinquatur, quo sensu verum sit ens per accidens non cadere sub scientiam. Sed quia res haec tractatur in 1. Poster., ubi agitur de subalternatione scientiarum, et per se satis est clara, dicendum est breviter, ea ratione qua scientia non est, nisi de necessariis, ens per accidens non esse objectum scibile, quatenus tale est. Item, quia ens per accidens, ut sic, non est ens, sed entia, et ita non cadit sub unam scientiam.

Et ex prima ratione collige, non tantum ea, quae raro et per accidens eveniunt, sed etiam ea quae ad utrumlibet, et per se moraliter seu ex intentione agentis fiunt, ut sunt libera, ut sic non cadere sub scientiam; ut hinc intelligatur vanas esse doctrinas, quae divinant de futuris liberis in particulari et definite; de quo alias.

Ex secunda vero ratione collige, ens constans ex multis diversorum generum, licet absolute sit ens per accidens, tamen si consideratur sub aliqua ratione per se una in ordine ad aliquos effectus, vel proprietates, posse /p. XXVIII/ cadere sub scientiam, maxime subalternatam, ut latius in dialectica tractatur.

Ultimo est considerandum, aliud esse loqui de ente per accidens quoad rem subjectam huic denominationi, aliud de ipsamet formali ratione entis per accidens; quod aliter dicitur, aliud esse loqui de ente per accidens in actu exercito, et in actu signato: ens ergo per accidens quoad rem subjectam seu exercitam, non cadit sub scientia, et hoc est per se evidens ex dictis. Atque hoc modo ostendimus in disp. 1, sect. 1, ens per accidens non comprehendi sub objecto hujus scientiae. At vero ratio formalis entis per accidens considerari potest scientifice; nam concipitur per modum unius rationis formalis per se, quae habet suas proprietates, et hoc modo egimus de divisione entis in ens per se et per accidens, propriamque rationem entis per accidens quoad esse declaravimus disput. 4, sect. 3. Similiter inter disputandum de causis efficientibus, diximus de entibus per accidens quoad contingentias, an sint, et quas causas habeant, disput. 19, fere per totam, ubi etiam hac occasione de fato et fortuna, aliisque causis per accidens disserimus. Quae simili modo, ut exercent causalitatem per accidens, sub scientiam non cadunt; ratio

autem formalis illius causalitatis in quo posita sit et unde oriatur sub scientiam cadit. Atque haec de priori parte hujus capitulis.

In posteriori autem excludit Philosophus a consideratione hujus scientiae ens quod appellat verum, cui opponitur falsum, ut non ens. Et rationem reddit, quia haec tantum sunt in compositione et divisione mentis, et ita sunt entia rationis. Circa quam partem multa dubitari possunt. Primum an veritas sit solum in compositione et divisione intellectus, vel etiam in simplicium apprehensione. Aristoteles enim hic aperte videtur affirmare primum, et negare secundum, illis verbis: *Quod autem tanquam verum ens, et non ens ut falsum, quoniam circa compositionem et divisionem est,*⁴⁹ etc. Et infra: *Non est autem verum [et] falsum in rebus sicut bonum et malum, sed in mente; circa simplicia vero, et circa ea quae quid sunt, nec in mente.*⁵⁰ Ubi aperte et affirmat veritatem esse in compositione, et negat esse in rebus, sed in mente, et declarat non esse in qualibet mentis operatione, quia non in simplici qua cognoscitur quid est, sed tantum in compositione. Cum autem sermo sit doctrinalis et indefinitus, aequivalet universali, et quaecunque exceptio vel dis- /col. b/ tinctio fiat, erit aperta contradictio vel limitatio doctrinae Aristotelicae, et extra mentem ejus. Unde Commentator, Alexander, Aphrodisaeus, Scotus, et alii ita simpliciter exponunt absque declaratione vel limitatione.

D. Thomas vero et Alexander Alensis aperte limitant, et aliquam veritatem fatentur esse in simplici mentis conceptu. Quam sententiam late defendimus disp. 8, sect. 3. Et brevis resolutio est, quam tetigit Aegid. Quodl. 4, q. 7, duplicem esse veritatem: unam, quae habet oppositam falsitatem, alteram, quae non habet oppositam falsitatem, sed ignorationem. Aristoteles ergo hoc loco de priori falsitate loquitur, et de illa universaliter verum est, solum reperiri in compositione et divisione. Posterior autem veritas in simplici conceptione locum habet.

Hanc vero esse legitimam Aristotelis intelligentiam ex eodem Aristotele colligimus. Nam imprimis distinctio illa duplicis veritatis ex ipso desumpta est, lib. 3 de Anima, c. 6, tex. 26, et lib. 6 Metaph., c. 12, ubi expositores, praesertim Aphrodisaeus, et D. Thomas, et Alensis notarunt, Themistiusque, 3 de Anima, cap. suo 45. In priori itaque loco sic ait Aristoteles: *Est autem dictio quidem aliquid de aliquo, quemadmodum affirmatio; estque vera vel falsa omnis; at intellectus non omnis, sed qui est ipsius quid est ex ipso quid erat esse, et verus est, et non aliquid de aliquo, sed ut visus proprii verus est.* Ubi aperte distinguit alium modum veritatis, praeter illum, *qui est ut aliquid de aliquo*, id est in compositione. Quod autem illa veritas non habeat falsitatem oppositam, declarat Aristoteles, lib. 9 Metaph., c. ult., ubi cum text. 21 dixisset, verum et falsum in compositione et divisione

reperiri, interrogat deinde text. 22., quomodo possint in simplicibus inveniri, et respondet, suo etiam modo reperiri in eis verum et falsum; sed verum proprie, falsum autem solum improprie et per ignorationem, seu per accidens. Nam *attingere* (inquit) *est dicere verum*⁵¹ (ne tamen quis putaret hic sumi *dicere pro componere*, sicut in citato loco de Anima, interponit dicens) *Non enim est idem affirmatio et dictio*⁵² (hic enim *dicere* sumitur pro eo quod est concipere rem sicut est.) At, *non attingere*, ait, *est ignorare*,⁵³ quasi dicat, ibi non est falsitas, sed ignorantia, *nisi secundum accidens*, id est, adjungendo compositionem ettribuendo alienum conceptum ei, cujus conceptus non est.

Quo etiam modo dixit lib. 3 de Anima, c. /p. XXIX/ 3, text. 161, in phantasia et sensibus esse interdum falsitatem; intelligit enim non proprie et per se, sed per accidens. Nam sensus ipse, cum decipitur, solum deficit non apprehendendo quod est, sed aliud, quae est impropria falsitas, et potius quaedam ignoratio; per accidens vero sequitur falsitas, non tam in sensu quam in intellectu, quia id quod sensui apparet, tribuit rei cui non convenit. Hanc vero differentiam inter veritatem et falsitatem simplicium, quod illa sit propria, haec vero impropria, Aristoteles satis explicat in citato loco 9 Metaph., dum veritatem illam, simpliciter veritatem appellat; alteram vero potius ignorationem et falsitatem per accidens, seu potius occasionem falsitatis, ut disp. 9., sect. 1, latius declaramus ex eodem Aristotele, lib. 5 Metaph., cap. 29.

Denique quod hoc loco 6 Metaph., solum loquatur Philosophus de veritate illa, quae habet propriam falsitatem oppositam, patet, tum quia aliis locis ponit distinctionem duplicis veritatis, et alteram extra compositionem admittit; tum etiam, quia hoc loco non sine consideratione semper conjunxit verum et falsum, ut significet se loqui de illo ente vero, cui non ens falsum opponitur. Tum praeterea, quia supra, lib. 5, c. 7, text. 14, inter acceptiones entis posuit illam, qua esse significat veritatem compositionis, et ad illud ens verum alludit hic, cum dicit ens verum solum in compositione reperiri. Nam in principio hujus capituli resumpsit Aristoteles tres divisiones entis, quas in l. 5, cap. 7 Metaph., posuerat, scilicet, in ens per se et per accidens, in ens verum et non ens falsum, et in ens actu et potentia. Et potius exclusit ens per accidens, statim autem ens verum; ergo de eodem loquitur hic, de quo lib. 5 locutus fuerat.

Q. 4. Ex his facile expeditur alia quaestio, an verum et falsum reperiantur in rebus; videtur enim hic Aristoteles negare. Sed eandem habet interpretationem; nam in rebus etiam non est veritas, quae habeat propriam falsitatem oppositam; est tamen sua propria veritas, de qua late dictum est disp. 8, sect. 7. Constatque hanc veritatem cognitam fuisse ab Aristotele,

cum dicat lib. 2. *Metaphys.*, cap. 1, *ut unumquodque est, ita et verum esse*;⁵⁴ eaque esse verissima entia, quae sunt maxime perfecta.

Q. 5. Rursus quaeri hoc loco posset an bonum et malum sint in rebus; de qua re dictum est disp. 10 et 11. Discrimen autem ab /col. b/ Aristotele hic positum est, bonitatem quae habet propriam malitiam oppositam in rebus reperiri; veritatem autem quae habet proprie falsitatem oppositam non reperiri in rebus, sed in mente, et ita est res clara.

Q. 6. Tandem esse potest quaestio, an entia rationis pertineant ad metaphysicae considerationem. Quia ea ratione, qua Aristoteles excludit verum ens, excludit etiam omne ens rationis. Quod est verum loquendo de objecto directo et proprio, ut disput. 1, sect. 1, dixi. Hoc vero non obstat quominus per occasionem et ad distinguendum illud ab ente reali, consideretur ens rationis in hac scientia, ut in disp. ult. hujus operis annotamus; sic enim Aristoteles cum hic excluserit ens verum, de alio tractationem promittit, eamque tradit lib. 9, cap. ult.

LIBER SEPTIMUS METAPHYSICAE

De Praecipuo Significato, Quod Est Substantia

In hoc libro incipit Philosophus agere de principali subjecto, et quodammodo unico (ut ipse primo cap. dixit) objecto hujus scientiae, quod est substantia; et prius intentionem proponit: deinde declarat quid sit substantia, et praesertim agit de Quod quid est; ac tandem in agitandis opinionibus philosophorum de variis modis substantiarum plurimum immoratur.

CAPUT I

SUBSTANTIAM ESSE PRIMUM ENS, PRIMUMQUE HUIUS SCIENTIAE OBJECTUM

Quaest. 1. Posset hoc loco tractari primo quaestio de analogia entis inter substantiam et accidentia, quoniam aperte hic Aristoteles eam docet. Videatur disp. 32., sect. 3.

Q. 2. Secundo, quaeri solet utrum accidentia in abstracto sint entia, quoniam Aristoteles hic eam videtur quaestionem movere. Sed praeter ea, quae de divisione entis inter substantiam et accidens ibi diximus, nihil addendum occurrit. Quia cum dicuntur accidentia in abstracto, nihil additur vel adimitur ipsis accidentibus; nam illud *in abstracto*, solum dicit denominationem extrinsecam ex nostro modo concipiendi aut significandi desumptam. Quare solum esse potest quaestio de ipsis formis vel modis accidentalibus, non prout hoc vel illo modo significantur, sed secundum se, seu prout tales formae sunt; sic /p. XXX/ enim merito dicuntur accidentia in abstracto: quia ut formae sunt, non sunt aliter significabiles. De his ergo formis nulla superest quaestio, quin sint entia, diminuta quidem et imperfecta, tamen vera entia, et quae simpliciter et sine addito possunt ita appellari, ut citato loco dixi.

Est autem differentia inter accidens concretum et abstractum in modo significandi, quia illud includit subjectum in sua significatione, hoc vero non, sed significat tantum ipsam formam. Et ex hac parte videtur concretum magis absolute ens, tanquam id quod est, quam solum abstractum; hoc

enim argumentum Aristoteles hic proponit. Dicendum vero est accidens abstractum et concretum idem esse, idemque ens importare, si formaliter ac per se sumantur ut sumi debent; nam materialiter certum est concretum ratione subjecti, quod connotat, esse magis ens, quia est subsistens, seu compositum ex subsistente et forma accidentali; tamen, licet sub ea ratione plus habeat entitatis, minorem tamen unitatem per se habet; est enim ens per accidens. Sed de hac distinctione accidentis in abstractum et concretum dixi plura disput. 39, sect. 2.

Q. 3. Ubi etiam vulgarem quaestionem attigi, quae hic tractari solet, scilicet, an concreta accidentium significant de formali subjectum, ut vult Avicenna; an vero de formali significant qualitatem, ut Commentator, D. Thom. et frequentius Doctores docent ex Aristotele, in Praedicam., cap. de substantia, dicente: *Album solam qualitatem significat*. Sed neutra sententia satis ex Aristotele sumitur; nam hic solum argumentando dicit, videri magis ens concretum quam abstractum propter inclusionem subjecti, quod est verum, etiamsi subjectum includatur ut connotatum. In cap. autem de substantia non dicit: *Album solam qualitatem*, sed *solum quale significat*, in quo etiam subjectum includitur; quanquam mens Aristotelis ibi solum fuerit dicere non significare quale quid, ut secundas substantias, sed quale accidentale, quod vocavit *solum quale*. Nihilominus posterior sententia, sicut communior, ita et verior est, ut ex ipso usu vocum satis constat, et dicto loco satis probatum est; videri etiam potest Cajetanus, cap. de ente et essentia.

Q. 4. Rursus hic quaeri solet, utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis, eo quod /col. b/ Aristoteles hic ait, accidens esse entis ens. Tractatur disp. 37, sect. 1.

Praeterea, quomodo verum sit quod hic dicit Aristoteles, natura, cognitione, ratione et tempore esse substantiam priorem accidente, tractatur disput. 38, per totam, ubi textus Philosophi late exponitur.

CAPUT II ET III QUID SIT SUBSTANTIA, ET QUOTUPLEX

Quaest. 1 et 2. Hae duae quaestiones, quid nimirum substantia sit, et quotuplex, in disp. 33 late tractantur, ubi specialiter disputatur illa divisio substantiae in primam et secundam, ad quam revocat hic D. Thom. quadrimembrem divisionem, quam hic ponit Philosophus, substantiam dividens in *quod quid erat esse*, id est, essentiam et quidditatem rei, *ipsum universale*, id est, supremum genus substantiae, et *genus*, subintelligit sub

illo contentum, adde etiam et speciem, et *primum subjectum*, id est primam substantiam.⁵⁵ Nam primum membrum non est proprie substantia, imo nec proprium praedicamenti substantiae, sed analogum ad omnem rei quidditatem; et ideo in praedicamento substantiae omissum est. Secundum vero et tertium continentur sub secunda substantia; quartum vero idem est quod prima substantia. De qua etiam quomodo dicatur maxime substantia, ibidem declaratum est.

Q. 3. Tertio, posset hic tractari divisio substantiae in materiam, formam et compositum, quam etiam tradit Aristoteles infra, c. 10 hujus lib., et c. 13 et 15, ac lib 8, c. 2 et 3, et lib 12, cap. 3, text 14, et in principio secundi de Anima; tractatur autem a nobis disp. 33, sect. 1. Id solum videtur hic notandum, Aristotelem hoc loco divisisse primam substantiam in illa tria membra, quae eadem proportione sumenda sunt; potuisset tamen pari modo dividere vel substantiam secundam, vel substantiam in communi, ut fecisse videtur in lib. de Anim. Sed hoc parum refert; intellexit enim Aristoteles ex una divisione in particulari data alias subintelligi facile posse.

Q. 4. Quarto, quaeri hic solet circa text. 7, in fine, an forma sit prior ac praecipua substantia quam materia et compositum; solet enim ita intelligi textus hic Aristotelis, ut patet ex interpretatione D. Thomae, Alensis, Scoti, et Commentatoris. Sec occasio errandi fuit, quod infideliter antiquus interpres trans- /p. XXXI/ tulit; ubi enim textus graecus habet *et ipsum*, ipse vertit *et ipso*. Unde Aphrodisias aliter exponit, scilicet, non solum formam, sed etiam compositum esse perfectius materia; quod Aristoteles statim tradit text. 8. Vel certe sensus est, si forma est perfectior materia, compositum esse utraque perfectius. Tractatur hoc ex professo, disp. 15, sect. 7, ubi etiam forma cum materia comparatur; et explicatur ratio Aristotelis, qua probat formam esse perfectiorem materia, quia est separabilis; intelligitur enim permissive, sed de forma et materia ut sic; nam in tota latitudine formae est aliqua separabilis, non vero in tota latitudine materiae; id enim satis indicat excessum formae respectu materiae ex genere suo, et ex communi ratione actus et potentiae ejusdem generis.

Q. 5. Quinta quaestio hujus loci maxime propria est, qualis substantia sit materia, et an sit pura potentia, vel aliquid habeat actualitatis, de qua re late disp. 13, sect. 4 et sequentibus. Cum qua quaestione conjuncta necessario est quaestio de forma substantiali, an detur, quam etiam hic Aristoteles attigit, eamque late disseruimus disp. 16. Quod ergo hoc loco Aristoteles definit, solum est materiam solam non esse illam substantiam primam quam appellamus maxime substantiam, sed esse quamdam potentiam ad illam; non tamen negat Aristoteles habere materiam suam substantialem entitatem, quamvis potentialem, ad formam recipiendam. Cum ergo ibi

Aristoteles significat materiam esse notissimam, vel argumentaando tantum loquitur, vel certe intelligit materiam esse notissimam sub communi ratione materiae, seu subjecti transmutationum, non vero sub propria ratione materiae purae.

Q. 6. Sexto, quaeri potest an quantitas sit substantia, quod hic Aristoteles negat, et merito; de qua re egimus disp. 43, sect. 2

CAPUT IV DE DEFINITIONE SEU QUIDDITATE REI

Aristoteles in fine praecedentis capitis, de substantiali forma se acturum promisit; quia vero substantialis forma est, quae complet substantiae quidditatem, seu *quod quid erat esse*,⁵⁶ ut ipse loquitur, ideo ab ipso quod quid erat esse disputationem exorditur. Et tacite inchoat disputationem contra Platonem, ut ostendat formas separatas seu ideas non esse necessarias, nec propter definitiones, nec propter esse individuorum, nec propter rerum generationes. In hoc ergo capite tractat de quidditate, seu quod quid est (hoc enim nomen magis proprium concretumque est quam quidditas), agit (inquam) *logice*, ut ipse dicit, seu in ordine ad definitiones. Quia vero quod quid est latius patet quam forma substantialis rigorose sumpta, ideo hic generalius de illo disputat. Et hac occasione multa praefatur de ordine doctrinae in procedendo a notioribus ad minus nota; circa quae immorari aut movere quaestionem supervacaneum est, cum ea methodus passim ab Aristotele repetatur, sitque proprium dialectici declarare illam.

Quaest. 1. Primo ergo quaeri potest, an verum sit quod in principio hujus capitis Aristoteles ait, illud esse quod quid erat esse rei, quod per se primo praedicatur de re, id est, ita ut in definitione praedicati non ponatur subjectum, ut ipsemet declarat. Et ratio dubii esse potest, quia genus praedicatur per se primo de specie, ut animal de homine, et tamen non est quod quid erat esse hominis. Rursus differentia, ut rationale, non dicit quod quid est, quia non in quid, sed in quale praedicatur, et tamen praedicatur per se primo. Verumtamen haec quaestio rejicienda est in lib. Poster., ubi de modis per se late Aristoteles disputat. Et breviter dicendum est, quod quid erat esse, logice sumptum, nihil esse aliud quam definitionem essentialem ac quidditativam rei, quae, ut est formaliter in mente aut voce, est opus dialecticae; ut vero essentia rei menti objecta, aut definitione explicata, est essentia metaphysica, quae, dum in ordine ad definitionem explicatur, logice declarari dicitur, et ita loquitur Philosophus hic.

Haec autem definitio potest aut tota distincte praedicari de definito, et tunc est propria et adaequata praedicatio quidditatis; potest item praedicari per partes enunciando vel solum genus, vel solam differentiam; et tunc, licet absolute non praedicetur totum quod quid est, tamen explicite praedicatur aliquid ejus, et implicite totum, quia nec genus, nec differentia praedicantur ut partes, sed ut aliquo modo dicunt totum. Et ideo sub *quod quid erat esse*, non sola definitio, sed etiam genus, et differentia, ea ratione qua praedicantur de definito, comprehenduntur. Et hoc modo animal dicitur esse quod quid erat esse hominis, non integrum formaliter, confuse tamen totum. Nec refert quod differentia dicatur praee-/p. xxxii/ dicari in quale, quia praedicatur in quale quid, id est, essenziale, et constituens rei essentiam. Unde constat omnia praedicata accidentalia, qualiacunque sint, excludi a quod quid erat esse, quia non praedicantur per se primo de re.

Q. 2. Secundo, hic quaeri potest an accidentia habeant quod quid erat esse, id est, an definiri possint, et quomodo. Quam rem latissime tractat Aristoteles hic, text. 12 et sequentibus, et toto cap. seq. Sed vix potest hic esse quaestio de re, sed de nomine tantum. Summa ergo eorum, quae Aristoteles tradit, in hoc continetur. Quod si metaphysice loquamur de quod quid erat esse, id est, de essentia, constat accidentia aliquam habere realem essentiam, sicut sunt entia realia, nam ens per essentiam in ratione entis constituitur. At sicut accidentalia analogice et secundum quid sunt entia, ita solum habet [sic] essentiam secundum quid, et cum eadem proportionali analogia.

Atque hinc ulterius loquendo logice de quod quid erat esse, id est, de definitione, eadem proportione constat esse dicendum accidentia posse aliquam definitionem habere, nam habent realem essentiam et metaphysice non omnino simplicem; omnis autem essentia realis et composita potest oratione aliqua et expressa mentis conceptione declarari; et hoc est definiri. Quae imperfectio consistere potest, vel in eo quod genus et differentia ejus in latitudine entis valde incompleta sunt et imperfecta, multo magis quam sit genus animae, vel materiae; vel certe in eo quod non possunt definiri accidentia, nisi ponendo in definitione aliquod additum, ut per ordinem ad illud talis essentia declaretur. Quomodo superius dictum est substantiam esse priorem definitione accidente, quia non potest accidens, nisi per substantiam definiri. Nam ut definitio ejus vere ac proprie declaret essentiam ejus, necesse est ut per aliquam habitudinem ad substantiam illam explicet, de qua re diximus disp. 37, sect. 1.

Illud autem adverte, videri in hoc textu Aristotelem aliquando loqui de ente per accidens, aliquando vero de accidente: de quibus tamen non est

omnino eadem ratio in ordine ad definitionem. Nam ens per accidens ut sic revera non habet definitionem, /col. b/ sed per plures definitiones seu aggregatum definitionum explicandum est, quia sicut non est ens, sed entia, ita non habet essentiam, sed essentias, et idem proportionaliter est de definitione. Accidens vero proprie sumptum, est ens per se (inquam), non prout distinguitur contra in alio, sed prout distinguitur contra per accidens; seu est per se non in ratione entis, sed in ratione unius, et ita una etiam definitione definiri potest, non tamen omnino perfecte una, quia in ea ponendum est aliquod additum, et quoad hoc comparatur aliquo modo enti per accidens.

CAPUT V SOLVUNTUR DUBITATIONES CIRCA DEFINITIONES ACCIDENTIUM

Quaest. unica. Hic nihil occurrit notatione dignum praeter regulam quamdam, quae communiter ex hoc cap. colligitur, nempe non committi nugationem cum accidens in concreto adjective jungitur subjecto quod connotat, ut cum dicitur, nasus simus, aut capillus crispus, aut etiam corpus album; haec enim regula non solum in accidentibus propriis, ut quidam significant, sed etiam in communibus locum habet respectu adaequati subjecti, quod connotant. Nam horum omnium eadem est ratio apparentis nugationis, eo quod altera dictio videatur idem significare, quod utraque simul; nam *album* significat corpus disgregativum visus, et *simum* nasum curvum; unde fit argumentum, loco nominis posse poni definitum, atque ita perinde esse dicere *capillus crispus*, quod capillus talis figurae.

Nihilominus certum est quod Aristoteles docet, in his non committi nugationem, quod satis constat ex communi modo loquendi, qui proprius et non abusivus censetur. Ratio vero est, quia haec concreta non significant de formali subjecta, sed tantum ea connotant, et quando adjective seu ex parte praedicati ponuntur, proprie non ponuntur ratione formalis significati, sed ratione formalis tantum quod applicant materiali, et ideo non fit ulla repetitio seu nugatio. Neque etiam in his licet totam definitionem ipsius accidentis concreti ponere loco ipsius concreti adjectivi, quia in sua definitione includit (ait D. Thom. hic) aliquid quod est extra essentiam suam. Vel clarius, quia in definitione ponitur ipsum subjectum seu materiale loco generis, et tamen in praedicatione vel compositione cum /p. XXXIII/ ipso materiali, solum adjungitur ratione formalis.

Caput VI

AN QUOD QUID EST SIT IDEM CUM EO CUJUS EST

Hoc capite tacite probat Aristoteles propter esse individuorum non esse necessarias separatas quidditates, quid quod quid est non separatur ab eo cujus est, de qua re multa in expositionem hujus capituli dicimus disp. 34, sect. 3, ubi de natura et supposito eorumque distinctione agimus; solum advertatur diligenter quid intelligat Aristoteles per *quod quid est*, et quid sit id cum quo illud comparat; nam ex horum intelligentia pendet sensus Aristotelis et explicatio quaestionis. Igitur per *quod quid erat esse*, intelligit Aristoteles definitionem essentialem rei: eodem enim modo hic accipit *quod quid est*, quo in praecedentibus capitulis, ut manifeste patet ex connectione contextus, et in superioribus semper hoc sensu egerat de quod quid, et quoad hanc partem omnes expositores conveniunt.

Quidam vero aiunt Aristotelem comparare quod quid cum definito. Sed obstat, quia secundum hunc modum non solum in substantiis, sed etiam in accidentibus, quod quid est, esset idem cum eo cujus est; quod Aristoteles negat. Et sequela patet, quia in omnibus rebus definitum esset idem cum sua definitione, et e converso. Respondent non negare hoc Aristotelem in accidentibus, sed in entibus per accidens, quae non habent quod quid est. Sed obstat, quia Aristoteles hic de his, quae accidentaliter dicuntur, non dicit non habere illud, licet minus perfectum, ut superiori capite tradiderat, et negat illud esse idem cum eo cujus est.

Quocirca mihi valde placet expositio Alex. Alensis, quam ex Commentatore sumsit, comparari hic quod quid est, ad primam substantiam, seu ad subjectum cui attribuitur; omnia enim quae habent aliquo modo quod quid est, sunt ipsius primae substantiae. Et hoc modo clarissima est doctrina Philosophi, quod quid est esse idem cum eo cujus est, id est, cum eo subjecto cui attribuitur in eo quod quid ac per se, non vero cum eo de quo dicitur per accidens. Itaque comparat Philosophus quod quid est ad omne subjectum de quo dicitur, et duas generales regulas constituit. Prima est, respectu ejus de quo dicitur per se, esse idem cum illo; alia, respectu ejus de quo dicitur ex accidenti, non esse idem. Et /col. b/ quia quod quid est substantiale, quia ut tale est, de nullo dicitur per accidens, sed tantum per se, ideo simpliciter est idem cum eo cujus est. Quod quid autem accidentale, si formaliter comparetur ad rem sui generis, et sibi per se subjectam in praedicatione, etiam est idem cum eo cujus est, ut quod quid est albedinis cum albedine, vel cum hac albedine. Quia vero hujusmodi quod quid est accidentale, potest etiam dici per accidens de

substantia, ideo respectu ejus cujus hoc modo est, non est idem cum eo, quia non est ejus, ut quod quid est ejus, sed ut accidens ejus.

Atque hoc modo explicata sententia Aristotelis, aptissime per illam paratur via ad ostendendum ideas non esse separatas a rebus et substantiis particularibus, quod Aristoteles intendit. Sic etiam cessant hic quaestiones de distinctione naturae a supposito, et de distinctione abstracti a concreto in substantiis, etiam universe conceptis, ut sunt homo et humanitas, quae a nobis tractatae sunt d[icta] disp. 34.

Quaest. 1. Pertinet autem huc proprie quaestio de identitate definitionis cum definito; sed quia dialectica est, et nihil habet difficultatis, eam praetermitto.

Q. 2. Posset etiam hic tractari quaestio, quomodo definitum in communi, seu species, sit idem cum individuo, de quo per se dicitur, quae disp. 4 de unitate individuali tractatur. Hinc tamen collige, cum Aristoteles ait, quod quid est, esse idem cum eo cujus est, non excludere omnem distinctionem rationis, sive fundatam in modo concipiendi, ut inter definitionem et definitum, sive in re concepta, ut inter speciem et individuum; excludit ergo distinctionem rei, et ex natura rei, et omnem illam, quae impedit praedicationem formalem ac per se, et sic erit facilis littera Philosophi quoad reliqua.

CAPUT VII QUOMODO ET A QUO FORMAE RERUM FIANTE

Hic incipit perficere tertiam partem disputationis contra Platonem, quod ideae non sint necessariae propter generationem, et ea occasione in hoc et sequenti capite varia distinguit principia et modos generationum, scilicet, ab arte, vel natura, vel casu, et alia, quae latissime disputantur a nobis in disp. 18 de causa efficienti.

Quaest. 1. Hic vero specialiter disputari solet occasione textus Aristotelis, primo, an /p. XXXIV/ omnia, quae fiunt, fiant ex aliqua materia, quod tangit quaestionem illam, an Aristoteles cognoverit creationem. Sed hic Aristoteles de actionibus naturalibus loquitur; et in his verum habet generalis propositio, quae affirmat omnia fieri ex materia alia. Et eodem modo accipienda est aliqua propositio, quam habet text. 24: *Quare, quemadmodum dicitur, impossibile est fieri, si nihil praeexistat.*⁵⁷

Q. 2. Secundo quaeri solet an omnia, quae materiam habent, possint esse et non esse, propter verba Philosophi, text. 22: *Cuncta quae natura fiunt, habent materiam; possibile enim est esse et non esse eorum unumquodque, hoc*

*autem materia.*⁵⁸ Sed in hoc textu non habet fundamentum illa quaestio, quia hic solum dicitur omne quod potest esse et non esse, id habere ex materia; non potest autem haec affirmans propositio converti simpliciter, nec Aristoteles id dixit. Tractatur vero illa quaestio d. 13, sect. 8 et seq.

Q. 3. Tertio quaeri potest, an omnia, quae generantur ex semine, possint ex putrefactione et sine semine generari. Nam Aristoteles hic, text. 22, clare affirmat, eadem quae ex semine fiunt, contingere fieri sine semine. Propter quod Averroes, 8 Physicor., comm. 46, de omnibus animalibus sine distinctione id affirmat. Avicen. vero, lib. 2 Sufficient., in universum negat id fieri posse; putat enim specie distingui animalia, quae sine semine fiunt ex putrefactione, ab aliis quae similia videntur ex semine generatis. Sed utraque opinio satis est repugnans experientiae. Nam videmus nonnulla animalia generari ex putrefactione omnino similia iis quae per seminalem propagationem fiunt, et in plantis idem est evidens. Et e contrario praeter omnem naturalem eventum est, quod animalia perfecta, ut equi, leones, etc., generentur nisi per propriam et per se generationem.

Quapropter D. Thom. hoc loco recte distinguit, expendens accurate verba Philosophi dicentis: *Quaedam enim eadem ex semine, et absque semine fiunt.*⁵⁹ Dixit enim *quaedam*, quia non est id commune omnibus. Distinctio ergo est de perfectis et imperfectis viventibus; haec enim possunt sine semine virtute coelestium corporum causari, quia sunt adeo imperfecta, ut dispositiones ad eorum formas necessariae casu possint in subjecto consurgere ex contingente concursu aliorum agentium; at priora viventia adeo sunt perfecta, et tam exactam ac mirabilem organisationem postulant, ut minime possint nisi a causa propria ac per /col. b/ se fieri. Atque ita hoc ipsum docet experientia de utroque viventium ordine, ut dixi. Et in hac resolutione conveniunt contra Avicennam et Commentatorem sectatores utriusque scholae D. Thom. et Scot. hic; Alexand. Alens. et alii.

Q. 4. Hinc vero nascitur altera quaestio, quaenam causa inducat formas substantiales in haec viventia, et an coelum habeat ad hoc sufficientem virtutem, de qua re dixi disp. 15, sect. 1.

Q. 5. Quaeri item potest an huiusmodi rerum generatio sit dicenda causalis. Hoc vero facilem habet resolutionem; nam respectu particularium agentium est causalis, respectu vero solis non ita. Ita D. Thom., cujus sententia defenditur contra impugnationes Janduni a Javello, quaest. 10. Sed est res facilis. Aliter dici potest, illam generationem quantum ad concursum causarum disponentium materiam esse per accidens et a casu; posita vero illa dispositione per se et ex intentione agentis universalis induci talem formam substantialem, quod attigimus disputatione ult., sect. ult.

Q. 6. Praeterea, hic quaeri potest quomodo exemplaria artium ad suos effectus concurrant: quia Aristoteles hic ait sanitatem in materia oriri ex sanitate in mente seu sine materia. Hanc quaestionem et locum exponimus disp. 25, sect. 3.

Denique potest quaeri utrum actiones immanentes sint vere actiones; ita enim expresse videtur affirmare Philosophus dum ait: *Generationum autem et motuum, haec quidem intellectio, illa vero effectio seu factio vocatur.*⁶⁰ De hac re late disputatum est disp. 48, sect. 2, et disp. 49, sect. 4.

CAPUT VIII DE EADEM RE, ET QUOD FORMA NON PER SE FIAT, SED COMPOSITUM

Quaest. 1. Primo ab ipso Philosopho tractatur, an forma per se generetur, quam quaestionem expeditivimus breviter disp. 15, sect. 4.

Q. 2. An hoc non solum in formis substantialibus, sed etiam accidentalibus verum sit, ibi num. 6, ubi breviter affirmantem partem resolvimus.

Q. 3. An formae substantiales introducantur in materiam ab aliquo agente universali, vel a particularibus: de hac quaest. late disp. 15, sect. 2, et disp. 18, sect 1 et 2. /p. XXXV/

Q. 4. An unumquodque generet sibi simile. Haec quaestio ex eisdem locis expedita est, et ex divisione causae efficientis in univocam et aequivocam, quae traditur et explicatur disput. 17, sect. 2. Solum advertenda sunt duo. Unum est Aristotelem loqui proprie de generatione, sub ea comprehendendo alterationem, quae ad illam disponit; non vero de omni effectione; sic enim qui localiter movet, non proprie agit simile; nec per omnes actiones immanentes intendunt agentia productionem sibi similitudinem, sed unaquaeque potentia dicitur agere id, quod proportionatum et accommodatum est ad suam perfectionem. Haec enim non tam agunt ut se communicent, quam ut se perficiant; et ideo non agunt proprie sibi similia. Quanquam si late extendatur similitudo ad causam aequivocam, possunt etiam haec dici agere sibi similia. Secundo igitur advertendum est, Aristotelem hic non dixisse omnia generari a sibi similibus, sed indefinite ait: *In quibusdam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale id quod generatur.*⁶¹ Est ergo generaliter et in omni proprietate verum in causis univocis; in aequivocis autem secundum eminentiam et virtualement similitudinem; in artificialibus vero seu intellectualibus causis secundum idealem seu intentionalem representationem; et ita nullam habent difficultatem, quae de hac re tractari solent; vide Soncin., hoc lib., quaest. 14; Javel. quaest. 12, et alios.

CAPUT IX
DE EADEM RE DUBITATIONES NONNULLAE CUM
SOLUTIONIBUS EARUM

Quaest. 1. Primo quaeri solet hic de educatione formae de potentia materiae, quae et qualis sit, et an aliquid formae actu praecedat in materia. De qua re late disp. 15, sect. 2 et 3, ubi in secunda ex professo exponitur text. 29 hujus capituli.

Q. 2. Quomodo virtus seminis vel accidentales virtutes efficiant substantialem generationem; de quo late disp. 18, sect. 2.

Quaestiones etiam omnes in superiori capite annotatae in hoc habent locum, quia ab Aristotele fere repetitur eadem doctrina.

CAPUT X
DE QUIDDITATE IN ORDINE AD DEFINITIONES

Quaest. 1. Principio hic quaeri posset, ad philosophumne primum pertineat de defini- /col. b/ tione disputare; sed de hoc disp. 1 prooemiali, sectione 4, ubi ostendimus formam definiendum mente, tum consequenter verbo, ad dialecticum spectare; metaphysicum vero explicare fundamentum definitionis, quod est essentia rei; tamen, quia haec ipsa essentia et quidditas, prout in se est, difficile cognoscitur, ideo Aristoteles multa tradit de ipsa definitione prout a nobis fit, aut fieri debet, ut in ordine ad nos rationem essentiae declaret, et maxime ut ostendat materiam pertinere ad essentialem rationem aliquarum rerum, ut hac etiam ratione contra Platonem ostendat, non posse dari talium rerum ideas a materia separatas. Hac ergo ratione in his capitibus agit de definitione, in quorum tractatione nos ea omnia, quae mere dialectica sunt, breviter attingemus.

Q. 2. Secundo ergo inquiritur, an de ratione definitionis sit, ut partibus constet. Sed in hoc satis expressa est sententia Aristotelis hic affirmantis; et, si nomen ipsum, et munus definitionis explicetur, dubitationem non habet. Nos enim per simplices conceptus non possumus distincte cognoscere et explicare rerum essentias; et ideo ad distincte concipiendam vel explicandam naturam rei, eam in plures conceptus dividimus, ut quid ei proprium, quid commune, quid essenziale, quid accidentale sit, cognoscamus, atque ita tandem apte conjungendo conceptus essentielles rei, ipsam distincte concipiam; eamque distinctam conceptionem, definitionem essentialem vocamus, vel mente conceptam, vel voce expressam; et proportionali modo conficimus definitiones quas descriptivas appellant. Sic ergo constat de

ratione definitionis esse, ut sit oratio, et consequenter ut partes habeat, unde proprius modus venandi definitionem est per divisionem conceptuum communium usque ad proprios, alienos rejiciendo, ut latius Aristoteles, lib. 2 Poster., cap. 14.

Q. 3. Tertio, an partes definitionis correspondeant partibus rei definitae; id enim affirmare videtur Philosophus initio hujus capituli dicens: *Sicut ratio ad rem, similiter et pars rationis ad partem rei se habet.*⁶² Nam cum distincte declaret totam rei essentiam, et ad hoc munus utatur (ut sic dicam) partialibus conceptibus, videtur necessarium ut illis correspondeant partes proportionatae in definito. In contrarium est, quia saepe definitum est res simplex, et non habet veras partes. Item, licet eas habeat, non semper illis respondent partes definitionis, sed potius quaelibet pars definitionis dicit totam rei essentiam, licet minus distincte quam ipsa definitio; genus enim et differentia, licet sint partes definitionis, non significant partes definiti, sed totum confusa et incompleta ratione. Aliqui putant Aristotelem loqui de rebus tantum naturalibus et compositis, et in illis veram esse in universum propositionem ejus, quia generi correspondet forma generica, et differentiae forma specifica, quae distinctae sunt. Sed haec responsio primo supponit falsam sententiam de pluralitate formarum juxta ordinem praedicatorum essentialium, quam improbamus disp. 15. Deinde est contra verba Aristotelis absoluta et generalia.

Duobus ergo modis exponi potest Philosophus. Primo, ejus locutionem solum esse per proportionalem comparisonem, nec esse absolutam, sed cum distributione accommodata. Vult enim partes definitionis eam proportionem inter se, et ad definitum servare, quam partes rei inter se et cum toto. Non quod necesse sit omnem rem definitam habere partes, sed quod comparatio fiat ad illam quae eas habet. Consistit autem proportio in hoc, quod partes definitionis comparantur ut potentia et actus, sicut partes rei. Altera expositio est, ut partes rei dicantur, vel partes physicae, si res physice ac proprie composita sit, quibus respondent partes definitionis, vel secundum rem, si definitio detur modo physico, vel secundum proportionem et imitationem, si definitio sit propria ac metaphysica per proprium genus et differentiam. Vel latius etiam dicantur partes rei, ipsi gradus metaphysici praecise concepti, qui per genus et differentiam, ut sunt partes definitionis, indicantur.

Q. 4. Quarta ac praecipua quaestio circa hoc caput est, utrum materia sit pars quidditatis substantiae materialis, et consequenter an in definitione talium rerum ponatur materia. Sed prior quaestio ex professo tractatur disp. 36, sect. 2, ubi cum Aristotele et D. Thoma affirmantem partem amplectimur. Ex qua sequitur in definitione quidditativa substantiarum

materialium poni materiam, non ut additum, hoc enim est praeter perfectionem et naturam substantitae completae, sed ut de intrinseca essentia talium rerum existens. Ponitur autem materia in tali definitione, vel expresse, si definitio detur modo physico, ut cum dicitur homo constare corpore et anima; vel implicite, ut inclusa in genere metaphy- / col. b/ sico, ut cum dicitur homo animal rationale. Denique ponitur materia in definitione secundum aliquam universalem rationem, non tamen materia signata, nam haec propria individuorum est, ut hic docet Philosophus, et D. Thomas et alii late exponunt.

Q. 5. Hinc oritur quinta quaestio, an singulare ut singulare definibile sit, et consequenter in ejus definitione poni possit materia signata. Est autem quaestio de singulari non in actu signato (ut sic dicam), id est, de communi ratione singularitatis; hoc enim modo jam aliquid commune sumitur, quod definiri suo modo potest, sicut persona, suppositum, et alia hujusmodi; sed est quaestio de singulari (ut sic dicam) exercito. Et hoc modo negat hic Aristoteles, text. 35, singulare definiri; ideo enim negat materiam signatam poni in definitione: idem habet infra, c. 15, text. 53; et supra, cap. 4, text. 13, dixerat solam speciem posse definiri proprie; et 1 Poster., cap. 7, ait individuorum neque scientiam esse, neque definitionem. Quo loco res haec ex professo tractanda est.

Non enim caret difficultate, cur non possit individuum definiri, cum possit in duos conceptus resolvi, scilicet in conceptum speciei, et propriae differentiae individualis. Quod enim quidam dicunt,⁶³ non habere individuum propriam differentiam individualem, sed tantum accidens individuale, falsum est, ut ex dictis a nobis in disp. 5 constat. Praeterea de individuis perpetuis est vera scientia, ut de Deo et Angelo (nam Aristotel. solum de individuis materialibus hoc negat); cur ergo non potest eorumdem esse propria definitio? Quod si illorum esse potest, etiam erit aliorum, prout abstrahuntur a tempore, et ab actuali existentia. Propter quae non desunt⁶⁴ qui existiment singulare ex se et natura sua esse definibile, a nobis tamen non definiri, quia propriam ejus differentiam non attingimus.

Existimo tamen quaestionem esse de nomine, et Aristotelis locutionem magis esse propriam, sicut et magis receptam. Quia definitio proprie dicta explicat essentiam rei; unde, sicut individuum non habet aliam essentiam praeterquam essentiam speciei, ita neque aliam propriam definitionem habere censetur. Item contractio speciei ad individuum est quasi materialis ratione talis entitatis; et ideo id, quod individuum addit ultra / p. XXX-VII/ speciem, non tam definitione propria explicatur, quam applicatione definitionis essentialis ad hanc entitatem. Proprie ergo definitur species, quae genere et differentia essentiali constat. Genera vero summa et indi-

vidua non ita propriam definitionem habent, licet aliquo modo describi et explicari valeant. Quod vero de singularibus non sit scientia vel demonstratio, intelligendum est fere eodem modo, quia de eis ut talia sunt, solum contingentia et mutabilia cognoscuntur. Quod si aliqua necessaria demonstrari videntur, id semper est in vi alicujus medii universalis, et ita potius est applicatio scientiae universalis ad particularem, quam propria scientia particularium. Quod in omni re creata fortasse verum est, quia nulla res est essentialiter singularis praeter Deum, de quo perfectissima scientia esse potest. Et maxime hoc intelligitur de humana scientia, nam angelica est alterius rationis per intuitionem singularum rerum, prout in se sunt.

Q. 6. Rursus quaeri hic potest, an partes definiti sint priores ipso definito; item an loco partis definitionis liceat ejus definitionem semper ponere.

Q. 7. Quas quaestiones videtur hic proponere Aristoteles. Et priorem quidem magis ex professo tractat, et in summa respondet, partes formales esse priores, materiales vero minime. Per formales autem partes intelligit eas, quae sumuntur a forma ut sic, vel quae illi formaliter correspondent, vel denique quae sumuntur aequè universaliter ac ipsum definitum. Unde per materiales partes intelligit individuales, vel omnes illas quae contrahunt rationem definiti ad particularem materiam, quam ex vi suae formalis rationis non requirit, ut est respectu sphaerae quod aenea sit. Dicuntur autem partes formales priores definito prioritatem quadam naturae, seu causalitatis, interdum etiam subsistendi consequentia, quamvis non semper, quia interdum sicut totum non potest esse sine his partibus, ita neque e converso partes extra totum, ut Aristoteles etiam hic notavit.

De altera vero quaestione nil fere Aristoteles dicit, et resolutio sumi potest ex notatis supra, c. 4. Nam si id, quod ponitur in definitione, est vere essentialiter et definitionem propriam habet, nihil impedit quin loco ejus definitio ponatur; sic enim, cum homo definiatur esse animal rationale, recte dicitur esse vivens sensibile rationale; imo sic distinctior est definitio. Si vero pars definitionis sit ita /col. b/ simplex, ut definitionem non habeat, non oportet loco illius descriptionem ejus ponere, ut patet in generibus summis et differentiis, et hac ratione transcendentia non ponuntur in definitionibus. Similiter, si id, quod ponitur in definitione, non sit essentialiter, sed additum quoddam, non ponitur loco ejus ipsius definito, quia saepe committeretur nugatio, aut circulus vitiosus, ut capite 4 tactum est. Et juxta haec intelligendus est idem Aristoteles, 2 Topic., c. 2.

CAPUT XI

QUAE SINT PARTES FORMALES, QUAE VERO MATERIALES

Quaest. 1. In hoc capite nihil novi quaerendum occurrit, nam fere nihil in eo additur, sed inculcatur iterum quaestio de materia, an sit pars essentiae specificae, necne, et pars affirmans concluditur; et hac ratione dicitur, partes formales, seu quae sunt de definitione speciei, non excludere materiam sensibilem in rebus naturalibus, nec intelligibilem in mathematicis; sed in prioribus excludere individuum materiam, in posterioribus vero sensibilem. Unde partes formales dicuntur, quae secundum specificam rationem, et ad munus aliquod ratione illius conveniens, requiruntur, etiamsi materiam in universali, seu modo proportionato includant; materiales vero dicuntur, quae sunt quasi per accidens ad communem rationem speciei. Quae omnia eo tendunt, ut contra Platonem concludat rationes communes et specificas harum rerum non posse ab omni materia abstrahi.

Q. 2. Rursus inculcat quaestionem, an quod quid est, sit idem cum eo cujus est, quam supra jam tetigimus; et hic locus in particulari, et verba etiam Philosophi explicata ex professo sunt in disp. 34, sect. 5, in fine.

CAPUT XII

EX PARTIBUS DEFINITIONIS, SEU EX GENERE
ET DIFFERENTIA FIERI PER SE UNUM

Quaest. 1. Hic prima quaestio esse potest, unde habeant definitum et definitio unitatem per se. Non est autem sensus unde habeant unitatem, definitum et definitio inter se comparata; hoc enim jam est actum, habent enim illam ex identitate; sed est sensus, cum definitio plura dicat vel contineat, unde habeat definitum, de quo illa omnia dicuntur, quod sit unum et non plura. Idemque consequenter de ipsa definitione intelligendum est. Et /p. XXXVIII/ resolutio est per se satis clara. Definitio enim una est, quia constat genere et differentia, quae comparantur ut propria potentia et actus, et simili modo definitum est unum, quia essentia ejus constat genere et differentia ut proprio actu et potentia metaphysicis, ac per se ordinatis; ex hujusmodi autem actu et potentia semper fit unum per se, etiam in rebus physicis, ut infra, lib. 8, docetur de materia et forma, et sumitur ex lib. 2 de Anima, textu 7; ergo multo magis ex metaphysicis. Quod probatur ex altera ratione Philosophi in praesenti, quia, videlicet, *genus non est praeter ipsas species*,⁶⁵ seu extra illas; unde tantum est ipsa essentia speciei confuse concepta. Et (ut recte D. Thom. declarat) ideo

genus non potest esse sine speciebus, quia *formae specierum non sunt aliae a forma generis*; ergo in re dicunt eandem essentiam, solumque differunt, ut determinabile et determinans secundum rationem; componunt ergo unum per se. Hac ergo de causa, tam definitum, quam definitio habent unitatem propriam.

Sed est advertendum, definitionem et definitum posse considerari, vel ut sunt formaliter in mente, vel ut sunt objective. Priori modo definitio est proprie, et secundum rem composita ex conceptibus mentis re ipsa diversis; dicitur tamen habere unitatem ad modum totius cujusdam artificialis, ob subordinationem et conjunctionem aliquam talium conceptuum. Objective autem non habet compositionem realem ex vi generis et differentiae, sed solum rationis, per denominationem a compositione conceptuum mentis. Definitum autem neutro modo habet compositionem rei, sed tantum rationis, etiam ex vi generis et differentiae. Hoc autem nomen, *definitum*, proprius dici videtur de conceptu objective quam de formali, licet e converso *definitio* proprius videatur dici de conceptu formali quam de objective; et ideo haec unitas magis cernitur per se in definito, quam in definitione; atque ita Aristoteles in hoc capite praecipue loquitur de unitate per se ipsius definiti seu essentiae, quatenus ex genere et differentia componitur. De hac autem compositione et extremorum distinctione, et comparatione, videnda sunt quae late tractantur disp.6, sect. 9, 10 et 11.

Q. 2. Quaeri vero ulterius potest, an genus possit extra omnes species reperiri. Et ratio dubii est, nam Aristoteles sub disjunctione dicit: *Genus non est praeter eas, quae ut species generis sunt, aut si est quidem, sed tan- / col. b/ quam materia est.*⁶⁶ Unde innuere videtur, posse genus interdum reperiri extra species, saltem per modum informis materiae. In contrarium est, quia genus nullo modo potest extra omnes species reperiri, cum in re ab ipsis non distinguatur, nec dicat aliam essentiam ab ipsis.

Duobus modis intelligi potest genus esse extra omnes species: uno modo realiter per separationem in re ipsa; et hoc modo simpliciter est impossibile genus esse extra species, ut rationes factae concludunt, et hoc ubique docuit Aristoteles agens contra ideas Platonis, et inferens hoc inconueniens, quod si darentur ideae specierum abstractae ab individuis, dandae essent ideae generum separatae ab speciebus. Si ergo de hac separatione hic textus intelligatur, ut communiter intelligitur a D. Thoma, et aliis, disjunctio solum additur ad tollendam quarumdam vocum aequivocationem, quae videntur significare genera quae separantur ab speciebus, re tamen vera ut sic non significant genera, sed partem materialem totius compositi, ut patet in exemplo *vocis*, quo Aristoteles utitur: *vox* enim significare potest articulatam sonum in communi, et ut sic est genus; ut vero significare

potest tantum sonum ut capacem talis formationis, est materia. Et idem est de *corpore*, ut D. Thomas hic notat; nam ut significat compositum ex materia et forma substantiali in communi, est genus, et ut sic non est ullo modo separabile ab omnibus speciebus; ut vero significat primum subiectum aptum informari substantialiter, dicit materiam. Alio vero modo dici potest genus esse separabile ab speciebus secundum rationem, ita ut non sit praedicabile de illis, et hoc modo etiam est verum dictum Aristotelis, vel non esse separabile, vel non sumi ut genus, sed ut materiam. Et ex utroque membro concluditur intentum, nempe genus non esse separabile propter identitatem et unitatem, et, quatenus separatur aliquo modo, significari, vel concipi ut materiam, et ideo aptum esse ad componendum per se unum cum differentia.

Q. 3. Tertia quaestio esse potest, quomodo verum sit differentiam superiorem dividi per inferiores; sic enim Philosophus ait: *Oportet dividi differentia differentiam*.⁶⁷ Est autem ratio dubii, quia differentia indivisibilis videtur, alioqui si differentia per differentias divisibilis est, et in infinitum procedetur, et non constituet speciem indivisibilem. Respondetur, Aristotelem clare loqui de differentiis /p. XXXIX/ subalternis, quas dividi dicit, non quia ipsae ut differentiae sunt, dividantur, sed quia constitutum ex illis, ut tale est, amplius est divisibile per alias formales differentias. Nec proceditur in infinitum, quia in aliqua ultima differentia sistitur, ut idem Aristoteles dicit. Neque etiam fit, ut talis differentia non constituat speciem, sed ut non constituat speciem ultimam.

Advertit vero Philosophus hanc divisionem debere esse formalem, ita ut posterior differentia per se determinet priorem, et sit modus seu actus ejus. Intellige autem aliquando posteriorem differentiam esse ejusdem ordinis cum priori, et tunc esse solum quasi determinationem ejus in eadem latitudine, ut sensibile determinatur per talem sentiendi modum; interdum vero posteriorem differentiam pertinere ad superiorem ordinem, et secum evehere priorem differentiam, quo modo rationale comparatur ad sensibile. Et tunc non solum determinat illam quasi modificando intra suum gradum, sed addendo etiam gradum superiorem; tamen quia illud additum est formalis actuatio prioris gradus, simulque est perfectio illius intra suum gradum, non solum illa est propria et formalis differentia, verum etiam est perfectissima.

Q. 4. Quarta quaestio est, num differentia inferior superiorem includat. Id enim affirmare videtur Philosophus, cum ait: *Si ergo haec ita se habent, manifestum est quod ultima differentia rei substantia erit, et definitio*;⁶⁸ et infra: *Si igitur differentiae differentia fiat, una quae ultima est, erit species et substantia*.⁶⁹ Adhibetque exemplum in his, *animal habens pedes, bipes*;⁷⁰

nam haec secunda includit primam, ut per se constat, et hinc concludit in definitione non esse ponendam, nisi ultimam differentiam; nam si simul priores ponantur, committetur nugatio, ut si in dicto exemplo dicatur *animal habens pedes, bipes*. In contrarium vero est, quia differentia superior includitur in genere, ut sensibile in animali; ergo non potest includi in differentia inferiori. Patet consequentia, tum quia genus omnino extra rationem differentiae est, ut in lib. 3 est dictum: tum etiam quia alias semper committeretur nugatio adjungendo differentiam generi, quod est plane falsum. Item quoties in definitione ponitur genus remotum, non satis est ponere differentiam ultimam, sed oportet addere intermedias, ut hic etiam dicitur; ergo non includuntur in ultima; alias esset nugatio. /col. b/

Aliqui exponunt, et significat S. Thomas, Aristotelem loqui de differentia, non secundum praecisum conceptum ejus, ut est pars definitionis, sed ut est quoddam totum includens confuse, non solum superiores differentias, sed etiam genus ipsum. Nam solum in hoc sensu potest esse verum, quod differentia ultima sit substantia rei et definitio, nimirum aequivalenter et implicite. Aliter Alensis indicat, et etiam Scotus ait, ultimam differentiam appellari substantiam rei et definitionem, quia complet illam, non quia omnia superiora includat, sed quia illa per se supponit, et necessaria consecutione, cui ultima differentia convenit, necesse est omnes superiores convenire. Sed, licet haec vera sint, tamen non sufficiunt ad explicandam Aristotelis argumentationem, nimirum committi nugationem, si simul cum ultima differentia superiores in definitione ponantur. Nam hoc, per se loquendo, non sequitur; dicendo enim *vivens sensibile rationale*, non committitur nugatio, etiamsi *rationale* sumptum confuse et per modum totius superiora omnia includat, quia in illa definitione non ita adjungitur, sed secundum suam praecisam rationem. Neque etiam committitur nugatio propterea quod *rationale* per se supponat superiora, et implicite ac illative illa indicet; satis est enim quod illa formaliter non includat. Videtur ergo Aristoteles sentire ultimam differentiam formaliter includere superiores, et ideo committi nugationem. Idque videtur clarum in exemplo Aristotelis; nam haec differentia *bipes*, includit formaliter hanc superiorem, scilicet, *habere pedes*.

Dicendum nihilominus est per se loquendo differentiam ultimam non includere formaliter superiores, sed praesuppositive aut confuse, ut citati auctores vere dixerunt. Ex qua etiam fit non committi nugationem, per se loquendo et generaliter, ponendo in definitione plures differentias per se subordinatas, quando definitio non datur per genus proximum, sed per remotum. Et hoc etiam est certissimum, et sumitur ex eodem Aristotele in hoc capite. Aliquando vero talis esse potest divisio differentiarum, ut

in conceptu unius alia formaliter includatur, et fiat repetitio utramque ponendo, ut in dicto exemplo Aristotelis. Quo indicio particulari utitur Aristoteles, ut ostendat ultimam differentiam esse actum per se superiorem, et completivam unius essentiae definiti, quod erat in hoc discursu intentum. Nam ex hoc indicio sumi potest /p. XL/ idem esse in aliis ultimis differentiis, etiamsi non ita formaliter superiores includant. Addi etiam potest, ut tacitae objectioni respondeamus, differentiam ultimam praecise sumptam nunquam includere formaliter superiores; aliquando vero ita esse conjunctam, ut nec concipiatur nec significetur nisi includendo superiores, ut in exemplo Aristotelis constat, hocque satis esse ad discursum Aristotelis. Fortasse etiam Aristoteles non loquitur de differentia ultima et subalterna, sed de ultima, quam vult ostendere tantum esse unam, nec posse poni in definitione duas ultimas sine nugatione, ut statim declarabimus.

Q. 5. Alia quaestio in hoc capite definitur, nempe quas condiciones requirat definitio essentialis, ut recte tradita sit; multae enim conditiones in hoc capite colliguntur. Prima, ut detur per ea quae definitioni conveniunt per se primo et secundum quod ipsum, quia debent explicare quod quid est ejus. Secunda, ut detur per propriam potentiam et actum per se ordinata, et, si plures differentiae ponantur, una per se dividat aliam. Tertia, ut differentia ultima, una tantum sit, nam, si sint plures, vel una includet aliam, et sic erit nugatio, vel neutra includet aliam, et tunc vel sunt per accidens ordinatae, et sic non component per se unam essentiam, vel si per se ordinatae sunt, una est potentia, et alia actus, et haec tantum erit ultima, altera vero generalior erit. Quartam conclusionem colligit Alensis, quod, scilicet, ut definitio recto ordine constituatur, quae communiora sunt praecedant, et si plures ponantur differentiae, prius ponatur subalterna, deinde ultima. Sed Aristoteles hanc non posuit; quin potius significat in fine capituli, hunc ordinem non pertinere ad substantiam; quod quidem verum est, si materialiter sumatur; formaliter tamen quoad rationem actus et potentiae necesse est ut potentia supponatur, et sic sumatur ut prior, licet forte non prius proferatur, et hoc sensu coincidit haec conditio cum praecedenti. Ultima conditio quae colligitur, est, definitionem debere esse propriam et reciprocam definito. Quam etiam Aristoteles expresse non ponit; in ea tamen includitur, quod definitio debet habere unitatem ab ultima differentia, quae propriam rei substantiam et essentiam declarat.

Q. 6. Sexta quaestio hic tractari solet, an unitas per se substantiae compositae unam formam requirat. Hanc enim quaestionem saepe inculcat hic D. Thomas, colligens uni- /col. b/ tatem formae ex rationibus quibus hic Aristoteles utitur. Scotus vero ibidem id redarguit, et rationes conatur

solvere. D. Thomae autem sententia praeferenda est, quam late tractamus disputat. 15, sect. 10.

CAPUT XIII DE SUBSTANTIA SECUNDA SEU UNIVERSALI

Ab hoc capite incipit Aristoteles dicere pressius et clarius de secunda substantia, praesertim ad concludendam disputationem de ideis contra Platonem.

Quaest. 1. Unde prima quaestio hic occurrit, an universalia sint substantiae, quam Aristoteles hoc capite praecipue tractat. Et potest primo intelligi de omnibus universalibus, et sic constat non omnia esse substantias, quod attigimus disput. 6, sect. 7. Secundo potest in speciali intelligi de universalibus praedicamenti substantiae, quae in praedicamenti secundae substantiae dicuntur. Unde constat talia universalia substantias esse, de quibus late disputamus disp. 33, sect. 2. Aristoteles autem hoc capite contendit non esse substantias simpliciter, id est per se subsistentes in seipsis, et hoc probant rationes ejus, de quibus legi possunt expositores.

Q. 2. Deinde hac occasione disputari hic potest de universali, an recte definiatur esse illud, *Quod pluribus natura aptum est esse*;⁷¹ ita enim illud hic Philosophus definit, text. 45. Sed haec res disputatur late disp. 6, per totam, ubi tractamus quid sit aptitudo illa, et quomodo sit in rebus, et ab ipsis distinguatur.

Q. 3. Hic enim tractari potest quo sensu vera sit illa vulgaris propositio: *Ex duobus entibus in actu non fit unum in actu, sed ex duobus in potentia, actus enim separat*;⁷² haec enim sunt verba Aristotelis hic, text. 46. Sed de hoc axiome dicimus late tractando de existentia rei creatae, disp. 21, sect. 11. Quod vero ad mentem Aristotelis attinet, constat eum loqui de entibus in actu completis, et quatenus talia sunt. Eam enim propositionem affert, ut demonstret non posse universalia esse substantias integras et per se subsistentes, et ita inesse individuis substantiis, ut cum eis unum per se et actu component. Et ita nulla superest difficultas. /p. XLI/

CAPUT XIV
UNIVERSALIA NON ESSE SUBSTANTIAS
AB INDIVIDUIS SEPARATAS

In hoc capite nihil notatione dignum occurrit; supervacaneum enim existimo in re tam clara singulas Aristotelis rationes expendere, cum in eis nullum sit peculiare principium aut metaphysicum dogma, quod nova expositione indigeat; legantur ergo expositores.

CAPUT XV
DE EADEM RE

Hic obiter tanguntur ab Aristotele aliquae propositiones notandae, et quae in quaestionem adduci possent.

Quaest. 1. Prima est illa: *Rei singularis non est definitio nec demonstratio, quia⁷³ habet materiam,⁷⁴ in qua ipsa propositio de inesse, et causalis, difficultatem habent.⁷⁵ Sed haec res tacta sufficienter est circa cap. 10.*

Q. 2. Secunda est: *Quod habet materiam, esse et non esse contingit, et corruptibile est.⁷⁶ Sed intelligenda est juxta subjectam materiam; hic enim solum agit de rebus sublunaribus ex materia et forma compositis.*

Q. 3. Tertia est, non fieri formam, sed compositum, et consequenter neque ideam, sed rem singularem. De quo partim lib. 1, cap. 2, partim in hoc libro, cap. 8, dictum est.

Q. 4. Quarta est, definitionem debere ex pluribus partibus seu nominibus constare, quae tracta est cap. 10.

Q. 5. An vero efficaciter inde Aristoteles concludat singulare non esse definibile, non est facile ad explicandum. Summa enim rationis, ut ex interpretatione D. Thom. et aliorum colligitur, est, quia vel uterque terminus definitionis est communis, vel singularis uterque aut alter. Si primum, definitio non erit rei singularis adaequate, sed aliis etiam de se conveniet. Si secundum, non erit definitio, sed erunt nomina synonyma, quantum ad terminum singularem definitionis, et non definiti. Haec vero ratio videtur inefficax quoad hoc posterius membrum, nam differentia individualis, etsi sit convertibilis cum re singulari, non est vox synonyma, quia alio modo et per alium conceptum illam rem significat, sicut differentia specifica non est synonyma speciei, licet cum ea convertatur.

Discursus ergo Aristotelis maxime videtur /col. b/ concludere contraponentes, ideas esse res subsistentes, et consequenter particulares, et tamen separatas ab omni contractione individuali; sic enim definiri non

possunt per differentiam individualem, et consequenter habere non possunt definitionem constantem ex terminis communibus, ex quibus non potest confici definitio ita propria ideae ut idea est, quin possit aliis rebus convenire; et ita procedunt aliae rationes Aristotelis, quae non carent suis difficultatibus, sed inutile censeo in eis explicandis immorari. Quomodo item illa ratio possit habere aliquam vim quoad vera individua, etiam materialia, supra, cap. 10, tactum est.

CAPUT XVI QUOMODO POSSINT SUBSTANTIAE EX PLURIBUS PARTIBUS COMPONI

Pauca de proposita intentione hic dicit Aristoteles; statim enim revertitur ad impugnandas ideas Platonis; circa quam partem nihil novi occurrit. Circa priorem vero possunt hic quaestiones variae moveri de pluralitate formarum, sed duae sunt praecipuae. Prior est, an elementa sint formaliter in misto. Posterior vero est, an in partibus heterogeneis animalium sint partiales formae diversarum rationum. Quas quaestiones breviter attingimus disp. 15, sect. 10.

CAPUT XVII QUOD QUID EST ESSE PRINCIPIUM ET CAUSAM EORUM QUAE REI CONVENIUNT

Circa priorem partem hujus capituli tractari possunt quaestiones logicae, ut an necessario de re supponatur an sit, et quid sit; an vero haec possint demonstrari. Item an quaestio propter quid locum habeat circa ipsum quid. Sed haec et similia in lib. 2 Posteriorum tractantur, et difficultatem non habent. Nam integra quidditas rei non potest habere causam intrinsecam, nisi quatenus forma vel materia assignantur ut causa totius, vel una pars assignatur aliquo modo ut causa alterius; quod tamen essentia rei talis sit, seu quod ex talibus principiis, verbi gratia, anima rationali et corpore, talis quidditas hominis consurgat, non potest habere aliam causam intrinsecam praeter naturam talis formae et talis materiae. Et in hoc sensu verum est non dari causam ipsius quod quid est, sed ipsum esse causam aliorum quae rei conveniunt. At vero loquendo de causa extrinseca finali vel efficiente, /p. XLII/ aut etiam exemplari, interdum potest dari causa ipsius propter quid, quo modo una definitio quidditativa interdum demonstratur per aliam

etiam a priori, ut in princ. lib. 2 de Anim. disseritur, et in lib. 2. Poster., c. 8 et sequentibus. Et de hac re aliquid attigimus disp. 1, sect. 4.

Q. 2. Circa alteram partem hujus capituli tractari solet quaestio, an totum distinguatur a suis partibus simul sumptis. Hanc tractamus disp. 36, sect. ult. Et resolutio ibi data est consentanea Aristoteli hic, qui aperte docet, totum, quod est aliquo modo per se unum, distingui a partibus tanquam addens aliquid ultra illas, non tamen ab illis sumptis simul cum illo addito. Quid autem illud additum sit, nunquam satis explicat Aristoteles; nos autem breviter diximus illud esse unionem partium.

LIBER OCTAVUS METAPHYSICAE

De Substantia Sensibili Et Principiis Ejus

Liber hic videri potest ad physicam doctrinam potius quam ad metaphysicam spectans; tamen, licet res de quibus in eo tractantur, communes sint physicae considerationi, modus et ratio disserendi de his est proprius metaphysicae, ut disp. 1 prooemiali latius exponimus. Unde praesentis libri materia late disputatur a nobis disputat. 12, 13, 14, et 15.

CAPUT I

SUBSTANTIAM SENSIBILEM MATERIA CONSTARE, ET QUID ILLA SIT

In hoc capite praesertim est notanda illa propositio in text. 3: *Sensibiles vero substantiae materiam habent.*⁷⁷ Numeraverat autem paulo antea, in text. 2, inter sensibiles seu naturales substantias coelum seu partes coeli, et aperte loquitur in dict. text. 3 de materia substantiali, quam statim definit dicens: *Materiam autem dico, quae cum non quod quid actu sit, potentia est quod quid.*⁷⁸ Ex his ergo variae quaestiones oriuntur.

Quaest. 1. An materia substantialis sit in rebus, quae aliqua vera substantia sit.

Q. 2. An sit ens in pura potentia, et quo sensu id accipiendum sit.

Q. 3. An sit in omnibus rebus corporalibus, etiam in coelis.

Q. 4. An sit una in omnibus, vel diversa. Pro qua sunt notanda illa verba Aristotelis in /col. b/ fine capitis: *Non enim est necesse, si quid materiam habet localem, hoc generabilem etiam et corruptibilem habere.*⁷⁹ Ubi plane sentit in rebus generabilibus et ingenerabilibus esse diversas materias. Hae vero quaestiones omnes cum aliis, quae de materia desiderari possunt, tractantur late disp. 12.

Q. 5. Alia quaestio est, an forma substantialis sit separabilis a materia. Aristoteles enim, text. 3, ait, *esse ratione separabilem.*⁸⁰ Resolutio vero est materialem formam aliquando nullo modo separari posse in re a materia, ut in corporibus incorruptibilibus; aliquando vero separari posse, ita tamen ut separata non maneat, sed destruat. At vero formam immaterialem realiter separari posse, ita ut separata conservetur; de qua re

nihil Aristoteles hic tetigisse videtur. Quamvis Alexand. Aphrod. indicet, Aristotelem hoc dixisse propter animam rationalem, sensumque esse, formam esse rationem separabilem, quia formae ut sic ex ratione formae non repugnat separari; nam aliqua separabilis est. Materia vero ex absoluta ratione materiae separabilis non est. Alia vero expositio est, quod forma sit ratione separabilis, id est, cognoscibilis praecise ut entitas distincta a materia, quanquam sine habitudine ad materiam plene intelligi ac definiri non possit. Et ideo cum dicit Aristoteles esse ratione separabilem, non est intelligendum, id est definitione, ita ut sine materia definiri possit, sed intelligentia ac praecisione, ut dictum est. Alii exponunt, quod est definitione separabilis a materia signata et individua; sed Aristoteles de hac re hic non loquitur, ut constat.

Q. 6. Sexto, quaeri potest de composita substantia quid sit et quomodo comparetur ad partes suas, de qua re dicemus disput. 36. Quod vero Aristoteles in text. 3 ait, compositum esse separabile simpliciter, non est intelligendum esse separabile a partibus, ita ut sine illis esse possit, id enim clare repugnat; sed separabile dicitur, quia potest esse per se subsistens distinctum et separatum a qualibet alia substantia. Et ita potest consequenter exponi ratio quam subjungit his verbis: *Earum enim substantiarum, quae secundum rationem*, supple, formae, id est, quae per formam constituuntur, *quaedam sunt separabiles*, id est, in se subsistentes, ut primae substantiae, *quaedam vero non*,⁸¹ scilicet secundae substantiae. Aliter alii exponunt haec posteriora verba, sed non declarant contextum, nec vim illius conjunctionis causalis, *enim*. /p. XLIII/

Q. 7. Ultimo, habet etiam hic locum quaestio, an solum compositum per se generetur, quae tractatur disp. 15, sect. 4.

CAPUT II DE SUBSTANTIALI FORMA

Unica quaestio hic occurrit, an detur substantialis forma, quam hic Aristoteles probat esse solum ex proportione ad actus accidentales. Sed de hac re, et aliis quae ad hanc formam spectant, dictum est latius disp. 15.

CAPUT III
DE PRINCIPIO FORMALI PER COMPARATIONEM AD
POSITIONES PLATONIS ET PYTHAGORAE

Duas partes continet hoc caput: in priori agit Aristoteles de formis et speciebus rerum per comparisonem ad ideas quarum impugnationem semper inculcat; in posteriori comparat formas ad numeros.

Quaest. 1. Ut priorem partem prosequatur, primo movet quaestionem, *an nomen compositum substantiam significat, an actum et formam.*⁸² Et quanquam non declarat de quo nomine loquatur, sine dubio tamen agit de nominibus absolutis significantibus substantiarum species, ut *homo, equus*; nam quaestionem hanc movet, ut ex nominis significatione colligat, significata horum nominum non esse res aliquas a materia separatas. Non videtur autem quaestioni clare ac distincte respondere. Unde Alex. Aphrod. ait Aristotelem non respondisse ad quaestionem hanc, quia erat clara ejus resolutio, scilicet hac nomina significare formam. Sed fallitur, ut patebit. Alii putant Aristotelem quaestioni respondere in illis verbis: *Erit autem utique in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum, sed ut unum.*⁸³ Ex quibus Alexander Alens. colligit resolutionem esse, nomen significare utrumque, scilicet compositum et formam, non tamen univoca ratione, sed unum per prius, aliud vero in ordine ad aliud. Tamen hoc etiam verum esse non potest, eo quod neque nomen totius, proprie loquendo, significat formam absque materia, ut per se patet, neque in his nominibus sit vera aliqua analogia. Et ideo Scotus ait Aristotelem solum respondere quaestioni Platonicæ, et non ex propria sententia.

D. Thomas autem ait Aristotelem in illis verbis non respondere quaestioni, nisi forte indirecte et implicite. Nam potius illud infert /col. b/ tanquam inconueniens, quod sequitur ex sententia Platonis, qui ponebat ideam hominis separatam, esse per se hominem; individua vero participatione illius. Hinc ergo fit, si *homo* significat utrumque, et formam sine materia, quae est idea, et compositum, analogice significare illa, quod est absurdum. Quis enim dicat Petrum esse analogice hominem? ita ergo tacite concludit Aristoteles haec omnia significare ipsum tantum, et non solam formam. Et hoc videtur esse, quod obscurissime Aristoteles subdit, scilicet illam resolutionem Platonis, nimirum omnia haec significare solas formas, ad aliquid fortasse aliud esse utilem, puta in substantiis abstrahentibus a materia, in sensibilibus vero nihil conferre, quia substantia sensibilis non dicit solum quod quid erat esse, *nisi homo anima dicatur*,⁸⁴ quod est

absurdum, et ideo nomen significans substantiam sensibilem non potest significare formam separatam a materia.

Quaest. 2. Ex hac vero interpretatione oriuntur aliae duae quaestiones, nimirum, an in substantia sensibili sola forma sit quidditas ejus, vel etiam materia, seu constans ex utroque. Nam videtur Aristoteles in praedictis verbis sentire, solam formam esse quod quid est; compositum vero esse id cujus est.

Q. 3. Unde rursus pullulat alia quaestio, an in formis separatis quod quid est non sit aliud ab eo cujus est, in sensibilibus autem rebus haec distinguantur. Utrumque enim videtur Aristoteles docere in citatis verbis. Existimo autem esse magnam aequivocationem in his verbis et quaestionibus prout nunc tractantur in scholis, et prout Aristoteles eas ponit, ut in superioribus tactum est, et ex hoc loco fiet manifestum.

Forma ergo nunc communi usu aut pro forma partis sumitur, aut pro forma totius, quae est, verbi gratia, humanitas. Aristoteles vero de forma totius fere nunquam facit mentionem expressam, licet possit comprehendi sub nomine quidditatis. Aristoteles ergo praeter formam partis, quae est proprius actus materiae, per formas intelligit frequenter in 7, et in hoc 8 libro, illas Platonicas, quae (juxta sensum in quo Aristoteles illam sententiam tractat) ponendae erant separatae et distinctae non solum a materia, sed etiam a formis singularibus actuantibus materiam. Quia vero Plato asserebat, illas formas esse quidditates ipsorum singularium, videtur /p. XLIV/ illas easdem posuisse secundum se abstractas et separatas, participatione autem quadam intrinsecas ipsis individuis et exercentes in eis munus formae, actuando materiam, et constituendo individuum; ideo Aristoteles ita etiam loquitur in ea sententia, ac si in substantia sensibili non sit alia forma praeter ideam; ideoque saepe ab una ad aliam transitum facit. Hinc etiam est ut nomine *quidditatis*, seu *quod quid erat esse*, saepe non totam rei essentiam, sed solam formam significet, conveniens in hoc modo loquendi cum Platone, non ut in re illi consentiat, sed potius ut concludat non posse quod quid est rerum materialium in sola forma consistere. Atque hoc fere modo loquitur in praesenti.

Unde in prima quaestione, mens ejus est haec nomina significare in rebus sensibilibus substantiam compositam ex materia et forma. Quod ut plenius explicetur, distinguere possumus adaequatum significatum nominis, et formale seu quasi formale. Ut in hac voce *homo*, adaequatum significatum est totus homo, formale vero est humanitas; formalius autem videri posset anima rationalis. Haec igitur nomina adaequate significant compositas substantias, ut est per se evidens, nam illud significat nomen, quod per definitionem explicatur, ut patet supra, lib. 4, text. 28; definitiones autem

harum rerum non includunt solas formas, sed compositum ex materia et forma, ut constat ex dictis lib. 7, text. 18 et sequentibus; illud ergo significant nomina. Idemque satis constat ex modo concipiendi omnium; nemo enim per nomen *homo* solam animam concipit, nec animam esse hominem quispiam dixerit; significat ergo homo adaequate compositum ipsum. Quin etiam de formali significat compositum ex materia et forma, scilicet, integram hominis naturam, quae non est sola forma physica, licet dicatur forma metaphysica, seu totius quae est humanitas. Animam vero neutro modo proprie significat, sed eam includit in suo significato, sicut etiam includit materiam, licet in diverso genere; nam animam includit ut formam constituentem quidditatem rei, materiam vero ut inchoantem illam.

Ex quibus colligitur resolutio secundae quaestionis et interpretatio Aristotelis in hoc loco circa illam. Simpliciter enim verum est, et de sententia Philosophi, non solam formam, sed etiam materiam esse de quidditate substantiae sensibilis, ut tractamus late disp. 36, sect. 1. Nihilominus forma speciali ratione dicitur quod quid est rei cujuscunque, quia dat ultimam speciem et constitutionem. Et hoc sensu dicit Aristoteles hic, substantiam sensibilem non solum includere quod quid est, id est, formam constituentem quod quid est, sed etiam materiam, ut recte Alensis.

Atque eodem sensu (ut tertiae quaestionis respondeamus) ait in forma ipsa non distingui quod quid est ab eo cujus est, quia omnis forma se ipsa talis est, nec habet formam constituentem esse specificum illius; in re autem materiali id, quod formaliter constituit quidditatem, distinguitur ab habente ipsam formam; nam habens est totum compositum, forma vero est pars ejus. Unde Aristoteles hoc loco non comparavit naturam integram ad suppositum, quo sensu solet illa quaestio nunc tractari, ut late disserimus disp. 34. Nec etiam comparavit hic naturam specificam ad individua, quia solet esse alius sensus illius quaestionis, ut tractamus disp. 5, sect. 1, et disp. 6, sect. 1 et 2. Unde nihil etiam hoc loco distinxit philosophus inter materiam communiter sumptam, et materiam signatam seu individuum, quia Plato (ut ipse ei tribuit) non solum a materia signata, sed absolute a materia separabat ideas et essentias rerum sensibilium. Ac denique non declarat Aristoteles, an haec nomina significant compositum substantiale in communi tantum, vel etiam in individuo, de que re diximus etiam tractando de universalibus, disput. 6, sect. 5.

Q. 4. Aliae praeterea quaestiones occurrere possunt circa eandem partem, quas Aristoteles attigit, ut an individua tantum per se generentur, ut Aristoteles hic sentit, vel etiam species.

Q. 5. Item an totum praeter materiam et formam aliquid aliud includat, ut plane hic Philosophus intendit.

Q. 6. Ac denique, an res simplices definibiles sint, vel tantum compositae, ut hic Aristoteles significat; intelligendumque est de re composita, vel re ipsa, vel ratione ex genere et differentia. De qua re et de caeteris quaestionibus satis in superioribus tactum est.

Q. 7. Circa alteram capitis partem quaeri etiam solet, an numerus sit per se unus.

Q. 8. Item an ultima unitas sit forma numeri, quae duae quaestiones in disput. 41, de quantitate discreta, late tractantur.

Q. 9. Rursus potest disputari, *an essentiae rerum sint sicut numeri*; hoc enim axioma ex hoc loco sumi solet; et ad verum illius sensus /p. XLV/ sum percipiendum, oportet prae oculis habere, illam particulam *sicut*, non dicere adaequatam, imo nec veram similitudinem, sed proportionem. Quae in hoc consistit, quod sicut numeri ex pluribus unitatibus, ita essentiae rerum materialium (de his enim hic agitur, quamvis eadem ratio sit de omnibus creatis) componuntur ex pluribus praedicatis quidditativis, licet diverso modo; unitates enim sunt realiter plures, praedicata vero solum ratione. Item sicut unitates in quolibet numero finitae sunt, ita et quidditativa praedicata, ut supra circa lib. 2 tactum est. Quo etiam fit ut, sicut divisio numeri non procedit in infinitum, ita nec resolutio speciei in praedicata quidditative [sic], sed tandem sistit in aliquibus simplicibus et primis. Rursus sicut ultima unitas determinat rationem talis numeri, ita et ultima differentia rationem specificam. Quare sicut addita unitate mutatur numerus, ita et addita differentia mutatur species. Et quoad hoc maxime dicitur uniuscujusque rei essentia esse sicut numerus, et consistere quodammodo in indivisibili, sicut ille consistit.

Q. 10. Hinc vero suboriebatur altera quaestio, quomodo formae aliquae possint suscipere magis vel minus, et an tunc ipsa species mutetur, augeatur vel minuatur, vel sola forma individua, et an hoc habeat locum in accidentibus tantum, vel etiam in formis substantialibus. Sed hanc materiam de intensione formarum tractamus late in disput. 46, circa praedicamentum Qualitatis.

CAPUT IV DE PRINCIPIO MATERIALI SUBSTANTIARUM

In hoc capite nihil fere novum Aristoteles docet. Unde fere omnes quaestiones de materia, imo et de causis hic tractari possent.

Quaest. 1. An materia prima omnium rerum generabilium una sit.

Q. 2. Secunda, an materia proxima sit diversa, et quomodo id debeat intelligi de materia proxima, et quomodo de remota, et qualis haec distinctio sit.

Hae tractatae sunt in disp. 13, in prioribus sectionibus.

Q. 3. Rursus, an rerum naturalium quatuor sint causae, in disput. 12, late.

Q. 4 et 5. An finis et efficiens in eadem coincident, in disp. 27. Praeterea, an in substantiis naturalibus incorruptibilibus sit materia, et qualis; in disp. 13, sect. 9 et sequentibus. /col. b/

Q. 6. Ac tandem tractari hic potest de materiali causa accidentium, quod Aristoteles in fine capituli attingit, et de ea re disp. 14 confecimus. Neque aliquid aliud notatione dignum occurrit.

CAPUT V QUOMODO MATERIALE PRINCIPIUM AD TRANSMUTATIONES DESERVIAT

Quaest. 1. In hoc capite celebris esse solet illa sententia Philosophi: *Quaecumque absque eo, quod transmutentur, sunt, aut non, horum materia non est*,⁸⁵ cujus occasione tractari hic solet quaestio de materia coeli, quia ex illa propositione dici solet coelos, juxta Philosophi sententiam, materiam non habere, eo quod transmutari non possint. Sed imprimis Aristotelis sententia aliena est ab hoc proposito. Cum enim in principio hujus capituli dixisset, quaedam esse et non esse absque generatione et corruptione, non loquitur in dictis verbis de rebus incorruptibilibus; illae enim non sunt ex iis quae possunt esse et non esse, sed necessario sunt: hic ergo loquitur de iis rebus quae possunt esse et non esse absque generatione et corruptione, scilicet, quae ad illas per se primo sit, cujusmodi sunt formae ipsae. De his ergo dicit in dicta propositione, non habere materiam, sed esse actus materiae. Ipsa autem composita, quae materia constant, esse proprie transmutabilia per generationem et corruptionem. Deinde, si illa propositio nude sumpta, de coelis etiam sumeretur, intelligendum esset juxta superiora, scilicet, in illis rebus non esse materiam subjectam transmutationi, sed proportionatam, ut supra dictum est.

Q. 2. Circa finem hujus capituli attingit Aristoteles quaestionem, an sit regressus ex privatione ad habitum. Quae potest intelligi aut de regressu ad eundem numero habitum, seu ad eandem numero formam, et sic attingit materiam de resurrectione, quae ab hoc loco satis est aliena; trac-

tavimus autem illam late in 2 tomo tertiae partis, et in hoc opere saepius illam obiter attingimus, praesertim disp. 5, sect. 3 et sequentibus, ubi de principio individuationis agimus.

Vel potest intelligi quaestio de reditu ad eandem formam in specie, et sic non est dubium quin possit esse regressus, non tamen in omnibus immediate; non enim ex aceto fit immediate vinum, nec ex cadavere animal, licet ex aere, et fiat aqua, et ex aqua aer. Et ratio quam Aristoteles insinuat, et D. Thomas /p. XLVI/ melius declarat, est, quia aliquae sunt formae, quas aequali ordine et immediate respicit materia, aliae vero quae certum ordinem requirunt, ut ita una post aliam in materia introducantur, seu ut una res ex alia, ut ex termino a quo, generetur. Forma enim aceti, vel cadaveris naturaliter introduci non potest, nisi post formam vini vel animalis, et ad recessum ejus, et hic non potest mutari naturalis ordo generationis, ut ex aceto fiat vinum,, sicut ex sanguine fit semen, non vero e converso, et ideo in his necesse est ut materia prius redeat ad elementum, vel ad alias formas, ut iterum tandem disponi possit ad formam ejusdem speciei cum ea quam amisit.

CAPUT VI CUR EX GENERE ET DIFFERENTIA MATERIA ET FORMA FIAT PER SE UNUM

Quaest. 1. Totum hoc caput consumit Aristoteles in explicanda hac quaestione, quam supra etiam tetigit lib. 7, c. 12, ubi aliqua adnotavimus, et plura in disputat. de materia et forma, praesertim disp. 15, sect. 1. Neque in ejus discussione aliquid aliud Aristoteles docet notatu dignum. Solum observatur, cum Aristoteles in fine capituli videtur excludere omne medium, ut ex materia et forma fiat unum, non excludere modum unionis; id enim impossibile est, ut ostendimus eadem disp. 15, sect. 6; sed excludere aliam entitatem distinctam, a qua sit illa unitas, et sic est res clara.

Q. 2. Observetur etiam quomodo Aristoteles hic ait, res simplices et abstrahentes a materia seipsis habere unitatem et esse unum quid, confirmans plane expositionem a nobis datam supra, c. 3.

Q. 3. Ex doctrina etiam hujus capituli confirmari potest quod de modo determinationis entis ad universalissima genera tradimus disp. 3, sect. 6.

LIBER NONUS METAPHYSICAE

De Divisione Entis in Potentiam et Actum

Celebris est divisio entis in ens actu, et ens in potentia, seu in potentiam et actum, ex qua solet Aristoteles varias quaestiones dissolvere, ut an quod fit, antea existeret; ait enim praeesistere in potentia, et non in actu; et proxime in fine superioris libri ex eadem partitione definierat quaestionem de unitate /col. b/ substantiae compositae. Ob hanc ergo causam, postquam Philosophus de substantia tractavit in hoc libro, praedictam divisionem declarat. Est autem pro totius libri intelligentia advertendum, aliud esse dividere ens in ens in potentia vel in actu, aliud vero dividere ens in ens, quod est potentia, vel quod est actus; nam prior non est divisio in entia essentialiter diversa, sed in diversos status ejusdem entis secundum rationem existendi; et in hoc sensu pauca dicit Philosophus in toto hoc libro; illam vero divisionem nos applicamus in disp. 31, sect. 3. Posterior autem divisio est secundum diversas rationes essentielles entium, sive existentium actu, sive in potentia tantum: uterque enim status habet locum in utroque membro, et hoc sensu tractatur a Philosopho in discursu hujus libri. Sic autem sumpta divisio potissime locum habet in substantia et qualitate, et ideo secundum priorem rationem tractatur a nobis inter disputandum de materia et forma disp. 13 et 15. Posteriori vero modo tractando de qualitate speciebus, disp. 43.

CAPUT I

DE VARIIS SIGNIFICATIONIBUS NOMINIS *POTENTIA*

Quaest. 1. In hoc capite fere repetit Aristoteles quae tradiderat in libro 5, capite 12, unde quaestiones ibi tactae hic etiam locum habent. Addi vero possunt aliae, ut an potentia univoce dicatur de potentia activa et passiva; hic enim Aristoteles videtur docere dici analogice, et de potentia passiva dici per habitudinem ad activam. Resolutio vero est, si nomen potentiae transcendentaliter sumatur, analogice dici de illis; si vero sumatur ut est species qualitatis, sic dici univoce; de qua re agimus latius citato loco. Hic vero observa, Aristotelem hoc loco non agere de potentia ut est secunda

species qualitatis, sed late, ut comprehendit omnia principia agendi; unde artem et alios habitus saepe potentias nominat.

Q. 2. Rursus inquiri potest, an potentia activa et passiva semper sint distinctae potentiae, ut hic Aristoteles innuit, vel aliquando in eandem coincidunt, ut videtur contingere in potentiis animae. De qua re dicimus in praedicta disp. 44, s. 1.

Q. 3. Cum hac conjuncta est alia quaestio, an idem possit pati a seipso; nam Aristoteles hic negat his verbis: *Propter quod nullum, prout connaturale factum, ipsum a seipso pati potest.*⁸⁶ Quae possunt imprimis exponi de passione proprie et rigorose dicta, id est, physica, et aliquo modo corruptiva, ita ut non comprehendant passiones perfectivas, ut sunt immanentes. Secundo et melius expendenda censeo verba illa, *prout naturale factum*; duo enim includere videntur. Unum est, nihil existens in suo naturali et perfecto statu pati a seipso; aliud est nihil pati a se, *prout connaturale factum*, id est, secundum id praecise quod habet a natura, sed indiget aliquo alio, ut speciebus, vel alia re simili, sed haec res disputatur latissime a nobis, disp. 18.

CAPUT II

DE POTENTIIS RATIONALIBUS ET IRRATIONALIBUS

In hoc capite solum ait Aristoteles de potentia activa quam supra dixerat esse per se primo potentiam, idque facile patet ex discursu textus, et ex divisionibus quas tradit, et ex declaratione seu differentia, quam subjungit. Quae ergo primo potest quae sit potentia vitalis, quae vero non vitalis; haec enim divisio insinuat a Philosopho, cum ait quasdam esse potentias animae, alias vero rerum inanimatarum. Quae divisio magis spectat ad scientiam de anima. Et ideo breviter dicendum est, potentias vitales dici omnes illas, quae consequuntur animam, ut anima est, seu aliquem vitae gradum. Et quia gradus vitae a nobis non concipitur nec discernitur, nisi per ordinem ad operationem propriam, qua vivens in seipsum agit, ut se actuet, vel perficiatur, ideo potentia vitalis illa est, quae est principium proximum et intrinsecum operationis vitalis, per quam ipsum vivens seipsum perficit, non tamen secundum eandem potentiam; alia quae secundum eandem potentiam est principium proximum actuandi seipsum; et haec est proprie potentia ad actum immanentem, quae perfectiori modo vitalis est. Et haec rursus distinguitur in rationalem et irrationalem, quam divisionem expressius hic Aristoteles posuit.

Q. 2. Circa quam quaeri ulterius potest, an dicta divisio conveniens sit, et quae sit potentia rationalis, et quotuplex sit. Quae quaestiones etiam spectant ad scientiam de anima. Et ideo dicendum est breviter, potentiam rationalem appellari, omnem illam quae consequitur gradum intellectualem ut sic, om- /col. b/ nem vero inferiorem potentiam vocari posse irrationalem. Unde duplex distingui potest potentia rationalis, alia eliciens vel imperans, alia exequens cum subordinatione ad priorem potentiam, et potest uno verbo dici imperative rationalis, juxta doctrinam Philosophi, libro 1 Ethicorum, capit. 13. Priori modo dicitur rationalis illa potentia, quae in se rationalis est, elicitque actum modo rationali. Quae rursus subdistingui potest, nam quaedam est ipsa ratio formaliter seu per essentiam, ut est intellectus; alia est rationalis participative, seu per concomitantiam et regimen, ut voluntas, et de utraque loquitur Aristoteles hic, quia utraque gradum rationalem sequitur. Vel potius de illis videtur Philosophus loqui per modum unius, quia ex utraque completur veluti unum adaequatum principium humanarum actionum, quatenus altera quoad exercitium, altera quoad specificationem movet. Potentia imperative rationalis dicitur illa, quae cum in se rationalis non sit, natura sua obedire potest rationi, quomodo Aristoteles, citato loco 1 Ethicorum, appetitum sensitivum hominis vocat rationalem per participationem, licet sit irrationalis simpliciter; et ad hunc ordinem reduci potest potentia executiva ad extra, quatenus subjacet motioni voluntatis, et rationis, qualis est potentia motiva secundum locum, de qua Philosophus libro tertio de Anima, capit. 9 et sequentibus.

Ex illo vero loco, praesertim textu 41 et 42, oritur specialis dubitatio, quia ibi videtur Aristoteles rejicere, ut insufficientem, hanc divisionem potentiarum in rationales et irrationales. Responderi potest primo, illam divisionem dupliciter dari posse. Primo, ut adaequatam potentiarum animae, et hoc sensu non probari ab Aristotele citato loco; alio modo ut propriam ac specialem divisionem potentiarum hominis seu animae rationalis, et hoc modo tradi ab Aristotele tam hic, quam libro 1 Ethicorum, cap. 13. Ratio vero differentiae est, quia potentiae hominis habent aliquo modo ordinem ad rationem, quatenus omnes in eadem anima rationali radicantur, et ideo possunt convenienter dividi per ordinem ad rationem, aut participationem vel carentiam actus. Potentiae vero brutorum vel aliarum rerum naturalium non habent ordinem ad rationem; et ideo nec rationales, nec irrationales proprie dicuntur. Sed haec responsio non recte accommodatur huic loco Aristotelis, nam aperte sub potentiis irrationalibus includit omnes, quae naturaliter agunt, et sine /p. XLVIII/ ratione. Unde expresse ponit exemplum irrationalis potentiae in calore. Item, quia per illam differentiam quasi

privativam, scilicet irrationale, circumscribi potest modus agendi omnium potentiarum naturalium et vitalium, quae gradum rationis non attingunt. Non videtur ergo dubium, quin haec possit esse adaequata divisio potentiarum non solum in homine, nec solum in anima, sed absolute in omni agente. Aristoteles ergo, in 3 de Anima, non definiendo, sed disputando tantum procedit, ut D. Thom. notat, vel certe improbat illam divisionem ut insufficientem, non absolute, sed quia non satis erat ad explicandum numerum et varietatem potentiarum animae.

Q. 3. Tertia quaestio principalis hic est, an recte assignetur ab Aristotele discrimen inter has potentias, ex eo quod solae rationales potentiae sunt principia contrariorum; de qua re late dictum est disputat. 10, in qua de causis liberis et necessariis fuse disserimus, et explicamus quaenam potentiae liberae sint, et quomodo sint principia contrariarum actionum. Item in disp. 26, sect. 6, tractamus an eadem causa possit efficere contrarios effectus, et in utroque loco hunc Aristotelis locum explicamus.

CAPUT III POTENTIAM ESSE SEPARABLEM AB ACTU

Quaest. 1. In hoc capite reprobat Aristoteles quorundam sententiam, qui dicebant potentiam non esse, nisi dum actu operatur, quae tam est absurda, ut per se statim falsa appareat. Unde rationes Aristotelis perspicuae sunt. Hincque sumitur hoc principium: *Potentia praecedit actum suum*. Quod si intelligitur de antecessione secundum naturae ordinem, est in universum verum, quia cum potentia sit causa sui actus, praecedat illum ordine naturae. Loquimur enim de potentia comparata ad actum, quia ab illa proprie manat. Quod adverto, ut excludam potentiam generandi vel spirandi, quae est in divinis personis, de qua alia est ratio et consideratio. At vero si intelligatur de antecessione durationis, sic intelligendum est illud principium de possibili, seu indefinite, non de necessitate, seu universaliter. Potest enim potentia tum activa, tum etiam passiva, praecedere tempore actum suum; non est tamen necessarium, nec in qualibet potentia, neque respectu omnium actuum; potentia enim illuminandi non praecedat tempore omnem illuminationem— /col. b/ nem, nec potentia materiae omnem formam.

Q. 2. Ex eodem capite, in fine, sumptum est illud vulgare axioma continens definitionem possibilis, scilicet: *Possibile illud est, quo posito in esse nihil sequitur impossibile*.⁸⁷ Quod est evidens, si cum proportionem sumatur possibilitas et reductio in actum. Aliquid enim est possibile est [sic] se-

cundum actum successivum et non simultaneum, ut continuum dividi in infinitum est possibile, non ita ut tota divisio possibilis simul ponatur, sed ut successive ponatur, et nunquam finiatur. Sic etiam aliquid est possibile divisim, non tamen composite, ut album fieri nigrum. Si ergo reductio ad actum cum proportione fiat, manifesta est illa propositio, cujus rationem in sequenti capite magis declarabimus.

CAPUT IV

NON OMNE, QUOD NON FIT, POSSIBILE ESSE FIERI

Ut Aristoteles confirmet descriptionem possibilis, quam in fine superioris capituli tradidit, hic reprobatur sententiam eorum qui dicebant, unumquodque esse possibile, etiamsi futurum non sit, quod tam aperte falsum, ut nulla egeat refutatione aut declaratione.

Quaest. 1. Solum est advertendum, nonnullos ex hac littera Aristotelis colligere, non solum non omne, quod futurum nunquam est, esse possibile, sed etiam omne quod nunquam futurum est, esse impossibile, seu (quod idem est) omne, quod possibile est, aliquando esse futurum, quia omne id, quod semper non est, impossibile est esse. Et haec videtur esse expositio Commentatoris hic, textu 8 et 9, quam defendit Jandun. hic, quaest. 5, ut refert et late impugnat Javellus, quaest. 10. Verumtamen non solum repugnat menti et verbis Aristotelis, tum hic, tum etiam aliis locis, sed est etiam evidenter falsa, et repugnans etiam principiis fidei Catholicae. Primum patet, nam Philosophus hic, ut recte D. Thom. et alii exponunt, expresse docet quaedam quidem esse possible, quae nunquam futura sunt, quanquam non omnia, quae nunquam futura sunt, sint possible esse vel fieri. Et l. 2 de Generatione, c. 11, textu 64, dicit: *Qui jamjam ambulaturus est, facile non ambulabit*. Ubi non solum ait, aliquid possibile, sed etiam quod jam est in proposito, vel quasi in vestibulo ut fiat, interdum non fieri. Et ratio est evidens ex principio posito in praecedenti capite, quia potentia potest esse prior tempore quam suus actus; unde fieri potest ut ali- /p. XLIX/ quem actum nunquam exerceat, etiamsi possit. Deinde in effectibus divinis est hoc non solum evidens, sed etiam de fide certum; multa enim potest Deus facere quae nunquam facit; sic enim dixit Christus, Matthaei 26: *An non possum rogare Patrem meum, etc.?* Denique ex contingentia et libertate aliquorum effectuum vel causarum, necessaria consecutione id sequitur. De qua re late tractamus disput. 19, sectione 2 et seq. Neque est verum omne id, quod nunquam est, esse impossibile, sed quod ex se et ab intrinseco nunquam est, ita ut careat capacitate essendi.

Q. 2. Ultimo considerandum est quod in textu nono Aristoteles infert, scilicet, quando in propositionibus de inesse unum necessario infertur ab alio, eodem modo sequi in propositionibus de possibili, ut si antecedens possibile sit, etiam et consequens sit possibile. Ut si recte infertur: Currit, ergo movetur, recte etiam inferatur: Potest currere; ergo potest moveri; quia alias si possibile esset currere, impossibile autem moveri, aut posset poni cursus sine motu, contra priorem illationem, aut posito in re motu, qui supponitur possibilis, sequeretur aliquid impossibile, scilicet cursus ille qui dicebatur esse impossibilis. Est ergo evidens illud dogma, et in idem fere incidit, quod dialectici aiunt, in bona consequentia non posse esse antecedens verum, et consequens falsum, quia, sicut ex possibili non sequitur impossibile, ita nec ex vero falsum. Et ratio a priori est, quia consequens virtute continetur in antecedente; impossibile autem est ut possibile virtute contineat id quod est impossibile, aut verum aliquod falsum, quia hoc ipso jam illud non esset possibile, cum possibile respiciat actum, et non possit respicere actum impossibilem, quia ad impossibile non est potentia; et eadem ratione illud non esset verum, cum de ratione veri sit ut nihil falsum contineat. Item est alia ratio, quia actu esse, necessario infert possibile esse, cum actus supponat potentiam, et ideo si inter actus est necessaria consecutio, a fortiori etiam inter potentias. Recte autem advertit D. Thomas hic esse sermonem de possibili in communi, ut abstrahit a necessario vel contingenti, quia fieri potest, ut in bona illatione de inesse, antecedens sit possibile tantum contingens, consequens vero necessarium; ut, si ridet, est risibilis, aut est homo; et ratio est quia etiam ipse actus abstrahit ab esse necessario vel contingente, et quia ex proprietate necessar- / col. b/ ria sequitur actus contingens, qui actus necessario includit vel supponit potentiam, non tamen sub eadem conditione necessarii aut contingentis.

CAPUT V DE ORDINE INTER POTENTIAM ET ACTUM

Quaest. 1. Hic primo inquiri potest an in uno et eodem subjecto actus interdum antecedit potentiam, quod hic Aristoteles affirmare videtur. Sed haec quaestio facile dissolvetur, si advertatur quod supra notatum est. Aristotelem hic vocare potentiam omne principium agendi, etiamsi sit ars vel habitus. Hoc ergo sensu constat aliquas potentias, id est, principia agendi supponere actus suos, quibus generantur, sic enim ars et habitus consuetudine acquiruntur. At vero propria naturalis potentia activa vel

passiva semper supponitur ad actum suum vel tempore, vel saltem natura, nec fieri potest ut in eodem praecedat actus talem potentiam, ut aperte hic docet Aristoteles. Et ratio est, quia talis potentia est causa sui actus, et non est effectus illius, nisi forte in genere causae finalis, quae causa non praecedat in esse, sed fortasse in apprehensione et intentione, et sic est res clara, quam iterum in cap. 8 Aristoteles attingit.

Q. 2. Secundo, inquiri hic potest quo modo potentia reducatur in actum, et quanam differentia in hoc sit inter potentias racionales et irracionales. Sed haec res late tractata est disp. 19. Hic solum notetur ex hoc loco Aristotelis plane colligi definitionem potentiae liberae, quam dicto loco late tractavimus, scilicet, esse illam, *quae, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere*. Hoc enim est quod hic Philosophus ait: *Quoniam vero potest, aliquid potest, aliquando, et aliquo modo, et quaecumque alia necesse est adesse in definitione;*⁸⁸ haec enim verba aequipollent illi particulae definitionis praedictae, *positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum*; illa enim omnia ait Aristoteles et exponit optime divus Thomas sumenda esse, seu supponenda, ut aliquid dicatur posse seu esse possibile simpliciter. De potentia autem sic sumpta subdit Aristoteles hanc esse differentiam inter potentias naturales et liberas, seu (quod idem est) irracionales et racionales, ut ipse loquitur, quod *in prioribus necesse est, ut cum, quoad possint, passivum et activum approximant, hoc quidem faciat, illud vero patiatur.*⁸⁹ De aliis vero ait: *Illas vero non est necesse.*⁹⁰ Quod perinde est /p. L/ ac si diceret, potentiam liberam talem esse, ut approximata ad agendum cum omnibus requisitis, non necessario agat, sed possit agere et non agere, et subdit optimam rationem. Quia cum potentia libera sit per se, et ex se potens ad contraria, si approximata ad generandum, ex necessitate ageret, simul ageret contraria, quod est impossibile.

Q. 3. Tertio, quaeri potest quid determinet potentiam rationalem, vel liberam ad actum, hoc enim in fine hujus capituli Aristoteles investigat. Et nihil aliud respondet, nisi hanc potentiam determinari electione et proposito seu desiderio, quo posito (supple efficaci et absoluto) ex necessitate operatur quod potest. Quod per se satis clarum est. Restabat autem ulterius inquirendum, quid determinet hanc potentiam ad ipsam electionem; sed de hoc nihil inquisivit Philosophus, quia nihil esse credit amplius inquirendum, quia haec potentia sua vi naturali, ut actu primo (loquor in naturalibus et moralibus electionibus, ac per se loquendo), et ipsamet volitione seu electione, ut actu secundo, de se determinat ad volendum et eligendum; nam volendo eligit, et eligendo vult; non tamen se sola seu sine concursu et auxilio superioris causae requisitae; hoc enim semper supponitur. Quam sententiam attingit Soncin., lib. 9 Metaph., q.

14, eamque non improbat, sed defendit; putatque esse consentaneam doctrinae Philosophi hoc loco. Postea vero ipse addit ad hanc determinationem saltem quoad specificationem concurrere iudicium intellectus; sed quo sensu id verum sit, et an haec determinatio sui ipsius sit ipsi potentiae liberae tribuenda, latissime tractavimus in dicta disp 19, tam comparatione iudicii intellectus in sect. 6, quam comparatione divini concursus in sect. 4, et disp. 27, sect. 2, 3, et 4.

CAPUT VI QUIDNAM ACTUS SIT

In hoc capite nulla occurrit quaestio alicujus momenti. Solum notatur, Aristotelem hic non tam explicare quid sit actus qui proprie respondet potentiae activae et passivae, quam absolute quid sit esse in actu, prout distinguitur ab esse in potentia. Et hoc modo esse in actu latissime patet, et est veluti transcendens quoddam, et ideo ab Aristotele non declaratur definitione, sed exemplis, et inductione quadam, quia vix potest definitione hoc explicari, nisi utendo ipsomet actu ad id ex- /col. b/ plicandum; nam esse in actu non est aliud quam actu seu de facto habere id quod erat in potentia. Itaque si esse in actu distinguatur ab esse in potentia, nihil aliud est quam actu existere, de quo quid sit, late dicimus disp. 31. Si vero in actu dicatur de potentia activa, idem est quod actu operari. Si de passiva, idem erit quod actu recipere seu informari. Quae omnia exponuntur a nobis partim disput. 43, ubi de potentia activa et passiva, et actibus earum agimus, partim d. 48 et 49, ubi agimus de actione et passione, quae sunt immediatores actus harum potentiarum.

CAPUT VII QUANDO DICATUR RES PROPRIE ESSE IN POTENTIA

In hoc etiam capite nihil occurrit notatione dignum; solum enim docet Philosophus, tunc rem dici proprie et absolute esse in potentia, cum est in potentia proxima, ita ut per unius agentis effectum possit reduci ad actum. Quando vero est solum in potentia remota, non dicitur proprie et absolute esse in potentia, ut aqua non est in potentia homo vel equus, simpliciter loquendo, imo nec sperma (ait Aristoteles), quia multis transmutationibus indiget, ut inde fiat homo. Quae omnia solum ad modum loquendi spectant; nam res per se satis constat.

Deinde vero declarat quo modo materia dicatur de re, et docet praedicari denominative, non abstracte seu essentialiter; dicitur enim lignum aereum, non aer, et arca lignea, non lignum. Et ratio est clara, quia pars non praedicitur de toto, nisi denominative, quia non praedicatur per modum totius, quia id quod afficitur tali denominatione est ipsum totum. Quare hic nulla relinquitur quaestio quae alicujus momenti sit.

CAPUT VIII ACTUM ESSE PRIOREM POTENTIA

Quaest. 1. Primo inquiri potest, an actus sit prior potentia definitione, seu ratione, et cognitione, ut hic Aristoteles docet. De qua re ex professo agimus, disput. 43, sectione ultima.

Q. 2. Secundo, an actus praecedat tempore naturalem potentiam, saltem secundum speciem, seu in diversis subjectis. Haec etiam quaestio tractata est ibidem.

Q. 3. Ultimo, an potentia quae usu acquiritur, id est habitus, sit posterior tempore suo /p. LI/ actu, et quomodo per illum generetur, quod etiam cap. 5 tactum est, de qua re diximus disp. 44, quae est de habitibus.

CAPUT IX ACTUM ESSE PRIOREM SUBSTANTIA SEU PERFECTIONE, QUAM POTENTIAM

Quaest. 1. Prima quaestio, et in hoc capite directe intenta, est, an actus sit perfectior, quam potentia. Haec tractatur disp. 43, sect. ult.

Q. 2. An posteriora generatione sint perfectiora. Hanc propositionem assumit hoc loco Aristoteles ut principium, ex quo infert actum esse perfectiorem potentia. Cujus principii sensus verus est, quando aliquid ita est generatione prius, ut ad posterius ordinetur tanquam via ad terminum, vel tanquam id quod inchoatum est, ad id quod est consummatum, tunc quod est posterius, esse perfectius; et hunc sensum declarant exempla Aristotelis de viro et puero, et de semine et homine. Et ratio etiam quam subdit, dicens: *Illud enim* (scilicet, quod posterius est generatione) *jam habet formam, hoc vero non;*⁹¹ id est, illud perductum est ad terminum et consummationem comparatione alterius. At vero quando aliquid est posterius generatione tanquam quid consequens et dimanans ab alio, ut passio seu proprietates respectu formae, tunc non oportet ut sit perfectius, ut per se constat, nisi

forte ita fiat comparatio, ut quod posterius est, includat id quod est prius, et addat aliquid; sic enim perfectior est anima suis potentiis affecta, quam in sua nuda substantia; et sic est res clara.

Q. 3. Quaestio hic tractari poterat de distinctione duplicis finis, in eum, qui est operatio tantum, vel qui est aliquid factum. Sed hanc divisionem sufficienter attingimus in disp. 23, sect. 2.

Q. 4. Quarto, hic occurrit quaestio de differentia, quam hic Aristoteles tangit inter actionem immanentem et transeuntem, quod illa in agente manet, haec vero in patiente recipitur: de qua re inter explicandum praedicamentum actionis late tractamus disput. 48, sect. 2.

Q. 5. Quinto, ex hoc capite sumpta est quaedam vulgaris propositio: *Omnis potentia simul contradictionis est*,⁹² seu, ut communiter circumfertur, est potentia contradictionis. Cui difficile est verum ac doctrinalem sensum tribuere. Nam imprimis, ut D. Thomas notat, /col. b/ videtur non posse intelligi de potentia activa, quia supra dictum est ab eodem Philosopho, non omnem potentiam activam esse oppositorum, sed rationalem tantum. De potentia etiam passiva non potest esse universaliter vera, maxime in doctrina ejus Philosophi, quia materia coeli est potentia ad formam, et tamen non est potentia contradictionis, quia non est subjecta privationi, nec est in potentia ad repugnantem formam. Et coelum ipsum habet potentiam ad motum, et tamen juxta doctrinam Philosophi, non est in potentia contradictionis, quia non potest quiescere. Quod si quis dicat, Aristotelem loqui de potentia quae est conjuncta, vel subjecta privationi, hoc sensu erit plane inepta et quasi identica propositio, nihilque ad doctrinam deserviens. Perinde enim est ac si diceretur, potentiam ad habitum et privationem esse potentiam contradictionis.

Dicendum vero est, Aristotelem aperte loqui de potentia quae simul includit esse in potentia, quae non dicit solam potentiam receptivam, quoad positivam entitatem et capacitatem ejus, sed includit etiam statum in quo dicitur esse in potentia et carere actu. Hanc vero esse Aristotelis mentem perspicuum est; nam hoc sensu ait, *nihil potentia aeternum esse*,⁹³ quod aliter verum non esset (juxta ejus sententiam) de materia vel quantitate coeli, aut intellectu, vel voluntate Angeli. Rursus ait in coelo non esse potentiam ad moveri absolute, quod etiam esset plane falsum, si de sola potentia receptiva, quoad ejus positivam rationem, sermo esset; loquitur ergo de potentia, ut includit esse in potentia. Et hoc modo potest intelligi non solum de potentia passiva, sed etiam de activa. Quod ipsemet inferius videtur declarare, cum ait potentias rationales per se esse potentias contradictionis, id est, quae possunt agere et non agere, potentias autem irracionales, *solum quia adsunt et absunt*,⁹⁴ id est, solum quia possunt esse

et non esse applicatae; sic enim possunt interdum agere, interdum non agere, quem locum exponimus disputatione 26, sect. 4, n. 14.

Quod vero in hoc sensu sit nimis clara expositio, non obstat, tum quia in rigore non est identica; tum etiam quia in eo deservit intentioni, seu discursui Aristoteles, quo vult concludere rem in actu esse perfectiorem potentia; nam ob hanc causam res aeternae in actu sunt, et non in potentia. Dicitur etiam potest hoc amplius explicando, potentiam quae non /p. LIII/ solum est ad formam recipiendam, sed etiam ad propriam actionem vel passionem, esse potentiam contradictionis, vel simpliciter respectu totius mutationis seu formae, ut in potentia ad generationem, vel saltem secundum partes diversa, ut in potentia ad localem motum coeli, juxta sententiam Philosophi, et sic nullam patitur exceptionem propositio. Et ratio est, quia nulla potentia receptiva, quae per propriam actionem potest recipere actum suum, secundum Aristotelem habet illum ex aeternitate congenitum et immutabilem; nam potentia, quae hujusmodi est, non actuatur per propriam actionem, sed concreatur conjuncta suo actui, et natura sua determinata est, ut sub illo semper sit. Quod quidem ita existimavit Aristoteles esse verum in rebus incorruptibilibus, ut eas propterea aeternas esse crediderit; et in hoc sensu negat in eis esse potentiam, id est, quae possit esse in potentia, et carere actu, simpliciter loquendo.

Juxta veram autem doctrinam dicendum est, res omnes creatas ex se et absolute consideratas, esse potentiales seu in potentia tantum, non passiva, sed activa Creatoris, cum non repugnantia ex parte earum; res autem incorruptibiles hoc habent speciale, ut postquam creatae sunt, ex se non habeant potentiam intrinsecam ad non esse, et hoc modo est verum illas non habere potentiam contradictionis, quantum ad illud esse, in quo sunt incorruptibiles. Inde tamen non sequitur illas esse aeternas a parte ante, quia, ut absolute sint, pendent ex libera Dei voluntate.

Q. 6. Ultimo, posset hic disputari an secundum Aristotelem dentur plura entia per se necessaria, et puri actus absque ulla potentia; id enim videtur hoc loco significare, cum ait, *ea quae necessaria sunt*,⁹⁵ non esse in potentia, quia illa sunt prima entia; *si enim ipsa non essent, nihil esset profecto*.⁹⁶ Sed de hac re late disserimus disput. 30, sect. 2, et disput. 35, sect. 1. Quod vero ad hunc locum attinet, D. Thomas et alii illum exponunt de complexionibus necessariis ex sola essentiali, vel intrinseca connexionione praedicati cum subjecto, quae etiam in entibus corruptibilibus reperiuntur. Et quatenus necessaria sunt, non sunt in potentia, sed semper in actu, quoad veritatem seu essentialem connexionem. Quod si quis velit Aristotelem intelligere de substantiis, et rebus necessario existentibus, de quibus sane loqui videtur, dicat, vel doctrinaliter locutum fuisse in plurali

numero, non /col. b/ definiens an talia entia sint plura, vel una tantum, ac si diceret quaecumque illa sint, esse in actu et non in potentia. Vel certe sicut posuit plura entia aeterna, ita etiam possuisse plura necessaria, non tamen aequaliter, sed unum ex se necessarium, alia ex necessario influxu alterius, seu per necessariam emanationem ab alio.

CAPUT X ACTUM ESSE MELIOREM POTENTIA IN BONIS, SECUS IN MALIS

Hic videtur Aristoteles limitare conclusionem superioris capitis, nimirum, actum esse perfectiorem potentia, dicitque intelligendum esse, quando actus est bonus potentiae, non vero si sit malus.

Quaest. 1. Circa quam assertionem non parva difficultas occurrebat, an id intelligendum sit tantum de actu bono et malo in moralibus vel etiam in naturalibus; et si hoc posterius verum est, an id sit intelligendum respectu potentiae passivae, vel tantum respectu activae. Haec vero omnia tractantur dicta disput. 43, sect. ultima.

Q. 2. Obiter etiam hic attingit Aristoteles quaestionem de malo, an sit aliqua propria natura, vel quid in rebus sit. De qua re instituimus propriam disputationem, quae est undecima.

Q. 3. Item attingit quaestionem, an in rebus incorruptibilibus malum esse possit. Aristoteles enim hic absolute negat, quia et malum omne est quaedam corruptio, et corruptio quoddam malum. Optime vero id expedit divus Thomas uno verbo, id esse verum de incorruptibilibus formaliter, quatenus incorruptibilia sunt; nam ut sic non possunt privari; esse malum autem non est nisi cum privatione aliqua. Nihilominus ea, quae sunt incorruptibilia in substantia, possunt esse mutabilia in accidentibus, motibus, aut actibus, et ut sic potest in eis habere locum aliquis modus corruptionis physicae, seu secundum quid. Similiter, quae sunt indefectibilia in naturalibus, possunt in moralibus habere defectum, et ut sic potest malum morale habere locum in incorruptibilibus, quae res a Theologis disputatur copiosius, aliquid tamen attingimus disp. 35, sect. 5. /p. LIII/

CAPUT XI

ACTUM ESSE PRIOREM COGNITIONE QUAM POTENTIAM

Hanc conclusionem declarat hic Philosophus exemplo geometriae, in qua, reducendo in actum, per divisionem, id quod in potentia continetur in lineis continuis, pervenitur ad cognoscendas veritates geometriae; et circa textum quidem nihil notatu dignum occurrit: conclusio autem ipsa dicta disput. 43., sect. ult., declaratur.

CAPUT XII

DE VERITATE ET FALSITATE, QUOMODO
SINT IN SIMPLICIUM COGNITIONE

Quaest. 1. Ut caput hoc connexionem habeat cum praecedentibus, ait D. Thomas hic, in eo ostendere Philosophum, veritatem in actu potius quam in potentia reperiri. De qua re nihil fere in textu legitur. Unde verisimile est Aristotelem digressionem facere, et redire ad tractandum aliquid de ente vero. Tribus enim distinctionibus entis praecipue utitur in toto hoc opere, scilicet, entis per se (omisso ente per accidens) in decem praedicamenta; entis in actu vel potentia; et entis veri, et non entis falsi. Quoniam ergo de primis duabus dixerat in his tribus libris 7, 8 et 9, licet ens verum simul cum ente per accidens excluserat libro 6 a consideratione hujus scientiae, nihilominus in hoc capite breviter ad illud redit, praesertim ut declaret quomodo in simplicium cognitione veritas inveniatur: hoc enim in sexto libro omnino praetermiserat. Et imprimis repetit quod 6 libro dixerat, scilicet veritatem et falsitatem in compositione reperiri. De qua sententia multa dubitari possunt, quae tractata sunt disp. 8, sect. 1, usque ad 6.

Q. 2. Ulterius autem quaeritur, an veritas compositionis sumatur ex compositione rerum, ut Aristoteles significat. Sed res est clara, non enim est sensus, compositioni mentis, ut vera sit, debere correspondere compositionem in re, sed unionem et conjunctionem extremorum, quae per compositionem mentis significatur. Quanquam enim mens nostra non enunciat esse vel non esse, nisi realiter componendo suos conceptus simplices, non tamen attribuit rei conceptae illum compositionis modum, sed rem in se simplicem intelligit per modum compositae. Veritas ergo com- /col. b/ positionis mentis fundatur in unione vel identitate, quam extrema compositionis habent in re, sive illa sit absoluta identitas et simplex, sive unio cum aliqua compositione. Nisi fortasse in ipsamet compositione mentis exprimaturs modus identitatis, vel unionis, ut si dicas:

Bonitas Dei est ejus sapientia, vel aliquid ejusmodi; tunc enim necesse est ut talis modus identitatis correspondeat in re ipsa inter extrema, qualis per copulam significatur.

Q. 3. An eadem propositio possit esse vera et falsa, non quidem simul; hoc enim modo certum est absolutam veritatem, dum inest, excludere omnem falsitatem; quod tactum est in disp. 9, sect. 1; sed successive; nam Aristoteles hic affirmat, et non caret aliqua difficultate; tamen sententiam Aristotelis defendimus disp. 8, sect. 2.

Q. 4. An in simplicium intelligentia sit aliqua veritas, dictum est disp. 8, sect. 3, et supra, in fine lib. 6, nonnulla notata sunt pro hujus capituli expositione.

Q. 5. An in simplicium intelligentia sit aliqua falsitas propria, et quomodo per accidens interveniat, disp. 9, sect. 1.

Q. 6. An intellectus humanus possit quidditates substantiarum immaterialium cognoscere. Aristoteles enim ait habere ignorantiam earum non ut negationem, sed ut privationem; significans habere intellectum humanum potestatem consequendi illam cognitionem, et ita D. Thomas hic notat Aristotelem in hoc loco definivisse affirmantem hujus quaestionis partem, quam indecisam reliquerat lib. 3 de Anim., textu 36. Sed si quis recte consideret, Aristoteles, in 3 de Anima, loquitur de intellectu conjuncto; ut autem vera sit hujus loci sententia, quod ignoratio, quam nunc habemus de essentia substantiarum immaterialium, est ad modum privationis, satis est, quod in nostro intellectu secundum se sit capacitas naturalis ad illam cognitionem, etiamsi propter impedimentum sensuum non possint in hac vita expleri. Quapropter ex praesenti sententia non omnino habetur resolutio illius quaestionis propositae in 3 de Anim. Unde D. Thomas ibi affirmat nullibi esse ab Aristotele definitam. De ea vero dicimus late disp. 35, sect. 1.

Q. 7. Obiter etiam hic quaeri potest an ex sententia Aristotelis omnes substantiae immateriales sint ex necessitate entia in actu, et an recte intulerit, si sint in potentia, esse generabilia et corruptibilia; in hoc enim vide- /p. LIV/ tur Aristoteles profiteri se non agnoscere alium productionis modum, et indicare omnia incorruptibilia esse necessario entia in actu. Sed de hac re disputamus late disp. 20, sect. 1, disp. 30, sect. 2, et disp. 35, sect. 3.

LIBER DECIMUS METAPHYSICAE

De Unitate Ac Multitudine, Eorumque Oppositione Ac Differentiis

Quamvis libr. 4 et 5 nonnulla dixerit Aristoteles de uno, tamen quia semper illud annumeravit enti tanquam praecipuam ejus proprietatem, hoc loco redit ad ejus considerationem, eamque fusiorem magisque elaboratam tradit in toto hoc libro. Omnia tamen, quae ad illum pertinent, traduntur a nobis in disp. 4, usque ad 9, et in disp. 40 et 41. In prioribus enim agimus de unitate et multitudine transcendentali, in posterioribus de numero quantitatis, et uno illis proportionato, et ideo circa textum pauca notabimus.

CAPUT I

DE RATIONE UNIUS IN COMMUNI

In hoc capite repetit Aristoteles quae lib. 5, c. 5, dixerat; videantur ibi notata; nihil enim addendum occurrit.

CAPUT II

RATIONEM MENSURAE PER SE PRIMO UNITATI QUANTITATIS CONVENIRE

Quaest. 1. Quæri solet hoc loco, an primum in unoquoque genere sit mensura caeterorum; supponitur enim Aristotelem in principio capitis id affirmare, cujus verba haec sunt, *maxime autem mensuram esse cujusque generis, primum et maxime proprie quantitatis; hinc enim et ad alia advenit.*⁹⁷ Quae dupliciter legi possunt et exponi. Primo, ut hic notata sunt, ita ut illa dictio, *primum*, non sit nomen, sed adverbium; unde planus sensus est, esse mensuram in quolibet genere, primo et proprie convenire quantitati; et favet subjuncta probatio, scilicet, quia alia non mesurant nec mesurantur, nisi per quamdam proportionem ad quantitatem; hanc enim vim habent illa verba: *Hinc enim et ad alia advenit*; et totus discursus

capitis ad hoc tendit. Secundo, legi possunt illa verba, ita ut *primum*, nomen sit, et ibi fiat divisio, scilicet, *maxime autem mensuram esse cujusque generis pri-* /col. b/ *mum*, supple, diximus, et deinde addatur, *et maxime proprie quantitatis*. Et ita ex prioribus verbis sumptum est illud axioma: Primum in unoquoque genere est mensura caeterorum, quod est facile ac verum, si recte intelligatur.

Aliqui enim ita exponunt, ut per illud significetur, omnia quae sunt in aliquo genere participare suam perfectionem ab eo quod est praecipuum et primum in illo genere; et ideo natura sua per illud mensurari tanquam per mensuram extrinsecam maxime accommodatam. Sed, licet hoc interdum ita sit, ut, verbi gratia, quando illud primum est tale per essentiam, et reliqua per participationem; tunc enim illud primum est dicto modo mensura quasi a priori (ut sic dicam) caeterorum; non tamen id est in universum necessarium, nec ab Aristotele alicubi assertum, ut lib. 2, text. 4, notatum est. Quapropter, ut sit generale pronunciatum, intelligendum est de mensura extrinseca, nostro modo cognoscendi accommodata, et sive sit causa, sive non, et sive sit a priori, sive solum ex quadam debita et necessaria proportione. Sic enim recte colligimus, quod magis accedit ad id quod est perfectissimum in aliquo genere, esse etiam perfectius; subintelligendum est autem, caeteris paribus ac simpliciter et non tantum secundum quid, ut legitime accommodetur mensura; et sic est res facilis, nec majori indigens discussione.

Q. 2. Quaestiones igitur hujus loci propriae ad tractatum de quantitate spectant, nimirum an ratio mensurae sit ab Aristotele tradita, quam explicamus disp. 40, sect. 3.

Q. 3. Rursus an ratio mensurae primo ac proprie in quantitate reperitur, in aliis vero quasi secundario et per analogiam; id enim est quod Aristoteles hic sentire videtur; dictum est autem de ea re disp. 5, sect. 6, et latius disp. 4, sect. 3.

Q. 4. Altera quaestio est, an ratio mensurae per se primo unitati seu uno conveniat, ut etiam Aristoteles significat, et quo modo dictum hoc cum priori conveniat, quandoquidem unum, quantitas non est, sed principium numeri, ut statim hic dicitur; de quo disp. 40, sect. 3.

Q. 5. Quomodo verum sit, unum esse principium numeri, et de quo id accipiendum sit, disp. 41, sect. 4. /p. LV/

CAPUT III

PROSEQUITUR PHILOSOPHUS EAMDEM MATERIAM

In hoc capite quaeri solet, an mensura esse debeat homogenea, ejusdem generis cum re mensurata; hoc enim addit Aristoteles in hoc capite. Habet tamen facilem solutionem; sensus enim Aristotelis non est, mensuram et mensuratum debere esse semper ejusdem generis proprie sumpti. Nam primum ens est mensura caeterorum, et cum illis in genere non convenit. Est ergo sensus, inter mensuram et mensuratum debere esse formalem convenientiam; nam si omnino sint aequivoca, et solo nomine convenient, non poterit unum per accessum ad aliud mensurari; nam erunt omnino diversa; haec autem convenientia interdum est tantum analogica, ut inter Deum et alia entia, interdum est generica, ut inter albedinem et reliquos colores. Additque Alensis hic, non posse esse specificam, quia individua sunt ejusdem rationis, et ideo non est major ratio, cur unum sit mensura, quam alia. Verumtamen hoc solum procedit de individuis quatenus aequalia sunt; quatenus vero inaequalia esse possunt, potest quod perfectissimum fuerit, vel maxime unum, esse mensura caeterorum, vel in intensione, vel in duratione, vel etiam in singulari perfectione; siquidem in hac potest esse inaequalitas inter individua ejusdem speciei. Procedit etiam de mensura ex natura rei; nam secundum humanam accommodationem sumi potest quantitas unius individui ad aliam similem mensurandam.

Altera quaestio, vel propositio hic notanda est, an, scientia ex rebus, vel res ex scientia mensurentur. Aristoteles enim hoc posterius affirmare videtur in illis verbis: *At scientiam quoque et sensum mensuram rerum dicimus esse;*⁹⁸ sed non intelligit esse mensuram objectorum, sed rerum quas per mensuras cognoscimus; nam applicando ad sensum vel intellectum ipsam mensuram, fit mensuratio. Quod patet ex ratione quam subdit, dicens, *propterea, quia per ea aliquid cognoscimus.*⁹⁹ Sicut ergo 4 Phys., cap. 14, animam vocavit Aristoteles numerum numerantem partes motus, ita hic vocavit scientiam et sensum mensuram mensurati. At comparatione objectorum subdit statim Philosophus: *Atqui mensurantur magis quam mensurent.*¹⁰⁰ Haec enim verba D. Thomas et omnes referunt ad mensurationem cognitionis ex objecto. Quamvis /col. b/ Aristoteles solum explicare voluerit in ipso etiam actu mensurandi unam quantitatem per aliam, etiam ipsam scientiam et sensum mensurari, quia mensurando rei quantitatem simul mensuratur cognitio, quae de illa quantitate habetur, quatenus illam repraesentat. De illa vero quaestione, scilicet, de mensura veritatis, videri possunt dicta in disp. 8 de Verit., ubi diximus veritatem nostrae scientiae ex rebus mensurari, et non e converso; scientiam autem Dei esse mensuram rerum, et ab eis non

mensurari; et declaravimus, quid discriminis in hoc sit inter naturalia et artificialia respectu humani intellectus; et inter res secundum esse essentiae, et secundum esse existentiae respectu divini.

CAPUT IV UNUM NON ESSE SUBSTANTIAM A REBUS INDIVIDUIS SEPARATAM

Praecipue hic quaeri solet an detur unum ens primum, quod sit mensura caeterorum, vel una substantia, quae sit aliarum mensura. Verumtamen quod ad mentem Aristotelis attinet, sciendum est ipsum in hoc capite directe non tractare an detur una substantia quae sit mensura caeterarum, vel unum ens primum quod sit omnium mensura; vix enim aliquid de hac quaestione in toto textu reperitur, et D. Thomas, qui optime exponit, nullam fere de hac re mentionem facit. Sed tractat Philosophus quaestionem cum Platone, an ipsum unum sit substantia quaedam abstracta, quae non habeat aliam naturam nisi unitatem, et ex professo probat non dari talem substantiam, quae sit ipsum unum, quod est evidentius quam ut probatione indigeat; neque existimo tale unum a Platone unquam excogitatum. Hinc ergo concludit Aristoteles quod, sicut in quantitate, qualitate et aliis rebus, unitas nihil aliud est quam entitas uniuscujusque rei indivisa, ita etiam in substantiis. Ex quo tandem obiter infert quod, sicut in coloribus datur unus primus color, ita in substantiis una substantia, quae non erit aliquid separatum, sed singularis aliqua substantia.

Hinc sumpserunt expositores occasionem quaerendi quae sit haec substantia una. Et Scotus hic, quem transcribit Antonius Andr., quaest. 1, lib. 10, dicit non esse Deum, sed primam intelligentiam, quia haec est in genere substantiae, non vero Deus. At vero Commentator, et latius Alex. Alens. declarant esse Deum. Sed lis fere est de nomine et parvi momenti. /p. LVI/

Non est enim dubium quin Deus sit extrinseca mensura omnium multo altiori modo quam possit esse intelligentia. Primo ratione summae perfectionis suae, simplicissime et eminentissime continentis omnes perfectiones. Secundo, ratione idearum¹⁰¹ rerum omnium, quas in se habet. Tertio, quia omnia entia sunt entia per analogiam ad hoc ens, et per participationem ejus, et omnes substantiae creatae similiter sunt participationes hujus substantiae et non alterius. Quarto, quia, si sit sermo de mensura secundum se, sic constat Deo maxime convenire, quia est maxime indivisibilis, immutabilis et perfectus; si quoad nos, nobis etiam

est notior quam prima intelligentia. Neque oportet ut Deus sit proprie in genere, sed satis est ut habeat convenientiam aliquam formalem, ut praecedenti capite dictum est.

Si quis autem velit assignare mensuram intrinsecam substantiarum contentam in praedicamento substantiae, non est dubium quin prima intelligentia possit eam rationem subire. Nam habet perfectionem tali muneri accommodatam, scilicet, ut per comparisonem ad illam, caeterarum perfectio mensuretur et cognoscatur. Item suprema species in toto genere animalium, vel viventium, vel corporum, potest esse mensura omnium specierum sub tali genere contentarum, servata proportione; ergo et prima species totius generis substantiae poterit esse reliquarum mensura. Dices: mensura, secundum Aristotelem, debet esse minima; perfectio autem Dei vel Angeli non est minima, sed magna, vel infinita, ex qua parte magis repugnat Deo ratio mensurae, quia infinite atque ita aequaliter superat omnia. Respondetur: mensura quanta debet reduci ad minimam aliquam quantitatem, ut sit aliquo modo indivisibilis; tamen mensura perfectionis non debet esse minima, sed summa, maxime autem indivisibilis et simplex. Infinitas vero non obstat, quia inaequaliter a creaturis participatur, et ita ex parte earum est inaequalis accessus ad illam Dei magnitudinem, et hoc modo per illam mesurantur.

CAPUT V DE OPPOSITIONE INTER UNUM ET MULTA

Quaest. 1. Prima quaestio hic est, quomodo unum et multa opponantur, quam breviter tractamus disput. 5, sect. 6. /col. b/

Q. 2. An unum sit prius multitudine, et divisio indivisione, *ibid.*, sect. 7.

Q. 3. An idem et diversum adaequate dividant ens, et quomodo opponantur, *disp.* 7, sect. 3; et inde constat quid sit dicendum de simili et dissimili, aequali et inaequali; haec enim omnia eandem proportionem servant.

Q. 4. Quo modo intelligenda sit illa propositio: *Ea genere differunt, quorum non est materia una*,¹⁰² *disp.* 35, sect. 2.

Q. 5. An genera diversorum praedicamentorum dicenda sint proprie differre, vel esse diversa. Aristoteles enim hic primum insinuat, ac communiter censentur primo diversa. Sed de hac re satis disputat. 32, sect. ult., *disputatione* 39, *sext. ult.*, nonnihil *disp.* 4, sect. 1 et 2.

Caetera, quae de diversitate ac differentia hic dicuntur, a Philosopho sufficienter tractantur, et insinuata etiam sunt supra, lib. 5, cap. 9 et 10.

CAPUT VI DE CONTRARIETATE

Hinc ad finem usque libri agit Aristoteles de oppositis, et praesertim de contrarietate, quae res parum difficilis est, et fere dialecticorum propria, et ideo pauca in hoc opere de oppositis disputamus. Ea vero quae necessaria visa sunt, inter disputandum de qualitate, in quo solo genere propria contrarietas reperitur, dicta sunt, disp. 45, per totam. Oppositio vero relativa in disputatione de relativis, quae est 47, proprium locum habet. De negatione autem et privatione, in ultima disputatione de entibus rationis dicimus.

Quaest. 1. In hoc ergo capite disputari posset primo de illa propositione, quae in principio supponitur: *Ubi datur major et minor distantia, datur etiam maxima seu summa.*¹⁰³ Videtur enim non esse in universum vera, nam in numeris est major et minor distantia; magis enim distat binarius a quinario quam a ternario; et tamen non datur maxima. Idem est in figuris et in speciebus rerum substantialium; magis enim distant inter se homo et leo quam leo et equus, et tamen non datur maxima distantia, quia data quacumque specie perfecta, potest dari perfectior. Item non sequitur: Datur major et minor distantia; ergo potest dari minima. Ergo nec sequitur dari maximam. Patet antecedens, quia inter extrema maxime distantia possunt in infinitum multiplicari media magis et minus distantia, ita ut nunquam /p. LVIII/ perveniatur ad ultimum, quod minime possit distare ab extremis; ut calor summus et minimus in intensione (supposito quod dentur) maxime distant, et dantur inter hos quidam magis, alii minus distantes, et tamen nullus datur calor distans a summo qui minime distet. Denique in quantitate datur major et minor pars, et tamen non datur maxima aut minima, et ideo dari potest major vel minor inaequalitas, non tamen maxima.

Respondeo, argumenta convincere consecutionem non esse formalem, sed solum in iis tenere in quibus non datur processus in infinitum. Supponit autem Philosophus de facto non dari hunc processum in speciebus rerum aut qualitatibus, et ideo non probat specialiter illationem; sed tanquam certum sumit, sicut datur in qualitatibus, verbi gratia, major et minor distantia, ita etiam dari maximam. Quod inductione et experientia confirmat ex proximis terminis mutationum, quae fiunt inter aliquos ultimos terminos, et maxime distantes. Denique, secluso processu in infinitum, qui solum datur aut in rebus possibilibus, de quibus non est sermo, aut in divisione continui, vel aliqua proportionem quae inde resultet, ut fere in omnibus exemplis adductis fit, secluso (inquam) hoc processu, optima est

illatio. Unde D. Thomas in Comment. non aliter eam probat, nisi quia non datur processus in infinitum. Et eodem modo inferri potest dari minimam distantiam, si versus alterum extremum non detur ille processus.

Et praeterea ex vi illationis, non infertur dari maximam distantiam positive, sed negative tantum, id est aliquam, qua nulla sit major; hoc autem evidenter infertur ex eo quod non proceditur in infinitum. Quod vero illa sit tantum quae caeteris sit major, et quod sub eodem genere non possint dari duae distantiae specierum inter se repugnantium seu oppositarum aequae distantium, non potest satis colligi ex illo antecedente, neque ex negatione processus in infinitum, ut per se constat. Fortasse vero ad contrarietatem sufficit distantia maxima illo modo; tantum enim distare videtur justitia ab injustitia, sicut temperantia ab intemperantia, et utraque distantia est sub genere habitus moralis. Et sub genere vitii tantum distat prodigalitas ab avaritia sicut temeritas a pusillanimitate. Itaque, licet in una veluti linea et latitudine, extrema maxime differant, non tantum negative, sed etiam positive comparatione me- /col. b/ diorum, tamen secundum diversas lineas et considerationes possunt esse plures distantiae maximae etiam sub eodem genere prout ad contrarietatem sufficit, ut declaratum est.

Q. 2. Secundo, potest inquiri an bona sit definitio contrarietatis quae ex hoc capite sumitur, scilicet, est: *Maxima distantia eorum quae sub eodem genere maxime differunt, et ab eodem subjecto se expellunt*. Ita enim fere omnes expositores definitionem colligunt, et ita censendus est Aristoteles alias definitiones, quas hic refert, probare, ut huic aequivaleant; de quo disp. 45 dictum est.

Q. 3. Ubi etiam tractamus quaestionem illam, an contrarietas in solis qualitatibus reperiatur, quoniam definitio videtur etiam aliis convenire, nisi aliquid subintelligatur.

Q. 4. Item an uni unum tantum contrarium sit, et quomodo media opponantur extremis et inter se.

Q. 5. Praeterea, quomodo extreme contraria sint in mediis, vel possint esse simul in eodem subjecto.

Q. 6. Et ea occasione ibidem agitur de contrariorum permistione. De eorum vero intensione et remissione agimus in disp. 46.

CAPUT VII
DE DIFFERENTIA INTRA CONTRARIETATEM
ET ALIAS OPPOSITIONES

In hoc capite nihil fere occurrit notatione dignum. Nam quod Aristoteles ait, primam contrarietatem esse habitum et privationem, hunc habet sensum, omnia contraria esse aliquo modo privative opposita, et illud esse quasi radicem suae oppositionis. Duobus autem modis potest intelligi in contrarietate includi privativam oppositionem, scilicet, vel quia unum contrarium infert privationem alterius, vel quia unum est imperfectum et deficiens respectu alterius, et ideo ad illud per modum privationis comparatur; et utrumque verum est, hoc autem posterius intendit Philosophus.

Quod etiam hic dicitur, inter privative opposita dari medium, ita intelligendum est ut in ipso medio recedatur a proprietate privationis; datur enim medium tum formae, tum etiam aptitudinis ad formam: de qua re latius in praedicto loco. /p. LVIII/

CAPUT VIII
QUOMODO UNUM UNI CONTRARIUM SIT

Haec res tractatur a nobis dicta disp. 45. Quod vero hic Aristoteles tractat de aequali, quomodo opponatur duobus, scilicet, majori et minori, difficultatem non habet; opponitur enim quasi relative, seu potius per carentiam cujusdam relationis, quam posset habere, et ideo ait Aristoteles opponi quasi privative. Ait etiam illam oppositionem posse reduci ad eam, quae est inter unum et multa: quia aequalitas in unitate fundatur, magnum autem et parvum in carentia illius unitatis, seu in varietate magnitudinis vel quantitatis.

CAPUT IX
QUOMODO UNUM OPPONATUR MULTITUDINI ET NUMERO

Quaest. 1. In hoc capite dubitationem habet quod ait Aristoteles, multitudinem comparari ut genus ad numerum, et numerum addere multitudini rationem mensurati seu mensurabilis per unitatem; ideoque multitudinem opponi uni quasi contrarie vel privative, numerum vero opponi relative. Et ratio difficultatis est, quia, sicut omnis numerus est multitudo, ita omnis multitudo est numerus; quo modo ergo multitudo se habet ut genus ad

numerum? Item omnis multitudo unitatibus constat; ergo per unitatem mensurari potest; non ergo in hoc differt a numero. Hic locus dupliciter explicari potest: primo, ut Aristoteles hic sentiat solam multitudinem, ex rebus quantis constantem, esse numerum, ac mensurabilem unitate quantitativa, solamque hanc esse principium numeri; ideoque multitudinem appellari genus vel quasi genus, qui comprehendit numerum quantitativum, et omnem multitudinem transcendentalem. Secunda interpretatio est, numerum significare multitudinem definitam ac terminatam: multitudinem vero abstrahere, et de se comprehendere etiam infinitam multitudinem; et ideo numerum dicere multitudinem mensurabilem unitate; multitudinem vero abstrahere, quia multitudo ex vi hujus communis rationis potest esse immensurabilis. Quod horum sit magis ad mentem Aristoteles, non videtur ab ipso satis declaratum. Prior tamen expositio est D. Thomae et communis. Juxta quam hic est sermo de mensura quantitativa et sensibili. Quid autem in re verum sit, tractatur disp. 41, sect. 1. /col. b/

CAPUT X MEDIUM INTER CONTRARIA ESSE EJUSDEM GENERIS EX ILLISQUE CONSTARE

Quaest. 1. Primo, quaeri potest de quo genere contrariorum loquatur hic Aristoteles. Et non est quaestio de modo per abnegationem extremorum, tum quia certum est hoc medium non constare illo modo ex extremis, et ab illo non posse verificari alia, quae hic Aristoteles de medio docet; tum etiam quia inter privative et relative opposita invenitur hoc medium; quod hic Aristoteles negat. Certum est ergo hic loqui Aristotelem de medio positivo, quod est aliqua forma positiva media inter extreme contrarias. Hoc autem medium triplex videtur reperiri: unum, per formalem mixturem contrariorum in gradibus remissis, ut est tepiditas; alterum, per virtualement continentiam seu participationem extremorum, ut sunt colores medii inter extremos; aliud denique per recessum ab utroque extremo, ut virtus inter duo extrema vitia.

Quaeri igitur potest an, quae Aristoteles hic docet de medio, vera sint absolute et universe de medio formali seu positivo, an de aliquo horum in particulari. Aristoteles enim nihil distinguit, et doctrinaliter loquitur; unde videtur sermo ejus esse universalis. At obstare videtur quod medium tertii generis non potest vere dici constare ex extremis, nec esse in eodem genere cum illis, neque esse quasi proximum terminum transmutationis

ab uno vitio ad aliud extremum; has autem tres condiciones potissime tribuit Aristoteles hoc capite mediis inter contraria.

Sed dicendum, sermonem esse universalem, ut expresse constat praesertim ex fine capitis. Verificatur autem doctrina propriissime de medio primo modo sumpto (quanquam quaestio specialis sit, an tale medium detur, de qua in dict. disp. 45). In medio autem secundo modo satis etiam proprie locum habent duae primae conditiones; tertia vero non est ita intelligenda, ut necesse sit medium, per quod proceditur ab extremo in extremum esse semper ejusdem rationis, sed in quibusdam contrariis continget transiri per medium formale seu formaliter continens extrema refracta, in aliis vero per medium virtuale; solum vero accidit hoc posterius, quando qualitates extremae non possunt formaliter coniungi; de quo etiam in citato loco dictum est. /p. LIX/

At vero de medio tertio modo non verificantur dictae conditiones ita proprie, sed per quamdam proportionem. Est autem considerandum, habitum virtutis, qui est medium inter extrema vitia, posse considerari, vel solum in ratione habitus inclinantis ad talem operandi modum, vel in ratione virtutis et honesti boni. Priori modo habet proprie rationem medii, et ita convenit in genere cum extremis, secundo autem modo minime; unde non opponitur illis ut medium sub eodem genere, sed ut extreme oppositum ratione generis contrarii; quo modo ait Aristoteles capite de Oppositione, in Postpraedicamentis, opponi bonum et malum. Unde sub hac secunda consideratione nullo modo constat hoc medium ex extremis. Priori autem ratione licet non proprie constet, sapit tamen aliquo modo naturam extremorum, nam aliquid habet de opere seu inclinatione utriusque extremi. Liberalitas enim inclinatur ad dandum, in quo aliquo modo convenit cum prodigalitate; simul vero inclinatur ad retinendum aliquando, in quo accedere videtur ad aliud extremum. Et hac etiam de causa, licet non sit necesse transire a vitio ad vitium per virtutem, necesse tamen est transire per quamdam quasi materialem participationem vel imitationem virtutis; nemo enim ex avaro fit prodigus, nisi prius coeperit expendere, quod posset saepe studiose facere, si vellet.

Quanquam principium illud: *Non transitur ab extremo in extremum, nisi per medium*, intelligi debet de transmutatione quae fit per medium physicum ac proprium; nam quae fit per actus immanentes aut instantaneas mutationes, non oportet ita fieri, ut per se constat.

CAPUT XI

**CONTRARIA ESSE SPECIE DIVERSA, ET SPECIFICAM
DIVERSITATEM INCLUDERE DIFFERENTIARUM
CONTRARIETATEM**

Quaest. 1. Praecipua quaestio et hujus loci propria est, an differentiae dividentes genus in varias species sint contrariae, et e converso an contraria specie differant. Utrumque enim videtur Aristoteles affirmare. Et posterior pars difficultatem non habet, quia clarum est, quae sub eodem genere contraria sunt, necessario esse specie diversa, nam quae sunt ejusdem speciei, ut talia sunt, non possunt esse contraria, cum similia sint.

Q. 2. Altera vero pars videtur vel impropria, vel falsa, scilicet, omnes differentias, /col. b/ dividentes genus in species distinctas, esse contrarias. Alias etiam in substantia et in omni genere esset propria contrarietas; quod falsum est, ut constat ex Aristotele, in Praedicamentis, et ex iis quae tradidimus disput. 45. Sed dicendum breviter, contrarietatem inter formas physicas esse propriam qualitatum; contrarietatem vero inter formas metaphysicas extendi ad alia genera. Adde etiam hanc contrarietatem, quae dici potest metaphysica, esse minus propriam, quia genus non comparatur ad differentias proprie ut subjectum a quo mutuo se differentiae expellant; sed vocatur contrarietas, quia est repugnantia inter formas positivas, et ita maxime assimilatur proprie contrarietati.

Q. 3. Rursus posset hic obiter inquiri, an genus ita contrahatur per differentias, ut ipsummet in diversis speciebus dividatur, et essentialiter diversificetur. Expresse enim id affirmat Philosophus, ut notarunt D. Thomas, Alens. et alii. Videtur tamen habere difficultatem propter generis unitatem, et univocationem fundatam in re ipsa. Nihilominus sententia Aristotelis verissima est; ex qua habes genus in re non differre ab ea specie in qua contractum est; haec enim est mens Aristotelis hic, quam latius tractavi disp. 6, sect. 9. Habes etiam hinc principium seu formam a qua sumitur genus, non esse ejusdem essentiae in rebus differentibus specie, atque ideo non fuisse in re formas distinctas, a quibus differentia generica et specifica sumuntur, ut late disputatione 15, sect. 10.

Q. 4. Ultimo hic quaeri potest an genus et species inter se differant specie, vel sint ejusdem speciei. Aristoteles hic utrumque negandum censet; quod explicui disp. 7, sect. 3.

CAPUT XII
CONTRARIETATEM ALIQUAM ESSE
SINE SPECIFICA DIVERSITATE

Quaest. 1. Hic statim occurrit quaestio de ipsa assertione a Philosopho intenta; quoniam videtur repugnare quod contraria non sint essentialiter diversa, ut ex definitione supra tradita colligitur, et ex eo quod dictum est capite praecedenti, quod contrarietas esse non potest inter similia ut talia sunt; quae vero sunt ejusdem speciei, similia sunt. Sed res est facilis; possunt enim contraria formaliter inter se comparari, ut sunt sub genere sub quo per se constituuntur, vel respectu /p. LX/ subjecti cui denominative tribuuntur. Priori modo differunt specie, ut album et nigrum quatenus talia sunt, et sub colorato per se collocantur, et sic procedit ratio dubitandi tacta. Posteriori modo non causant semper specificam diversitatem in subjecto, et hoc sensu procedit dubitatio, et resolutio Aristotelis in hoc capite. Perinde enim est ac si quaesivisset, cur differentiae quaedam inter se oppositae sint per se respectu subjectorum, et indicent essentialem differentiam inter illa; quaedam vero sint per accidens, et solam individualem distinctionem ostendant. Imo interdum neque hanc demonstrant, sed accidentalem mutationem ejusdem individui. In hoc ergo sensu verum est aliquam contrarietatem non constituere specificam diversitatem in subjecto.

Reddit autem Aristoteles rationem, quia quaedam contrarietas sequitur formam, et illa est per se, et ad essentialem differentiam pertinet; alia sequitur materiam, et haec est vel individualis, vel accidentaria. Ubi solum notetur, aliquid posse consequi materiam ut per se necessario conexum cum essentia talis materiae secundum se, et contrarietas, quae sic sequitur materiam, etiam facit essentialem diversitatem, ut de corruptibili et incorruptibili dicitur capite sequenti. Et ratio est, quia etiam materia pertinet ad essentiam rei. Aliquid vero dicitur consequi materiam, quia ex dispositionibus vel mutationibus materiae consequitur; nam quia materia est passiva potentia, est principium et radix omnium extrinsecarum mutationum. Contrarietas ergo quae hoc modo ex materia sequitur, est vel accidentaria omnino, si ab extrinseco mere per accidens eveniat, vel ad summum individualis, si ex peculiari et individuali dispositione materia consequatur, ut est conditio sexus foemini vel masculini, de qua in particulari hoc capite Aristoteles quaestionem proposuit.

CAPUT XII
CONTRARIETATEM INTERDUM ESSE INTER
EA QUAE DIFFEREUNT GENERE

Hic solum occurrit quaestio de illa propositione: *Corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere*,¹⁰⁴ quo sensu vera sit; quae tractata est disputat. 35, et in superioribus saepe notata est. /col. b/

Liber Undecimus Metaphysicae

In toto hoc libro nihil novum Aristoteles docet, sed in summam quamdam redigit quae in superioribus libris tradiderat, adjungens multa ex iis quae in libris Physicorum docuerat, et ideo fere omnes interpretes et scriptores nullam quaestionem circa totum hunc librum movent, neque aliquid notant, praeter ea quae ad textus intelligentiam conferunt. Quae D. Thomas praeter alios satis perspicue docet.

In duobus ergo primis capitibus proponit iterum Philosophus quaestiones fere omnes quas libro tertio proposuerat, nihil definiens; quare iterum eas hic repetere supervacaneum duco.

In capitibus 3, 4, 5, ea resumit quae in toto lib. 4 latissime tradit; nimirum in tertio capite proponit hujus scientiae objectum, et analogiam entis, secundum quam ait posse unum objectum hujus scientiae constitui, ad quam proinde pertinet prima principia primasque rerum causas, proprietates et oppositiones considerare. Ubi obiter attingit, quo modo inter privative opposita possit esse medium, quod jam notatum est in lib. 10, circa cap. 7. In quarto vero et quinto defendit Aristoteles veritatem illius principii: *Impossibile est idem de eodem simul affirmari et negari*,¹⁰⁵ nihilque addit iis quae in libro 4 dixerat. Obiter vero in cap. 3 attingit quaestionem de continuitate alterationis et augmentationis. De qua re in disput. 46 aliqua tractamus.

Rursus in sexto capite repetit quod sit munus et objectum hujus scientiae, attingitque divisionem illam scientiae in speculativam et practicam, et hujus in factivam seu mechanicam et activam seu moralem, illius vero in physicam, mathematicam et metaphysicam; quam etiam tradiderat in libro 6. Et hac occasione declarat diversos modos definiendi physice et metaphysice per materiam et sine materia, de quibus latissime in 7 libro dixerat. Hic etiam repetit propositionem, quam circa lib. 6, c. 2, notavimus, quod, scilicet, si nulla est substantia separata a materia, scientia naturalis ac physica est omnium prima, quam etiam declaramus loco ibi notato. Denique in eo capite habet propositionem hanc, *Si aliqua est in rebus natura et substantia separabilis et immobilis, in eo ordine divinitatem esse, et hoc (inquit) erit primum et /p. LXI/ principale principium*.¹⁰⁶ Quae notanda est pro iis quae de mente Aristotelis de primo principio disputamus disput. 29, sect. 2; cui conjungi potest illa, quam in cap. 2 (licet disputando) proponit, ubi ait a peritioribus philosophis positum esse aliquod

tale principium, talemque substantiam: *Quo namque pacto, ait, ordo erit non existente aliquo perpetuo, separato et permanente?*¹⁰⁷

Deinde in capite 7 repetit Aristoteles quae libro 6 Metaphysicorum docuerat, nimirum, ens per accidens et ens verum sub scientiam hanc non cadere, et hujus occasione recolligit etiam quae de contingentibus effectibus fortuna et casu, tum ibi, tum etiam 2 Physicorum docuerat; de quibus in superioribus jam sunt signata disputationum loca; nam de vero ente dicimus disp. 8, de contingentia vero in disput. 19.

In reliquis capitibus, ab 8 usque ad 11, recapitulat Aristoteles multa ex iis quae in Physic., a 3 libro usque ad 6, docuerat. In capite enim octavo definitionem motus investigat, et quo modo ad mobile, ad moventem, ad actionem et ad passionem comparetur, et eandem doctrinam habet quam in 3 Physicorum, quam nos prout ad metaphysicum spectare potest, tractamus in disputation. 48 et 49, quae sunt de actione et passione. Hac occasione, aliqua tangit Philosophus de actu et potentia, quae in disputatione 43 fuse tractantur.

In nono autem capite repetit quae de infinito docet libro 3 Physic. et in lib. de Coelo. Solum adverto, hic Philosophum extendere aliquantulum sermonem, et probare non posse esse infinitum, non tantum in corporibus sensibilibus, sed simpliciter in entibus etiam separatis. Verumtamen semper supponit infinitam esse passionem rei quantae, et ita nihil affert quod infinitati Dei obstare possit.

In capite decimo, materiam de motu prosequitur, varias species motuum ac mutationum distinguens. In quo solum observa, cum inductione omnium praedicamentorum ostendat, solum ad quale, quantum, et Ubi esse mutationem, cumque per caetera discurrat, solum Quando, habitum, et situm omittere; fortasse quia de Quando et de motu seu passione eandem rationem esse censuit, quod tempus sit passio motus; habitum autem et situm saepe praetermittit (ut supra lib. 5, cap. 7, notavimus) tanquam parvi momenti et impropria, parumque a caeteris diversa. /col. b/

Tandem in cap. 11 Aristoteles recolit explicationem quorundam terminorum, quibus uti solemus in his rebus quae motum circumstant; ut esse simul vel separata, tangi, consequenter se habere, contiguum vel continuum esse, et similia, quae in lib. 5 hujus operis, et lib. 5 Physicorum, cap. 11, tradita sunt, et neque expositionem, neque disputationem requirunt.

LIBER DUODECIMUS METAPHYSICAE

CAPUT I, II, III, IV, ET V

In his quinque primis capitibus repetit Aristoteles, et in summam redigit ea quae superius, lib. 7, de substantia et principiis ejus tractaverat, et multa, quae in primo libro Physic. docuerat. Nam capite primo solum proponit, metaphysicam scientiam primo ac praecipue de substantiis disputare, quae est res per se perspicua, et ab ipso saepissime repetita, quam in disputatione prima seu prooemiali fusius declaramus.

In capite secundo, post divisionem substantiae in sensibilem, et separabilem, seu insensibilem et incorruptibilem et aeternam, proponit tria principia rei naturalis et substantiae sensibilis, et ex professo probat dari materiam; additque eam communem esse omnibus corporibus, non tamen eandem, quae omnia dictis locis dixerat; eaque tractamus in disputatione 13.

Quaest. 1. Hic vero disputari poterat, an secundum Aristotelem sit possibilis creatio, quia hic significat ex non ente simpliciter nihil fieri, de quo in disp. 21 dictum est.

Q. 2. Item disputari poterat an secundum Aristotelem omnes substantiae immateriales sint immobiles; ita enim hic eas appellat; de quo disputatione 35.

Q. 3. Deinde in capite tertio ostendit, praeter materiam necessarias esse formas, non separatas, ut Plato ponebat, sed materiam informantes, quae licet non proprie generentur, sed composita ex illis et materia, non tamen antea sunt quam generatio fiat; quae etiam in lib. 7 dicta fuerant, et tractantur disp. 15. Proponit vero hic Aristoteles gravem quaestionem, scilicet, esto forma non sit ante generationem, an post corruptionem totius maneat; et absolute respondet, *in quibusdam nihil obstare quin ita sit, scilicet, in anima intellectiva, nam in caeteris (ait) fortasse id impossibile est.*¹⁰⁸ Sed hanc considerationem remittimus in libros de Anima. /p. LXII/

Q. 4. Postea vero cap. 4, docet tria principia posita eadem esse secundum analogiam et proportionem in omnibus generibus accidentium; quia in omnibus considerari possunt potentia seu subjectum, forma seu ipsum accidens, et privatio ejus. Ubi quaeri potest an accidentia constent propria potentia et proprio actu physicis, sive in abstracto, sive in concreto sumpta. Quae quaestiones satis sunt extra intentionem praesentis libri, in quo haec omnia cursim praemittuntur ad disputationem de superioribus substan-

tiis. Nec Aristotelis mens fuerit tribuere singulis accidentibus proprias et distinctas potentias receptivas suorum generum; sed solum explicare proportionaliter in eis illa tria principia rerum; illae vero quaestiones tractantur a nobis disp. 14, quaestione 3. Ulterius vero extendit Philosophus sermonem ad omnes causas, dicens easdem secundum proportionem seu analogam rationem esse in accidentibus, quae sunt substantiarum. Et obiter nonnulla hic recolligit de principio, causa et elemento, quae in lib. 5 dixerat fusius, et ibi sunt exposita; latiusque tractata in disputationibus de causis, a 12 usque ad 27. Addit vero hic propositionem notandam; nempe, *praeter causas omnes particulares esse causam cuncta moventem tanquam omnium primam*;¹⁰⁹ de qua dicto loco disputationem 20, 21 et 22 instituimus, praeter alia, quae in caeteris disputationibus, praesertim in 24 et 25, sparsim diximus.

Tandem in capite quinto, hoc ipsum prosequitur, variis modis ostendens eadem esse principia rerum omnium, vel quia substantiae sunt causae omnium accidentium, et ita principia substantiarum sunt principia reliquorum entium; vel quia inter substantias quaedam sunt primae, et causae caeterarum, ut coelestia corpora, et animae eorum, id est, ut D. Thomas exponit, motrices intelligentiae (sive proprie dicantur animae, sive per metaphoram), et ideo addit, *vel intellectus, appetitus, et corpus*,¹¹⁰ id est, substantiae intelligentes et amantes, et corpora quibus proxime utuntur, seu quae movent, et per ea causant. Ac tandem repetit actum et potentiam esse principia omnium, non tamen eadem, sed per analogiam; quae omnia ex disputationibus citatis constant, neque hic aliquid addendum occurrit. /col. b/

CAPUT VI

PRAETER NATURALES SUBSTANTIAS DARI ALIQUAM PERPETUAM ET IMMOBILEM

Quaest. 1. Prima quaestio hic occurrit, an ostendere huiusmodi substantias esse, sit physici muneris, an metaphysici; tractatur disp. 29, s. 3, disp. 35, s. 1.

Q. 2. An recte Aristoteles hoc demonstravit in praesente. Summa rationis ejus est. Impossibile est omnes substantias esse corruptibiles; ergo necessaria est aliqua substantia aeterna. Antecedens patet, quia si substantiae omnes essent corruptibiles, nihil esset sempiternum, cum substantiae sint prima entia, sine quibus alia esse non possunt. Consequens autem est falsum, quia necesse est motum saltem esse sempiternum; ergo. Minorem probat,

quia tempus non potuit de novo incipere, ita ut antea non fuerit; quia sine tempore non potest esse prius et posterius; sed tempus non est sine motu, quia vel sunt idem, aut tempus est quaedam passio motus; ergo perinde oportet motum esse sempiternum et continuum, sicut et tempus, *quod* (ait) *de nullo nisi de circulari et locali dici potest.*¹¹¹ Itaque totus hic discursus revocatur ad illam propositionem, quod sine tempore non est prius et posterius, et ideo non potest dari initium temporis.

Quae ratio quoad hoc ultimum valde frivola est, quia, si modo nostro concipiendi loquamur, praeter prius et posterius reale, imaginarium concipitur, et ita potuit tempus reale habere initium, ante quod non fuerit; illud vero ante quod, non significat prius tempus, sed imaginarium tantum. Si autem loquamur secundum rem, ante hoc tempus praecessit infinita aeternitas, cui hoc tempus non semper coexistit, et sic illud *ante*, non dicit tempus prius, sed aeternitatem, quae in Deo praeeexistit, quando tempus non erat. Itaque processus Aristotelis nec firmus est, nec necessarius. Potest autem per dilemma fieri efficax: quia vel substantiae corruptibiles semper fuerunt, vel non: si primum, necessaria est aliqua substantia aeterna illis perfectior, a qua manaverint; si vero non semper fuerunt, non minus necessaria est illa substantia, ut ab illa originem duxerint. De hac re disserimus late disput. 29, sect. 1.

Q. 3. An satis ostendat Aristoteles illam substantiam non esse potentiam, sed actum, quia perpetuo movet. Respondetur, jam ex dictis /p. LXIII/ constare rationem hanc ex falso principio, et insufficienter probato, procedere. Adhuc tamen illo posito, non potest ex solo illo colligi, illam substantiam esse purum actum; nam substantia creata posset illum motum perpetuum efficere, si esset possibilis. Solum ergo colligitur ex illo motu, substantiam illius motoris semper esse in actu movendi. Adde, ad hoc etiam esse supponendum, illam substantiam semper esse eandem, quod probatum non est; possunt enim plures motores vicissim movere, et sigillatim cessare. Denique etiamsi idem motor sit semper in actu movendi, non sequitur non posse cessare; quia potest non ex necessitate, sed ex libertate perpetuo movere. De hac re latius disput. 30, sect. 8, et disp. 35, sect. 1 et 2.

Q. 4. An satis probetur a Philosopho has substantias esse immateriales,¹¹² quia sunt perpetuae. Difficile sane est huic rationi efficaciam tribuere, cum statim appareat defectus illationis in ipsis coelis, qui aeterni sunt et non sunt immateriales. Videatur disp. 30, sect. 4, et disp. 35, sect. 1 et 2.

Q. 5. An idem senserit Aristoteles de omnibus intelligentiis quod de prima quoad necessitatem essendi, et naturae simplicitatem et actualitatem; tractatur disput. 39, sect. 2, disp. 25, et exponitur hic locus, in quo videtur

Aristoteles confuse et indifferenter loqui de illo supremo substantiarum ordine, quanquam interdum in singulari, interdum in plurali loquatur.

Caetera, quae Aristoteles hic tractat de actu et potentia, circa lib. 9 sunt notata.

CAPUT VII DE ATTRIBUITIS PRIMI MOTORIS

Quaestio 1. An ex motu coeli sufficienter colligatur unus primus motor immobilis; de hoc fuse disp. 30, sect. 1 et 8.

Q. 2. An ex sententia Aristotelis primus motor solum moveat coelum ut finis, vel etiam ut efficiens; hic enim priorem tantum causandi modum illi attribuere videtur; sed hoc solum facit, ut ejus immobilitatem declaret, alioqui enim ejus efficientiam agnoscit, ut latius tractamus disput. 23, et disp. 30, sect. 17.

Q. 3. An secundum Aristotelem primus motor primum orbem mediante alia intelligentia, vel per seipsum. Hic enim priorem partem insinuat, nisi exponatur, quod moveat ut motus non ab alio, sed a se; ita /col. b/ enim melius explicatur immobilitas primi motoris, quia non solum in genere efficientis, sed etiam in genere finis movet, ut non motus ab alio, sed quia propter se operatur absque motione. Nam sicut in genere efficientis, ita in genere finis est primum et supremum. At vero in reliquis omnibus dictis Aristoteles sentit non esse alium motorem illius coeli praeter primum et immobilem; sed de hac re latius in libris de Coelo.

Q. 4. An primus motor sit primum intelligibile in actu, tanquam simplicissima et actualissima substantia. Ita enim de illo hic sentit Philosophus. Tractatur disp. 38, sect. 11.

Q. 5. An primus motor sit primum appetibile, quod perinde est ac quaerere an sit ultimus finis; de quo in disp. 24 disserimus. Ex hoc vero loco habes ab Aristotele distinctionem duplicis finis. Unus est praeexistens, alter non praeexistens. Prior acquirendus per media, posterior etiam efficiendus, et ideo priorem rationem finis ait habere locum in primo motore, non vero posteriorem.

Q. 6. An primus motor sit perpetua substantia omnium simplex, et secundum actum, seu purus actus, disp. 30, sect. 3.

Q. 7. An primus motor sit ens simpliciter necessarium natura sua, quod nullo modo possit aliter se habere, disp. 29, sect. 1.

Q. 8. An secundum Aristotelem primus motor moveat ex necessitate naturae, vel potius ex praeconcepto fine ejusque necessitate, disp. 30, sect. 16.

Q. 9. An coelum et natura pendeant a primo motore secundum Aristotelem, non tantum quoad motum, sed etiam quoad substantiam; disp. 29, sect. 1, et disp. 29, sect. 2.

Q. 10. An primus motor optimam ac perpetuam, et actualem vitam habeat, summa ac perfectissima jucunditate affectam, quae ex sui contemplatione nascitur. Tractamus late disput. 30, sect. 14. Non est tamen dubium quin Aristoteles hoc loco optime de Deo sentiat ac loquatur. Cujus illa sunt verba notatione digna: *Si ita bene se habet Deus semper, sicut nos aliquando, admirabile est; quod si magis adhuc, admirabilius est; at ita se habet.*¹¹³ Videtur sane Philosophus expertus aliquando magnam quamdam jucunditatem in sua qualicumque speculatione substantiarum separatarum, et praesertim primae, in qua proinde humanam felicitatem alibi constituit; hinc ergo ascendit, et in admirationem venit divinae perfectionis. Sicque vere ratiocinatur. Intellectus intelligit per quamdam conjunctio- /p. LXIV/ nem ad rem intellectam, et illam in se habens contemplatur, et haec operatio est optima dispositio ejus, et in illo ordine speculatio est optima et maxime delectabilis; si ergo Deus est summum intelligibile, sibi que conjunctissimum, et se per se ipsum perpetuo contemplatur, admirabilis est ejus vita atque delectatio.

Q. 11. An Deus non solum sit sempiternum ac optimum vivens, sed etiam sit sua vita, quia est sua operatio, ac purus actus; ita enim hic de Deo Aristoteles sentit, et optime, ut disput. 30, sect. 3 et 14, tractamus.

Q. 12. Quomodo verum sit id quod hic Aristoteles asserit, nempe Deo inesse aevum continuum et aeternum, disp. 30, sect. 8, et disp. 50, sect. 1.

Q. 13. An Deus, sicut est omnium entium principium, ita et sit optimum et pulcherrimum eorum. Tractatur a nobis in praedicta disputatione. Habetque locum circa textum hunc, nam haec omnia plane significat Aristoteles, dum reprehendit Pythagoricos et Speusisum, eo quod negaret Deum esse optimum et pulcherrimum, licet sit principium; non enim semper principia sunt aequae perfecta, atque id quod ab illis fit, ut patet in semine. At ipse respondet principium proximum et instrumentarium non semper esse aequae perfectum; principale vero ac praesertim primum, necessario esse perfectissimum.

Q. 14. An senserit Aristoteles Deum esse simpliciter infinitum, recteque id probaverit ex eo quod infinito tempore movet; disp. 30, sect. 2.

Q. 15. An primus motor immaterialis sit ac simpliciter impassibilis, idque satis demonstretur ratione naturali, disp. 40, sectione 1 et 8.

CAPUT VIII

DE NUMERO SUBSTANTIARUM SEPARATARUM

Aristoteles in hoc capite ex numero coelorum mobilium probat numerum immaterialium substantiarum moventium, et ordinem ac proprietates earum ex ordine coelorum mobilium colligit. Circa quem discursum variae quaestiones insurgunt.

Quaest. 1. An probari satis possit coelos moveri ab aliqua substantia separata praeter primam. Haec spectat ad libros de Coelo, illam vero attingemus disp. 35, sect. 1.

Q. 2. Esto ita moveantur, an necesse sit a tot substantiis separatis moveri coelos, quot sunt ipsa corpora coelestia, *ibid.*

Q. 3. An probari possit numerum substantiarum separatarum non esse majorem quam coelorum, aut e converso hunc numerum esse majorem illo, vel neutrum possit satis ostendi, *ibid.*

Q. 4. An superius coelum a superiori et perfectiori intelligentia moveatur, idque intelligendum sit de perfectione individuali vel specifica. Quo loco attingi solet quaestio, an coelum solis sit perfectius superioribus planetarum coelis. Sed non est hujus loci, nec refert ad rem praesentem, nam quidquid sit de substantiali perfectione, in ratione mobilis, certum est coelum quo superius, eo habere rationem mobilis perfectioris, tum propter magnitudinem, tum quia est superius, et continet inferiora.

Q. 5. An ex incorruptibilitate coeli, vel motus ipsius aeternitate, recte colligatur substantias separatas esse incorruptibiles et perpetuas, *disput. 35, sect. 1 et 2.*

Q. 6. An ex coeli motu aeterno colligi possit illas substantias esse sine magnitudine, et consequenter esse infinitas, secundum Aristotelem, *ibidem, et disp. 30, sect. 4.*

Q. 7. An putaverit Aristoteles tales esse substantias motrices inferiorum coelorum ac primi, et quo sensu intellexerit hanc esse primam, illam vero secundam. Hae omnes quaestiones attinguntur a nobis in *disp. 29, sect. 2, et in disp. 35, sect. 2.* Et quae ad metaphysicum per se spectant, fuse tractantur; quae vero sunt proprie physicae, et pertinent ad libros de Coelo, solum breviter expediuntur.

Q. 8. Et eadem ratione omittimus reliquam partem capituli, in qua Aristoteles fuse agit de numero orbium coelestium. Item agit de unitate coeli, id est, totius sphaerae coelestis, et consequenter totius universi, ostendens esse unum. Ratio autem ejus frivola est, scilicet, quia si essent plures coeli, haberent principia plura solo numero diversa; quod impossibile probat, quia oporteret talia principia habere materiam.

Sed illa prima sequela frivola est, quia possunt esse plures mundi ab eodem principio, ut latius tractamus disp. 29, sect. 1.

Q. 9. Impugnatio etiam illius consequentis attingit quaestionem de principio individuationis, de qua late disput. 5, sect. 2 et sequenti. In toto vero hoc discursu Aristoteles [sic] prae oculis habenda sunt illa verba ejus satis modesta: *Ita rationabiliter arbitrandum est, quod enim necessarium est, relinquatur potioribus dicendum.*¹¹⁴ Recte enim intellexit has /p. LXV/ non esse demonstrationes, sed discursus probabiles.

CAPUT IX DUBIA QUaedam CONTINENS CIRCA DIVINAM INTELLIGENTIAM

Quaest. 1. Prima quaestio ab Aristotele posita est, an divina mens actu semper intelligat. Et rationem dubitandi proponit, quia si non actu semper intelligit, *quidnam praecellens erit? Erit enim ut dormiens.*¹¹⁵ Si autem semper intelligit actu, ergo ab actu intelligendi habet nobilitatem suam; non est ergo ipsa nobilissima substantia. Responsio vero est, semper actu intelligere, non intellectione addita substantiae suae, sed per suamet nobilissimam substantiam. Et ita satisfit utrique rationi dubitandi. Quam rem ex professo tractamus disput. 30, sect. 15. Addit vero hic Philosophus aliam probationem dictae responsionis, scilicet, quia si Deus non esset sua intellectio, laboriosa ei esse continuatio intelligendi. Sed ratio non est convincens, alias idem probaret de omnibus aliis intelligentiis. Quamvis ergo actio non sit substantia, potest non esse laboriosa continuatio ejus; quia nullam repugnantiam habet cum natura, nec contrariam aliquam alterationem, vel mutationem causat.

Q. 2. Quidnam intelligat divina mens, an se vel aliud; et an aliud et aliud semper, vel semper idem. Responsio est: *Manifestum est, illud intelligere quod divinissimum honorabilissimumque est,*¹¹⁶ *quo fit ut se ipsum intelligat.*¹¹⁷ Virtute ergo hunc conficit discursum. Divina mens est suprema ac nobilissima intelligentia seu intellectio ipsa; sed ad nobilitatem intellectionis multum refert nobilitas rei intellectae; propter quod melius est quaedam non videre quam videre, si vilissima sint; non ergo quaelibet intelligentia est optima, sed illa quae est optimae rei intellectae; ergo divina mens intelligit id quod optimum est; ergo intelligit se ipsam, alias esset quippiam aliud dignius ipsa.

Q. 3. Hinc vero oritur quaestio tertia, an secundum Philosophum Deus nihil extra se intelligat, sed solum seipsum. Nam prima facie videtur

Aristoteles ita de Deo sentire. Sed exponi potest cum D. Thoma, non cognoscere aliud a se per se primo, aut ita ut ab eo perficiatur, vel ita ut a nobilissimo objecto cognoscendo impediatur vel distrahatur. Sed de hac re latius dicta disp. 30, sect. 15.

Q. 4. Alia quaestio suboritur ex resolutione /col. b/ cujusdam dubitationis, quam hic Philosophus proponit, an, scilicet, in omnibus quae carent materia, et consequenter in omnibus intelligentiis, idem sint intellectio et res intellecta, et consequenter Angelus sit sua intellectio. Videtur enim hanc partem Aristoteles insinuare. Cum enim proposuisset dubium, quo modo divina mens possit esse intelligentia sui, cum soleat intellectio ab objecto distingui, respondet intellectionem non distingui ab objecto, nisi ut formam sine materia a forma quae est in materia. Unde cum divina mens careat materia, non oportet ut in ea res intellecta ab intellectione distinguatur, quae ratio si efficax est, in omnibus intelligentiis locum habet. Sed dici potest illam tantum fuisse accommodatam quamdam proportionem, ad explicandum quo modo in divina scientia propter summam ejus immaterialitatem et subtilitatem necesse non sit objectum proprium ab ipsa scientia distingui: Non est autem necesse ut id verum habeat in quavis intelligentia, neque est cur dicamus eam fuisse mentem Aristotelis, de qua re late disp. 34, sect. 4.

Q. 5. Quinta quaestio est, an Deus semper ac necessario permaneat in actuali cognitione sui, ut hic definit Philosophus. Quod probat optime, quia in deterius mutaretur, sive ita cessaret ut maneret in solo actu primo tanquam dormiens, ut in 1 quaest. dictum est, sive (quod ad hanc quaestionem pertinet) a sui contemplatione ad alia transiret: quia semper transieret ad aliud minus nobile; de hac quaestione agimus disputat. 30, sectione 15.

Q. 6. An Deus intelligat per simplicem intelligentiam, vel componendo, et definit priorem partem; et est res clara. Vide disp. 30, sec. 15.

CAPUT X

UNUM ESSE PRINCIPEM AC GUBERNATOREM UNIVERSI

Haec assertio est ab Aristotele in hoc capite intenta, quam etiam voluit esse totius operis conclusionem, et quasi perorationem tanto Philosopho dignam. Eam vero hujusmodi discursu demonstrat. Universi bonum consistit in debito ordine suarum partium, ita ut hoc bonum sit quasi bonum intrinsecum et inhaerens ipsi universo; sed non potest habere hujusmodi bonum, nisi in eo sit unus aliquis supremus et gubernator ejus, qui simul

sit extrinsecus et ultimus finis illius, a quo emanet et ad quem tendat extrinsecum bo- /p. LXVI/ num universi; ergo necessarius est in universo unus supremus princeps et gubernator. Hunc discursum primo declarat Philosophus exemplo exercitus, cujus intrinsecum bonum in debito ordine consistit; ad illum autem requirit ducem, qui majus bonum est totius exercitus, quia ab ipso et propter ipsum est ordo exercitus. Deinde declarat priorem propositionem assumptam, explicando breviter ordinem partium universi per comparisonem ad domum et familiam bene ordinatam; et res est per se satis clara.

Minorem autem propositionem non expresse subsumit, eam tamen revera intendit, et ea occasione divertit hic iterum ad attingendas leviter et rejiciendas antiquorum opiniones de principiis, ut inde colligat nullo ex dictis modis posse recte intelligi, quo modo mirabilis ordo hujus universi ex illis principiis subsistat et conservetur, sine ullo supremo governatore.

Et obiter optimas attingit rationes, quamvis brevissime et subobscurae, qualis est illa, quod non satis est dicere omnia fieri ex contrariis, nisi ponatur aliud superius principium quod illa ita disponat, et ordinet vicissitudines eorum, ut neutrum eorum aliud prorsus absumat, sed successio generationum perpetuo duret. Est item alia ratio, quod sine hoc principio non potest assignari causa, cur hoc individuum nunc participet speciem et non antea, et aliud prius, aliud posterius. Utramque vero rationem, ut optime D. Thomas notavit, habet in verbis illis: *At tum illis qui duo principia faciunt, aliud principalis principium necesse est esse* (scilicet, propter rationem primam), *tum illis qui formas* (id est ideas), *quia aliud principalis principium est; /col. b/ cur enim participavit aut participat?*¹¹⁸ Ecce rationem secundam. Tandem vero in fine capituli hanc probationem illius minoris subjungit: *Pluralitas principatum seu primorum principiorum non est bona,*¹¹⁹ nec confert ad bonum regimen: *at entia nolunt male gubernari; unus ergo princeps.*¹²⁰

Quaestio 1. Circa hanc Philosophi conclusionem ejusque probationes variae insurgunt quaestiones. Prima, an hoc discursu vel aliis naturalibus sufficienter demonstraretur esse unum tantum Deum; quam late tractamus disp. 29, sect. 1, et disp. 30, sect. 10.

Q. 2. An Deus habeat hujus universi providentiam et qualem, quidque in hoc Aristoteles senserit, disp. 30, sect. 16 et 17, praeter dicta disp. 22.

Q. 3. An Deus dicatur summum bonum universi solum tanquam finis ultimus ejus, an vero etiam ut efficiens. Haec saepe tacta est in superioribus, et designata sunt disputationum loca. Hic solum notetur, Aristotelem in hoc capite saepe concludere et conjungere utrumque, et reprehendere antiquos, qui alteram rationem omiserunt. Specialiter tamen approbat

Anaxagoram, quod posuerit mentem ut primum movens, id est, efficiens. Et subdit statim: *Verum alicujus gratia movet, quare alterum, nisi sit ut nos dicimus*,¹²¹ scilicet, quod propter se movet.

Caetera, quae de naturali cognitione Dei seu primae causae, et intelligentiarum desiderari possunt, disputamus late in nostris disputationibus, et de Deo quidem sub ratione primae causae, in disp. 20, 21 et 22, sub ratione ultimi finis in 25, sub ratione primi exemplaris in 26, sub propria ratione Dei in 29 et 30; de intelligentiis autem creatis in disput. 35, ut specialius sequens index monstrabit.

Notes

- ¹ Cf.: Moerbeke, in: *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΑ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ, ARISTOTELIS METAPHYSICA, METAFÍSICA DE ARISTÓTELES*, Edición trilingüe, por Valentín García Yebra, segunda edición revisada, Madrid, Editorial Gredos, 1990. (n. 1): “Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.”; Argyropoulos, in: *Aristotelis castigatissime recognitum opus metaphysicum* a Clarissimo principe Bessarione Cardinale Niceno latinitate foeliciter donatum/ xiiii libris distinctum: cum adiecto in xii primos libros Argyropyli Byzantii interpretamento/ rarum proculdubio et hactenus desideratum opus. Deus optimus qui sub nomine ipsius entis in hoc opere celebratur:... [Parisiis: Apud Henricum Stephanum, 1515. (fol. 2ra): “Omnes homines: natura appetunt scire.”; Bessarion, ibid. (2rb): “Omnes homines: natura scire desiderant.”; Fonseca, in: *Commentariorum In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*. Tomi quatuor, Coloniae: 1615–29 (tom. 1, col. 38): “Omnes homines natura scire appetunt,...”. It may be noted that references to Moerbeke will be to the paragraph numbers of his translation; references to Argyropoulos and Bessarion will be to parallel columns in the same work; and references to Fonseca will in different tomes give columns or pages as necessary.
- ² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 6) “Experientia quidem enim artem fecit, sicut ait Polus recte dicens, sed inexperientia casum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 2vb): “Experientia quidem (ut inquit Polus) artem efficit recte dicens: inexperientia vero fortunam.”; Bessarion (2va): “Experientia enim (ut recte Polus) artem efficit: imperitia vero casum”; Fonseca (tom. 1, co. 50): “Experientia enim, ut recte Polus ait, artem genuit; inexperientia fortunam.”
- ³ Note in Vivès edition: “Exponitur fere totum hoc caput disp. 1, sect. 2 et 5.” (“Almost all of this Chapter is explained in Disputation 1, Sections 2 and 5.”)
- ⁴ Moerbeke (n. 27): “Nam propter admirari homines nunc et primum incoeperunt philosophari:...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 4ra): “ob admirationes enim: homines et nunc et primo philosophari coeperunt.”; Bessarion (4rb): “propter admirationem enim: et nunc et primo incoeperunt homines philosophari.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 126): “Etenim propter admirationem et nunc et olim coeperunt homines philosophari,...”.
- ⁵ Moerbeke (n. 27): “Qui vero dubitat et admiratur, ignorare videtur.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 4ra): “Qui vero dubitat et admiratur: is ignorare se arbitratur.”; Bessarion (4rb): “Qui vero dubitat et admiratur: putat se ignorare.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 126): “Qui autem dubitat, et admiratur, plane se ignorare existimat.”
- ⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (nn. 29–30): “...sic et haec sola libera est scientiarum: sola namque haec suummet causa est. Propter quod et iuste non humana eius putetur possessio. Multipliciter enim hominum natura serva est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 4vb): “...sic et ipsam solam scientiarum liberam esse, est enim haec: suiipsius gratia sola. Quapropter: et non humana possessio ipsius non iniuria putaretur, multis enim conditionibus serva:

- natura hominum est.”; Bessarion (4va): “haec sola scientiaru libera est, siquidem sola haec: suiipsius gratia est. Quare: merito non humana eius possessio putabitur, natura etenim hominum in plerisque serva est.”; Fonseca (tom. 1. col. 128): “...ita haec sola ex omnibus scientiis libera est, quod sola sit sui gratia. Quocirca merito eius possessio non humana existimari potest. Multis enim in rebus serva natura hominum est.”
- ⁷ Moerbeke (n. 32): “et talem aut solus, aut maxime Deus habet.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 4vb): “et talem scientiam aut solus aut maxime deus habet.” Bessarion (4va): “et talem: aut solus aut praecipue deus habet.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 132): “et eam aut solus ipse aut maximae habeat.”
- ⁸ Moerbeke (n. 45): “Non enim itaque facit ipsum subiectum transmutare seipsum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 5vb): “non enim subiectum: seipsum mutari facit.”; Bessarion (5va): “non enim ipsum subiectum: sese mutari facit.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 220): “Neque enim id quod subiicitur, suam ipsius mutationem efficit, ...”
- ⁹ Moerbeke (nn. 47–8): “neque iterum ipsi automato et fortunae tantam committere rem bene habere. Dicens et aliquis inesse intellectum, quemadmodum animalibus, et in natura causam et mundi et ordinis totius, ut excitans apparuit praeter priores inconvenientia dicentes.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 6ra): “nec rursus: casui fortunaeve tantam rem concedere tribuereque bene sese habeat. Itaque quidam cum mentem mundi causam ac universi ordinis esse perindeque naturae ac animalibus inesse dixerit: inter priores illos vana dicentes quasi sobrius habitus est.”; Bessarion (6rb): “nec rursus: casui et fortunae tantam attribuere rem probe se habet. Quare qui ut in animalibus ita in natura intellectum inesse causam mundi totiusque ordinis dixerat: quasi sobrius comparatus ad antiquiores vana dicentes apparuit.” Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 222): “nec rursus aequum est tantam rem casui, et fortunae tribuere. Itaque qui mentem quemadmodum in animantibus, sic in natura causam mundi, tum etiam totius ordinis esse dixit, is prae superioribus temere loquentibus, quasi sobrius visus est.”
- ¹⁰ Moerbeke (n. 51): “sed qualiter in bellis inerudiiti faciunt. Etenim illi circumducti saepe bonas plagas faciunt, at nec illi ex scientia, nec isti visi sunt scientes dicere quod dicunt.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 6vb): “sed ut in pugna rudes et inexercitati faciunt, etenim illi cum agitantur, persaepe praeclare agunt accomodatosque inferunt ictus, verum neque illi id per scientiam agunt: neque hi quid dicunt scire videntur.”; Bessarion (6va): “sed quemadmodum inexercitati in proelio faciunt, etenim illi circuneuntes: egregias plerumque plagas infligunt, sed nec illi ex scientia: nec isti videntur scire quid dicant.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 228) “sed quemadmodum inexercitati in pugna faciunt. ii enim cum in omnem partem feruntur, insignes plagas persaepe inferunt, verum neque illi ex arte faciunt, neque hi videntur ea, quae dicunt, scientia tenere.”
- ¹¹ Moerbeke (n. 181): “[de] quibus prooemialiter dictis...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 17vb): “de iisce quae in exordiis...”; Bessarion (17va): “de iis quae in prohemio...”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 556): “in iis, quae prooemii loco dicta sunt.”
- ¹² Moerbeke (n. 144): “digne”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15ra): “digne”; Bessarion (15rb): “satis”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 378): “pro dignitate.”
- ¹³ Moerbeke (n. 147): “In foribus quis delinquet?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15ra): “quis nam ostium non attinget...”; Bessarion (15rb): “quis aberrabit a ianua...”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 378): “Ecquis ab ostio aberret?”
- ¹⁴ Moerbeke (n. 148): “Habere autem totum et partem non posse, difficultatem eius ostendit.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15ra): “at totum ac partem habere non posse: id difficultatem ipsius ostendit.”; Bessarion (15rb): “totum autem et partem habere non posse: hoc eius difficultatem ostendit.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 378) “quod autem totum et partem habere non possumus, id eius difficultatem declarat.”
- ¹⁵ Moerbeke (n. 146): “Et secundum unumquemque quidem nihil aut parum ei immittere, ex omnibus autem coarticulatis fieri magnitudinem aliquam.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15ra): “et singulos quidem nichil aut parum ad ipsam conferre: ex omnibus autem

- congestis magnitudinem quamdam emergere.”; Bessarion (15rb): “et singuli quidem nil aut parum ei addunt: ex omnibus vero collectis aliqua magnitudo fit.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 378): “et singuli quidem aut nihil, aut parum ad eam conferunt, sed tamen ex omnibus in unum congestis magnitudo quaedam existit.”
- ¹⁶ Moerbeke (n. 151): “Unumquodque vero maxime id ipsum aliorum, secundum quod et in aliis inest univocatio.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15vb): “Unumquodque autem maxime caeterorum est ipsum: quo et caeteris nomen idem cum eadem competit ratione.”; Bessarion (15va): “Unumquodque vero id ipsum maxime aliorum est, secundum quod aliis univocatio inest.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 384): “Unumquodque autem maxime tale est prae caeteris, cuius causa caeteris et nomine et ratione idem convenit.”
- ¹⁷ Berton edition notes: Vide Aristotelem, lib. 7. Phys., c. 1, et l. 8., c. 5, l. 1 Post., c. 16, 17 etc., et 1. Eth. c. 2; Avicen., 8 suae Metaph., c. 2.
- ¹⁸ Moerbeke (nn. 166–167): “...scire destruunt qui ita dicunt. ...Nam quae sic sunt infinita, quomodo contingit intelligere?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 16vb): “qui ita dicunt: scientiam e medio tollunt, ...namque fieri potest ut ea quae hoc pacto sunt infinita intelligantur?” Bessarion (16va): “Item ipsum scire perimunt: qui ita dicunt, ...quae enim ita infinita sunt, quomodo intelligere contingit?”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 432): “Tollunt item funditus scientiam ii, qui hoc pacto dicunt. ...Quae enim hoc pacto infinita sunt, quomodo intelligi possunt?”
- ¹⁹ Moerbeke (n. 170): “Infinitum vero secundum adjectionem non est pertransire in finito.”; Argyropoulos fol. (16vb): “fieri autem nequit, ut finito tempore id quod infinitum est additione pertranseamus.” Bessarion (16va): “infinitum vero secundum additionem: non est in tempore finito pertransire.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 436): “id autem, quod additione infinitum est, tempore finito percurri nequit.”
- ²⁰ Moerbeke (n. 174): “...absurdum [-] simul quaerere scientiam et modum sciendi.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 16vb): “absurdum est scientiam simul et scientiae quaerere modum.”; Bessarion (16va): “absurdum est simul scientiam et modum scientiae quaerere.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 480): “...absurdum est scientiam simul et scientiae modum quaerere.”
- ²¹ Moerbeke (n. 175): “Acribologia vero mathematica non in omnibus est expetenda, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 16vb–17ra): “Mathematicorum autem exacta discussio non in universis est flagitanda.”; Bessarion (16va–17rb): “Certitudinem vero mathematicam non oportet in cunctis quaerere.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, cols. 480–82): “Mathematicorum autem accurata docendi ratio non in omnibus postulanda est, ...”
- ²² Moerbeke (n. 175): “...omnis enim forsan natura materiam habet.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 17ra): “universa namque natura: fortasse materiam habet.”; Bessarion (17rb): “tota enim natura: forte habet materiam.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 482): “Fortasse enim omnis natura materiam habet.”
- ²³ Moerbeke (n. 186): “Et utrum est aliquid praeter synolon...”; Argyropoulos (17vb): “et utrum sit quippiam praeter ipsum totum...”; Bessarion (fol. 17va) “et utrum est aliquid praeter cunctum...”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 558): “Sitne etiam aliquid praeter ipsum totum...”
- ²⁴ Moerbeke (n. 186): “(dico autem synolon quando praedicatur aliquid de materia)”; Argyropoulos (fol. 17vb): “(dico autem totum: cum de materia quippiam praedicatur.)”; Bessarion (17va) “(dico autem cunctum: cum quicquid de materia praedicatur)”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 560): “(voco autem ipsum totum, cum aliquid de materia praedicatur)”.
- ²⁵ Moerbeke (n. 296): “Quoniam autem principia et extremas quaerimus causas, palam quia cuiusdam eas naturae secundum se esse necesse est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 25vb): “Quoniam autem principia summasque causas quaerimus: patet ipsas necessario per se cuiuspiam esse naturae.”; Bessarion (25va): “Cum autem principia et supremas causas quaeramus: patet quod alicuius naturae per se necesse est eas esse.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, cols. 636–38): “Quoniam vero principia, summasque causas quaerimus, illud necessarium esse perspicuum est, natura alicuius per se eas esse.”

- ²⁶ Moerbeke (n. 296): “Unde et nobis entis inquantum est ens, primae causae sunt accipiendae.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 25vb): “Quapropter et a nobis eius quod est ea ratione qua est ens: primae causae sunt sumendae.”; Bessarion (25va): “Quare nobis quoque entis prout entis: primas causas accipiendum est.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 638): “Quapropter et a nobis primae causae entis, quatenus ens est, sumendae sunt.”
- ²⁷ Moerbeke (n. 300): “Omnis autem generis unius est...unus et scientia...Quapropter et entis inquantum est ens, quascumque species speculari unius est scientiae genere, et species specierum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 26ra): “Omnis autem generis unius...est unus atque scientia...Quapropter et eius quod est ut ens: quaecumque sunt species unius est scientiae genere et specierum species contemplari.”; Bessarion (26rb): “Omnis autem generis...unius, et scientia...Quare entis quoque quot species sunt et species specierum speculari: unius scientiae genere est.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 668): “Porro cuiusque generis unius, ...est unus et scientia... Quare, et entis quotquot sunt species, unius scientiae genere est, et specierum species contemplari.” The dangling “unus” in each of these citations is modifying “sensus”, which I have omitted in order to track as close as possible to Suárez’s citation.
- ²⁸ Moerbeke (n. 328): “Idem enim simul esse et non esse in eodem...est impossibile...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 28vb): “...non posse ut idem simul insit et non insit.”; Bessarion (28va): “Idem enim simul inesse et non inesse...impossibile est.”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 846): “Etenim fieri non potest, ut idem simul insit et non insit eidem,...”
- ²⁹ Moerbeke (n. 347): “Non entia autem quomodo utique pronuntiabunt aut ibunt?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 31ra): “ea vero quae non sunt: qui fieri potest ut aut loquentur aut intelligant quicquid?”; Bessarion (31rb): “illa sane quae non sunt quomodo loquentur aut ambulabunt?”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 876): “ea vero quae non sunt, quoniam pacto aut loquentur, aut ambulabunt?”
- ³⁰ Moerbeke (n. 418): “praeter impetum et praeuoluntatem...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 38vb): “praeter appetitionem voluntatemque...”; Bessarion (38va): “praeter propositum et electionem...”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 310): “praeter propensionem electionemque...”
- ³¹ Moerbeke (n. 433): “alia secundum numerum sunt unum, alia secundum speciem, alia secundum genus, alia secundum analogiam.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 40vb): “alia numero, alia specie, alia genere, alia similitudine rationis: sunt unum.”; Bessarion (40va): “alia numero, alia genere, alia specie alia analogice: unum sunt.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 352): “alia numero unum sunt, alia specie, alia genere, alia vero analogia.”
- ³² Moerbeke (n. 433): “Numero quidem, quorum materia una.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 40vb): “Numero quidem ea: quorum est materies una.”; Bessarion (40va): “Numero quidem: quorum materia una.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 354): “Numero quidem ea sunt, quorum materia una est.”
- ³³ Moerbeke (n. 433) “posteriora praecedentia sequuntur.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 40vb): “posteriora anteriora sequuntur.” Bessarion (40va): “posteriores sequuntur praecedentia.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 356): “posteriora sequuntur priora.”
- ³⁴ Moerbeke (n. 456): “quaecumque in eadem substantia differentiam habent.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 42ra): “quae in eadem substantia sunt: et differentiam habent.”; Bessarion (42rb): “quaecumque cum in eadem substantia sint: differentiam habent.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 596): “omnia cum in eadem ipsorum substantia sint, differentiam habent.”
- ³⁵ Moerbeke (n. 457): “priora...dicuntur...quod propinquius principio alicui.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 42vb): “id enim est prius: quod est propinquius cuidam primo.”; Bessarion (42va): “priora...dicuntur...quod propinquius est principio cuidam.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 614): “illud est prior quod propinquius est alicui principio,...”
- ³⁶ Moerbeke (n. 457): “quaedam”; Argyropoulos (fol. 42vb): “quaedam”; Bessarion (42va): “uno quidem modo”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 614): “nonnulla”.

- ³⁷ Moerbeke (n. 461): “Ergo ea priora dicuntur hoc modo.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 42vb): “hoc igitur modo: priora dicuntur.”; Bessarion (42va): “itaque hoc modo priora dicuntur.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 616): “hoc pacto priora dicuntur.”
- ³⁸ Moerbeke (n. 462): “Alio vero modo”; Argyropoulos (fol. 42vb): “Alio vero modo”; Bessarion (42va): “Alio vero modo”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 616): “Alio autem modo”.
- ³⁹ Moerbeke (n. 467): “...principium motus aut mutationis in diverso, inquantum diversum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 43ra): “...principium motus mutationisve quod est in alio, aut ut quippiam aliud est.”; Bessarion (43vb): “...principium motus aut transmutationis in altero, aut prout alterum est.”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 620): “...principium motus, mutationisve in alio, aut quatenus aliud est.”
- ⁴⁰ Moerbeke (n. 467): “mutationis”; Argyropoulos (fol. 43ra): “mutationis”; Bessarion (43rb): “transmutationis”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 620): “mutationis”.
- ⁴¹ Moerbeke (n. 467): “diversum”; Argyropoulos (fol. 43ra): “aliud”; Bessarion (43rb): “alterum”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 620): “aliud”.
- ⁴² Moerbeke (n. 467): “inquantum diversum”; Argyropoulos (fol. 43ra) “ut quippiam aliud est”; Bessarion (43rb): “prout alterum est”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 620): “quatenus aliud est”.
- ⁴³ Moerbeke (n. 503): “terminus”; Argyropoulos (fol. 46ra): “extremum”; Bessarion (46rb): “terminus”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 914): “terminus”.
- ⁴⁴ Moerbeke (n. 506): “secundum quod”; Argyropoulos (fol. 46vb): “ipsum quo”; Bessarion (fol. 46va): “secundum quod”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 918): “secundum quod”.
- ⁴⁵ Moerbeke (n. 507): “secundum se”; Argyropoulos (fol. 46vb): “ipsum et se [quo]”; Bessarion (46va): “secundum se”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 918): “secundum quod”.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. Argyropoulos (fol. 46vb); Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 918).
- ⁴⁷ Moerbeke (521): “omne et totum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 48vb): “totum et universum”; Bessarion (48va) “omne et totum”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 938): “totum et omne”.
- ⁴⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 522): “colobon”; Argyropoulos (fol. 48vb): “diminutum”; Bessarion (48va): “mutilum”; Fonseca (tom. 2, col. 940): “mutilum”.
- ⁴⁹ Moerbeke (n. 556): “Quod autem ut verum ens; et non ens, ut falsum, quoniam secundum compositionem et divisionem...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 53ra): “Quoniam autem id quod ut verum est ens, et id quod ut falsum est non ens: in compositione divisioneve...”; Bessarion (53rb): “Quod autem tanquam verum ens et non ens ut falsum quoniam circa compositionem et divisionem est...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 75): “Ens autem ut verum, et non ens ut falsum, in compositione, et divisione cernuntur:...”.
- ⁵⁰ Moerbeke (n. 558): “non est autem verum et falsum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum, quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente. Circa vero simplicia et quid est nec in mente est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 53ra): “verum enim falsumque non sunt in rebus, ut bonum quidem sit verum, malum autem falsum: sed sunt in mente, circa vero ea quae sunt simplicia, ipsumque quid est: neque in ipsa sunt mente.”; Bessarion (53rb): “non enim est falsum et verum in rebus (ut quod bonum: verum, quod vero malum: falsum) sed in mente, quae vero circa simplicia et circa ea quae quid sunt: non quidem sunt in mente.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 76): “Neque enim verum et falsum in rebus sunt, quasi verum sit id quod bonum; falsum autem id, quod malum; sed in mente: non tamen in mente, quae circa simplicia, et quiditates rerum versatur.”
- ⁵¹ Moerbeke (n. 810): “sed hoc est verum quidem aut falsum, attingere quidem et repraesentare verum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 79vb): “sed est quidem verum: tangere atque dicere.”; Bessarion (79va): “attingere namque ac dicere: verum est.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 667b): “sed hoc utique est verum, hoc falsum; tangere quidem ac dicere verum;...”.
- ⁵² Moerbeke (n. 810): “non enim idem affirmatio et repraesentatio.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 79vb): “non est enim idem: affirmatio et dictio”; Bessarion (79va): “non enim est idem: affirmatio et dictio”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 667b): “neque enim idem sunt affirmatio, et dictio”.

- ⁵³ Moerbeke (n. 810): “ignorare autem non attingere.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 79vb): “est autem falsum id ignorare: non tangere”; Bessarion (79va): “non attingere vero: est ignorare”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 667b): “ignorare autem non tangere.”
- ⁵⁴ Moerbeke (n. 151): “unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 15vb): “ut quidquam est: sic et veritatis particeps est”; Bessarion (15va): “ut secundum esse unumquodque se habet: ita etiam secundum veritatem”; Fonseca (tom. 1, col. 386): “ut unumquodque est, ita et verum est.”
- ⁵⁵ Cf. Moerbeke (n. 568): “Dicitur autem substantia, et si non multiplicius, de quatuor maxime. Etenim quod quid erat esse, et universale, et genus, videtur substantia cuiusque esse. Et quartum horum, subiectum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 54vb): “Substantia itaque (si non pluribus) quatuor autem modis maxime dici solet, etenim quidditas et universale ac genus: substantia cuiusque esse videtur, et quartum: horum subiectum.”; Bessarion (fol. 54va): “Dicitur autem substantia (si non pluribus) saltem quatuor modis, maxime etenim quid erat esse et universale et genus: substantia cuiusque esse videtur, et quartum: subiectum.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 212a): “Substantia igitur, si non pluribus, certe quatuor modis dicitur. Nam et quidditas, et universale, et genus substantia cuiusque videntur esse, et quartum horum subiectum.”
- ⁵⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 576): “quod quid erat esse”; Argyropoulos (fol. 55ra): “quidditas”; Bessarion (55rb): “quod quid erat esse”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 219b): “quidditas.”
- ⁵⁷ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 609): “Quare, sicut dicitur, impossibile factum esse si nihil praeeexistit.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 59ra): “Quare quodam modo dicitur: impossibile est quicquam fieri si nichil est prius.”; Bessarion (59rb): “Quare quemadmodum dicitur: impossibile est fieri si nichil praeeexistat.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 245b): “Quare, quemadmodum dici solet, impossibile est quicquam fieri, si nihil antea existat.”
- ⁵⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 602): “Omnia vero quae fiunt aut natura aut arte, habent materiam. Possibile enim esse et non esse eorum quodlibet.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 58ra): “Universa praeterea quae aut arte aut natura fiunt: materiam habent, et esse enim et non esse: quodque ipsorum potest, quod quidem a materia proficiscitur,…”; Bessarion (58rb): “Cuncta vero quae aut natura aut arte fiunt: habent materiam, possibile enim esse et non esse: eorum unumquodque, hoc autem cuique: materia.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 240b–241b): “Omnia porro, quae sive natura, sive arte fiunt materiam habent, quippe cum eorum quodque tum esse, tum non esse possit: quod quidem praestat materia,…”
- ⁵⁹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 604): “Quaedam et illi eadem, et ex spermate fiunt et sine spermate”; Argyropoulos (fol. 58vb): “et illic enim nonnulla: eadem ex semine et sine semine fiunt”; Bessarion (58va): “quaedam enim et illic: eadem et ex semine et absque semine fiunt”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 242b): “quaedam ex semine, et sine semine eadem gignuntur”.
- ⁶⁰ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 607): “Generationum vero et motuum haec quidem intelligentia vocatur, illa vero factio”; Argyropoulos (fol. 58vb): “Rationum autem motionumve: alia intellectio alia effectio nuncupatur”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 244b): “Generationum autem, motionumque, haec [qu]idem cogitatio, illa vero effectio vocatur:…”
- ⁶¹ Moerbeke (614): “In quibusdam vero, palam quia generans tale quidem est, quale generatum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 60ra): “in quibusdam enim et luce clarius extat: id quod generat tale quidem est quale est id quod ab ipso producitur.”; Bessarion (60rb): “in quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est: quod generans tale est quale quod generatur.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 277b): “in quibusdam etiam perspicuum est tale esse id, quod generat quale est, quod generatur,…”
- ⁶² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 622): “ut autem ratio ad rem et pars rationis ad partem rei similiter se habeat:…”; Argyropoulos (fol. 60vb): “ut ad rem sese habet ratio sic et pars rationis sese habeat ad rei partem:…”; Bessarion (60va): “sicut oratio ad rem similiter et pars orationis ad partem rei se habeat:…”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 339b): “ut ratio ad rem, sic pars rationis se habeat ad rei partem:…”
- ⁶³ Vivès footnote: Javell., l. 7 Met., q. 16.

- ⁶⁴ Vivès footnote: Ant. Andr., 8 Met. q. 7.
- ⁶⁵ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 644): “genus simpliciter non est praeter eas quae ut generis species, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64ra): “genus absolute non est praeter ea quae sunt ut generis species, ...”; Bessarion (64rb): “genus simpliciter non est praeter eas quae ut generis species sunt. ...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 357b): “genus simpliciter non est praeter ea, quae ut generis species sunt: ...”.
- ⁶⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 644): “Si ergo genus simpliciter non est praeter eas quae ut generis species, aut si est quidem, ut materia, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64ra): “Si igitur genus absolute non est praeter ea quae sunt ut generis species, aut si est quidem, est autem ut materies. ...”; Bessarion (64rb): “Si igitur genus simpliciter non est praeter eas quae ut generis species sunt, aut si est quidem sed tanquam materia est. ...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 357b): “Si igitur genus simpliciter non est, praeter ea, quae ut generis species sunt: aut si est quidem, est tamen ut materia: ...”.
- ⁶⁷ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 645): “oportet dividi differentia differentiam, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64ra): “differentia et in differentiam dividatur oportet.”; Bessarion (64rb): “oportet etiam dividi differentia differentiam.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 358b): “At differentia per differentiam oportet dividatur. ...”.
- ⁶⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 646): “Si itaque haec sic se habent, palam quia finalis differentia rei substantia erit et definitio, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64vb): “Quae cum ita sint: patet ultimam differentiam substantiam rei diffinitionemque esse. ...”; Bessarion (64va) “Si igitur haec ita se habeant, manifestum est quod ultima differentia rei substantia erit et diffinitio: ...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 358b): “Si haec igitur ita se habent, perspicuum est ultimam differentiam substantiam rei ac definitionem fore; ...”.
- ⁶⁹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 646): “Siquidem igitur differentiae differentia fiat, una erit quae finalis species et substantia.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64vb): “Si igitur differentia differentiae fiat: una erit ipsa inquam ultima species atque substantia rei.”; Bessarion (64ra): “Si igitur differentiae differentia fiat: una quae ultima est erit species et substantia.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 359b): “Itaque si differentia differentia fiat, una illa, quae ultima est species et substantia rei erit.”.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. Moerbeke (n. 646): “animal habens pedes, bipes, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64vb): “animal pedes habens bipes. ...”; Bessarion (64va): “animal pedes habens, bipes. ...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 359b): “animal pedes habens bipes. ...”.
- ⁷¹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 651): “quod pluribus inesse natum est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 64vb–65ra): “quod pluribus inesse est aptum, ...”; Bessarion (fol. 64va–65rb): “quod pluribus natura aptum est inesse, ...”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 395b): “quod in pluribus natura aptum est esse. ...”.
- ⁷² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 657): “Duo namque sic actu, nunquam sunt unum actu; sed si potestate duo fuerint, erunt unum ... Actus enim separat.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 65ra): “ea enim quae ita sunt actu duo: nunquam actu sunt unum, sed si potentia duo sunt: erit unum, ... actus enim: nimirum separat.”; Bessarion (65rb): “quae enim duo sic actu sunt: nunquam unum actu sunt, sed si potentia duo sunt: erunt unum. ... actus namque separat.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 397b): “duo enim, quae hoc pacto sunt actu, nunquam sunt unum actu; sed si potentia duo sunt, erunt utique unum: ... actus enim separat”.
- ⁷³ Here the Vivès edition has mistakenly inserted “non”.
- ⁷⁴ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 669): “substantiarum sensibilibium singularium nec definitio nec demonstratio est, quia habent materiam, ...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 66ra): “substantiarum. ... sensibilibium quae quidem sunt singulares: nec diffinitio est nec demonstratio, quod materiam habent.”; Bessarion (66rb): “substantiarum sensibilibium singularium: neque diffinitio neque demonstratio est eo quod habet materiam.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 402b): “singularium substantiarum sensibilibium nec definitio est, nec demonstratio, quod materiam habeant, ...”.
- ⁷⁵ Rábade *et al.* read “habet”.

- ⁷⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 669): “cuius natura talis est ut contingat et esse et non esse. Quapropter corruptibilia omnia singularia ipsorum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 66ra): “cuius natura est talis: ut esse atque non esse possit. Quapropter omnia singularia istius modi subeunt corruptionem...”; Bessarion (66rb): “cuius natura talis ut esse et non esse contigat. Quare corruptibilia sunt omnia singularia earum.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 402b): “cuius ea natura est, ut et esse, et non esse possit. Quocirca omnia earum singularia corruptioni sunt obnoxia.”
- ⁷⁷ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 696): “Sensibiles autem substantiae omnes materiam habent.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 69ra): “sensibiles substantiae, quas quidem materiam, universas habere constat.”; Bessarion (69rb): “sensibiles vero cunctae substantiae materiam habent.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 439b): “Sensibiles autem substantiae omnes materiam habent:...”.
- ⁷⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 696): “Materiam vero dico quae non hoc aliquid ens actu, potestate autem est hoc aliquid.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 69ra): “atque materiam eam dico: quae non actu hoc aliquid, sed potentia est.”; Bessarion (69rb): “materiam autem dico: quae cum non quod quid actu sit, potentia est quod quid.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 440b): “Materiam autem dico, quae non hoc aliquid est actu, sed potentia.”
- ⁷⁹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 698): “Non enim necesse, si aliquid materiam habet localem, hoc et generabilem et corruptibilem habere.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 69ra): “non enim si quippiam habeat materiam loco accomodatam: id et generationi subiectam habere corruptionive necesse est.”; Bessarion (69rb): “non enim est necesse si quid materiam habet localem: hoc generabilem etiam et corruptibilem habere.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 441b): “Neque enim necesse est, si quid habet materiam mutationi loci subiectam, id et generationi et corruptioni obnoxiam habere.”
- ⁸⁰ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 696): “ratione separabile est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 69ra): “atque separabile ratione”; Bessarion (69rb): “ratione separabile est.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 440b): “ratione separabile est.”
- ⁸¹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 696): “Nam secundum substantiarum rationem, hae quidem separabiles, illae vero non.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 69ra): “substantiarum enim earum quae ad rationem accommodantur: quaedam separantur, quaedam non separantur.”; Bessarion (69rb): “earum enim substantiarum quae secundum rationem: quaedam sunt separabiles quaedam vero non.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 440b): “Namque earum substantiarum, quae rationi congruunt, quaedam separari possunt, quaedam minime.”
- ⁸² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 708): “utrum significet nomen compositam substantiam, aut actum et formam.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 70ra): “utrum nomen ipsum significet compositam substantiam, an actum et formam.”; Bessarion (70rb): “utrum nomen compositam substantiam significet, an actum et formam.” Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 463b): “utrum nomen compositum substantiam significet, an vero actum, et formam: ...”.
- ⁸³ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 709): “Erit autem utique et in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum, sed sicut ad unum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 70ra): “dicetur autem animal: et de utrisque non una ratione, sed ut ad unum.”; Bessarion (70rb): “erit autem utique in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum, sed ut ad unum.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 463b): “Fuerit autem et in utrisque animal, non tamen ut id, quod una ratione, sed ut id, quod ad unum dicitur.”
- ⁸⁴ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 710): “nisi et anima homo dicatur”; Argyropoulos (fol. 70ra): “nisi et anima homo dicatur”; Bessarion (70rb): “nisi et anima homo dicatur”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 464b): “nisi et anima homo dicatur”.
- ⁸⁵ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 730): “Quaecumque autem sine transmutari sunt aut non, non est horum materia.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 72ra): “quae vero sine mutatione sunt aut non sunt: ea materiam non habent.”; Bessarion (72rb): “quaecumque vero absque eo quod transmutentur sunt aut non: horum materia non est.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, 490b): “quae autem sine mutatione et sunt, et non sunt, eorum non est materia”.

- ⁸⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 744): “Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a seipso.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 73vb): “Quare nullum copulatum a seipso patitur...”; Bessarion (73va): “Propter quod nullum prout connaturale factum ipsum a seipso patitur.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 511b): “Quare nihil quatenus congenitum est, ipsum a se ipso patitur...”.
- ⁸⁷ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 757): “Est autem possibile hoc, cui si extiterit actus, cuius dicitur habere potentiam, nihil erit impossibile”; Argyropoulos (fol. 75ra): “Id autem est possibile: cui si is evenerit actus cuius potentiam dicitur habere, non erit impossibile quicquid.”; Bessarion (75rb): “hoc autem possibile est, cui, si illius insit actus cuius potentiam habere dicitur, nihil impossibile erit”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 621b): “Illud autem est possibile, cui si is actus evenerit, cuius potentiam habere dicitur, nihil eveniet impossibile.”
- ⁸⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 762): “Quoniam autem possibile, et quando, et quomodo, et quaecumque alia necesse adesse in definitione:...”.; Argyropoulos (fol. 75vb): “Quoniam autem ipsum possibile aliquid potest, et quandoque, et aliquo modo, et quaecumque alia in definitione sunt adiungenda,...”.; Bessarion (75va): “Quoniam vero quod potest aliquid potest et aliquando et aliquo modo et quaecumque alia necesse est adesse in definitione:...”.; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 624b): “Quoniam vero id, quod possibile est, aliquid potest, et aliquando et modo aliquo, caeteraque habet, quae in definitione necessario addenda sunt:...”.
- ⁸⁹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 763): “Tales quidem potentiae necesse, quando ut possunt passivum et activum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere, illud vero pati.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 75vb): “talibus quidem potentiis passivum atque activum cum sint (ut possunt) proxima, alterum agat, alterum patiatur necesse est.”; Bessarion (75va): “huiusmodi quidem potentias necesse est, ut cum (quoad possunt) activum et passivum approximent hoc quidem faciat, illud vero patiatur,...”.; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 624b): “In his quidem potentiis, cum id, quod activum est, et passivum, eo modo, quo possunt, propinqua sunt, alterum agat, alterum patiatur necesse est.”
- ⁹⁰ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 763): “Illas vero non necesse.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 75vb): “at illis non est necesse.”; Bessarion (75ra): “illas vero non est necesse.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 624b): “In illis autem non est necesse:...”.
- ⁹¹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 784): “Hoc quidem enim iam habet speciem, illud vero non.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 77vb): “alterum enim: iam habet formam, alterum: non habet...”; Bessarion (77va): “illud enim: iam habet speciem, hoc vero: non.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 655b): “alterum enim iam habet speciem, alterum non habet.”
- ⁹² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 793): “Omnis potentia simul contradictionis est.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 78ra–vb): “omnis potentia nimirum simul est contradictionis.”; Bessarion (78rb–va): “omnis potentia simul contradictionis est.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 658b): “Omnis potentia simul est contradictionis:...”.
- ⁹³ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 792): “Est autem nihil potentia sempiternum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 78ra): “est autem res perpetua: potentia nulla.”; Bessarion (78rb): “nichil vero potentia: eternum est.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 658b): “nichil autem est potentia sempiterna.”
- ⁹⁴ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 799): “per adesse, et non,...”.; Argyropoulos (fol. 78vb): “praesentia nimirum absentiaque...”.; Bessarion (78va): “eo ipso quod adsunt et absunt...”.; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 660b): “eo quod aliquid adsit, et non adsit.”
- ⁹⁵ Cf.: Moerbeke (795): “eorum quae ex necessitate sunt.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 78vb): “eorum quae necessario sunt:...”.; Bessarion (78va): “eorum quae necessario sunt:...”.; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 65b): “eorum quae necessario sunt ...”.
- ⁹⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 795): “Namque si haec non essent, nihil utique esset.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 78vb): “si enim haec non essent: nichil esset profecto.”; Bessarion (78va): “si enim ipsa non essent: nichil esset profecto.”; Fonseca (tom. 3, p. 659b): “nam si haec non essent, nihil utique esset.”

- ⁹⁷ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 820): “Maxime vero in eo quod est metrum esse primum uniuscuiusque generis, et maxime proprie quantitatis. Hinc enim ad alia venit.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 81ra): “Maxime vero esse unius in hoc consistit: ut sit generis uniuscuiusque prima mensura, et propriissime quantitati, hinc enim: et ad alia accessisse videtur.”; Bessarion (81rb): “Maxime autem: mensuram esse cuiusque generis primum: et maxime proprie quantitatis, hinc etenim: ad alia advenit.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 6b): “Maxime autem mensuram esse primum cuiusque generis, ac quantitatis potissimum: hinc enim et ad alia traductum est.”
- ⁹⁸ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 827): “Et scientiam autem rerum metrum dicimus, et sensum...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 81vb): “Dicimus et scientiam ob idem sensumve rerum esse mensuram:...”; Bessarion (81va): “At scientiam quoque et sensum mensuram rerum dicimus esse:...”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 10b): “Sed et scientiam mensuram rerum esse dicimus, eademque ratione sensum,...”
- ⁹⁹ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 827): “quia cognoscimus aliquid ipsis:...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 81vb): “quia aliquid per ipsa cognoscimus.”; Bessarion (81va): “propterea quia per ea aliquid cognoscimus.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 10b): “quod iis aliquid cognoscimus.”
- ¹⁰⁰ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 827): “sed mensurantur magis quam mensurant.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 81vb): “Nam mensurantur potius quam mensurant.”; Bessarion (81va): “Atqui mensurantur magis quam mensurent.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 10b): “Atqui mensurantur potius quam mensurent.”
- ¹⁰¹ Here I prefer the reading of Rábade Romeo, *et al.* to the “ipsarum” of the Vives edition.
- ¹⁰² Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 840): “[differunt] genere quidem, quorum non est communis materia,...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 83vb): “genere quidem differunt ea: quorum materia non est communis,...”; Bessarion (83va): “[differunt] genere: quorum non est communis materia,...”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 18b): “[differunt] genere quidem quorum neque est communis materia,...”
- ¹⁰³ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 842): “Quoniam autem differre contingit abinvicem differentia plus et minus, est aliqua maxima differentia.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 83vb): “Quoniam autem fit ut ea quae differunt magis minusve different: est et quaedam sane maxime differentia.”; Bessarion (83va): “Cum autem contingat invicem differre quae differunt et plus et minus: est etiam quaedam maxima differentia.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 20b): “Sed quoniam ea quae differunt, magis ac minus differre possunt, aliqua sane est maxima differentia,...”
- ¹⁰⁴ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 895): “necesse diversum esse genere corruptibile et incorruptibile.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 88ra): “corruptibile sane atque incorruptibile genere diversa esse necesse est.”; Bessarion (88rb): “necesse est diversum genere esse corruptibile et incorruptibile.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 42b): “necesse est corruptibile et incorruptibile genera diversa esse.”
- ¹⁰⁵ Moerbeke (n. 934): “...non contingit idem secundum unum et idem tempus esse et non esse,...”; Argyropoulos (fol. 92ra): “...non potest ut idem uno eodemque tempore sit et non sit,...”; Bessarion (92rb): “...non contingit idem secundum unum et idem tempus esse et non esse,...”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 56b): “Non contingere ut idem uno et eodem tempore sit et non sit.”
- ¹⁰⁶ Cf.: Moerbeke (n. 960): “...siquidem existit aliqualis substantia talis, dico autem separabilis, et immobilis,...hoc utique erit alicubi et quod divinum, et hoc utique erit primum et principalissimum principium.”; Argyropoulos (fols. 94vb–95ra): “...si sit in ratione rerum quaedam substantia talis separabilis inquam atque immobilis: ...ibi profecto et ipsum divinum erit idque erit principium primum atque principium maxime.” Bessarion (94va–95rb): “...si aliqua quidem talis substantia est dico autem separabilis et immobilis:...illic profecto divinitas erit et hoc erit primum et principale principium.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 63b): “si quae tamen huiusmodi substantia est,

- separabilis, inquam, et immobilis, in hac profecto erit divinitas, eaque erit primum ac principale principium.”
- ¹⁰⁷ Moerbeke (n. 915): “Quomodo enim erit ordo non existente aliquo principio perpetuo, et separabili et manente?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 90ra): “quo namque modo fuerit ordo: si non sit quicquid aeternum et separatum ac manens?” Bessarion (90rb): “quo namque pacto ordo erit: non existente aliquo perpetuo separato ac permanente?”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 51b): “Quo enim pacto ordo fuerit, nisi aliquid extet sempiternum, separatum, ac permanens?”
- ¹⁰⁸ Moerbeke (n. 1040): “In quibusdam enim nihil prohibet, ut si est anima talis, non omnis, sed intellectus. Omnem namque, impossibile forsitan.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 101vb): “in quibusdam enim: nichil prohibere videtur, veluti si anima tale sit, non omnis: sed mens ipsa, ut enim omnis permaneat: omnino fieri fortasse non potest.”; Bessarion (101va): “in quibusdam enim: nichil prohibet, veluti si anima tale sit, non omnis: sed intellectus, omnem namque fortassis impossibile est.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 84): “in quibusdam enim nihil prohibet, ut si anima tale quid sit, non omnis tamen, sed mens ipsa. Namque ut omnis permaneat forsitan fieri non potest.”
- ¹⁰⁹ Moerbeke (n. 1049): “Amplius autem praeter haec, ut primum omnium, movens omnia.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 102ra): “Insuper praeter haec est id quod est omnium primum: omnia movens.”; Bessarion (102rb): “praeter haec item cuncta movens: tanquam omnium primum.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 88): “His accedit id quod est primum omnium, movensque omnia.”
- ¹¹⁰ Moerbeke (n. 1051): “aut intellectus et appetitus et corpus”; Argyropoulos (fol. 102vb): “aut mens aut appetitus ac corpus”; Bessarion (102va): “aut intellectus, appetitus et corpus”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 90b): “aut mens, et appetitus ac corpus”.
- ¹¹¹ Moerbeke (n. 1055): “Motus autem non est continuus, nisi qui secundum locum. Et huius qui circulo.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 103ra): “motus autem non est continuus ullus: nisi isce qui loco accommodatur, et huius isce qui est conversio.”; Bessarion (103rb): “motus vero non est continuus: praeter hunc qui secundum locum, et hunc qui circularis est.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 94b): “Motus vero non est continuus praeter localem, eumque circularem.”
- ¹¹² Here I am following the reading of Rábade instead of the Vivès’ “immortales.”
- ¹¹³ Moerbeke (n. 1073): “Si igitur sic bene habet, ut nos quandoque, Deus semper, mirabile. Si autem magis, adhuc mirabilius, habet autem sic.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 104vb): “Si igitur deus sic bene sese habet ut aliquando nos bene habemus: admirabile quid est ipse, quod si magis et bene se habet: magis admirabile est profecto. at sic se habet.”; Bessarion (104va): “Si igitur ita bene se habet deus semper, ut nos aliquando: admirabile est, quod si magis: adhuc admirabilius est. at ita se habet.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 102): “Si hoc igitur modo bene se habet, ut nos habemus aliquando; mirabile quid semper est Deus, eoque mirabilius, si melius. Atqui ita se habet.”
- ¹¹⁴ Moerbeke (n. 1084): “...rationabile existimare. Necessarium igitur dimittatur fortioribus dicere.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 106ra): “...existimare consentaneum est rationi, necessarium enim iis omittatur, atque ii dicant: quod exactius de hisce disserere possunt.”; Bessarion (106rb): “...rationabiliter arbitrandum est esse, quod enim necessarium est: relinquatur potentioribus dicendum.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 110): “ut rationi consentaneum...existimare. Necessaria enim probatio iis relinquatur qui in tractandis his de rebus plus valent.”
- ¹¹⁵ Moerbeke (n. 1090): “...ut si dormiens quid utique erit insigne?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 107ra): “...ut is qui dormit: quidnam ipsius excellens, quid egregium erit?”; Bessarion (107rb): “...ita se habeat ut dormiens: quidnam praeexcellens erit?”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 118b): “sed more dormientis affecta est, quid quaeso excellens et eximium erit?”
- ¹¹⁶ Moerbeke (n. 1093): “Palam ergo quod divinissimum et honorabilissimum intelligit.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 107ra): “Patet ipsum igitur: id quod divinissimum est omniumque

- praestantissimum intelligere.”; Bessarion (107rb): “Manifestum itaque est: quod illud intelligit quod divinissimum honorabilissimumque est.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 119b): “Ac constat quidem id quod divinissimum praestantissimumque sit intelligere,…”.
- ¹¹⁷ Moerbeke (n. 1095): “Seipsum ergo intelligit,…”; Argyropoulos (fol. 107ra): “Seipsam ergo intelligit,…”; Bessarion (107rb): “Seipsam ergo intelligit:…”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 119b): “Seipsam igitur intelligit,…”.
- ¹¹⁸ Moerbeke (n. 1115): “Et duo principia facientibus, aliquid necesse primum esse principalius. Et his qui species, quia aliud principalius. Propter quid enim participavit aut participat?”; Argyropoulos (fol. 108ra): “Atqui tam ii qui principia duo faciunt quam ii qui formas afferunt: aliud principium magis praecipuum ponant necesse est. quoniam pacto res aut fuerunt aut sunt illorum participes.”; Bessarion (108rb): “At tum illis, qui duo principia faciunt: aliud principalius principium necesse est esse, tum illis: qui species, quia aliud principalius principium est: cur enim participavit aut participat?”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 126b): “Atque apud eos qui duo principia faciunt, et eos qui ideas ponunt, aliud praestantius principium sit necesse est: cur enim caetera iis participarunt, aut participant?”
- ¹¹⁹ Moerbeke (n. 1122): “...nec bonum pluralitas principatuum.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 108vb): “multos principes esse bonum non est.”; Bessarion (108va): “non est bonum pluralitas principatuum.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, 127b): “multorum autem esse principatus bonum non est,…”.
- ¹²⁰ Moerbeke (n. 1122): “Entia vero nolunt disponi male... Unus ergo princeps.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 108vb): “at ea quae sunt: male gubernari nolunt... Unus ergo sit princeps.”; Bessarion (108va): “at entia: nolunt male gubernari... unus ergo princeps.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 127): “At ea quae sunt, male administrari nolunt;... unus ergo sit princeps.”
- ¹²¹ Moerbeke (n. 1112): “Sed gratia alicuius movet. Quare alterum. Excepto ut nos dicimus.”; Argyropoulos (fol. 108ra): “at alicuius gratia movet. Quare aliud quippiam erit: verum ut nos ipsi dicimus.”; Bessarion (108rb): “verum alicuius gratia movet. Quare alterum: nisi sit ut nos dicimus.”; Fonseca (tom. 4, p. 126b): “sed tamen alicujus gratia movet. Quare aliquid aliud erit; verum ut nos dicimus:…”.

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Sect. III. An in eductione substantialis formae oporteat materiam tempore antecedere.

Sect. IV. An forma, dum ex materia educitur, per se fiat.

Sect. V. Quae sit propria ratio formae substantialis, primae; propriaque causalitas ejus in suo genere.

Sect. VI. Quae sit ratio causandi formae.

Sect. VII. Quis sit effectus causae formalis.

Sect. VIII. Utrum forma substantialis sit vera causa materiae, et materia effectus ejus.

Sect. IX. Utrum tanta sit dependentia materiae a forma, ut sine illa nec per divinam potentiam conservari possit, et e converso.

Sect. X. Utrum unius substantiae una tantum detur causa formalis.

Sect. XI. Quid sit forma metaphysica, et quae materia illi respondeat, quamque causalitatem habeat.

DISPUTATIO XVI
DE FORMALI CAUSA ACCIDENTALI

Sect. I. Utrum omnia accidentia veram exercent causalitatem formalem, et circa quem effectum.

Sect. II. Utrum omnis forma accidentalis educatur de potentia subjecti.

DISPUTATIO XVII
DE CAUSA EFFICIENTE IN COMMUNI

Sect. I. Quid causa efficiens sit.

Sect. II. Quotuplex sit causa efficiens.

DISPUTATIO XVIII
DE CAUSA PROXIMA EFFICIENTE, EJUSQUE CAUSALITATE, ET
OMNIBUS QUAE AD CAUSANDUM REQUIRIT

Sect. I. Utrum res creatae aliquid vere efficiant.

Sect. II. Quodnam sit principium, quo una substantia creata efficit aliam.

Sect. III. Quodnam sit principium, quo substantiae creatae efficiunt accidentia.

Sect. IV. Quae accidentia possint esse principia agendi.

Sect. V. Utrum sola accidentia sine concursu formarum substantialium efficiant alia accidentia.

Sect. VI. Utrum accidens sit instrumentum tantum in productione alterius accidentis.

Sect. VII. Utrum causa efficiens esse debeat in re distincta a recipiente, ut agere possit.

Sect. VIII. Utrum causa efficiens debeat esse simul conjuncta, vel propinqua passo, ut agere possit.

Sect. IX. Utrum causa efficiens ad agendum requirat passum sibi dissimile, et in qua proportione.

Sect. X. Utrum actio sit propria ratio causandi efficientis causae seu causalitatis ejus.

Sect. XI. Utrum causa efficiens aliquid efficiendo corrumpat aut destruat, et quomodo.

DISPUTATIO XIX
DE CAUSIS NECESSARIO, ET LIBERE SEU CONTINGENTER
AGENTIBUS, UBI ETIAM DE FATO, FORTUNA ET CASU

Sect. I. Utrum in causis efficientibus creatis sint aliquae necessario agentes, et qualis sit illa necessitas.

Sect. II. Utrum inter efficientes causas sint aliquae absque necessitate et cum libertate operantes.

Sect. III. Utrum in causis efficientibus possit esse aliqua libere agens, si prima causa ex necessitate operatur, et in universum. An libertas actionis requi- /col. b/ rat libertatem in omnibus causis in illam influentibus, vel an una sufficiat.

Sect. IV. Quomodo stet libertas vel contingentia in actione causae secundae, non obstante concursu primae; et consequenter, quo sensu verum sit causam liberam esse, quae positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere, et non agere.

Sect. V. Quanam sit facultas, in qua formalis residet libertas causae creatae.

Sect. VI. Quomodo causa libera determinetur a iudicio rationis.

Sect. VII. Quae sit radix et origo defectus causae liberae.

Sect. VIII. Ad quos actus sit indifferentia in causa libera.

Sect. IX. An libertas causae sit dum actu operatur.

Sect. X. An ex libertate causarum efficientium oriatur contingentia in effectibus universi, vel sine illa esse possit.

Sect. XI. Utrum aliqua vera ratione possit fatum inter causas efficientes universi numerari.

Sect. XII. Utrum casus et fortuna inter causas efficientes numerari debeant.

DISPUTATIO XX
DE PRIMA CAUSA EFFICIENTE, PRIMAQUE EJUS
ACTIONE QUAE EST CREATIO

Sect. I. An possit ratione naturali cognosci creationem aliquorum entium esse possibilem, an etiam necessariam ; vel (quod idem est), an unum ens in quantum ens possit essentialiter dependere effective ab alio ente.

Sect. II. Utrum ad creandum requiratur infinita vis agendi; et ideo ita sit Dei propria, ut creaturae communicari non possit.

Sect. III. An possit dari instrumentum creationis.

Sect. IV. An creatio sit aliquid in creatura distinctum ex natura rei ab ipsa.

Sect. V. Utrum de ratione creationis sit novitas essendi.

DISPUTATIO XXI

DE PRIMA CAUSA EFFICIENTE, ET ALTERA EJUS ACTIONE, QUAE EST CONSERVATIO

Sect. I. An possit ratione naturali demonstrari entia creata in suo esse semper dependere ab actuali influxu primae causae.

Sect. II. Quanam actio sit conservatio, et quomodo a creatione differat.

Sect. III. Utrum res omnes a solo Deo pendeant in conservari.

DISPUTATIO XXII

DE PRIMA CAUSA, ET ALIA EJUS ACTIONE, QUAE EST COOPERATIO, SEU CONCURSUS CUM CAUSIS SECUNDIS

Sect. I. An possit sufficienter probari ratione naturali Deum per se ac immediate operari in actionibus omnium creaturarum.

Sect. II. Utrum concursus causae primae cum secunda sit aliquid per modum principii, vel actionis.

Sect. III. Quomodo comparetur concursus Dei ad actionem causae secundae et ad subjectum ejus.

Sect. IV. Quomodo Deus praebet concursum suum causis secundis.

Sect. V. Utrum causae secundae pendeant essentia—/p. LXX/ liter in operari a sola causa prima, aut etiam ab aliis.

DISPUTATIO XXIII

DE CAUSA FINALI IN COMMUNI

Sect. I. An finis sit vera causa realis.

Sect. II. Quotuplex sit finis.

Sect. III. Quos effectus habeat causa finalis.

Sect. IV. Quid sit, vel in quo consistat ratio causandi, seu causalitas causae finalis.

Sect. V. Quanam sit in fine proxima ratio finaliter causandi.

Sect. VI. Quae res possit causalitatem finalem exercere.

Sect. VII. An esse cognitum sit fini conditio necessaria ut possit finaliter causare.

Sect. VIII. Utrum finis moveat secundum esse reale vel secundum esse cognitum.

Sect. IX. Utrum causalitas finis locum habeat in divinis actionibus et effectibus.

Sect. X. Utrum in actionibus naturalium et irrationalium agentium vera causalitas finalis intercedat.

DISPUTATIO XXIV DE ULTIMA FINALI CAUSA, SEU ULTIMO FINE

Sect. I. An possit sufficienter probari ratione naturali dari aliquem ultimum finem, et non dari processum in infinitum in causis finalibus.

Sect. II. Utrum finis ultimus per se ac proprie concurrat cum omnibus finibus proximis ad finaliter causandum, et consequenter, an omnia agentia in omnibus actionibus suis finem ultimum intendat.

DISPUTATIO XXV DE CAUSA EXEMPLARI

Sect. I. An sit, quid sit, et ubi sit exemplar.

Sect. II. Utrum exemplar propriam rationem causae constituat, vel ad aliquam aliarum revocetur.

DISPUTATIO XXVI DE COMPARATIONE CAUSARUM AD EFFECTA

Sect. I. Utrum omnis causa sit effectu suo nobilior.

Sect. II. Utrum omnis causa sit prior suo effectu.

Sect. III. Utrum ejusdem effectus esse possint, aut debeant plures causae.

Sect. IV. An possit idem effectus esse simul a pluribus causis totalibus ejusdem generis et speciei.

Sect. V. Utrum divisim possit idem effectus naturaliter esse a pluribus causis totalibus.

Sect. VI. Utrum eadem possit esse causa plurium effectuum, praesertim contrariorum.

DISPUTATIO XXVII
DE COMPARATIONE CAUSARUM INTER SE

- Sect. I. Quenam ex quatuor causis perfectior sit.
Sect. II. Utrum causae possint esse sibi invicem causae.

IN POSTERIORI TOMO

DISPUTATIO XXVIII
DE DIVISIONE ENTIS IN INFINITUM ET FINITUM

- Sect. I. An recte dividatur ens in infinitum et finitum.
Sect. II. An dicta partitio sit sufficiens et adaequata. /col. b/
Sect. III. An sit analogia, ita ut ens non univoce sed analogice dicatur de Deo et creaturis.

DISPUTATIO XXIX
DE PRIMO ET INCREATO ENTE, AN SIT

- Sect. I. An evidenter demonstretur dari aliquod ens a se, et increatum.
Sect. II. An demonstretur a posteriori Deum esse hoc unicum ens a se.
Sect. III. An hoc idem aliquo modo a priori demonstretur.

DISPUTATIO XXX
DE PRIMO ENTE SEU DEO, QUID SIT

- Sect. I. An demonstretur esse Deum quoddam ens eximie perfectum.
Sect. II. An demonstrari possit Deum esse infinitum.
Sect. III. An demonstrari possit esse purum actum simplicissimum.
Sect. IV. Quomodo excludatur a Deo omnis substantialis compositio.
Sect. V. Quomodo excludatur a Deo omnis accidentalis compositio.
Sect. VI. Quomodo attributa Dei ad ejus essentiam comparentur.
Sect. VII. An Deum esse immensum ratione naturali ostendi possit.
Sect. VIII. An Deum esse immutabilem ratione naturali demonstretur.
Sect. IX. Quomodo immutabilitas cum libertate divina possit consistere.
Sect. X. Unitas Dei quomodo demonstretur.

Sect. XI. An Deus sit indivisibilis, quidque possit ratione naturali circa hoc investigari.

Sect. XII. An demonstretur, Deum non posse comprehendi, nec quidditative cognosci.

Sect. XIII. Possitne demonstrari Deum esse ineffabilem.

Sect. XIV. An demonstretur, Deum esse per essentiam vivens vita intellectuali, ac felicissima.

Sect. XV. Quid possit ratione naturali de divina scientia cognosci.

Sect. XVI. Quid de divina voluntate ejusque virtutibus.

Sect. XVII. Quid de divina omnipotentia ejusque actione.

DISPUTATIO XXXI DE ESSENTIA ENTIS FINITI UT TALE EST, ET ILLIUS ESSE, EORUMQUE DISTINCTIONE

Sect. I. An esse et essentia creaturae distinguantur inter se.

Sect. II. Quid sit essentia creaturae priusquam a Deo producat.

Sect. III. Quomodo et in quo differant in creaturis ens in potentia et in actu, seu essentia in potentia et in actu.

Sect. IV. An essentia creaturae constituatur in actualitate essentiae per aliquod esse reale indistinctum ab ipsa, quod nomen habeat et rationem existentiae.

Sect. V. Utrum praeter esse reale actualis essentiae sit aliud esse necessarium, quo res formaliter et actualiter existat.

Sect. VI. Quae distinctio possit inter essentiam, et existentiam creatam intervenire, aut intelligi.

Sect. VII. Quidnam existentia creaturae sit. /p. LXXI/

Sect. VIII. Quas causas praesertim intrinsecas habeat creata existentia.

Sect. IX. Quae sit proxima efficiens causa existentiae creatae.

Sect. X. Quos effectus habeat existentia, et in quo differat in hoc ab essentia.

Sect. XI. Quarum rerum sit existentia, et an simplex, vel composita sit.

Sect. XII. Utrum essentia creata sit separabilis a sua existentia.

Sect. XIII. Qualis sit compositio ex esse et essentia, qualisve compositio sit de ratione entis creati.

Sect. XIV. An de ratione entis creati sit actualis dependentia, et subordinatio ad primum et increatum ens.

DISPUTATIO XXXII**DE DIVISIONE ENTIS CREATI IN SUBSTANTIAM ET ACCIDENS**

Sect. I. Utrum ens proxime et sufficienter dividatur in substantiam et accidens.

Sect. II. Utrum ens analogice dividatur in substantiam et accidens.

DISPUTATIO XXXIII**DE SUBSTANTIA CREATA IN COMMUNI**

Sect. I. Quidnam substantia significet et quomodo in incompletam et completam dividatur.

Sect. II. Utrum recte dividatur substantia in primam et secundam.

DISPUTATIO XXXIV**DE PRIMA SUBSTANTIA SEU SUPPOSITO,
EJUSQUE DISTINCTIONE A NATURA**

Sect. I. Utrum prima substantia sit idem quod suppositum, aut persona, vel hypostasis.

Sect. II. An in creaturis suppositum addat naturae aliquid positivum reale, et ex natura rei distinctum ab illa.

Sect. III. An distinctio suppositi a natura fiat per accidentia vel principia individuantia, et ideo locum non habeat in substantiis spiritualibus.

Sect. IV. Quid sit subsistentia creata, et quomodo ad naturam et suppositum comparetur.

Sect. V. Utrum omnis subsistentia creata indivisibilis sit, et omnino incommunicabilis.

Sect. VI. Quam causam efficientem vel materialem habeat subsistentia.

Sect. VII. Utrum subsistentia habeat aliquam causalitatem, et quomodo actiones dicantur esse suppositorum.

Sect. VIII. Utrum in secundis substantiis concreta ab abstractis distinguantur, et quomodo in eis suprema ratio substantiae, et coordinatio praedicamentalis constituenda sit.

DISPUTATIO XXXV
DE IMMATERIALI SUBSTANTIA CREATA

Sect. I. Utrum possit ratione naturali probari esse in universo aliquas substantias spirituales extra Deum.

Sect. II. Quid possit ratione naturali cognosci de quidditate et essentia intelligentiarum creaturarum. /col.b/

Sect. III. Quae attributa cognosci possit de essentia intelligentiarum creaturarum.

Sect. IV. Quid possit ratione naturali de intellectu et scientia intelligentiarum cognosci.

Sect. V. Quid possit de voluntate intelligentiarum ratione naturali cognosci.

DISPUTATIO XXXVI
DE SUBSTANTIA MATERIALI IN COMMUNI

Sect. I. Quid sit essentialis ratio substantiae materialis, et an eadem omnino sit cum ratione substantiae corporeae.

Sect. II. Utrum essentia substantiae materialis consistat in sola forma substantiali, vel etiam in materia.

Sect. III. Utrum substantia materialis sit aliquid distinctum a materia et forma simul sumptis, et unione earum.

DISPUTATIO XXXVII
DE COMMUNI RATIONE, ET CONCEPTU ACCIDENTIS

Sect. I. Utrum accidens in communi dicat unum conceptum seu rationem objectivam.

Sect. II. Utrum communis ratio accidentis in inhaerentia consistat.

DISPUTATIO XXXVIII
DE COMPARATIONE ACCIDENTIS AD SUBSTANTIAM

Sect. I. An substantia sit prior tempore accidente.

Sect. II. Utrum substantia sit prior cognitione accidente.

DISPUTATIO XXXIX**DE DIVISIONE ACCIDENTIS IN NOVEM SUMMA GENERA**

Sect. I. Utrum accidens in communi immediate dividatur in quantitatem, qualitatem, et alia summa genera accidentium.

Sect. II. Utrum divisio accidentis in novem genera sit sufficiens.

Sect. III. Utrum praedicta divisio sit univoca, vel analogica.

DISPUTATIO XL**DE QUANTITATE CONTINUA**

Sect. I. Quid sit quantitas, praesertim continua.

Sect. II. Utrum quantitas molis sit res distincta a substantia materiali et qualitibus ejus.

Sect. III. An essentia quantitatis consistat in ratione mensurae.

Sect. IV. Utrum ratio et effectus formalis quantitatis continuae sit divisibilitas, vel distinctio, aut extensio partium substantiae.

Sect. V. Utrum in quantitate continua sint puncta, lineae et superficies, quae sint verae res inter se, et a corpore quanto realiter distinctae.

Sect. VI. An lineae et superficies sint propriae species quantitatis continuae, inter se et a corpore distinctae.

Sect. VII. Utrum locus sit vera species quantitatis continuae ab aliis distincta.

Sect. VIII. Utrum motus aut extensio ejus propriam speciem quantitatis continuae constituat.

Sect. IX. Utrum tempus sit per se quantitas, peculiarem speciem a reliquis distinctam constituens. /p. LXXII/

DISPUTATIO XLI**DE QUANTITATE DISCRETA, ET COORDINATIONE
PRAEDECAMENTI QUANTITATIS ET PROPRIETATIBUS EJUS**

Sect. I. Utrum quantitas discreta sit propria species quantitatis.

Sect. II. Utrum quantitas discreta in rebus spiritualibus inveniatur.

Sect. III. Utrum oratio sit vera species quantitatis.

Sect. IV. Qualis sit coordinatio generum et specierum quantitatis.

DISPUTATIO XLII

DE QUALITATE ET SPECIEBUS EJUS IN COMMUNI

- Sect. I. Quae sit communis ratio, seu essentialis modus qualitatis.
Sect. II. Utrum qualitas in quatuor species convenienter et sufficienter divisa sit.
Sect. III. An quatuor qualitatis species sint inter se omnino distinctae.
Sect. IV. Utrum divisio qualitatis in quatuor species sufficiens sit.
Sect. V. An duplicatae voces, quibus dictae species proponuntur, significant essentiales vel accidentales differentias earum.
Sect. VI. Quae proprietates qualitati conveniant.

DISPUTATIO XLIII

DE POTENTIA

- Sect. I. Utrum potentia sufficienter dividatur in activam et passivam, et quid utraque sit.
Sect. II. An potentia activa et passiva semper re, vel interdum tantum ratione differant.
Sect. III. Quodnam sit divisum illius partitionis, quaeve definitio illius.
Sect. IV. Utrum omnis potentia sit naturalis, et naturaliter indita.
Sect. V. Utrum unicuique potentiae proprius actus respondeat, et quomodo.
Sect. VI. Utrum actus sit prior potentia duratione, perfectione, definitione et cognitione.

DISPUTATIO XLIV

DE HABITIBUS

- Sect. I. An sit, et quid sit, et in quo subjecto sit habitus.
Sect. II. An in potentia secundum locum motiva acquiratur.
Sect. III. An in brutis sint habitus.
Sect. IV. An in intellectu sint proprii habitus.
Sect. V. Utrum habitus sint propter actus efficiendos.
Sect. VI. Quid efficiat habitus in actu.
Sect. VII. Quos actus efficiat habitus.
Sect. VIII. Utrum actus sit causa per se efficiens habitum.
Sect. IX. An habitus uno, vel pluribus actibus generetur.

Sect. X. Utrum habitus per actus augeatur, et quomodo.

Sect. XI. Quale sit augmentum extensivum habitus, ubi etiam de unitate habitus.

Sect. XII. Quomodo habitus minuatur, vel amittatur.

Sect. XIII. Quotuplex sit habitus, et praesertim de speculativo et practico.
/col. b/

DISPUTATIO XLV DE QUALITATUM CONTRARIETATE

Sect. I. Quid sit oppositio et quotuplex.

Sect. II. Quanam sit propria contrariorum definitio, eorumque ab aliis oppositis discrimen.

Sect. III. Utrum propria contrarietas inter qualitates, vel omnes, vel solas inveniatur.

Sect. IV. An contraria possint simul esse in eodem subjecto, et quo modo possit aliquid ex contrariis componi.

DISPUTATIO XLVI DE INTENSIONE QUALITATUM

Sect. I. An sit latitudo intensiva in qualitatibus, et quid illa sit.

Sect. II. Cur haec latitudo in solis qualitatibus, non vero in omnibus inveniatur.

Sect. III. An haec latitudo acquiratur mutatione, seu successione continua.

Sect. IV. An in hac latitudine detur maximus et minimus terminus. Ubi alia etiam breviora dubia expenduntur.

DISPUTATIO XLVII DE RELATIONIBUS REALIBUS CREATIS

Sect. I. An relatio sit verum genus entis realis ab aliis diversum.

Sect. II. An relatio praedicamentalis distinguatur actu, et in re ab omnibus entibus absolutis.

Sect. III. Quotuplex sit relatio, et quae sit vere praedicamentalis.

Sect. IV. Quo differat respectus praedicamentalis a transcendentali.

Sect. V. Quae sit definitio essentialis relationis praedicamentalis.

Sect. VI. De subjecto praedicamentalis relationis.

Sect. VII. De fundamento praedicamentalis relationis, et de ratione fundandi.

Sect. VIII. De termino praedicamentalis relationis.

Sect. IX. Quae distinctio necessaria sit inter fundamentum et terminum.

Sect. X. An tria relativorum genera ex triplici fundamento recte fuerint ab Aristotele divisa.

Sect. XI. De primo genere relationum in numero vel unitate fundato.

Sect. XII. De secundo genere relationum in potentia vel actione fundato.

Sect. XIII. De tertio genere relationum in ratione mensurae fundato.

Sect. XIV. Sitne sufficiens dicta divisio, omnesque relationes comprehendat.

Sect. XV. An omnes et solae relationes tertii generis sint non mutuae. Ubi de relationibus Dei ad creaturas.

Sect. XVI. Utrum formalis terminus relationis sit altera relatio, vel aliqua ratio absoluta. Ubi etiam varia dubia incidenter expediuntur.

Sect. XVII. Quomodo praedicamentum ad aliquid sub uno supremo genere ordinari possit. Ubi etiam de individua distinctione relationum.

Sect. XVIII. Quas proprietates habeat relatio.

DISPUTATIO XLVIII

DE ACTIONE

Sect. I. Utrum actio essentialiter dicat respectum ad /p. LXXIII/ principium agendi. Ubi etiam de relationibus extrinsecus et intrinsecus advenientes.

Sect. II. Utrum actio, ut sic, essentialiter respiciat terminum, etiamsi immanens sit, ideoque etiam illa in hoc praedicamento collocetur.

Sect. III. Quis ex dictis respectibus sit magis essentialis actioni, ita ut inde sumat speciem.

Sect. IV. Utrum actio ut sic dicat respectum ad subjectum inhaesionis, et quodnam illud sit.

Sect. V. Quae sit actionis essentia, quae causae, quaeve proprietates.

Sect. VI. Quot sint species et genera actionum usque supremum genus.

DISPUTATIO XLIX

DE PASSIONE

Sect. I. Utrum passio in re ipsa distinguatur ab actione.

Sect. II. Quomodo passio ad motum vel mutationem comparetur, et quid tandem passio sit.

Sect. III. Utrum de ratione passionis sit actualis inhaesio, vel aptitudinalis tantum.

Sect. IV. Utrum passio successiva et momentanea hujus generis sint, et quomodo sub illo differant.

DISPUTATIO L

DE QUANDO, ET IN UNIVERSUM DE DURATIONIBUS

Sect. I. Utrum duratio sit aliquid distinctum in re ab esse rei durantis.

Sect. II. Quae sit formalis ratio durationis, per quam ratione distinguitur ab existentia.

Sect. III. Quid sit aeternitas, et quomodo a creata duratione distinguetur.

Sect. IV. Includatne aeternitas in sua formali ratione aliquem respectum rationis.

Sect. V. Quid sit aevum, et quomodo a successivis durationibus differat.

Sect. VI. An aevum essentialiter etiam differat ab aliis durationibus permanentibus creatis.

Sect. VII. Habeantne res corruptibiles permanentes propriam durationem, et qualis illa sit.

Sect. VIII. An res successivae propriam habeant durationem, quae tempus vocatur.

Sect. IX. An tempus in re distinguatur a motu.

Sect. X. Utrum esse mensuram durationis alicui tempori conveniat.

Sect. XI. Quae res hoc tempore mensurentur.

Sect. XII. Quae duratio ad praedicamentum quando pertineat, et quomodo illud constituat.

DISPUTATIO LI

DE UBI

Sect. I. Quid sit Ubi in corporibus, et an sit aliquid intrinsecum.

Sect. II. An Ubi sit locus corporis, ita ut per illud solum vere dici possit esse in loco.

Sect. III. Utrum etiam in substantiis spiritualibus sit verum et intrinsecum Ubi.

Sect. IV. In quibus differant, vel proportionem servent inter se Ubi spiritus et corporis.

Sect. V. Utrum Ubi solis substantiis conveniat, vel etiam accidentibus.

Sect. VI. Quomodo distinguendum et ordinandum sit praedicamentum Ubi, quaeve proprietates illi tribuantur.

DISPUTATIO LII DE SITU

Sect. I. Quidnam sit situs, et quomodo ab ubi differat.

Sect. II. Quomodo species, genera, et aliquae proprietates, possint situi attribui.

DISPUTATIO LIII DE HABITU

Sect. I. Quidnam habitus sit, et quomodo a substantia et qualitate differat.

Sect. II. Quomodo species, genera et aliquae proprietates habitui tribui possint.

DISPUTATIO LIV DE ENTE RATIONIS

Sect. I. An vere aliqua rationis entia esse dicantur, et quomodo sub ente sint, quaeve esse habeant.

Sect. II. An ens rationis habeat aliquas causas, et quanam illa sint.

Sect. III. An recte dividatur ens rationis in negationem, privationem et relationem.

Sect. IV. An sufficienter dividatur ens rationis in dicta tria membra, ubi tota varietas entium rationis, quae occurrere potest, explicatur.

Sect. V. Quid commune sit, quidve proprium negationi et privationi.

Sect. VI. Quot sint modi relationum rationis, et quid omnibus commune sit, quid vero proprium.

Persons Mentioned In The *Index* *Locupletissimus*

ALBERT THE GREAT, ST., O.P. (ca. 1200–1280)—Dominican theologian, Bishop of Regensburg, and teacher of St. Thomas Aquinas. Commentator on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS (fl. ca. 200)—Commentator on the works of Aristotle, including Books I to V of the *Metaphysics*.

ALEXANDER OF HALES, O.F.M. (ca. 1186–1245)—Theologian at the University of Paris, where he was the first Franciscan “magister regens” (i.e. “ruling master”—the medieval equivalent of a modern endowed professor).

ANTONIO ANDREAS, O.F.M. (d. ca. 1320)—A disciple of Duns Scotus whose own writings were mingled with those of his master. Among other works, Antonio authored “Questions on the 12 Books of the *Metaphysics*” and was the probable author of the “Exposition of the 12 Books of the *Metaphysics*” which was attributed to Duns Scotus in the 1639 Wadding edition of Scotus’s *Opera omnia*.

AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS, O.P. (1225–1274)—Dominican and foremost philosopher–theologian of the Middle Ages. Principal medieval commentator on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.

ARGYROPOULOS, JOHN (ca. 1415–1487)—A translator of Aristotle from Greek to Latin.

ARISTOTLE (384–322 BC)—Greek philosopher, disciple of Plato, called “The Philosopher” (*Philosophus*) by the Latins

AVERROES (aka Ibn Rushd [1126–1198])—Arabic philosopher, commented on Aristotle’s works for which he was called by the Latins as “the Commentator” (*Commentator*).

AVICENNA (aka Ibn Sina [980–1037])—Arabic philosopher, renowned for learning and medical skill; author of numerous scientific, religious, and

philosophical works, including an original presentation of Aristotelian metaphysics.

BESSARION, CARDINAL JOANNES (ca. 1403–1472)—Byzantine theologian, Archbishop of Nicaea, titular Patriarch of Constantinople, co-founder (with Gemistus Plethos) of the Platonic Academy in Florence, translated Aristotle's *Metaphysics* into Latin.

BOETHIUS, ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS (ca. 480–524/5)—Christian Latin philosopher and theologian, translated and commented on logical writings of Aristotle, author of “On the Consolation of Philosophy” (*De consolatione philosophiae*).

CAJETAN (aka Thomas de Vio, O.P. [1469–1534])—Cardinal, theologian, Master General of the Dominicans, and principal commentator on the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas Aquinas

CAPREOLUS, JOANNES, O.P. (1380–1444)—Thomistic commentator, known as the “Prince of Thomists” (*Princeps thomistarum*).

DAMASCENE, ST. JOHN (d. 780)—Christian archbishop of Damascus, theologian, author of “On the Orthodox Faith” (*De fide orthodoxa*).

FERRARA, [FRANCIS SYLVESTER OF] FERRARA, O.P. (1474–1528)—Theologian, Master General of the Dominicans, and principal commentator on the *Summa contra Gentiles* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

FONSECA, PEDRO DA, S.J. (1548–1599)—Jesuit philosopher, edited and translated the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. He was himself known as “the Portuguese Aristotle.”

GILES OF ROME (aka Aegidius Romanus, O.S.A. [ca. 1244/7–1316])—Medieval philosopher and theologian, a pupil of St. Thomas Aquinas, and later Archbishop of Bourges. Commented on Aristotle at the University of Paris before 1300.

JAVELLI, CHRYSOSTOM, O.P. (d. ca. 1538)—Dominican philosopher and theologian.

JOHN OF JANDUN (ca. 1286–1328)—French philosopher, author of influential commentaries on Aristotle, defended Averroism.

MICHAEL EPHESIUS (11th–12th cent.)—Byzantine bishop of Ephesus. Books VI to XIV of the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, in Suárez's time attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, are now attributed to Michael.

NIFO, AGOSTINO (ca. 1470–1538)—Italian professor of Philosophy. Taught at Padua, Naples, and Pisa. Commented on Averroes and Aristotle, especially the *Metaphysics*.

PLATO (428–348 BC)—Greek philosopher, disciple of Socrates, and teacher of Aristotle.

PORPHYRY (ca. 233–305)—Neoplatonic philosopher. Especially important for the Middle Ages as the author of an Introduction (*Isagoge*) to the *Categories* of Aristotle.

PSEUDO-ALEXANDER OF HALES (Alessandro Bonini, O.F.M. [ca. 1270–1314])—Author of a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which was published at Venice in 1572 erroneously under the name of Alexander of Hales.

SCOTUS, JOHN DUNS (1266–1308)—“The Subtle Doctor,” Franciscan philosopher and theologian.

SONCINAS, PAUL, O.P. (d. 1494)—Dominican philosopher, author of a much cited “Metaphysical Questions” (*Quaestiones metaphysicales*).

THEMISTIUS (ca.: 317–388 A.D.)—Greek philosopher and commentator on Aristotle, especially on the *De Anima* (“On the Soul”).

WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE, O.P. (ca: 1215–1286)—A very influential translator of Greek philosophical texts, including the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. William's translation was most probably used by his fellow Dominican, St. Thomas Aquinas. While William is not mentioned by name in the “Most Ample Index,” he is the “old translator” to whom Suárez does refer.

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